Autor: Reagrupamento Revolucionário
Militant Longshoreman No. 22
Militant Longshoreman
No. 22, July 25, 1987
HERMAN/RUBIO HAND PMA WEAPONS TO WEAKEN ILWU LONGSHORE DIVISION
After much rhetoric about “no concessionary bargaining” Herman and Rubio engineered two provisions in the proposed longshore contract that will disastrously weaken and divide the union. One of these “sleepers” is hidden in the supplemental memorandum of understanding-safety and the other is contained in the wages section.
PMA is accomplishing two goals dear to their heart in section B of the proposed Safety Rules. Section B(1) gives PMA the right to suspend and then move rapidly toward de-registering any longshoremen found guilty of not following “reasonable verbal instructions.` This provision has nothing to do with safety; it’s simply a way that superintendants can demand immediate absolute obedience, strike fear in every longshoreman, and easily get rid of anyone who doesn’t show the right ass-kissing attitude. During the unions bitter struggles of the 30s’ longshoremen achieved a high degree of union to protect workers from employment victimization. The hiring hall, which equalized job opportunity protected a man’s income and job action protected him from abuse, discrimination, and speed-up. In 1960 Bridges’ one year “Performance and Conformance” contract undermined the job action weapon. Then the 1966 9.43 steady equipment operators provision of the contract placed a large chunk of longshoremen in a much more vulnerable position.
Even so, the union has been able to pretty well protect longshoremen up to now. B(1) is an historic surrender to the employer. Any longshoreman who is not fast enough in jumping to obey a superintendant who orders men to work in violation of the contract will rapidly be programmed toward deregistration. B(2) will enable any superintendant whose speedup, incompetence, or faulty equipment results in an injury or damage to cargo to place the blame on a longshoreman for “intentionally” or “knowingly” causing the accident. The PMA companies have been trying to shift the blame for their high accident rate and insurance costs upon the individual longshoremen. For some time now in San Francisco any longshoreman involved in an accident has been fired and cited. Now PMA will have the power to get rid of the man.
PMA’s hypocrisy about accidents is shown by their consistent resistance to longshoremen trying to use the Health & Safety provisions of the contract; hard-timing and firing men who stop work on safety beefs. In the past when longshoremen had job control they were able to collectively maintain safer working conditions. In recent years this undermining of union power has been a large contributing factor in the high accident rate.
There are no contract penalties for incompetent, drunk, or speed-up happy superintendants whose orders cause accidents and injuries. The whole burden is hypocritically shifted upon our shoulders. For over 50 years the employers have nutured a sick hatred and jealously of the pride and independence of longshoremen; now they will be able to “get even.”
6 TIER WAGE SCALE WILL UNDERMINE LONGSHORE UNITY
Unions have resisted 2 tier wage rates because they are highly divisive and unfair. If this contract passes, within a few years union members (A men) will be working side by side doing the same work for different wage scales. The Class B system with less work opportunity led to resentment and divisiveness. Long after men got Class A registration the divisions often persisted. Now we’ll have 6 separate and distinct wage rates for the same work.How’s that for undermining brotherhood and unity in the face of employers?
HERMAN AND RUBIO. RUNNING SCARED
The editor of this newsletter was surprised at the extent of the give-aways in this contract. The increase in export shipping (resulting from the decline in the U.S. dollar) less PGP costs, and a decline in the work force made it unlikely that PMA would seek confrontation leading to a strike even-in the face of the minimal gains proposed by the International officers. So what happened? Herman and Rubio were running so scared that they sent all kinds of signals to the PMA that the door was open to a union weakening contract. The International sent orders down to the locals during negotiations to stop all job actions and minimize beefs. Instead of setting July 1st as a no-contract no‑work target date they announced ahead of time that they would order work past the July 1st contract termination ~ date.
Probably the most glaring indication of weakness was the criminal way in which the IBU strike against Crowley was sabotaged. Any picketing or actions against Crowley which even slightly inconvenienced the PMA companies were stopped. Just one example: an arbitration on picket line language in Los Angeles which appeared to have a good chance of upholding the right of longshoremen and clerks to stop work behind IBU picket lines and to force ships agents to hire non-Crowley bunkering barges has been repeatedly postponed and delayed. Herman and Rubio have strangled the IBU from continuing their initially successful picketing in Los Angeles last month — By the way there isno injunction in L.A. against IBU picketing Crowley’s very profitable bunkering operations.
When the Crowley cargo-carrying barge Molokai which we stopped in Oakland and Redwood City was loaded by scab longshoremen at Seaways in Seattle it then went to Hawaii and was picketed by the IBU. Teamsters observed the IBU-ILWU pickets but longshoremen went thru the picket lines and unloaded the barge!
Part of the reason this contract may pass is that longshoremen and clerks are justifiably fearful of going into a strike with the weak and treacherous Herman/Rubio leadership. The only chance we have of winning even a defensive contract battle is to take control of the strike out of the hands of the International. We need to elect broad rank-and-file strike committees in every port to take complete control of the strike, shut it down solid and hurt PMA economically. That’s why the 1934 and 1948 strikes were successful–the rank-and-file were in control.
VOTE NO! PREPARE TO STRIKE
Nota do Coletivo Lenin sobre o Racha
Esta nota foi copiada do blog do Coletivo Lenin (coletivolenin.blogspot.com). Leia aqui a nossa resposta.
No dia 23/06, dois militantes do setor estudantil, depois de meses de discussão onde tentamos evitar esse final, romperam com o CL. Eles ainda não escreveram a sua declaração de ruptura (que publicaremos no nosso blog e criticaremos) mas, como eles já estão falando sobre o racha com simpatizantes do CL, achamos melhor publicar nossa declaração sobre o fato.
Um racha sem motivo político com os fatos internacionais e nacionais recentes
A primeira coisa que surpreende negativamente no racha é que ele não reflete nenhuma tendência da luta de classes. Para explicar melhor: em todos os rachas normais são provocados por algum acontecimento na luta de classes, que leva setores da organização a terem respostas políticas tão diferentes que não podem ser conciliadas.
Mesmo que tenha havido sim uma diferença política (os companheiros defenderam a dupla derrota na Líbia antes da invasão, negando que houvesse um movimento progressivo contra a ditadura de Khadafi no inicio dos protestos em fevereiro na Líbia), os próprios companheiros negam que esse tenha sido o motivo do racha.
Então, qual foi o motivo?
O dogmatismo!
Desde a nossa ruptura com a TBI, em novembro, o CL decidiu que iria fazer um balanço da tradição que a TBI reivindica, o espartaquismo, para determinar se existem elementos do próprio programa espartaquista que facilitaram a degeneração de todas as correntes que o reivindicam (LCI, IG e TBI). A nossa caracterização sobre a degeneração das correntes espartaquistas está na nossa declaração de ruptura com a TBI.
Como marxistas, sabemos que o ser determina a consciência. É impossível que uma seita que se recusa a intervir no movimento de massas, como a TBI, possa desenvolver e manter um programa correto para as lutas. Por isso, começamos a fazer um balanço do programa que tínhamos reivindicado até então. Chegamos á conclusão que as melhores contribuições do espartaquismo foi a intervenção no movimento negro nos EUA nos anos 60 e 70, e também o posicionamento correto contrário ao apoio à burocracia cubana, e até mesmo algumas posições defensistas que em alguns casos não eram stalinofílicas. Porém o auto-isolamento dessa corrente, o sua stalinofilia crescente desde o final dos anos 60 até o final dos anos 80 (onde substitui o papel da classe trabalhadora pela burocracia “anti-restauracionista” em incontáveis casos no leste europeu), a sua incapacidade de analisar a realidade imposta sem propor novas teorias (que como consequência levou ao pensamento absurdo e anti-marxista de que “programa gera teoria”); foram esses os principais fatores que levaram as três correntes espartaquistas dos dias de hoje à degeneração e a serem incapazes ou a se recusarem a intervir no movimento de massas e na luta de classes.
Porém, os companheiros que depois romperam se recusaram a aceitar qualquer crítica e qualquer modificação do programa, chamando de revisionistas e oportunistas todos os que propusessem isso.
Logicamente, isso acabou criando um clima insuportável na organização, já que qualquer discussão política era “aumentada” até virar um julgamento do “oportunismo” de quem divergia deles.
E sectarismo…
Isso por si só poderia ser resolvido. Mas acontece que o dogmatismo sempre vem acompanhado com o sectarismo. Em maio, na sua primeira contribuição ao nosso período de pré-congresso, os companheiros que romperam declararam que as diferenças políticas eram irreconciliáveis, e que só havia duas soluções possíveis: ou eles ficariam em minoria, e iam rachar, ou ganhariam a maioria, e expulsariam quem ficasse em minoria!
Ou seja, eles deram o racha como fato consumado. Diante disso, tentamos organizar todos os temas da discussão para esclarecer o conjunto do CL sobre a natureza das divergências. Para nós, os companheiros poderiam ficar dentro do CL mesmo que em minoria, o que não aceitamos foi que eles defendessem a expulsão de membros da organização por causa da paranoia deles com o “oportunismo”.
O papel do “Reagrupamento Revolucionário”
Durante tudo isso, Sam Trachtenberg, que organiza o site Reagrupamento Revolucionário, e com quem tínhamos relações fraternais, entrou na campanha dos companheiros para rachar e destruir o CL, fazendo acusações pessoais totalmente sem fundamento (ele mora em Nova Iorque e nunca conheceu pessoalmente nenhum militante do CL).
Nisso, ele mostrou que aprendeu tudo com os burocratas da TBI, que tentaram rachar o CL sem motivos políticos em 2010, para ganhar militantes facilmente manipuláveis, como já denunciamos na nossa declaração de ruptura com a TBI.
Diante do papel de Sam, declaramos desde já, nessa mesma nota, que rompemos as relações fraternais com ele. E aproveitamos para avisar a quem quiser discutir com ele: esse é o método de Sam Trachtenberg para fazer o “reagrupamento revolucionário”: rachar uma organização em cima de posições dogmáticas e sectárias, através de ataques pessoais, para criar uma “corrente internacional” com dois militantes num país e um em outro.
Com certeza ninguém vai reconstruir a Quarta Internacional assim!
A luta continua!
Depois que perceberam que suas posições foram rechaçadas, e que eles ficaram em minoria, eles romperam. Não sabemos ainda o que eles vão falar para “explicar” a sua derrota, já que não podem dizer que perderam o debate porque ninguém no CL aceitou o dogmatismo e o sectarismo deles.
Não vamos tapar o sol com a peneira: esse foi um dos piores problemas que o CL já sofreu. Como já dissemos, não queríamos que os companheiros rompessem. Apesar dos seus erros, eles são honestos e muito contribuíram para a construção do CL.
Mas essa derrota não vai fazer a gente desanimar! O CL continua nas suas trincheiras da luta de classes, construindo a FIST, o Movimento Hora de Lutar e a Oposição Classista. Ainda não tivemos como terminar o balanço do espartaquismo, mas em breve, todos verão a nossa avaliação e um novo programa está sendo construído para nossa organização.
Não vamos ficar isolados nacionalmente depois das péssimas experiências com a TBI e o “RR”. O balanço será usado para fundamentar nossas relações internacionais. Como leninistas marxistas-revolucionários, não acreditamos em uma organização que se limite a um só país, e paro nós o socialismo só pode ser construído a nível internacional.
Nesse momento, estamos retomando o fôlego para voltar com o nosso jornal, aumentar a nossa intervenção no movimento e nossas discussões com outras organizações revolucionárias. Sabemos que, dentro do movimento dos trabalhadores e no movimento estudantil, temos muitos militantes que simpatizam com o nosso árduo trabalho político (quem não tem sido em vão), nos apoiam e certamente vão rejeitar esse racha.
Arquivo Histórico: Vern-Ryan e a Revolução Boliviana (1)
Ao Secretariado do SWP
A entrevista com o camarada Guillermo Lora, publicada em The Militant [jornal do SWP] em 12 e 19 de maio levanta algumas questões sérias sobre o programa e a política do POR que, eu acredito, deveriam ser resolvidas o quanto antes. As questões levantadas na entrevista, e insatisfatoriamente respondidas pelo camarada Lora, incluem:
Deixe-me comentar brevemente sobre a forma com a qual o camarada Lora parece responder a essas questões.
Arquivo Histórico: Declaração Espartaquista à III Conferência do Comitê Internacional
Nós estamos presentes nessa Conferência na base de um acordo fundamental com a Resolução Internacional do CI [Comitê Internacional]; além do mais, o relatório do camarada Slaughter foi para nós solidamente comunista, condizente em todo por uma determinação revolucionária.
“Onde o Estado toma uma forma bonapartista em nome de uma burguesia frágil, como na Argélia ou em Cuba, então o tipo de ‘revolta’ que ocorreu em 19-20 de junho em Argel está na agenda.”
Newsletter, 26 de junho de 1965
A atual resolução do CI, “Reconstruindo a Quarta Internacional”, entretanto, põe a questão muito bem:
“Da mesma forma, a Internacional e seus partidos são a chave para o problema da luta de classes nos países coloniais. Os líderes nacionalistas pequeno-burgueses e seus colaboradores stalinistas restringem a luta ao nível da libertação nacional ou, na melhor das situações, a uma versão do ‘socialismo num só país’, sustentado pela subordinação às políticas de coexistência da burocracia soviética. Dessa forma, todas as conquistas da luta dos trabalhadores e camponeses, não apenas no mundo árabe, Índia, Sudeste da Ásia, etc., mas também na China e em Cuba [ênfase do grupo Espartaquista], ficam confinadas dentro dos limites da dominação imperialista, ou expostas à contra-revolução (o bloqueio contra a China, a crise dos mísseis cubana, a guerra do Vietnã, etc.).”
O documento oferecido pela seção francesa do CI há muitos anos atrás sobre a revolução cubana sofre, do nosso ponto de vista, de uma fraqueza central. Ele enxerga a revolução cubana como análoga à experiência espanhola dos anos 1930. Essa analogia não é meramente defeituosa: ela enfatiza precisamente o que não é comum aos processos na Espanha e em Cuba, ou seja, a autêntica revolução operária na Espanha que foi esmagada pelos stalinistas.
Os pablistas foram fortalecidos contra nós, em nossa opinião, por esse reflexo simplista do CI, que parece precisar negar a possibilidade de uma transformação social liderada pela pequeno-burguesia para poder defender a validade e a necessidade do movimento marxista revolucionário. Esse é um método errado: no fundo, ele iguala os Estados operários deformados com o caminho para o socialismo; é o erro pablista virado de cabeça para baixo, e uma profunda negação da compreensão trotskista de que a casta burocrática dirigente é um obstáculo que deve ser derrubado pelos trabalhadores se eles pretendem seguir adiante.
Terceira Conferência do Comitê Internacional:
Derrota para o Trotskismo Mundial
Junho de 1966
Hacia el Renacimiento de la IV Internacional
Hacia el Renacimiento de la IV Internacional
[Proyecto de resolución sobre el movimiento mundial, sometido a la Convención del SWP [Socialist Workers Party —Partido Obrero Socialista] de 1963 por la Revolutionary Tendency [Tendencia Revolucionaria. Copiado deSpartacist – Edicíon em español, numero 33, enero de 2005. http://www.icl-fi.org/espanol/spe/33/40anos.html ]
INTRODUCCIÓN
1. Durante los últimos quince años el movimiento fundado por León Trotsky ha estado desgarrado por una profunda crisis teórica, política y de organización. La manifestación superficial de esta crisis ha sido la desaparición de la IV Internacional como estructura significativa. El movimiento ha sido reducido por tanto a un gran número de grupitos, nominalmente reunidos en tres tendencias: el “Comité Internacional”, el “Secretariado Internacional” (de Pablo), y el “Secretariado Internacional” (de Posadas). Los políticos superficiales esperan conjurar esta crisis a través de una fórmula organizativa: la “unidad” de todos aquellos grupitos que quieran unirse alrededor de un denominador programático común. Esta proposición oscurece las causas fundamentales, políticas y teóricas de la crisis y de hecho las agrava.
2. El surgimiento del revisionismo pablista indicó cuál era la raíz oculta de la crisis de nuestro movimiento: el abandono de una perspectiva obrera revolucionaria. Bajo la influencia de la relativa estabilización del capitalismo en los países industriales del Occidente y de la victoria parcial de movimientos pequeñoburgueses al derrotar el dominio imperialista en algunos países atrasados, la tendencia revisionista dentro del movimiento trotskista elaboró una orientación que la separa del proletariado y la acerca a direcciones pequeñoburguesas. La conversión del trotskismo en un satélite de izquierda de las direcciones obreras y revolucionario-coloniales existentes, combinada con una ortodoxia verbal clásicamente centrista, fue simbolizada por Pablo, pero de ningún modo se limitó sólo a él o a su fracción organizada. Por el contrario, las revoluciones cubana y argelina han constituido las pruebas de fuego que han demostrado que la tendencia centrista prevalece también entre ciertos grupos que originalmente se oponían a la fracción de Pablo.
3. Existe una lógica evidente y convincente en las proposiciones para la pronta reunificación de los grupos centristas dentro del movimiento trotskista. Pero la “reunificación” en torno a políticas centristas no puede significar el restablecimiento de la IV Internacional. La lucha por la IV Internacional es la lucha por un programa que incorpore la perspectiva revolucionaria marxista de la clase obrera. Es verdad que las doctrinas básicas del movimiento, formuladas en abstracto, no han sido rechazadas formalmente. Pero con el abandono de una perspectiva revolucionaria los revisionistas desafían concretamente las bases programáticas de nuestro movimiento.
4. La esencia del debate dentro del movimiento trotskista es la cuestión de la perspectiva del proletariado y de sus elementos de vanguardia revolucionaria hacia las direcciones pequeñoburguesas actuales del movimiento obrero, los estados obreros deformados y la revolución colonial. El meollo de la perspectiva revolucionaria del marxismo está en la lucha por la independencia de los obreros como clase de todas las fuerzas no proletarias; la fórmula política directriz y el criterio teórico es la democracia obrera, cuya expresión suprema es el poder obrero. Esto es aplicable a todos aquellos países en los que el proletariado se ha vuelto capaz de ejercer una política independiente; sólo las formas bajo las que se plantea la cuestión varían de país a país. Estas formas, por supuesto, determinan la intervención práctica de los marxistas.
EUROPA
5. La recuperación y prolongada prosperidad del capitalismo europeo no han producido, como pretenden los revisionistas de todos los colores, un movimiento obrero conservador. En realidad, la fuerza, la cohesión, el nivel cultural y la combatividad potencial del proletariado europeo son hoy mayores que nunca. La derrota de de Gaulle por los mineros franceses y la persistente tendencia electoral hacia la izquierda, que actualmente se está acelerando, en los países democrático-burgueses de Europa (principalmente Italia, Gran Bretaña y Alemania) ilustran este hecho.
6. Los intentos de los obreros europeos de ir más allá de las luchas económicas parciales hacia la transformación socialista de la sociedad han sido frustrados por la resistencia y la traición de la burocracia sindical. En Francia los cuatro años de reacción que siguieron a la toma del poder por de Gaulle muestran el tremendo precio que todavía hay que pagar por tolerar a estos falsos líderes. La huelga general belga mostró una vez más que los burócratas de “izquierda” como Renard también harían todo lo posible para bloquear o desviar un movimiento capaz de amenazar el dominio capitalista. Pero las experiencias tanto de Francia como de Bélgica demuestran un deseo espontáneo de los obreros de iniciar una lucha contra la clase capitalista, llegando ocasionalmente a la confrontación abierta al sistema.
7. La tarea de los trotskistas en el movimiento obrero europeo es la construcción dentro de las organizaciones de masas existentes (sindicatos y, a veces, partidos) de una dirección alternativa. Los marxistas deben retener y ejercer en todo momento una independencia política y programática en el contexto de la forma organizativa en cuestión. Es correcto y hasta obligatorio apoyar tendencias dentro de la burocracia obrera, en tanto defiendan los intereses esenciales de la clase obrera o reflejen un impulso de lucha de clases en el movimiento obrero; pero este apoyo es siempre sólo condicional y crítico. Cuando, como es inevitable, la lucha de clases llegue al punto en que los burócratas “de izquierda” desempeñen un papel reaccionario, los marxistas deben oponerse a ellos de inmediato y abiertamente. La conducta de la tendencia centrista alrededor del periódico belga La Gauche al retirar durante la huelga general la consigna correcta de marchar sobre Bruselas, para evitar una ruptura con Renard, es justo lo opuesto a una actitud marxista frente a la burocracia sindical.
8. Las perspectivas objetivaspara el desarrollo de un movimiento trotskista en Europa son extremadamente buenas. Gran número de los mejores militantes jóvenes de todos los países, rechazando el rutinismo cínico y arribista de los burócratas estalinistas y socialdemócratas, están buscando con ahínco una perspectiva socialista. Pueden ser ganados a un movimiento capaz de convencerles, práctica y teóricamente, de que ofrece esta perspectiva. Los cambios estructurales que resultan de la integración europea plantean las cuestiones de la democracia obrera y la independencia de los organismos políticos y económicos de la clase obrera como la alternativa frente al control estatal del movimiento obrero, y compelen a la clase obrera hacia luchas de clase cada vez más significativas. Si bajo estas condiciones objetivas los trotskistas de Europa occidental no logran crecer a ritmo acelerado, será porque ellos mismos han adoptado la posición revisionista de satélites de los líderes sindicales, opuesta a la perspectiva de lucha en torno al programa de democracia obrera.
EL BLOQUE SOVIÉTICO
9. Desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial los países de Europa oriental se han ido convirtiendo en estados industriales modernos. A medida que el proletariado de los estados obreros deformados aumenta en número y eleva su nivel de vida y de cultura, así también aumenta el conflicto irreprimible entre la clase obrera y la burocracia estalinista totalitaria. A pesar de la derrota de la revolución obrera húngara, el proletariado del bloque soviético ha ganado reformas importantes, ensanchando substancialmente su campo de pensamiento y de acción. Estas reformas, sin embargo, no significan un “proceso de reforma” o “un proceso de desestalinización”: han sido cedidas a regañadientes por la incorregible burocracia, están sometidas a un continuo ataque por la fracción de los “herederos de Stalin” y permanecen en constante peligro mientras prevalezca el dominio burocrático estalinista. Estas concesiones son significativas históricamente solamente en tanto que ayudan al proletariado a prepararse para derribar a la burocracia. Una desestalinización real sólo puede ser llevada a cabo por una revolución política.
10. Una nueva dirección revolucionaria está brotando de la juventud proletaria del bloque soviético. Inspirándose en fuentes gemelas —la inextinguible tradición leninista y las necesidades directas y tangibles de su clase— la nueva generación está formulando y llevando a cabo en la lucha el programa de la democracia obrera. Es notable en este aspecto la observación hecha recientemente por alguien que ha participado durante largo tiempo en la vida estudiantil soviética. En lo tocante al carácter fundamental de gran parte de la extensa oposición entre la juventud rusa, ha declarado lo siguiente: “Porque es un marxista-leninista, el estudiante ruso está mucho más radicalmente insatisfecho que si fuera un pragmático anglosajón” (David Burg al New York Times). Los trotskistas, continuadores directos de la etapa previa, tienen una contribución indispensable que hacer en esta lucha: la concepción del partido internacional y el programa de transición que se requieren para llevar a cabo la revolución política. Ayudar al desarrollo de una dirección revolucionaria en el bloque soviético a través del contacto personal e ideológico es una actividad práctica primaria para cualquier dirección internacional digna de ese nombre.
LA REVOLUCIÓN COLONIAL
11. La democracia obrera cobra la mayor significación programática en las regiones atrasadas, antes coloniales, del mundo: es precisamente en este sector donde el programa de la democracia obrera proporciona la línea de demarcación más clara posible entre las tendencias revolucionarias y revisionistas. En todos estos países la lucha por los derechos democrático-burgueses (libertad de expresión, derecho a la organización y a la huelga, elecciones libres) es de enorme importancia para la clase obrera porque sienta las bases para la lucha avanzada por la democracia proletaria y el poder obrero (control obrero de la producción, poder estatal basado enconsejos obreros y campesinos).
12. La teoría de la Revolución Permanente —que es fundamental para nuestro movimiento— declara que en el mundo moderno la revolución democrático-burguesa no puede ser completada sino a través de la victoria y expansión de la revolución proletaria, la consumación de la democracia obrera. La experiencia de todos los países coloniales ha confirmado esta teoría y mostrado al desnudo las manifiestas contradicciones internas que continuamente perturban el estado actual de la revolución colonial contra el imperialismo. Precisamente en aquellos estados en los que los fines burgueses de independencia nacional y reforma agraria han sido obtenidos más completamente, los derechos políticos democráticos de los obreros y campesinos no han sido realizados, independientemente de las conquistas sociales. Esto es particularmente cierto en aquellos países donde la revolución colonial ha conducido al establecimiento de estados obreros deformados: China, Vietnam del Norte…y Cuba. El balance, hasta la fecha, ha sido una victoria frustrada, o bien esencialmente vacía como en las neocolonias de modelo africano, o profundamente limitada y deformada, como en el ejemplo chino. El resultado actual es una consecuencia del predominio de fuerzas de clase específicas dentro de los levantamientos coloniales, y de las formas de naturaleza de clase específicas empleadas en la lucha. Estas formas impuestas sobre la lucha han sido, aun con toda su variedad, exclusivamente “desde arriba”, es decir, comprendiendo desde formas parlamentarias hasta burocrático-militares. Y las fuerzas de clase involucradas han sido, por supuesto, burguesas o pequeñoburguesas. Una contraposición de clases se desarrolla a partir del complejo de antagonismos que resultan del no llevar a término la revolución democrático-burguesa. Las direcciones pequeñoburguesas con sus formas burocráticas y métodos empiristas se oponen a la participación en la lucha de los obreros como clase. La intervención de la clase obrera gira necesariamente en torno a la obtención de la democracia obrera y requiere la dirección de la vanguardia proletaria revolucionaria con la conciencia programática de su misión histórica. A medida que la clase obrera gana ascendencia en la lucha y arrastra consigo a las capas más oprimidas de la pequeña burguesía, la Revolución Permanente será impulsada hacia adelante.
13. La Revolución Cubana ha expuesto las amplias infiltraciones que el revisionismo ha hecho dentro de nuestro movimiento. Con el pretexto de defender la Revolución Cubana, en sí mismo una obligación para nuestro movimiento, se le ha dado un apoyo pleno, incondicional y sin críticas al gobierno y dirección de Castro, a pesar de su naturaleza pequeñoburguesa y su conducta burocrática. Sin embargo, el historial del régimen de oposición a los derechos democráticos de los obreros y los campesinos cubanos está claro: la destitución burocrática de los líderes del movimiento obrero elegidos democráticamente y su remplazo por lacayos estalinistas; la supresión de la prensa trotskista; la proclamación del sistema de partido único; y mucho más. Este historial es paralelo a los enormes logros iniciales, sociales y económicos, de la Revolución Cubana. Por lo tanto, los trotskistas somos al mismo tiempo los defensores más combativos e incondicionales de la Revolución Cubana, así como del estado obrero deformado que nació de ella, contra el imperialismo. Pero los trotskistas no pueden poner su confianza, ni dar su apoyo político, por muy crítico que sea, a un régimen gubernamental hostil a los más elementales principios y prácticas de la democracia obrera aunque nuestra orientación táctica no es la que sería hacia una casta burocráticaendurecida.
14. Lo que es cierto de la orientación de los revisionistas hacia el régimen de Castro es todavía más evidente en lo que respecta al régimen de Ben Bella, que gobierna ahora en Argelia con el programa de una revolución “socialista” en cooperación con el imperialismo francés. La naturaleza antiobrera de este grupo pequeñoburgués ha sido puesta en evidencia para todos, menos para los que se niegan a ver, por la imposición de su control sobre el movimiento obrero y por la supresión de todos los partidos de oposición. Ni la extensa nacionalización ni la aparición de comités de administración, vistos en el contexto de la expropiación política de la clase obrera y la orientación económica hacia la colaboración con Francia, le dan a Argelia el carácter de un estado obrero, sino que, por el contrario, la califican como una sociedad capitalista atrasada con un alto grado de estatificación. Como revolucionarios, nuestra intervención en ambas revoluciones, como en cualquier estado actual, debe estar de acuerdo con la posición de Trotsky: “No somos un partido de gobierno; somos el partido de la oposición irreconciliable” (En defensa del marxismo). Esto puede dejar de aplicarse tan sólo en relación con un gobierno genuinamente basado en la democracia obrera.
15. La experiencia desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial ha demostrado que la guerra de guerrillas basada en los campesinos bajo una dirección pequeñoburguesa no puede por sí sola llegar más allá de un régimen burocrático antiobrero. La creación de estos regímenes ha ocurrido bajo las condiciones de la decadencia del imperialismo, la desmoralización y desorientación causadas por la traición estalinista, y la ausencia de una dirección revolucionaria marxista de la clase obrera. La revolución colonial puede tener un signo inequívocamente progresista sólo bajo tal dirección del proletariado revolucionario. Para los trotskistas el incorporar a su estrategia el revisionismo sobre la cuestión de la dirección proletaria de la revolución es una profunda negación del marxismo-leninismo, cualquiera que sea el beato deseo expresado al mismo tiempo de “construir partidos marxistas revolucionarios en los países coloniales”. Los marxistas deben oponerse resueltamente a cualquier aceptación aventurera de la vía al socialismo a través de la guerra de guerrillas campesina, análoga históricamente al programa táctico socialrevolucionario contra el que luchó Lenin. Esta alternativa sería un curso suicida para los fines socialistas del movimiento, y quizá físicamente para los mismos aventureros.
16. En todos los países atrasados en que el proletariado existe como clase, el principio fundamental del trotskismo es la independencia de la clase obrera, sus sindicatos y sus partidos, en intransigente oposición al imperialismo, a cualquier burguesía liberal “nacional”, y a gobiernos y partidos pequeñoburgueses de todo tipo, incluyendo aquéllos que profesan el “socialismo” y hasta el “marxismo-leninismo”. Sólo de esta manera se puede preparar el camino para la hegemonía de la clase obrera en la alianza revolucionaria con las capas oprimidas pequeñoburguesas, particularmente los campesinos. Similarmente, el que el partido obrero en un país avanzado viole la solidaridad de clase con los obreros de un país atrasado al apoyar políticamente a un gobierno revolucionario-colonial pequeñoburgués es un signo seguro de centrismo oportunista, al igual que el rehusarse a defender una revolución colonial debido al carácter no proletario de su dirección es un signo de sectarismo o de algo peor.
17. La interrelación de las luchas democrático-burguesa y democrático-proletaria en la revolución colonial continúa como fue formulada en el programa de fundación de la IV Internacional, una formulación que todavía retiene hoy completa validez:
“Es imposible rechazar pura y simplemente el programa democrático; es necesario que las masas por sí mismas sobrepasen este programa en la lucha. La consigna de la Asamblea Nacional (o Constituyente) conserva todo su valor en países como China o la India. Es necesario ligar indisolublemente esta consigna a las tareas de la emancipación nacional y de la reforma agraria. Es necesario ante todo armar a los obreros con este programa democrático. Sólo ellos pueden levantar y unir a los campesinos. Sobre la base del programa democrático-revolucionario es necesario oponer los obreros a la burguesía ‘nacional’. A una cierta etapa de la movilización de las masas bajo las consignas de la democracia revolucionaria, los soviets pueden y deben surgir. Su rol histórico en cada periodo dado, en particular su relación con la Asamblea Nacional, está determinado por el nivel político del proletariado, por la ligazón entre éste y la clase campesina, por el carácter de la política del proletariado. Tarde o temprano los soviets deben derribar a la democracia burguesa. Sólo ellos son capaces de llevar la revolución democrática hasta el final y abrir así la etapa de la revolución socialista.
“El peso específico de las diversas reivindicaciones democráticas y transitorias en la lucha del proletariado, su ligazón recíproca, su orden de sucesión, están determinados por las particularidades y condiciones propias de cada país atrasado, y en una parte considerable, por su grado de atraso. No obstante la dirección general del desarrollo revolucionario puede ser determinada por la fórmula de la revolución permanente, en el sentido que definitivamente han dado a esta fórmula las tres revoluciones rusas (1905, febrero de 1917 y octubre de 1917).”
—La agonía del capitalismo y las tareas de la IV Internacional (Programa de Transición)
CONCLUSIONES
18. La tarea del movimiento marxista revolucionario internacional es hoy la de restablecer su propia existencia real. Hablar de la “conquista de las masas” como una guía general internacionalmente es una exageración cualitativa. Las tareas de la mayoría de las secciones y grupos trotskistas de hoy nacen de la necesidad de clarificación política en la lucha contra el revisionismo, en el contexto de un nivel de trabajo de naturaleza generalmente propagandística y preparatoria. Una parte indispensable de nuestra preparación es el desarrollo y fortalecimiento de raíces dentro del movimiento más amplio de la clase obrera sin las que los trotskistas estarían condenados a un aislamiento estéril o a la degeneración política en periodos de aumento de lucha de clases, y en ambos casos a la incapacidad de avanzar en nuestra tarea histórica de conducir a la clase obrera al poder. Por encima de todo, lo que se puede y debe hacer es construir un partido mundial firmemente basado en secciones nacionales fuertes: la cohesión de cuadros obreros ganados y probados en el proceso de la lucha de clases y sobre la recia base de la perspectiva revolucionaria de la IV Internacional, el programa para llevar a cabo la democracia obrera, culminando en el poder obrero. Una exposición fundamental que amplía esta perspectiva, su oposición al pablismo y su relevancia en Estados Unidos está contenida en el documento de la Minoría, “En defensa de una perspectiva revolucionaria” (SWP Discussion Bulletin [Boletín de discusión del SWP] Vol. 23, No. 4, julio de 1962).
19. La “reunificación” del movimiento trotskista alrededor de la base centrista del pablismo en cualquiera de sus variantes sería un paso que nos alejaría del genuino renacimiento de la IV Internacional, en vez de acercarnos a él. Sin embargo, si la mayoría de los grupos trotskistas existentes insiste en seguir adelante con esta “reunificación”, la tendencia revolucionaria del movimiento mundial no debe volver la espalda a estos cuadros. Por el contrario, sería vitalmente necesario pasar por esta experiencia con ellos. La tendencia revolucionaria entraría al movimiento “reunificado” como fracción minoritaria, con la perspectiva de ganar una mayoría al programa de la democracia obrera. La IV Internacional no renacerá a través de una adaptación al revisionismo pablista: sólo con la lucha política y teórica contra toda forma de centrismo puede el partido mundial de la revolución socialista ser finalmente establecido.
—14 de junio de 1963
Carta de Rompimento de Sam Trachtenberg com a Liga Espartaquista
9 de Dezembro de 1994
A SL diz que Ieltsin realizou uma “consolidação gradual de um Estado capitalista” (WV número 564). Na prática isso poderia significar que a Rússia era 80% Estado operário e 20% Estado capitalista, depois 40% Estado operário e 60% Estado capitalista, etc. Isso é ridículo! Revolução e contra-revolução não são processos graduais. Dizer isso vai contra os ensinamentos marxistas sobre o Estado. Somente uma classe pode deter o poder de Estado por vez. A classe capitalista ou a classe operária. A SL costumava entender isso: em “A Gênese do Pablismo” ela escreveu, sobre a teoria de Ernest Mandel da revolução, que “a ‘revolução’ foi implicitamente redefinida como um processo metafísico de duração contínua e progredindo inevitavelmente em direção à vitória, ao invés de uma confrontação brusca, e necessariamente limitada no tempo, sobre a questão do poder de Estado, cujo resultado irá moldar todo o período histórico subsequente” (Spartacist, número 21, outono de 1972).
Militant Longshoreman No 9
Militant Longshoreman
No #9 July 21, 1984
Older & DISABLED MEN VICTIMIZED
NO JOB SECURITY!
NO SAFETY!
NO PROTECTION AGAINST PMA CONTRACT VIOLATIONS !
VOTE NO! PREPARE TO STRIKE!
This contract is worse than the editor expected. I did expect that a Negotiating Committee dominated by the International officers and without any strike demands would get no real improvements in job security, safety, or grievance procedure. But I was unpleasantly surprised that Herman’s tactic of divide and conquer (exemplified by separate steady men contracts in the three major locals) while piecing off different sections of the Division with minor concessions, would be even more successful this time around. The Northwest and Southern California got their stop gap concessions and San Francisco is brutally victimized,
JOB SECURITY
The April Caucus defeated by one vote Local 10’s demand for a shorter work shift at no loss in pay to create jobs. The resolutions passed for manning on container operations and no extended shifts got strictly nowhere during negotiations. The Northwest and Southern California zones got expanded voluntary paid travel rights, but Local 10 is still locked into a zone with only two small river ports to which we can travel. We can expect those ports which are outside our zone and have extra work to tighten up and further limit the number of San Francisco longshoremen who can travel there as jointly recognized visitors.
PGP
So where does that leave us? Depending almost entirely on PGP, the crumbling “cornerstone” of job security. Local 10’s demand for a “make whole” on the PGP shortfall from the last contract and our demand to eliminate Section 20.7, “PGP Abuse”, were rejected by the April Caucus. The demands passed by the Caucus for a weekly 40 hour PGP were dropped. Also to bite the dust in negotiations was the demand that men not involved directly in a contract beef were not to be dinged for a weeks PGP.
Instead, what we got was a 38 hour PGP with restrictive rules tailored to punish Local 10. All men will have to maintain 50-7, of the average port hours in order to keep from being coded out of PGP. Men on slow-moving boards will be forced to haunt the hall seven days a week, day and night, in a desperate attempt to keep their hours up. Older and partially disabled men will have to take a dispatch to steel in the hold and lashing to keep up their availability (or to make a living income if “coded out” of PGP). If a Class B longshoreman or a casual takes a lashing or steel job every A man on the Dock or Hold Board who isn’t squared off and doesn’t take those jobs will lose his PGP for the week. Several hundred men will be forced out of the industry by these rules. Especially hard hit will be men on the Dock Preference Board who have to make 50% of Port hours to stay on PGP.
Every longshoreman will be desperately competing with every other man for jobs, We can end up fighting each other instead of PMA.
COPS FOR THE PMA?
The new sections 10.2131 through 20.21313 will lead to men snitching on each others “outside income” and place the union in the position of acting as cops for PMA witchhunting. Our officers will be so preoccupied with hearings and appeals from this section that they won’t be able to get out onto the job.
HEALTH & SAFETY
None of the Coast Caucus’ Health and Safety demands were negotiated. Instead, a committee with no power will meet with FMA after the contract is signed to update the safety code. PMA’s push to get the ships out can only result in even more crippling accidents especially on steel and container operations .
GRIEVANCES/ARBITRATORS
The April Coast Caucus ducked the problems represented by a “grievance procedure” that doesn’t allow longshoremen to protect their conditions. Unlike previous Caucuses, this one didn’t even formulate a demand to allow Longshoremen to stop work when PMA superintendents order men to work in clear violation of the contract.
That same Caucus overwhelmingly defeated delegate Keylor’s amendment to eliminate arbitrators and arbitration completely from the contract. Instead the Caucus passed two resolutions calling for termination of an arbitrator’s term of office at the end of each contract. Even this timid and useless demand was dropped during negotiations.
The only addition to the grievance machinery, new section 17.57, can be used against the union forcing us to strictly abide by Sutliff’s rulings while we wait out the interminable process of appealing to the Coast Committee.
HOURS
Caucus demands to eliminate extended shifts except for emergencies were likewise dropped. Also disappeared from this contract package was the demand to tighten up on PMA’s shift starting time.
What this Negotiationg, Committee did was to make further concessions to PMA to allow a Container Freight Station to operate from 7:00 AM to 7:00 PM.
CONTAINER FREIGHT STATIONS
PMA was given a further concession on hours allowing them to stagger the CFS work week over any consecutive five day period and to stagger the lunch hour.
In what is a vain attempt to compete with non-union off-dock CFS operations the remaining job classifications will be wiped out, so that a super CFS utility man will throw cargo, do his own clerking, and drive equipment. This may even lead to a net loss of jobs for Locals 10 and 34
Section 10 of the proposed CFS agreement eliminating the IBT swamper/lumper could push us into a bitter jurisdictional war with the Teamsters. A fight with the Teamsters is the last thing we need right now; the April Caucus endorsed a Coast Committee resolution to set up machinery for more and closer cooperation with the Teamsters.
STEADY SKILLED MEN
The Section entitled Steady Skilled Men is probably the most deceptive and confusing section of the agreement. Local 13 (Los Angeles) got increased crane and tractor training. L.A. also got some concessions on their equalization formula between Crane Supplement and Crane Board men.
What did Local 10 get? No training. All equalization language deleted from the contract. SEO Board in the hall eliminated; all 9.43 men back to their individual employer. PMA companies will be able to tighten up control over “their” steady skilled men.
The new contract language which is supposed to return tractors and lifts over five tons to the hall is both confusing and deceptive. Attempts to get clear explanations from the Negotiating Committee were met with evasions :nnd bombastic oratory,
Here is how the editor interprets this contract section, (Remember: Sutliff will be making the contract interpretations!)
A) Steady Skilled Men can operate tractors, lifts, payloaders, and bulldozers to fill out their eight hour guarantees.
B) 9.43 men can drive lifts on the ship on all types of cargo including steel.
C) 9.43 men can operate lifts on the dock on Ro-Ro and “container operations”. This probably means 9.43 on lifts moving containers where the ship has mixed break bulk/container cargo.
Since each PMA member company won’t be able to use another company’s steady skilled men (no SEO Board in the hall), each company will have an incentive to hire back more 9.43 men and to chisel wherever they can in using steady men in place of hall men.
The April Caucus voted down Keylor’s motion to make the demand for elimination of all steady skilled men provisions from the contract a strike issue.
The Negotiating Committee was given a demand requiring that all crane-rated equipment mounted on a floating vessel be dispatched from the hall. Since this demand was dropped the door remains wide open for more 9.43 men operating back-hoes, whirleys, swinging booms, and any ships hoisting gear rated at 40 tons.
PENSIONS
Contrary to the Coast Committee recommendation (and Caucus action) nothing was done to even begin to consolidate the different levels of pension benefits for men already retired. In fact, beefing up the maximum years of service credit to 33 years for future retirees only increases the spread in pensions between men who retired earlier and men who will retire in the future.
For the first time part of pension increases (for retirees prior to July 1, 1984) will not have to be fully funded by PMA – as ERISA requires – but will be funded like welfare, from contract to contract, a move which if extended into the future will make our pensions less secure.
COULD WE HAVE GOTTEN MORE?
The unions “negotiating posture” sent a signal of weakness to PMA. Not one key demand was designated a strike issue. The leadership did not prepare the rank-and-file for a strike. The Negotiating Committee was not armed with a strike vote. Instead, president Herman spread scare tactics as to how weak we are and how bad the anti-labor climate is under Reagan.
PMA was never told “July 1 – no contract – no work”. The Negotiating Committee was top heavy with five International officers. The four large locals had only one member each on the Negotiating Committee.
The shipping lines have been making money and were not prepared for a real solid strike. PMA got off easy by offering money to a steadily diminishing work force.
FUTURE CONCESSIONS
Jimmy Herman has been throwing out hints that we might have to make increased concessions to some of our employers to help them compete with non-union operations like Seaways. That’s probably why in the face of an agressive attack by Crowley on the ILA, Masters Mates and Pilots, and the Inland Boatmen – ILWU the International pushed concession bargaining between IBU and Crowley, and was largely responsible for the obscene spectacle of longshoremen going through the IBU tankerman’s picket lines at the army base on June 21st.
WHAT CAN WE DO?
VOTE NO AND PREPARE FOR A STRIKE!
It’s remotely possible that if the contract is turned down that a few concessions could be wrung from PMA simply by reopening negotiations. But it would be dishonest not to tell the membership that only a determination to fight accompanied by preparations for a brawl can get us even a part of what we need.
It looks as if Herman has manipulated the leadership of other sections of the Longshore Division to make Local 10 the scapegoat. Local 10’s Caucus delegation voted 7-4 against the contract. This is the largest Caucus delegate no vote since the ’71 strike. A serious and determined Local leadership would send rank-and-file delegates all over the coast immediately in an attempt to win at least 41% against the contract in the voting which takes place July 21-27. The delegates would talk directly to longshoremen and clerks appealing to them for a common fight for jobs through manning and a shorter work shift. Defeating the contract on the first round would give us breathing space to reorganize for a real fight.
The hour is late. In fact when the Executive Board discussed the contract on June 28 and the discussion finally got around to what to do, the meeting dissolved before a vote was taken on the proposal to send people coastwise. This should have been done much earlier, even before the April Caucus, and at the latest after we learned what was in the contract.
It’s better to fight for what you want and need — and maybe not get it, than to ask for what you don’t want — and get that (Loosely paraphrasing Eugene Debs).
VOTE NO!
PREPARE FOR A STRIKE!
RECALL THE NEGOTIATING COMIMITTEE!
HOLD NEW CAUCUS ELECTIONS COASTWISE!
ELECT STRIKE COMMITTEES!
FROM ALL BOARDS 5 GANGS AND WORKING LOCATIONS TO RUN THE STRIKE!
Resolução da Tendência Revolucionária Sobre o Movimento Mundial
2. A ascensão do revisionismo pablista apontou para a raiz fundamental da crise do nosso movimento: o abandono de uma perspectiva revolucionária da classe trabalhadora. Sob a influência de uma relativa estabilização do capitalismo nos Estados industriais do Ocidente e de um sucesso parcial dos movimentos pequeno-burgueses ao derrubar o poder imperialista em alguns países periféricos, a tendência revisionista dentro do movimento trotskista desenvolveu uma orientação que se distanciava do proletariado e se dirigia às lideranças pequeno-burguesas. A conversão do trotskismo em um satélite de esquerda das lideranças operárias e coloniais existentes, combinada com uma ortodoxia verbal centrista clássica, foi tipificada por Pablo – mas de maneira alguma ficou confinada a ele ou sua fração organizativa. Pelo contrário, as revoluções cubana e argelina constituíram testes ácidos ao provar que a tendência centrista também prevalece entre certos grupos que originalmente se opuseram à fração de Pablo.
“É impossível rejeitar pura e simplesmente o programa democrático: é necessário que as próprias massas ultrapassem este programa na luta. A palavra de ordem de Assembleia Nacional (ou Constituinte) conserva todo seu valor em países como a China ou a Índia. É necessário ligar, indissoluvelmente, esta palavra de ordem às tarefas de emancipação nacional e da reforma agrária. É necessário, antes de mais nada, armar os operários com esse programa democrático. Somente eles poderão levantar e reunir os camponeses. Baseados no programa democrático e revolucionário é necessário opor os operários à burguesia ‘nacional’. Em certa etapa da mobilização das massas sob as palavras de ordem da democracia revolucionária, os sovietes podem e devem aparecer. Seu papel histórico em determinado período, em particular suas relações com a Assembleia Constituinte, é definido pelo nível político do proletariado, pela união entre eles e a classe camponesa e pelo caráter da política do partido proletário. Cedo ou tarde os conselhos devem derrubar a democracia burguesa. Somente eles são capazes de levar a revolução democrática até o fim e, assim, abrir a era da revolução socialista.”“O peso especifico das diversas reivindicações democráticas na luta do proletariado, suas mútuas relações e sua ordem de sucessão estão determinados pelas particularidades e pelas condições próprias a cada país atrasado, em particular pelo grau de seu atraso. Entretanto, a direção geral do desenvolvimento revolucionário pode ser determinado pela fórmula da Revolução Permanente, no sentido que lhe foi definitivamente dado pelas três revoluções na Rússia (1905, fevereiro de 1917, outubro de 1917).”(A Agonia Mortal do Capitalismo e as Tarefas da Quarta Internacional).
Um Conto de Fadas sobre o Liquidacionismo
Era uma vez, há muito pouco tempo atrás, uma grande nação, não muito distante, onde viviam dois grupos de pessoas, muito diferentes.
Carta de Ruptura com o Coletivo Lenin
Nessa tarefa, a tendência revisionista foi em muito ajudada por inúmeros fatores. Os principais foram a experiência negativa da tentativa de fusão com a Tendência Bolchevique Internacional, finalizada em agosto de 2010 (confira a carta de ruptura entre o Coletivo Lenin e a TBI, Coletivo Lenin rompe relações com a Tendência Bolchevique Internacional, de dezembro de 2010) e a despolitização e inexperiência dos militantes mais recentes e aspirantes (que eram cerca de um terço da organização ao longo da luta fracional). A saída de alguns membros veteranos e com autoridade no grupo, por inúmeros motivos não relacionados, pouco antes de se iniciar a disputa, também contribuiu, já que Paulo permaneceu como único membro que havia formado o grupo desde a origem, e assim tinha grande influência para negar o programa que ele próprio havia ajudado a lapidar.
No fim, a aceitação passiva do programa revisionista por parte de alguns; a atitude movimentista de querer retornar ao ritmo normal de atividades o quanto antes e sem discutir a fundo, por parte de outros; e um ódio comum aos “causadores de problemas”, nós, que prezavam pela pureza dos princípios estabelecidos por nossa organização e a necessidade de estudar e discutir a fundo todas as polêmicas antes de tomar uma decisão, além da negação em aceitar conciliar com o revisionismo, fizeram com que se formasse uma maioria heterogênea hostil aos princípios e ao programa pelo qual o Coletivo Lenin havia sido forjado e funcionado pelos seus mais de dois anos de existência. Essa, maioria, liderada por Paulo, apesar de manter o nome, nada mais tem a ver com a tradição do Coletivo Lenin.
O programa original do Coletivo Lenin
Com a expansão do stalinismo no Leste Europeu e na China e o grande crescimento da influência stalinista no movimento operário mundial a partir da década de 1950, vários elementos da nova liderança da Quarta formularam uma compreensão oportunista sobre as tarefas da Internacional. Esse novo programa foi formulado por Michel Pablo e logo aceito por outros, como Ernest Mandel, e consistia em compreender a Quarta como uma ferramenta para “empurrar” os stalinistas para liderarem a revolução mundial. Esse revisionismo, que se tornou conhecido como pablismo (em “homenagem” ao seu principal formulador) logo foi estendido a outras correntes do movimento, como a socialdemocracia e mesmo o nacionalismo burguês nos países periféricos.
O pablismo criou as bases para transformar a Quarta Internacional numa organização centrista e sua política foi a fonte para as posições traiçoeiras da organização em eventos fundamentais como a Revolução Boliviana de 1952, a greve geral francesa de 1953 e a revolta operária contra a burocracia stalinista em Berlim Oriental no mesmo ano. Em todos eles, a posição da Quarta foi de não denunciar o papel traidor do stalinismo ou dos nacionalistas, e de fazer “chamados” para que eles cumprissem as tarefas que só uma organização revolucionária poderia cumprir. No caso boliviano, a traição destruiu a possibilidades palpáveis que o partido trotskista boliviano tinha de liderar a classe operária em direção ao poder, e guiou esse partido numa tentativa frustrada de “influenciar” o governo nacionalista para a esquerda. A forma organizativa defendida pelos pablistas tinha sido de fazer um entrismo de tipo especial (“sui generis”) nos partidos oportunistas, possuindo caráter “profundo”, pois previa a duração de gerações e gerações. Mais gritante ainda, tal entrismo pretendia esconder as posições políticas trotskistas e “não denunciar as lideranças” stalinistas, nacionalistas ou socialdemocratas.
O sucesso dos pablistas no III Congresso Mundial só foi contraposto (e de maneira imperfeita), por algumas seções, como a maioria do Partido Comunista Internacionalista francês e o SWP norte-americano. Esses, junto a outras seções menores, romperam com a Quarta em 1953 e organizaram o Comitê Internacional. O Comitê tinha uma compreensão insuficiente dos novos Estados criados pelo stalinismo, mas mantinha a necessidade de combater as suas direções burocráticas. Além disso, defendia corretamente que a Quarta deveria resolver a crise de liderança proletária internacional, e não se adaptar a ela tentando “empurrar” partidos comprovadamente oportunistas para a realização de tarefas revolucionárias. Em razão disso, reivindicamos o combate do Comitê Internacional contra o pablismo.
A posterior capitulação do SWP ao pablismo, sob a pressão da segunda fase da revolução cubana (a partir de 1961), foi, portanto, uma grande derrota para os revolucionários. O SWP passou a cumprir o mesmo papel com relação à liderança castrista que os pablistas tinham com relação a outras correntes do movimento. Não por acaso, isso levou a uma fusão entre o SWP e os pablistas em 1963, para formar o “Secretariado Unificado da Quarta Internacional” (SU). O ato de celebração dessa fusão foi a concepção de que o recém-formado Estado Cubano era um Estado Operário pleno, como a União Soviética nos seus primeiros anos, sob a liderança de Lenin e Trotsky, e que os castristas eram “trotskistas inconscientes”. Na época, a Tendência Revolucionária (RT) foi o único setor do SWP a combater essa capitulação. Também formulou uma análise inovadora da formação social cubana e do processo pelo qual havia sido criada. A análise daRT, posteriormente desenvolvida quando ela se tornou a Liga Espartaquista, reconhecia Cuba como um Estado operário deformado, que necessitava de uma revolução política para estabelecer uma democracia operária. Dessa forma ela não apenas saía em oposição aos entusiastas pablistas de Castro, mas também se diferenciava da liderança do Comitê Internacional, que defendia a necessidade de uma liderança trotskista, apesar de negar a realidade de que o capitalismo havia sido derrubado em Cuba.
Além disso, a RT combatia o pablismo em todas as suas formas, e colocava a necessidade de priorização dos setores mais explorados do proletariado (os negros e as mulheres, principalmente) no movimento e a solução de suas opressões específicas através da revolução socialista. A sua atuação no movimento sindical sempre foi pautada pela defesa de um programa transitório, que defendia as melhorias progressivas da classe trabalhadora, enquanto apontava para reivindicações essenciais que só poderiam se realizar com a tomada do poder pelos proletários. Uma das principais contribuições teóricas da RT para o trotskismo foi a atualização da política trotskista, baseada no binômio defesa da URSS contra possíveis tentativas de contrarrevolução social / revolução política contra a burocracia, a partir da sua extensão aos demais Estados operários deformados surgidos no pós-guerra. Após ser expulsa do SWP, a RT formou a Liga Espartaquista. É essa tradição, e as posições políticas da SL e da TBI (que consideramos ter representado a continuidade do espartaquismo após a degeneração burocrática da SL) que o Coletivo Lenin reivindicou até a vitória da tendência revisionista, que agora nega raivosamente essa mesma tradição. Como foi dito em nossa carta de ruptura com a TBI em agosto de 2010:
Podemos, assim, enumerar as características da tendência de Paulo Araújo, que hoje lidera o Coletivo Lenin, e que foram manifestadas antes e ao longo da luta fracional. Antes de termos preparado a versão final do presente documento, fomos acusados pelo Coletivo, numa postagem feita em seu blog (confira Nota sobre o racha no Coletivo Lenin, de 28 de junho), de termos rachado “sem motivo”, a não ser o nosso suposto “sectarismo” e “dogmatismo”, e sem termos nos pautado em posições reais da luta de classes. Os pontos a seguir, assim como a seção seguinte, mostram o que de fato motivou nosso rompimento. Além disso, estamos publicando o documento principal da tendência revisionista (confira A Teoria da Decadência e a Crise da III e da IV Internacionais, de março de 2011), e nos pontos que se seguem acrescentamos citações dos documentos através dos quais cada uma dessas posições foi expressa:
- Renúncia à tradição do espartaquismo e à importância de sua história política de combate às capitulações dos pablistas. No lugar de tal tradição, Paulo defende a compreensão de que os pablistas representaram a melhor tradição política do trotskismo (e que seriam representantes autênticos do marxismo revolucionário) após o racha da Quarta Internacional:
- Tendência a substituir a política fundamentada em princípios marxistas por uma política pautada em combinações de ilusões em movimentos burgueses e também na necessidade de se basear nas “possibilidades reais” (imediatas) como forma de responder aos eventos da luta de classes. Em outras palavras, de capitular ao “menos pior” da podridão burguesa quando não está colocada imediatamente a possibilidade de um levante revolucionário da classe operária. Isso fica claro nos exemplos das eleições presidenciais brasileiras e na questão líbia, que nós discutiremos na próxima seção.
- Desprezo pelas tradições do leninismo em relação à forma de organização. Paulo explicitamente rejeita o centralismo democrático leninista na forma como o Coletivo Lenin o praticou até hoje. Para ele, qualquer discussão que “não envolva riscos [físicos] para a organização” pode ser feita publicamente. É a “liberdade de criticar” típica da socialdemocracia. Além disso, reivindica o entrismo “sui generis” feito pelos pablistas, e não vê problema em uma organização revolucionária permanecer indefinidamente dentro de partidos reformistas:
- Abandono da teoria trotskista sobre os Estados operários degenerados e deformados, formulada por Trotsky para a URSS. Essa teoria foi posteriormente expandida pela Quarta Internacional para o Leste Europeu e atualizada pela RT para países como Cuba, que quebraram a dominação capitalista, mas cujas revoluções tiveram base camponesa e estabeleceram regimes burocráticos. Paulo formula uma absurda teorização experimental, sem nenhuma base empírica, segundo a qual, tanto a URSS (a partir dos anos 1930) quanto os Estados do Leste Europeu, China, Cuba, Coréia do Norte e Vietnã seriam “Estados burgueses sem burguesia”:
- Abandono das históricas posições práticas da TBI de defesa dos Estados operários degenerados ou deformados. Tais posições consistiram em combater os movimentos contra-revolucionários mesmo que em frente única (unidade de ação) com os setores da burocracia que resistiram à contrarrevolução, da mesma maneira como delineado por Trotsky no Programa de Transição:
- Compreensão de que Frentes Populares eleitorais (blocos entre partidos de base operária e setores burgueses, como a candidatura Dilma) podem ser utilizadas para proteger o proletariado contra as alas fascistas ou reacionárias da burguesia:
- Negação de que a razão dos fracassos das revoluções do século XX, assim como da atual situação de recuo da luta de classes, reside, sobretudo, na crise de liderança do proletariado, como delineado por Trotsky no documento de fundação da Quarta Internacional. Para Paulo, a causa do fracasso das revoluções do século XX reside no desenvolvimento natural do capitalismo, que teria tornado os trabalhadores “adaptados ao sistema capitalista”. Além disso, Paulo formula que a classe trabalhadora está “perdendo a sua potencialidade revolucionária” em razão do desenvolvimento “decadente” do capitalismo a partir da década de 1970:
Ao fator “deslocamento de contradições” ainda se somaria o recuo de consciência gerado pelo fim contrarrevolucionário da URSS no início dos anos 1990 (o que é completamente contraditório com a análise estrutural que Paulo faz dessa sociedade). Tudo isso combinado colocaria o proletariado mundial em um estado de “crise de perspectiva”, no qual este não mais enxergaria como viáveis mudanças sociais obtidas através da luta – e aí Paulo inclui até mesmo mudanças reformistas ou democráticas, negando assim os eventos da luta de classes que vêm ocorrendo desde o início do ano. Apesar de sempre termos reconhecido os efeitos destrutivos causados pelo fim da URSS, nunca delineamos tais conclusões impressionistas de Paulo. Inclusive, em artigo relativamente recente, discutimos a reorganização do proletariado e os indícios de superação do refluxo sofrido pelo movimento operário (confira O novo período que se abre na conjuntura internacional, de janeiro de 2011).
Essa análise, que varre qualquer possibilidade de revolução mundial, é a base teórica para as posições de Paulo Araújo sobre frentes populares, seu apoio à oposição burguesa na Líbia (que discutiremos a seguir) e o indicativo, expresso em seu documento principal, de que este pretende secundarizar o papel das reivindicações transitórias frente às reivindicações democráticas, como medida necessária para se disputar a consciência dos trabalhadores no período após a destruição da União Soviética. Suas posições chegam (via outros caminhos) a conclusões políticas pessimistas semelhantes às da degenerada Liga Espartaquista (confira A Liga Espartaquista apóia as tropas imperialistas no Haiti!, de 15 de fevereiro de 2010):
Posteriormente, Paulo Araújo declarou que sua posição nas eleições havia sido desnecessária, já que a vitória de Dilma não estaria ameaçada pela direita reacionária. Mas continuou reivindicando a “tática” de votar em frentes populares contra alas reacionárias ou fascistas da burguesia. Como já apontamos, essa “tática”, que passa por cima da independência de classe e coloca os trabalhadores em segundo plano no combate à reação burguesa em favor das alas “progressivas” da burguesia, foi a mesma adotada pelo stalinismo na década de 1930. Hoje, a organização da qual fazíamos parte faria mais sentido se fosse chamada de Coletivo Dimitrov – nome do capanga de Stalin que formulou a política das frentes populares.
Apesar das enormes ilusões das massas com a capacidade deste Conselho em lhes dar democracia, o CNT era composto por líderes tribais fundamentalistas, setores a favor da monarquia e membros desertores do alto escalão da ditadura de Kadafi. Sua incapacidade de garantir democracia estava evidente em sua composição, seu programa de conciliação com o imperialismo e sua trajetória de chamados por uma intervenção militar da OTAN. Assim, não apoiamos a tomada de poder de quase metade do país, inclusive a estrategicamente importante cidade de Bengasi, pelo Conselho. Isso não pode ser confundido com a necessidade de intervir em todos os espaços onde fosse possível para quebrar as ilusões das massas com este Conselho, que se aproveitou do ódio nutrido pela ditadura que há 40 anos dominava o país para arrebanhar setores dos trabalhadores para defender um programa igualmente subserviente ao imperialismo.
Para os revolucionários, somente a classe trabalhadora pode ser conseqüente na luta por direitos democráticos. Estes direitos são fundamentais para que o proletariado se organize para lutar por sua emancipação. Mas isso não é o mesmo que apoiar um setor da burguesia que “promete democracia” quando toma o poder. Paulo Araújo demonstrou não apenas disposição a apoiar o Conselho Nacional nessa empreitada, como também revelou suas ilusões de que o CNT de fato levaria democracia às massas líbias. Semanas depois dessas suas declarações, os “justos democratas” do CNT estavam lado a lado com a OTAN, esmagando a população do país. Esses trechos produzidos por Paulo contra um membro de nossa tendência deixam isso claro:
Seguindo a própria lógica “anti-sectária” de Paulo Araújo e seus apoiadores, expressa na nota do Coletivo sobre nossa ruptura, segundo a qual tudo o que expomos aqui não é suficiente para separar politica e organizativamente nossas duas tendências, o próprio Coletivo Lenin não deveria existir. Se diferenças programáticas profundas e antagônicas não devem manter tendências separadas, então o Coletivo deveria ter como principal objetivo unificar a maior parte das organizações de esquerda em um só “partidão”, degenerado e incapaz de liderar a classe trabalhadora para uma revolução, diga-se de passagem.
Outra situação que fez acelerar nosso rompimento envolveu a recente greve e motim dos bombeiros militares no Rio de Janeiro. Um panfleto havia sido preparado para ser distribuído no acampamento-vigília dos bombeiros no Rio de Janeiro, após a prisão de 439 membros dessa corporação. Esse texto não chegou a ser usado nessa ocasião devido à proibição que os líderes do movimento dos bombeiros impuseram a “qualquer material criticando a Polícia Militar”. Diante disso, nossa tendência pediu para que a linha do Coletivo Lenin fosse discutida e revista e que, portanto, o material não fosse publicado no blog do grupo. Esse pedido fazia sentido já que o panfleto não havia sido discutido em nenhum organismo do Coletivo. Entretanto, ignorando o direito de nossa tendência a questionar uma posição, a tendência revisionista, passando por cima da própria Direção Executiva (dentro da qual nossa tendência tinha maioria) postou o panfleto que nem sequer critica a liderança pró-polícia dos bombeiros e diz, contra a realidade, que “os Bombeiros não cumprem nenhum papel repressivo na sociedade, pelo contrário, o papel deles sim é ajudar e socorrer.”
Por fim, somado a tais atos de desonestidade e deslealdade, fomos confrontados ainda com o enorme e crescente desinteresse dos camaradas que estavam fora da tendência revisionista em prosseguir as discussões, tornando insustentável nossa permanência no Coletivo Lenin. Antes que chegássemos sequer a um terço do calendário de discussões que havíamos marcado coletivamente, alguns camaradas começaram a nos considerar um empecilho para que o Coletivo Lenin retornasse ao seu ritmo normal de atividades. Prezando para que houvesse debate e discussão extensa, nós sem dúvida éramos os “causadores de problemas” que impediam alguns militantes, despreocupados com o tipo de programa que defenderiam, a retornar à rotina habitual do movimento. Para nós, reduzir momentaneamente o ritmo das atividades públicas era um preço pequeno a pagar em troca da oportunidade de lutar por clareza programática e combater o revisionismo.
Hoje o Coletivo Lenin não é superior a nenhum dos outros grupos centristas do movimento. De fato, ele caminha a passos largos para abandonar qualquer semelhança, mesmo aparente, com uma organização marxista revolucionária e se tornar apenas mais um seguidor reformista dos grandes peixes oportunistas. Seus membros estão unidos não por um programa bem definido, mas pelo pacto de “manter a unidade” (não importa com qual programa) e “negociar” os princípios políticos para aceitar qualquer nova “formulação teórica” que surja na cabeça de seu novo “líder” a qualquer momento. Se mantida e fortalecida, a longo prazo, essa condição degenerada fará do Coletivo Lenin nada menos do que um verdadeiro santuário de adoração às “teorias” de Paulo Araújo.
Cuba, the LRCI and Marxist Theory
In Defense of the Revolutionary Tendency
Cuba, the LRCI and Marxist Theory
[First printed in 1917 #13, 1994]
In a recent polemic on the collapse of the Soviet Union (see accompanying article) Keith Harvey, a leading theoretician of the League for a Revolutionary Communist International (LRCI) alleges that the roots of the International Bolshevik Tendency’s ‘‘anti-Trotskyist method’’ can be traced to an erroneous position on the Cuban Revolution originally developed by the Spartacist League of the 1960s.
We welcome the opportunity to take up the LRCI’s views on this question, since the Cuban Revolution is of particular importance for post-war Trotskyism. The Cuban events helped clarify important aspects of the social overturns in China, Yugoslavia and Vietnam after World War II. The key question, in the words of the LRCI’s leading section, the British Workers Power (WP) group, is:
‘‘…how has capitalism been overthrown in a whole series of countries without the independent action of the working class playing the decisive role, and what are the implications of this for revolutionary strategy?’’
After the overtly counterrevolutionary role played by Moscow in strangling the Spanish Revolution in the 1930s, the Trotskyist movement tended to view Stalinism simply as an anti-revolutionary agency in the working class, not qualitatively different from social democracy. After World War II, the phenomenon of indigenous Stalinist-led insurrectionary peasant movements taking power and liquidating the bourgeoisie without the intervention of either the Soviet bureaucracy or the working class, a phenomenon unforseen by Trotsky, created a ‘‘crisis of theory’’ for his followers.
Pabloism and Post-War Stalinism
The leadership of the Fourth International, headed by Michel Pablo, concluded that the Stalinists could be forced to ‘‘roughly outline a revolutionary orientation,’’ and foresaw ‘‘centuries’’ of deformed workers’ states on the horizon. The Pablo leadership, anticipating the imminent outbreak of World War III between the USSR and world imperialism, considered that there was no time to forge independent mass revolutionary parties. Instead they proposed a tactic of ‘‘entrism sui generis’’ in which the existing Trotskyist cadres should dissolve themselves into Stalinist, social-democratic, and even pettybourgeois nationalist parties in order to pressure them to the left.
The leadership of the American Socialist Workers Party (SWP), historically the strongest section of the international, carried out a belated and partial struggle against Pablo’s liquidationism, in which they reasserted the necessity for independent revolutionary (i.e., Trotskyist) parties. While this fight represented a defense of Bolshevism against liquidationism, the SWP’s ‘‘orthodoxy’’ was flawed and one-sided, and too often amounted to little more than a denial that the post-war social overturns posed any new questions. Joseph Hansen spoke for the SWP leadership when he asserted that Stalinism is counterrevolutionary through and through, an erroneous characterization which denied that Stalinist formations could spearhead anti-capitalist social overturns. This empirically false assertion, made in the heat of the struggle against Pablo’s supporters, both reflected the political disorientation of the SWP leadership and contributed to disarming the party cadres politically.
Castroism vs. Trotskyism in the SWP
When Fidel Castro’s petty-bourgeois guerrillas smashed Fulgencio Batista’s neo-colonial regime and the bourgeois state apparatus, and then two years later nationalized the economy, the SWP leadership became Fidelistas and began hailing Castro as an ‘‘unconscious Marxist.’’ This political capitulation laid the basis for a 1963 reunification with the Pabloists, which launched the pseudo-Trotskyist United Secretariat of the Fourth International, today headed by Ernest Mandel.
Opponents of the adaptation to Castroism within the SWP founded the Revolutionary Tendency (RT) to fight the revisionism of the leadership. In a key document, the RT drew a parallel between the course of the Cuban Revolution and the Chinese Revolution led by Mao Tse Tung:
‘‘The transformation of China into a deformed workers state was instituted, not by the working class of China nor primarily because of great pressure from the working class—-it was carried through on top on the initiative of the Maoist bureaucracy itself as a defensive act against imperialism.
‘‘It is now quite clear that Cuba has followed the model of China quite closely. It was primarily the support of the peasantry which pushed Castro into power. The extensive nationalizations were primarily initiated by the regime itself in response to imperialist provocation and not by the working class which generally tailed these events.
‘Cuba makes this process all the more clear precisely because of the central unique feature of the Cuban revolution—- that the transformation into a deformed workers state occurred under the leadership of a party which was not even ostensibly ‘working class,’ by a non-Stalinist petty-bourgeois formation.’’
—-‘‘Cuba and the Deformed Workers States’’
The RT argued that the Castroist guerrillas were no substitute for the class-conscious proletariat, and concluded that the road to socialism could only be opened through a political revolution:
‘‘It is a matter of replacing the rule of a petty-bourgeois apparatus with the rule of the working class itself. Changes in the economic structure would not be so profound, and that is why we characterize such a change as a political, as contrasted to a social revolution.’’
The RT’s essentially correct analysis of the Cuban Revolution cut through many of the theoretical difficulties that had surrounded the post-war social transformations.Moreover, the RT correctly generalized its criticisms of the SWP leadership’s capitulation to Castro, and linked them to the whole adaptationist methodology which destroyed the Fourth International. In its 1962 founding document, the RT wrote:
‘‘Pabloism is essentially a revisionist current within the Trotskyist movement internationally which has lost a revolutionary world perspective during the post-war period of capitalist boom and the subsequent relative inactivity of the working class in the advanced countries. The Pabloites tend to replace the role of the working class and its organized vanguard—-that is, the world Trotskyist movement—-with other forces which seem to offer greater chances of success.’’
—-‘‘In Defense of a Revolutionary Perspective’’
The RT defended the centrality of the subjective factor—- and the importance of the struggle for the Trotskyist program against those who saw the struggle for world revolution as a semi-automatic unfolding objective ‘‘process.’’ In this the RT carried forward the positive aspects of the SWP leadership’s earlier struggle against Pabloist liquidationism, and ensured the political continuity of the struggle of the Left Opposition and the Fourth International under Trotsky. When the RT cadres were bureaucratically expelled from the SWP in 1963, they launched the Spartacist League (SL) which uniquely upheld the heritage of authentic Trotskyism for the next decade and a half, before its qualitative degeneration into the pseudo-Trotskyist obedience cult it is today.
Workers Power’s ‘Degenerated Revolution’
The core of the British Workers Power group emerged from the British International Socialists led by Tony Cliff in the mid-1970s. Cliff’s group had been expelled from the Fourth International in the early 1950s for its cowardly refusal to defend North Korea against U.S. imperialism.Workers Power retained a version of the IS’s nonsensical ‘‘state capitalist’’ analysis of the USSR and the deformed workers’ states for some years after leaving the Cliffites. In the early 1980s it began to distance itself from this position, and began projecting itself as a representative of authentic Trotskyism.
Most of the major international claimants to the tradition of Trotskyism at the time (e.g., groups associated with Ernest Mandel, Gerry Healy or Pierre Lambert) could be easily dismissed politically, but the Revolutionary Tendency (and its successor, the Spartacist League) had to be taken more seriously. The British Spartacist operation, whose cadres were already shell-shocked by several years of brutal and apolitical purges, exerted little appeal. Yet, if the RT alone had been essentially correct on the difficult political questions that had bedeviled post-war Trotskyism, then the legitimacy of Workers Power’s claim to have uniquely reestablished an authentically Trotskyist tendency, and therefore its historical justification for existence, would be called into question.
In the early 1980s Workers Power devoted considerable resources to an internal re-examination of the history of the Russian question and the Trotskyist movement.The fruit of this work was the publication in 1982 of a lengthy pamphlet entitled The Degenerated Revolution.This was an attempt to analyze the whole phenomenon of Stalinism, particularly the post-war social overturns, and to settle accounts with WP’s previous ‘‘state capitalist’’ analysis.
For a small group it was an ambitious undertaking, and much of the history of the post-war period was competently sketched. But the tract’s opaque and confusionist theoretical generalizations suggest that the group’s leadership was as concerned that Workers Power’s insights be original and unique as anything else.
The authors, who had for years mistaken the bureaucratized workers’ states for capitalist ones, boldly claimed to be the first people to understand the whole problem of the post-war property transformations. ‘‘The plain truth is that the elements of the shattered Trotskyist tradition have never fully understood the real nature of the Stalinist regimes’’ intoned the WP theoreticians. While they themselves only recently discovered that Cliff’s state capitalist theory was ‘‘wrong, and that Trotsky’s analysis provided a correct alternative’’ they went on to add: ‘‘Correct, but not fully developed….’’
In ‘‘developing’’ Trotsky’s analysis, WP was particularly concerned to demonstrate that all previous attempts to deal with the question, particularly those of the RT, were inadequate. To launch The Degenerated Revolution in 1982, Workers Power invited the Spartacist League/Britain (SL/B) to participate in a public debate. But the SL/B, itself already badly degenerated, chose to avoid a political confrontation and instead staged a stupid macho provocation (see Spartacist Britain, December 1982). This let Workers Power’s leaders off the hook politically and reinforced the impression among their followers that their critique of the RT’s position was unassailable.
LRCI’s Critique of the RT on Cuba
In his recent polemic against us (see Trotskyist International No. 11) Keith Harvey purports to trace the root of IBT errors on the Russian question to the RT/SL’s position on Cuba:
‘‘In attempting to analyse the Cuban Revolution the leaders of the Spartacists developed the idea that the Castro bonapartist regime in 1959 and 1960 did not defend either capitalism or any other set of property relations. Rather it was a petit- bourgeois government that was uncommitted to the defence of either….until Castro finally jumped into the camp of Stalinism under the hostile pressure of the USA and turned Cuba into a deformed workers’ state.’’
—-Trotskyist International, No. 11, May 1993
The LRCI rejects such notions, and argues that a bonapartist petty-bourgeois regime like that of Castroists in 1959-60 ‘‘can oscillate under the pressure of more fundamental forces between defending first one and later a different set of property relations…’’ (Ibid.)
We shall come back to the Kautskyist implications of imagining that states can ‘‘oscillate’’ between defending the interests of one social class and another. For the moment we wish to consider the LRCI’s charge that our supposed methodological error of ‘‘attribut[ing] the class character of the state to the subjective intentions of the office holders.’’ This same criticism is made in The Degenerated Revolution, where Workers Power asserts that those who argue that ‘‘a state is defined as ‘armed bodies of men dedicated to defending a particular property form’’’ have an ‘‘idealist notion of the relationship between property relations and the state machine.’’
Against such ‘‘idealism’’ WP sagely pronounces that, ‘‘We judge the class nature of a state by its actions, not by the ‘dedication’ of the individuals who make up its apparatus.’’ The question is not one of the personal dedication of individual functionaries to the performance of their duties, but the connection of the apparatus of repression to the interests of a particular social class, i.e., to the defense of a particular set of property relations. This can only be assessed on the basis of its actions. It is simply an empirical fact that in Cuba for almost two years the Castroite July 26 Movement possessed a monopoly of political and military power, but its actions demonstrated that it was neither committed to defending private property nor to expropriating it.
The petty-bourgeois Castroist apparatus, after first establishing a monopoly of armed force, proceeded to organize the administration of governmental functions on the national, regional and municipal level. The bourgeoisie was politically and militarily, but not economically, expropriated. Prior to the massive expropriation of foreign and domestic capital in the autumn of 1960, the July 26 Movement was not definitively committed either to a system of private or collectivized property. The Castroite apparatus at this point was only ‘‘committed’ to the defense of its political monopoly and could not therefore be considered to constitute a state in the Marxist sense, i.e., an armed body defending a particular form of property.
Trotsky described the Stalinist bureaucracy in the USSR as a petty-bourgeois caste which grew up within the administrative apparatus of the besieged workers’ state and appropriated the role of ‘‘gendarme.’’ In Cuba, the Castroist bureaucracy played the role of ‘‘gendarme,’’ but it existed before the creation of the collectivized economy and indeed, was instrumental in creating it. The July 26 Movement originated as a radical nationalist movement which aspired to rid Cuba of the corrupt, neo-colonial Batista regime and open the road for the free development of the patriotic bourgeoisie. In 1959-60, as the Castroists came into increasingly sharp conflict with the Cuban bourgeoisie and their U.S. godfathers, the July 26 Movement split, and a right wing, led by Hubert Matos, went over to the imperialists. In the end, the Castro leadership refused to knuckle under to Washington and opted instead for collectivizing the economy.
The ability of the July 26 Movement to make such a choice was conditioned by a number of factors: the destruction of Batista’s state apparatus, the absence of the working class as an independent political factor, and the existence of the bureaucratized Soviet workers’ state which was willing and able to provide military and economic support.
LRCI on Cuban Revolution: ‘Predominantly Counter-revolutionary’
According to Workers Power, when the Castroists took power they formed a ‘‘popular front’’ which defended capitalism while presiding over a ‘‘nine-month period of dual power.’’ The ‘‘fragmentation of state power’’ in this period ‘‘ran through the army and the J26M itself.’’ But it is a mistake to talk of ‘‘dual power’’ in Cuba in 1959. The period in which there was a sort of ‘‘dual power’’ ended when the guerrilla army marched triumphantly into Havana on New Year’s Eve. The July 26 Movement was riven with internal contradictions, but its military and political hegemony was undisputed. There was no dual power in society.
According to Workers Power’s chronology, by ‘‘November 1959, the popular front had been ended, along with the duality of power.’’ At this point the LRCI claim that the Castroists established a ‘‘bourgeois workers’ and peasants’ government’’ which, in turn, was somehow transmogrified in the summer of 1960 into a ‘‘bureaucratic anti-capitalist workers’ government’’ which proceeded to carry out large-scale expropriations of the capitalists. Finally, ‘‘From the implementation of the first Five Year Plan in 1962, we can speak of the creation of a degenerate workers’ state in Cuba.’’ Their conclusion is that ‘‘Castro, who in 1959 was a bonaparte for the enfeebled Cuban bourgeoisie was, by 1962, a bonaparte ‘for’ the politically expropriated Cuban working class.’’
Workers Power presented this confused and arbitrary schema as an important contribution to Marxist theory. In fact it contains a profound revision of the Marxist understanding of the state as an instrument of coercion used by one class against another. According to the LRCI, in January 1959 Castro headed a Cuban ‘‘state’ which ‘‘defended capitalism,’’ yet which, over the next several years, gradually evolved into a (deformed) workers’ state. This is the background to Keith Harvey’s doubletalk about how:
‘‘It is well within the Marxist understanding of Bonapartism to recognise that a petit-bourgeois regime can oscillate under the pressure of more fundamental forces between defending first one and later a different set of property relations. It does not mean that the governmental regime becomes detached from the state which it administers. The class character of the state is defined as always by whatever social form of property exists and is actually being defended by bodies of armed men and women.’’
Clear as mud. You see, we can have ‘‘a petit-bourgeois regime’’ which oscillates between classes without ever becoming ‘‘detached from the state which it administers.’’ Harvey thinks the ‘‘class character of the state’’ in the case of such oscillations can be determined by the activity of such a regime at any given instant—-when it acts for the capitalists, it is a capitalist state, but, if it takes some action that favors working people, it becomes a workers’ state. The kind of ‘‘Marxism’’ that ‘‘understands’ such notions is called Kautskyism.
Lenin attacked the idea that a bourgeois state can be transformed into an instrument to serve the interests of the oppressed:
‘‘That the state is an organ of the rule of a definite class which cannot be reconciled with its antipode (the class opposite to it), is something the petty-bourgeois democrats will never be able to understand.’’
—-State and Revolution
Lenin categorically rejected the idea that an oscillating petty-bourgeois regime (or anything else) can turn a capitalist state into an instrument for social revolution:
‘‘Revolution consists not in the new class commanding, governing with the aid of the old state machine, but in this class smashing this machine and commanding, governing with the aid of a new machine. Kautsky slurs over this basic idea of Marxism, or he had utterly failed to understand it.’’
The LRCI position on Cuba slurs over this same basic idea. The historic position developed by the RT/SL, which we defend, is the only way in which the genesis of the Cuban deformed workers’ state can be explained without doing violence to either the actual historical events or the Marxist understanding of the state as an organ of class rule.
Where the Pabloists identified the Cuban Revolution with the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the RT recognized that although the Castroists expropriated the bourgeoisie, the bureaucratic regime they established was an obstacle to the further development of the revolution, and had to be removed through workers’ political revolution. At the same time, the RT recognized that the destruction of capitalism in Cuba, China and Vietnam represented historic gains for the international working class despite the bureaucratic deformations of the Stalinist regimes that came to power.
The LRCI draws precisely the opposite conclusion The Workers Power pamphlet baldly asserts: ‘‘Whilst gains were made for and by the working class….the Cuban overturn had a predominantly counter-revolutionary character’’ (emphasis added). This echoes the arguments of Tony Cliff and other pseudo-Marxists who renounced the social content of the anti-capitalist overturns because they objected to the character of the bureaucratic Stalinist political regimes that issued from them.
While in theory defending collectivized property, the LRCI has repeatedly in practice ascribed a progressive dynamic to the champions of capitalist restoration, from Polish Solidarnosc in 1981, to the movement for capitalist reunification in East Germany, to Boris Yeltsin’s rabble in Moscow in 1991. If some gang of pro-imperialist gusanos in Havana were to attempt to oust the Castroists and reverse the results of what Workers Power considers a ‘‘predominantly counter-revolutionary’’ social revolution, we suppose that the LRCI will once again throw its support to the forces of capitalist restoration. In that case we will find ourselves, once again, on the opposite side of the barricades from the LRCI and the rest of the centrists and social democrats who inhabit the Third Camp.
The core of the RT’s position on the Cuban Revolution is as clear and logically compelling today as it was three decades ago. Fidel Castro led a victorious peasant-based guerrilla insurrection which, in the absence of the working class as an independent political factor, smashed capitalist property relations and established a society modeled on the degenerated Soviet workers’ state. The lesson of Cuba is, as the revolutionary Spartacist League stated in 1966, that:
‘‘the petty-bourgeois peasantry, under the most favorable historic circumstances conceivable could achieve no third road, neither capitalist, nor working class. Instead all that has come out of China and Cuba was a state of the same order as that issuing out of the political counter-revolution of Stalin in the Soviet Union, the degeneration of October. That is why we are led to define states such as these as deformed workers states. And the experience since the Second World War, properly understood, offers not a basis for revisionist turning away from the perspective and necessity of revolutionary working-class power, but rather it is a great vindication of Marxian theory and conclusions under new and not previously expected circumstances.’’
Documento Principal da Tendência Revisionista do Coletivo Lenin
A premissa econômica da revolução proletária já alcançou há muito o ponto mais elevado que possa ser atingido sob o capitalismo. As forças produtivas da humanidade deixaram de crescer. As novas invenções e os novos progressos técnicos não conduzem mais a um crescimento da riqueza material.(Programa de transição)
De tudo o que dissemos sobre a essência econômica do- imperialismo deduz-se que se deve qualificá-lo de capitalismo de transição ou, mais propriamente, de capitalismo agonizante. (…) Quando uma grande empresa se transforma em empresa gigante e organiza sistematicamente (…), quando a distribuição desses produtos se efetua segundo um plano único a dezenas e centenas de milhões de consumidores (…) percebe-se que as relações de economia e de propriedade privadas constituem um invólucro que não corresponde já ao conteúdo, que esse invólucro deve inevitavelmente decompor-se se a sua supressão for adiada artificialmente, que pode permanecer em estado de decomposição durante um período relativamente longo (no pior dos casos, se a cura do tumor oportunista se prolongar demasiado), mas que, de qualquer modo, será inelutavelmente suprimida.(Imperialismo, etapa superior do capitalismo)
Uma nova época nasceu. Época de desagregação do capitalismo, de sua derrocada interior. Época da revolução comunista do proletariado.O sistema imperialista desaba. Problemas nas colônias, fermentação entre as pequenas nacionalidades até o momento privadas de independência revoltas do proletariado, revoluções proletárias vitoriosas em vários países, decomposição dos exércitos imperialistas, incapacidade absoluta das classes dirigentes de conduzir doravante os destinos dos povos – tal é o quadro da situação atual no mundo inteiro.A humanidade, cuja cultura foi totalmente devastada, está ameaçada de destruição. Apenas uma força é capaz de salvá-la, e esta força é o proletariado. A antiga “ordem capitalista” morreu. Não pode mais existir. O resultado final dos processos capitalistas de produção é o caos, – e este caos só pode ser vencido pela maior classe produtora, a classe operária. Ela é que deve instituir a ordem verdadeira, a ordem comunista. Ela deve vencer a dominação do capital, tornar as guerras impossível, anular a fronteiras entre os países, transformar o mundo numa vasta comunidade que trabalha para si mesma, realizar a solidariedade fraternal e a libertação dos povos.
II. O PERÍODO DA DECADÊNCIA DO CAPITALISMOApós a análise da situação econômica e mundial, o 3º Congresso pode comprovar com absoluta precisão que o capitalismo, depois de haver realizado sua missão de desenvolver as forças produtivas, caiu em contradição irredutível não somente com as necessidades da evolução histórica atual, mas sim também com as condições mais elementares da existência humana. Esta contradição fundamental se refletiu particularmente na última guerra imperialista e foi agravada por esta guerra que comoveu, de modo mais profundo, o regime de produção e de circulação. O capitalismo, que desse modo sobreviveu em si mesmo, entrou em uma fase em que a ação destruidora de suas forças desencadearam a ruína e a perda das conquistas econômicas criadoras e realizadas pelo proletariado em meio as cadeias da escravidão capitalista.O quadro geral da ruína da economia capitalista não é atenuado em absoluto pelas flutuações inevitáveis próprias do sistema capitalista, tanto em sua decadência como em sua ascensão. As tentativas realizadas pelos economistas nacionais burgueses e sociais democráticos por apresentar um melhoramento verificado na segunda metade de 1921 nos EUA e em menor medida no Japão e Inglaterra, em parte também na França e outros países, como um indício do restabelecimento do equilíbrio capitalista se baseia na vontade de alterar os feitos e na falta de perspicácia dos lacaios do capital. O 3º Congresso, bem antes do começo da expansão industrial atual, havia previsto que no futuro mais ou menos próximo, com a precisão possível, como uma onda superficial sobre o fundo da destruição crescente da economia capitalista. Já é possível prever claramente que se a expansão atual da indústria não é suscetível (não pode receber modificações), a não ser em um futuro distante, restabelecendo o equilíbrio capitalista de sanar as feridas abertas provocadas pela guerra, a próxima crise cíclica, cuja ação coincidirá com a linha principal da destruição capitalista não fará se não agudizar todas as manifestações desta última, e em conseqüência, em grande medida elevará a uma situação revolucionária.Até sua morte, o capitalismo será presa de suas flutuações cíclicas. Só a tomada do poder pelo proletariado e a revolução mundial socialista poderá salvar a humanidade desta catástrofe permanente provocada pela persistência do capitalismo moderno.Atualmente, o capitalismo está vivendo sua agonia. Sua destruição é inevitável.
Quando mais violentamente o capital empreende a destruição de todos os estratos não-capitalistas, em casa e no mundo externo, mais ele rebaixa o padrão de vida dos trabalhadores como um todo, também maior é a mudança na história cotidiana do capital. Ele se torna uma cadeia de desastres e convulsões políticas e sociais e, sob essas condições, pontuadas por crises ou catástrofes econômicas periódicas, a acumulação não pode continuar mais.Mas, mesmo antes que esse impasse econômico natural criado pelo próprio capital seja atingido, se torna uma necessidade para a classe operária internacional se revoltar contra o seu domínio.(A Acumulação do Capital)
II – Em que Deve Constituir a Preparação Imediata da Ditadura do Proletariado5.O desenvolvimento atual do movimento comunista internacional é caracterizado pelo fato que em grande número de países capitalistas o trabalho de preparação do proletariado para o exercício da ditadura não acabou e em muitos deles sequer começou de forma sistemática. Disso não decorre que a revolução proletária seja impossível num futuro próximo; ela é, ao contrário, tudo o que há de mais possível, a situação política e econômica apresenta-se extraordinariamente rica em materiais inflamáveis e em causas suscetíveis de provocar sua agitação inopinada; um outro fator da revolução, fora do estado de preparação do proletariado, é notadamente a crise geral em que se encontram todos os partidos governantes e todos os partidos burgueses. Mas resulta do que foi dito que a tarefa atual dos Partidos Comunistas consiste em acelerar a revolução, sem todavia provocá-la artificialmente, sem haver antes uma preparação suficiente; a preparação do proletariado para a revolução deve ser intensificada pela ação. De outra parte, os casos acima assinalados na história de muitos partidos socialistas obrigam a velar para que o reconhecimento da ditadura do proletariado não seja puramente verbal.Por essas razões, a tarefa principal do Partido Comunista, do ponto de vista do movimento proletário internacional, é, presentemente, o agrupamento de todas as forças comunistas dispersas; a formação, em cada país, de um Partido Comunista único ou o fortalecimento e renovação dos partidos já existentes a fim de decuplicar o trabalho de preparação do proletariado para a conquista do poder sob a forma da ditadura do proletariado. A ação socialista habitual dos grupos e partidos que reconhecem a ditadura do proletariado está longe de ter sofrido alguma modificação fundamental; essa renovação radical é necessária, porque nela se reconhece a ação como sendo comunista e como correspondendo às tarefas da ditadura do proletariado.
A base econômica do oportunismo e do social-chauvinismo é a mesma: os interesses de uma ínfima camada de operários privilegiados e da pequena-burguesia, que defendem a sua situação privilegiada, o seu ‘direito’ às migalhas dos lucros obtidos pela ‘sua’ burguesia nacional com a pilhagem de outras nações, com as vantagens da sua situação de grande potência etc.(O Socialismo e a Guerra)
Atualmente já possuímos uma experiência internacional bastante considerável, experiência que demonstra, com absoluta clareza, que alguns dos aspectos fundamentais da nossa revolução não têm apenas significado local, particularmente nacional, russo, mas revestem-se, também, de significação internacional, E não me refiro à significação internacional no sentido amplo da palavra: não são apenas alguns, mas sim todos os aspectos fundamentais – e muitos secundários – da nossa revolução que têm significado internacional quanto à influência que exercem sobre todos os países. Refiro-me ao sentido mais estrito da palavra, isto é, entendendo por significado internacional a sua transcendência mundial ou a inevitabilidade histórica de que se repita em escala universal o que aconteceu no nosso país, significado que deve ser reconhecido em alguns dos aspectos fundamentais da nossa revolução.(Esquerdismo, doença infantil do comunismo)
1) toda propaganda e agitação cotidiana devem ter caráter efetivamente comunista e dirigida por comunistas;2) toda organização desejosa de aderir à IC deve afastar de suas posições os dirigentes comprometidos com o reformismo;3) em quase todos os países da Europa e da América, a luta de classes se mantém no período de guerra civil. Os comunistas não podem, nessas condições, se fiar na legalidade burguesa. É de seu dever criar, em todo lugar, paralelamente à organização legal, um organismo clandestino;4) o dever de propagar as idéias comunistas implica a necessidade absoluta de conduzir uma propaganda e uma agitação sistemática e perseverante entre as tropas;5) uma agitação racional e sistemática no campo é necessária;6) todo partido desejoso de pertencer à IC tem por dever não só o de denunciar o social-patriotismo como o seu social-pacifismo, hipócrita e falso;7) todos os partidos desejosos de pertencer à IC devem romper completamente com o reformismo e a política do centro. A IC exige, imperativamente e sem discussão, essa ruptura, que deve ser feita no mais breve de tempo;8) nas colônias, os partidos devem ter uma linha de conduta particularmente clara e nítida;9) todo partido desejoso de pertencer à IC deve realizar uma propaganda perseverante e sistemática nos sindicatos, cooperativas e outras organizações das massas operárias;10) todo partido pertencente à IC tem o dever de combater com energia e tenacidade a Internacional do sindicatos amarelos de Amsterdã;11) todos os partidos desejosos de pertencer à IC devem rever a composição de suas frações parlamentares;12) os partidos pertencentes à IC devem ser construídos com base no princípio do centralismo democrático;13) os partidos comunistas, onde são legais, devem ser depurados periodicamente para afastar os elementos pequeno-burgueses;14) os partidos desejosos de entrar na IC devem sustentar, sem reservas, todas as repúblicas soviéticas nas suas lutas com a contra-revolução;15) os partidos que ainda conservam os antigos programas socialdemocratas têm o dever de revê-los e, sem demora, elaborar um novo programa comunista adaptado às condições especiais de seu país e no espírito da IC;16) todas as decisões do Congresso da IC e de seu Comitê Executivo são obrigatórias para todos os partidos filiados à IC;17) todos os partidos aderentes à IC devem modificar o nome e se intitular “Partido Comunista”. A mudança não é simples formalidade e, sim, de uma importância política considerável, para distingui-los dos partidos socialdemocratas ou socialistas, que venderam a bandeira da classe operária;18) todos os órgãos dirigentes e da imprensa do partido são importados do Comitê Executivo da IC;19) todos os partidos pertencentes à IC são obrigados a se reunir, quatro meses após o II congresso da IC, para opinar sobre essas 21 condições;20) os partidos que quiserem aderir, mas que não mudaram radicalmente a sua antiga tática, devem preliminarmente cuidar para que 2/3 dos membros de seu comitê central e das instituições centrais sejam compostos de camaradas que, antes do II Congresso, tenham se pronunciado pela adesão do partido à IC;21) os aderentes partidários que rejeitam as condições e as teses da IC devem ser excluídos do partido. O mesmo deve se dar com os delegados ao Congresso Extraordinário
8 – A II Internacional se dividiu em três grupos principais: os social-patriotas declarados que, durante toda a guerra imperialista dos anos de 1914-1918, sustentaram sua própria burguesia e transformaram a classe operária em carrasco da revolução internacional; o “centro” cujo dirigente teórico atualmente é Kautsky, que representa uma organização de elementos constantemente oscilantes, incapazes de seguir uma linha determinada, constituindo-se, muitas vezes em verdadeiros traidores; e, enfim, a ala esquerda revolucionária.9 – Com relação aos social-patriotas que, por toda parte, nos momentos críticos, se recusaram a pegar em armas para a revolução proletária, só a luta implacável é possível. Com relação ao “centro” – a tática de esgotamento dos elementos revolucionários, crítica implacável e desmascaramento dos chefes. Em certa etapa do desenvolvimento, a separação organizativa dos elementos do centro é absolutamente necessária.
A conferência socialista de Berna, em fevereiro de 1919, foi uma tentativa de galvanizar o que restava da Segunda Internacional.A composição da Conferência de Berna demonstrou que o proletariado revolucionário de todo o mundo nada tem em comum com esta conferência.O proletariado vitorioso da Rússia, o proletariado heróico da Alemanha, o proletariado italiano, o partido comunista do proletariado austríaco e húngaro, o proletariado suíço, a classe operária da Bulgária, Romênia, Sérvia, os partidos operários de esquerda suecos, noruegueses, finlandeses, o proletariado ucraniano, letão, polonês, a Juventude Internacional, a Internacional de Mulheres, recusaram-se ostensivamente a participar da Conferência de Berna dos social-patriotas (= as seções da IC!).
No desenvolvimento das forças produtivas chega-se a um ponto em que nascem forças produtivas e meios de circulação que só podem ser nefastos no quadro das relações existentes, e que não são mais forças produtivas, e sim forças destrutivas…
Particularmente significativa, mas ainda muito escassamente considerada pelos economistas, é a profunda mudança que estamos atualmente sofrendo no que se refere à taxa de expansão extensiva. É importante integrar estreitamenteo aumento da população com os outros fatores sobre os quais se baseia a expansão, incluídos a expansão territorial e o progresso tecnológico. Com efeito, dificilmente se poderá colocar em discussão o fato de que um aumento contínuo da população, à taxa experimentada no séxulo XIX, apresentaria dentro em breve problemas insolúveis. Isso, naturalmente, deve-se ao fato de que não temos mais a rápida expansão territorial extensiva por todo o mundo que tínhamos anteriormente. A coisa mais importante a notar é o declínio da expansãoextensiva, a qual implicava tanto um aumento da população quanto uma expansão territorial.(Política Fiscal e Ciclos Econômicos)
Conforme a nossa teoria, esse desenvolvimento é uma necessidade que se confirma pelo simples fato de que o modo de produção capitalista tem os seus limites, que não pode ultrapassar. Deve chegar uma época, e talvez essa época se encontre muito próxima, a partir da qual se torne impossível o mercado mundial, mesmo que só transitoriamente, se expansa mais rapidamente que as forças produtivas sociais, com o que, em todas as nações industriais, a superprodução se torna crônica.(Teorias das Crises)
Atacaram violentamente a proposição do Manifesto referente à tendência do capitalismo baixar o nível de vida dos trabalhadores, e ainda reduzir-los à pobreza. Padres, professores, ministros, jornalistas, teóricos socialdemocratas e dirigentes sindicais saíram a enfrentar a chamada “teoria da pauperização”. Invariavelmente, encontravam sinais de crescente prosperidade entre os trabalhadores, faznedo a situação da aristocracia operária passar como a de todo o proletariado, ou tomando como perdurável alguma tendência momentânea. Enquanto isso, até o desenvolvimento do capitalismo mais poderoso do mundo, o dos EUA, converteu milhões de trabalhadores em mendigo mantidos às expensas da caridade federal, municipal ou privada.
Quando o desenvolvimento da indústria atingir o seu apogeu e o mercado mundial iniciar a fase descedente, a luta sindical tornar-se-á difícil: 1º, porque as conjunturas objectivas do mercado serão desfavoráveis à força do trabalho, a procura da força de trabalho aumentará mais lentamente e a oferta mais ràpidamente, o que não é o caso actual; 2º, porque o próprio capital para se compensar das perdas sofridas no mercado mundial, se esforçará por reduzir a parte do produto pertencente aos operários. A redução dos salários não é, em resumo, segundo Marx, um dos principais meios de travar a baixa das taxas de lucro? (ver Marx, Capital, livro III, cap. XIV, 2, Tomo X, p, 162). A Inglaterra oferece-nos o exemplo do princípio do segundo estádio do movimento sindical. Nessa fase, a luta reduz-se necessàriamente e cada vez mais à simples defesa dos direitos adquiridos e mesmo isso é cada vez mais difícil. Esta é a tendência geral da evolução cuja contrapartida deve ser o desenvolvimento da luta de classe política e social.
Nós definiremos o neocapitalismo como o último estágio no desenvolvimento do capitalismo monopolista, em que uma combinação de fatores – inovação tecnológica acelerada, economia de guerra permanente, expansão da revolução colonial – transferiram a fonte principal de lucros monopolistas dos países coloniais para os próprios países imperialistas, e fizeram as corporações gigantes mais independentes e mais vulneráveis.Mais independentes, porque a enorme acumulação de superlucros monopolistas permite a essas corporações, através de mecanismos de investimentos por preços e autofinanciamento, e com a ajuda da manipulação dos custos de venda, distribuição e despesas de pesquisa e desenvolvimento, se libertarem do controle estrito pelosbancos e pelo capital financeiro, que caracterizava os monopólios da épocadeLênin e Hilferding. Mais vulneráveis, porque o encurtamento do ciclo do capital fixo, o fenômeno crescente da capacidade ociosa, o declínio relativo dos consumidores em meios não-capitalistas e, não menos importante, o desafiocrescente das forças não-capitalistas no mundo (os assim chamados países socialistas, a revolução colonial e, pelo menos potencialmente, a classe operária nas metrópoles) semearam até nas menores flutuações e crises a semente de perigosas explosões e do colapso total.(Os trabalhadores sob o Neocapitalismo)
A questão que foi posta: O papel da classe operária não mudou fundamentalmente nesse ambiente modificado? O alto nível de emprego a longo prazo e o aumento dos salários reais não cortam qualquer potencial revolucionário da classe operária? Elanão estámudando a sua composição, se divorciando cada vez mais do processo produtivo, como resultado da automação crescente? As suas relações com outros setores da sociedade, como os trabalhadores de escritório, técnicos, intelectuais, estudantes, sofrem modificações básicas? (…)O capitalismo clássico educou os trabalhadores para lutarem por saláriosmaiores e menos horas de trabalho na fábrica. O Neocapitalimo educa o trabalhador para questionar a divisão da renda nacional e a orientação do investimento no nível superior da economia como um todo.A lógica de todas essas tendências coloca o problema do controle operário no centro da luta de classes.
A inexistência de uma crise como a de 1929 no pós-guerra – ou seja, umchoque que comova todo o mundo capitalista, do centro até a periferia – o boom econômico dos países imperialistas (a partir pelo menos de 1950), mais a combinação desses elementos com um espetacular desenvolvimento tecnológico, levaram o revisionismo a levantar uma nova concepção econômica antimarxista.Ela sustenta, em primeiro lugar, que uma nova etapa se abriu, a neocapitalista ou neoimperialista, que se diferencia da imperialista, definida por Lênin como de decadência total, de crise crônica da economia capitalista. Generalizando abusivamente estes novos fatos, essa nova corrente teoricopolítica aceita tanto a teoriadoseconomistas burgueses como a da burocracia, e a transporta para as nossas fileiras como uma teoriaeconômica a serviço da sua capitulação aos aparatos burocráticos.A segunda revisão – a principal – é a afirmação de que, nessa suposta nova etapa, as forças produtivas vivem um desenvolvimento colossal, graças ao enorme progresso tecnológico. É uma concepção anticlassista e antihumana, e justamente abase de sustentação dos ideólogos do imperialismo.Para os marxistas, o desenvolvimento das forças produtivas é uma categoria formada por trêselementos: o homem, a técnica e a natureza. E a principal força produtiva éo homem: concretamente, a classe operária, o campesinato e todos os trabalhadores. Por isso, consideramos que o desenvolvimento técnico não é o desenvolvimento das forças produtivas se não permite o enriquecimento do homem e da natureza, ou seja, um maior domínioda natureza por parte do homem e deste sobre a sua sociedade .A técnica – como também a ciência e a educação – são fenômenos neutros que se transformam em produtivos ou destrutivos de acordo com a utilização classista que se dê a eles. A energia atômica é uma colossal descoberta científica e técnica, mas transformada em bomba atômica é uma grande tragédia para a humanidade, nada tem a ver com o progresso das forças produtivas, e sim com o das forças destrutivas. A ciência e a técnica podem originar o enriquecimento do homem – desenvolver as forças produtivas – ou a decadência e a destruição do homem. Depende da sua utilização, e a sua utilização depende da classe que as tenha em mãos. Atualmente, o desenvolvimento das forças produtivas não só está freado pela existência do imprialismo e da propriedade privada capitalista, como também pela existência dos estados nacionais, entre os quais incluímos todos os estados operários burocratizados. Na época da agonia do capitalismo, esses estados nacionais cumprem o mesmo papel nefasto que os feudos no período de transição do feudalismo ao capitalismo.Nesse pós-guerra, vimos o desenvolvimento colossal da indústria armamentista, ou seja, das forças destrutivas da sociedade, e também um desenvolvimento da técnica que levou a um empobrecimento do homem, a uma crise da humanidade, a guerras crescentes, e a um começo de destruição da natureza. Oatual desenvolvimento da economia capitalista e burocrática tem uma tendência crescente à destruição do homem e da natureza humanizada. A análise revisionista nesse ponto é árcial e analítia, porque não define nem as consequências do desenvolvimento nem suas tendências.Se o revisionismo tivesse razão, as suas concepções significariam que entramos em uma época reformista em que se trata de se obter a maior parte possível a favor dos trabalhadores dentro desse processo de desenvolvimento progressivo. Se fosse assim, toda a concepção do Programa de Transição estaria errada. Mas a atualetapa docapitalismo produz miséria crescente para as massas. O domínio da economia mundial pelo imperialismo é uma trava ao desenvolvimento das forças produtivas. E o marxismo, o leninismo e o trotkismo estão mais vigentes do que nunca, porque são a única ciência que explica porque se abre uma etapa revolucionária: porque o deenvolvimento das forças produtivas é travado pelo regime social dominante, até o grau que provoca uma decadência, uma crise no desenvolvimento das mesmas.A terceira revisão é consequência da anterior: se as forças produtivas se desenvolvem sob o neocapitalismo, os trabalhadores melhoram constante e sistematicamente seu nível de vida em escala mundial. O grave problema para as massas deixa de ser a miséria, já que, ao consumir cada vez mais, se alienam.Os fatos foram tão categóricos contra essa teoria revisionista que, hoje em dia, de forma envergonhada, eles tratam de ocultá-la. Mas essa era a posição oficial do revisionismo na década de sessenta: a miséria das massas é relativa, já que sempremelhoram seu nível de vida, e não absoluta, como assegura o marxismo para a época imperialista. Os fatos e a concepção marxista ortodoxa sustentam que se abre uma etapa revolucionária quando a vida se torna insustentável para as massas, quando há desemprego, miséria crescente, queda do salário etc. A economia capitalista e imperialista, tanto quanto a burocrática, em sua etapa de crise definitiva, de putrefação e enfrentamento com a revolução socialista mundial, é a etapa da miséria crescente do movimento de massas em seu conjunto. O revisionismo tomou, como referência para formular a sua teoria, a situação da classe operária nos países avançados durante o boom, e não todas as massas.A quarta revisão é a que sustenta que desapareceram as cirses econômicas do tipo de 1929 no imperialismo, o qual, ao contrário, vive um boom econômico sustentado. Essa concepção ignora que o boom é excepcional e conjuntural e, em consequência, os fatos que assim o explicam. A suposta nova etapa não é, na verdade, outra coisa que a da economia capitalista em sua crise definitiva, de putrefação, deenfrentamento com a revolução socialista mundial. A atual economia imperialista , incluido seu boom, só pode ser entendida como parte dependente do político e do social, ligada ao processo total daluta entre a revolução socialista internacional e a contrarrevolução no mundo. A política dominou a economia nessa época, e com o método revisionista de separação não se pode entender nada.São so grandes acontecimentos políticos de pós-guerra que exolicam a falta deuma crise como a de 1929, e não o automatismo económico por si só. Todos os fenômenos econômicos “anormais”, em última instância, têm a ver com a política contrarrevolucionária do Kremlin e do stalinismo no mundo. Sem essa política consciente, não teria havido o boom econômico, nem o Plano Marshall, nem o levantamento da economia alemã e japonesa, nem da europeia em seu conjunto, e teríamos presenciado crises muito superiores à do ano de 1929 nos países capitalistas avançados. O fato de que não tenha sido assim não tem a ver com as tendências mais poderosas da economia capitalista em seu estado de putrefação, ou seja, não surge de um fenômeno econômico, e sim de fenômenos políticos tais como, por exemplo, que o Kremlin tenha ordenado aos partidos comunistas ocidentais que apoiassem o restabelecimento da economia capitalista devastada pelasegunda guerra imperialista, fazendo com que a classe operária se sacrificasse para levantar essas economias capitalistas.
O sistema capitalista, para sobreviver, só coloca uma perspectiva à frente da humanidade: o da queda na barbárie. O imperialismo não pode desenvolver as forças produtivas, porque a propriedade dos meios de produção continua em mãos privadas, com aeconomiamundial dividida em uma série deestados-nação rivais.Essas contradições básicas e inescapáveis estiveram sempre presentes durante o boom relativo que o capitalismo experimentou depois da última guerra, mesmo que essas contradições não se revelassem abertamente “na superfície”.Nossa perspectiva em economia deve partir, portanto, da natureza da presente época, caracterizada porum sistema social, o capitalismo, em crise, em que a crise de direção da classe é a questão principal. O capitalismo sobreviveu neste século, não por causa de sua força inerente, mas somente porque a classe trabalhadora foi incapaz de resolver essa crise de direção e tomar partido da série de crises econômicas e sociais que abalaram o sistema capitalista no curso desse século. O período desde 1945 não foi exceção a essa caracterização.
A marca do revisionismo de Mandel é que ele não consegue fazeruma análise da crise que se aproxima, e pode apenas repetir como um papagaio que 1929-1932 nunca vai se repetir… Como osrevisionistas antes dele, Mandel não vê tendências dominantes no modo de produção capitalista para o colapso. (…) Enquanto Mandel e seus colegas, os economistas burgueses e stalinistas, estudam o modo de produção capitalista com preocupação, as suas contradições, esclarecidas por Marx, estão levando à depressão, guerra e revolução socialista.
Não, a origem da teoria das ondas longas de Mandel é política, não econômica. É um meio desonesto e objetivista de se desculpar pelo fato de que, durante os anos 1960, ele descartou a classe trabalhadora dos países imperialistas como força revolucionária. Nesse tempo, ele não se referia a “capitalismo tardio”, e sim “neocapitalismo”, baseado na “terceira revolução industrial” da automação eenergia nuclear. No seu livro Uma Introdução à Teoria Econômica Marxista, Mandel declara que: “A fase neocapitalista que estamos testemunhando agora é a de uma expansão a longo prazo no capitalismo”. Isso contradiz diretamente a tese leninista de que a época imperialista é a da decadência das forças produtivas – “a agonia mortal do capitalismo”, como Trotsky pôs no título do programa de fundação da Quarta Internacional.E quais são as implicações dessa expansão de longo prazo? Mandel escreve:“O ciclo de longo prazo que começou com a Segunda Guerra Mundial, e em que ainda estamos… tem, ao contrário, sido caracterizado pela expansão e, por causa dessa expansão, a margem de negociação entre a burguesia e a classe trabalhadora se alargou. Se criou a possibilidade de fortalecer o sistema na base da garantia de concessões aos trabalhadores… a colaboração próxima entre ums a burguesia expansiva e as forças conservadoras do movimento operário é sustentada fundamentalmente pela tendência ascendente no nível de vida dos trabalhadores.”—Uma Introdução à Teoria Econômica MarxistaTente apresentar esta linha para o meio radical pequeno-burguês hoje! Ririam de Mandel na palteia. Mas, na época, era um tema popular entre todas as teorias da “nova classe operária” e, sempre, nosso economista “marxista” pegou o que estava na moda e elaborou uma teoria que se encaixasse na impressão superficial.
A teoria é uma simplificação suficiente da realidade, que pode entrar na nossa cabeça e nos dar uma compreensão ativa como participantes do que está acontecendo – ou seja, o que temos na nossa cabeça também é um fator. O programa gera a teoria. Oque é decisivo são as questões programáticas. Os bolcheviques e Lênin tinham uma teoria incorreta, uma teoria suficiente mas não correta mas, no momento supremo, eles tiveram a conclusão política correta de não fazer alianças com os liberais.
A tarefa estratégica do próximo periodo – período pré-revolucionário de agitação, propaganda e organização – consiste em superar a contradição entre a maturidade das condições objetivas da revolução e a imaturidade do proletariado e de sua vanguarda (confusão e desencorajamento da velha geração, falta de experiência da nova). É necessário ajudar as massas, no processo de suas lutas cotidianas a encontrar a ponte entre suas reivindicações atuais e o programa da revolução socialista. Esta ponte deve consistir em um sistema de REIVINDICAÇÕES TRANSITÓRIAS que parta das atuais condições e consciência de largas camadas da classe operária e conduza, invariavelmente, a uma só e mesma conclusão: a conquista do poder pelo proletariado.A social-democracia clássica, que desenvolveu sua ação numa época em que o capitalismo era progressista, dividia seu programa em duas partes independentes uma da outra: o programa mínimo, que se limitava a reformas no quadro da sociedade burguesa, e o programa máximo, que prometia para um futuro indeterminado a substituição do capitalismo pelo socialismo. Entre o Programa mínimo” e o Programa máximo” não havia qualquer mediação. A social-democracia não tem necessidade desta ponte porque de socialismo ela só fala nos dias de festa.A Internacional Comunista enveredou pelo caminho da social-democracia na época do capitalismo em decomposição, quando não há mais lugar para reformas sociais sistemáticas nem para a elevação do nível de vida das massas, quando a burguesia retoma sempre com a mão direita o dobro do que deu com a mão esquerda (impostos, direitos alfandegários, inflação, deflação”, carestia da vida, desemprego, regulamentação policial das greves, etc.), quando cada reivindicação séria do proletariado, e mesmo cada reivindicação progressista da pequena burguesia, conduzem inevitavelmente além dos limites da propriedade capitalista e do Estado burguês.
Militant Longshoreman No.4
Militant Longshoreman
No.4 January 7, 1983
RE -ELECT KEYLOR TO EXECUTIVE BOARD
Election time in Local 10 – a time to stand back and look at the state of the Local, the Longshore Division, and the International union. In the past we’ve described a series of losses, continued weakening of the union, and the failure of leadership to show a way out. Is anything different this year? Yes: the basic structure and strength of the union is clearly in jeopardy and the International leadership appears to be ready for major give-aways.
The basic unity of the Longshore Division is being shattered by conflicts between locals over such issues as voluntary travel, transfers, registration, and lawsuits. Transfer of longshoremen to clerk status is still stuck on dead center in the Bay Area. The voluntary travel program is virtually dead; arbitrators have ruled that casuals in a port have dispatch priority over men traveling voluntarily. Same locals are insisting on Class C registered casuals. Many locals are being sued by outsiders. Locals are competing with each other for work. It was inevitable that without a union-wide program of united struggle against the empliyers that local officers in some cases would fall back on deals with their “own’ enployers for short term gains. Herman’s ’78 contract paved the way for these divisions by taking a historic step backward in establishing separate port steady man agreements.
Encouraged by this disunity, PMA companies have extended to the rest of the coast the practice of ordering men to work in violation of the contract. When men resist, the arbitrators move promptly to declare an “illegal work stoppage” and place penalties on men and locals under Section 17.61 of the contract. Union complaints of PMA contract violations die on the vine. Often it takes eight to nine months to get Coast Committee rulings on PMA violations and there are no real penalties for employer violations.
At the April 1981 Caucus, Keylor was successful in getting a resolution on deck calling for eliminating arbitration and the no-strike/work-as-directed clauses from the contract. While the motion was defeated, for the first time within my memory the caucus was forced to debate the fallacies of the grievance procedure. We need the unrestricted right to take job action over grievances.
The International officers haven’t even called a Longshore Caucus to discuss this crisis. A caucus has the authority to impose policies on the locals and International officers, policies which could solve some of the most glaring problems ripping the Division apart.
INTERNATIONAL PROPOSES GIVE -AWAYS
The scary thing is that Herman and company are floating proposals for give-aways. For example, the International is pushing for the union to give up JOINT REGISTRATION and allow PMA full power over all registration matters (hiring, promotion, transfers) under the pretext of avoiding lawsuits. While such a step would jeopardize the basis of the union’s strength, the hiring hall, and would reopen the door to massive employer discrimination, it wouldn’t even protect the union legally. Many unions which don’t have joint registration are being sued.
The International’s program of total reliance on PGP as the “cornerstone” of waterfront job security has laid the basis for further “giveaways”. As many of us predicted the PGP fund is running short; weekly Payments will probably be .cut about 30% this month. At the Tacoma Divisional meeting the International floated the proposal to take 20 cents from the contractual wage-increase of $1.25 per hour July 11, 1993 and use that money to beef up the PGP fund.
This weakness and disunity encourages employers to run the ILWU off the docks. Levin Terminals used non-longshoremen in December to unload and then load a barge at Richmond yard #1. That week saw the most dangerous crisis to the Local since 1948. Legalistic solutions will fail before such attacks; the courts will not protect our jobs. Only mass picketing to stop raiding and scabbing can preserve our job jurisdiction.
The combined impact of mechanization and the depression is even more rapidly destroying our jobs. Most ports are drawing on the PGP. Even if everyone (including SEO men) shared the work equally in this port, we would all get about one or two shifts per week. We can’t afford to postpone any longer the fight for jobs. During the 1981 contract negotiations PMA asked for continuous operations – three 8 hour shifts around the clock (seven hours work – one hour lunch) . There is talk at the local and International level of reopening the contract and giving PMA three shifts, continuous operation, in return for more PGP money in the fund – or at most a no-cap weekly PGP. This move would only continue the tragic policy of selling conditions for welfare, instead of the policy of a fight for jobs.
We cannot tolerate a further cut in our standard of living. If PMA moves to cut PGP, the union must move to reopen the contract. We must defend full PGP benefits but we can’t depend on_PGP. We need jobs_-. not supplemental unemployment benefits (PGP). If the employers propose to cap their productivity drive with three continuous shifts, then we must propose a six hour shift for eight hours pay, manning scales on all operations, and one man – one job. If that’s not enough to keep all longshoremen working, we may have to cut the shift down to five or even four hours.
THE SKILLED STEADY MAN CANCER
The SEO–9.43 system continues to weaken the hiring hall and divide the union. The rank and file tried to protect the lift board by job action but were frustrated by Federal Court injunctions. When Keylor made his Caucus report on the 1981 contract, he warned that the new contract language further threatened hall jobs. He later warned that halfway measures wouldn’t work, that only a program to call all the steady men back to the hall and to mobilize the ranks to defy the courts could smash this cancer. Any candidate for Caucus Delegate who won’t commit himself now to a coastwise fight to eliminate 9.43 and SEO from the contract is only playing with the needs of the membership.
NEEDED – A WORKERS PARTY
In the face of anti-labor courts, government strike-breaking, and austerity imposed on the backs of the poor and elderly to help fund Reagan’s anti-Soviet war drive, the International officers only response has been to support the Democratic party, a party which consistently supports Reagan’s program in all its fundamentals. Local 10 was severely criticized at Tacoma for contributing only a small amount of money to the Political Action Fund (support Democrats Fund). I’m proud of Local 10 members for refusing to throw good money after bad. Even though they couldn’t raise money, our local officers and delegates did everything they could to lock the union once again behind the Democratic Party. Elected NCDC delegates and self-appointed ILWU Legislative Committeemen again endorsed the same old candidates and propositions without once bringing these endorsements back to the Local for membership approval.
At the October Labor Parade our officers went along with the AFL-CIO, UAW, IBT, ILWU leaders policy of excluding any signs critical of the Democrats. I was excluded from the Local 10 contingent but carried my sign BREAK WITH THE DEMOCRATS/BUILD A WORKERS PARTY – VOTE COLEMAN/BRADLEY SPARTACIST CANDIDATES FOR SAN FRANCISCO BOARD CF SUPERVISORS.
When Jimmy Herman blocked any discussion of a Labor Party at the 1981 International Convention, not one Local 10 delegate joined me in trying to get the three resolutions submitted out on the floor for debate. The phony socialist delegates like Joe Figureido of Local-6 and Dave Arian of Local 13 whose Labor Party resolutions had been passed by their own locals were no better. They sat on their hands refusing to contest Herman’s bureaucratic squashing of debate. Ask all the Local 10 candidates for Convention delegate whether they will stand up and be counted on to fight at this years convention to win the union for a break with the Democrats and to build a workers party.
1982 – BETTER, BUT NOT ENOUGH
For the first time in many years there was some improvement in the Local’s functioning in 1982. Committees met, membership meetings took place, some officers were more accessible and responsive, more information got to the membership and some limited campaigns and battles were waged to defend jobs and conditions. Even these improvements will be swept away unless the membership is mobilized behind a program that can point the way out. Unfortunately none of the candidates for leading office has such a program. That’s why I’m not supporting any candidate for top office.
CRITICAL SUPPORT TO STAN GOW
Last year the Militant Longshoreman supported Stan Gow for election to the Executive Board and Caucus delegate; that support was in spite of Gow’s lying and viscious attack on Keylor. I supported him because he still had the Militant Caucus program, a program for which we had both fought over a period of many years. Stan still has the program formally on paper but his actions have begun to deviate from the program in practice.
Stan has ducked taking a stand on unpopular issues, probably to avoid losing votes. Stan flip-flopped on the Gibson case where he refused to support Local 10 contributing our share of the money when that case was finally settled. This anti-union position was a reversal of the Militant Caucus position of defending all locals against Court suits while fighting to end discrimination through union action. Stan’s “neutrality” in this case clearly implies that the racist, capitalist government can be relied on to protect minority rights. We must clean up our own house, not let PMA and the government divide and conquer.
Then Stan took a dive when the Polish Stalinist bureaucracy declared martial law and smashed Solidarnosc. While critical of Solidarnosc, Gow refused to say in writing or at union meetings that he supported the crushing of the capitalist restorationist Walesa and Company as being in the interests of the Polish workers. Keylor took this unpopular position in writing, a position which would have been consistent with Stan’s own political views.
Stan’s opportunism got him a few more votes than Keylor but anyone who ducks issues for votes cannot be trusted to stand up and be counted in times of crisis.
The basis of opportunism is the belief that you can’t win workers to face unpleasant truths, that you can’t win the organized workers to fight in their own interests. On two issues before Local 10 Stan has been content to make the record with a paper position while backing off from a fight to persuade the Local to take any real meaningful action.
When South African Longshoremen found their strike attacked as employer and government tried to break their union by firing and deporting the workers, Stan put up a long, politically correct motion at the Executive Board. The heart of his motion called for Local 10 to boycott South African cargo in solidarity with the fired black longeshoremen and in defense of their union. While there was wide opposition to most of Stan’s motion, the Executive Board vote on boycott action was very close: Eight in favor, nine against. Given the wide support for solidarity action, I approached Stan with a proposal to work together to build support for passage of a boycott motion at the next membership meeting. Stan was uninterested had refused to cooperate saying essentially that it was his whole political motion or no boycott.
Then later in November Stan’s motion passed the membership meeting to declare December 11 our stop work meeting day and to mobilize union membership to demonstrate in defense of the black community in Oroville against Nazi/Klan terror. Dead-set against this stop work mobilization, PMA threatened to retaliate and the officers convened a special Executive Board meeting to capitulate. Stan changed his position and said he could only give the most minimal support to the demonstration unless the local adopted his new motion calling for Labor/Black defense guards. Stan did not show up at Oroville. Although I and other longshoremen marched with signs calling for Labor/Black defense guards to smash the Klan, the Militant Caucus (which also did not show up) attacked my action in marching as “reformist”! In fact, our slogans were counterposed to the sub-reformist slogans under which the march was held.
These actions are consistent with the actions of the Militant Caucus in Warehouse. There the Militant Caucus seems to have given up on building an alternative class struggle leadership, confining their activity largely to abstract propaganda on extra-union issues.
A further indication that Stan no longer believes that the unionized section of the working class will fight to defend their interests is his strange silence on the Canadian strike/lockout. When I put up motions at the Executive Board not to work diverted cargo from the struck Canadian government ports and to take solidarity strike action against the Canadian government strike breaking, Stan chose to remain silent. This silence is strange in view of the fact that a main issue for which our Canadian brothers were on the bricks was their resistance to extension of the steady skilled man system in Canada.
I have had great respect for Stan’s stubborn courage in pursuit of his convictions but his present disorientation means that I can’t give him unconditional electoral support. Vote for Stan Gow but watch what he does!
NEEDED – A WORKERS GOVERNMENT
This edition of the Militant Longshoremen gives only a description of the state of the union. The economy is collapsing, world trade is declining, employers are on the offensive, unions are giving up wages and conditions, gains won in 1934 and since are in jeopardy. Only a determined fight can hope to protect us at least partially from the ravages of a capitalist system in crisis. This fight must be linked to opposition to the bipartisan anti-Soviet war drive through which Reagan intends to launch World War III. The U.S. government attempts to overthrow the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and to defeat the rebels in El Salvador, combined with the virtual blank check given the Israeli government in its naked aggression against the Palestinians in Lebanon, are examples of what this capitalist regime has in store for workers everywhere – mass murder and nuclear holocaust. We cannot seperate “union” issues from “political” issues because not only is our livelihood at stake, but our lives are in jeopardy. To put an end to the threat, we need a workers government.
The Militant Longshormanwill never surrender the responsibility of calling things as they are and trying to build an alternative .class struggle leadership in the unions. A first step is to rebuild the Militant Caucus in Longshore. A vote for Keylor is a vote for the program.
EXECUTIVE BOARD 30 – C
MILITANT LONGSHOREMAN PROGRAM
1. DEFEND OUR JOBS AND LIVELIHOOD – Reopen the contract if PMA cuts the PGP. For six hours work at eight hours pay; manning scales on all ship operations; one man, one job. Call all SEO men back to the hall. Prepare the union for a coastwise fight to delete 9.43 , SBD, and crane supplement sections from the -contract –
2. DEFEND THE HIRING HALL – No surrender of union control over registration.
3. DEFEND UNION CONDITIONS AND SAFETY THROUGH JOB ACTION – No dependance on arbitrators. Mobilize to smash anti-labor injunctions.
4. DEFEND OUR UNION – No second class B or C registration lists. Full Class A status for all B men coastwise. Keep racist anti-labor government and courts out of the union. Support all ILWU locals against court suits and government “investigations”. Union action to break dawn racial and sexual discrimination on the waterfront.
5. BUILD LABOR SOLIDARITY – against government./employer strikebreaking. No more PATCO’s. Honor all picket lines. Don’t handle struck or diverted cargo. No raiding of other unions. Organize the unorganized. Labor strikes to stop cuts in Social Security, MediCal, Medicare.
6. STOP NAZI/KLAN TERROR through union organized labor/black/Latin defense actions. No dependence on capitalist police or courts to smash fascists.
7. WORKING CLASS ACTION TO STOP REAGAN’s WAR DRIVE AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION – Oppose reactionary boycotts against Soviet and Polish shipping. Labor strikes against military blockades of Cuba or Nicaragua. Boycott military cargo to Chile, South Africa, El Salvador and Israel.
8. INTERNATIONAL LABOR SOLIDARITY – Oppose protectionist trade restrictions – ILWU support to military victory of leftist insurgents in El Salvador. Defend the Palestinians – U.S. Marines, Israelis, French, and Italian troops out of Lebanon.
9. BREAK WITH DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN PARTIES – Start now to build a workers party based on the unions to fight for a workers government which will seize all major industry without payment to the capitalists and establish a planned economy to end exploitation, racism, poverty, and war.
Smash Yankee Imperialism! Defend the Cuban Revolution!
Smash Yankee Imperialism! Defend the Cuban Revolution!
[First published in 1917 No.11, 3rd Quarter 1992. Copied from http://www.bolshevik.org/1917/no11/no11cuba.html ]
The overthrow of the corrupt and brutal neo-colonial regime of Fulgencio Batista in January 1959, and the subsequent expropriation of the Cuban bourgeoisie, was a victory for working people everywhere. With Soviet aid, Cuba consolidated a functional and relatively egalitarian economic system, and for three decades Fidel Castro could thumb his nose at the U.S. colossus. After the ignominious collapse of the USSR, the rulers of a declining American empire are no longer compelled to tolerate the continued existence of a collectivized economy 90 miles from Florida. The U.S. imperialists are cranking up a ‘‘democratic’’ propaganda offensive, while simultaneously tightening their economic embargo and leaning on their Latin American neo-colonies to isolate Cuba. The defense of the Cuban revolution has never been more acutely posed than it is today.
Cuba under Batista was a gigantic sugar plantation and fun house for wealthy Americans. By breaking the social power of the Cuban bourgeoisie, the Castro regime cut the connection with world imperialism, thus dramatically transforming life for ordinary working people. In the first five years of the revolution consumption of meat and textiles doubled, the new regime slashed rents, deserted Havana mansions were converted into residences for 80,000 students from peasant families, and abandoned luxury automobiles were handed over to former servants so they could start working as taxi drivers.
Today Cuban standards of health, education and housing are far above those of other Latin American countries. Rents are subsidized, medical care is free and education is available to everyone. The level of literacy is 98 percent. Everyone has a job. Cuba remains poor by the standards of the imperialist colossus to the north, but there is none of the endemic disease and desperate poverty so common throughout the rest of the region.
Soviet Connection Severed
Aid and trade from the Soviet bloc enabled Cuba to survive American attempts to strangle the revolution through an economic embargo. The Kremlin bureaucrats maintained Cuba as a bargaining chip in their search for global ‘‘peaceful coexistence’’ with imperialism. The USSR bought Cuban sugar and other exports above the world market price, while selling oil to Cuba below the going rate. This amounted to a subsidy of billions of dollars a year. By the late 1980s, 85 percent of Cuban trade was with the Comecon countries.
In 1990, as perestroika disorganized the Soviet economy, shortfalls and delays in deliveries to Cuba made it necessary to ration basic foods and fuel tightly. Industrial oil consumption fell by 50 percent. In December 1990, the Soviets halved the subsidy on sugar, and imposed world market prices for everything else.
The counterrevolutionary victory over the August 1991 coup in the USSR severed Cuba’s economic lifeline. The Yeltsinites lost no time announcing the cancellation of the sugar subsidy and the withdrawal of Soviet military personnel from Cuba. By October 1991 Castro reported that less than 40 percent of scheduled imports from the former Soviet bloc were arriving in Cuban ports. The Cuban daily Granma noted bitterly that Moscow’s abandonment of the Cuban revolution gave the ‘‘green light’’ for U.S. aggression.
The Batistianos hailed the announcement of the Soviet pullout. The ‘‘Cuban American National Foundation’’ (CANF), an organization of Florida millionaires and veterans of the CIA’s Bay of Pigs fiasco, set up a commission to plan the counterrevolution. Included in the CANF commission are Jeane Kirkpatrick and Ronald Reagan (Guardian Weekly, 15 September 1991). Another CANF connection is George Bush’s son, Jeb, a millionaire Miami property speculator. So far the CANF claims to have found buyers for 60 percent of Cuba’s land and industry (New York Times, 6 September 1991).
Cuba’s ‘Option Zero’
With poor sugar harvests and little hard currency to buy oil and other vital imports, Havana has launched a drive for self-sufficiency in foodstuffs. It is attempting to lure workers made redundant by drastic cutbacks in industrial production onto state farms. But the self-sufficiency campaign is hampered by a shortage of animal feed and fertilizers. Cuba still needs to buy wheat on the international market. The Cuban leadership is trying to prepare for a complete cessation of oil imports. In this ‘‘option-zero’’ scenario, oxen, horses and hundreds of thousands of Chinese bicycles are to be substituted for trucks and cars.
Castro adamantly opposed Gorbachev’s pro-capitalist market ‘‘reforms’’ from the beginning. In the late 1980s the Cuban government banned Soviet newspapers considered too enthusiastic about perestroika. Instead of ‘‘market socialism’’ the Cuban bureaucracy’s slogan is ‘‘Socialismo o muerte’’ (socialism or death). Yet despite the socialism-or-bust rhetoric, the regime is now desperately seeking foreign investment to offset the economic pressure of capitalist encirclement and reduce the country’s dependency on sugar. The Cuban government wants to boost tourism and, to this end, is promoting joint ventures with Spanish and Brazilian capitalists.
The burgeoning of the tourism industry has planted a dollar economy side by side with that of the peso. Cubans are now waiting on tables and driving taxis for foreigners with hard currency. The British Independent (2 November 1991) described how this is eroding the anti-imperialist sentiment that has helped maintain the regime: ‘‘Cuba’s best beaches, her choicest foods, her scarce consumer goods, are available only for dollars—which Cubans cannot legally possess….Many Cubans comment on the contrast between rhetoric of national sovereignty and the daily humiliation of the peso shopper.’’ As tourism has increased, prostitution, bureaucratic corruption and the black market have all kept pace. The austerity measures adopted by the regime compel ordinary Cubans to look to their socios, (black market connections) for many consumer items. The Guardian Weekly (17 March 1991) reported that an acerbic parody of the official slogan, ‘‘Sociolismo o muerte,’’ has gained widespread popularity.
The Mechanics of Stalinist Rule
For 30 years Castro has tolerated no organized political opposition. In 1976 the regime unveiled a new constitution that formalized the Cuban Communist Party’s (PCC) monopoly on politics and proclaimed it ‘‘the highest leading force of the society and of the state.’’ The new constitution established local, regional and national ‘‘Assemblies of People’s Power.’’ These bodies only exist to provide a facade of popular legitimacy for decisions made by the PCC.
Nominations to the municipal assemblies at public meetings are subject to approval by PCC commissions, while the party itself makes the nominations to the higher assemblies. The National Assembly normally only meets twice a year, in July and December, usually for two days each time. Half the National Assembly members are nominated by the party from among delegates to the lower bodies. The other half are nominated directly from the PCC or government bureaucracies. Over 90 percent of delegates to the 1981-86 National Assembly were party members or candidate members.
Like every other Stalinist party, there is no internal democracy within the Cuban Communist Party itself. The PCC held its first congress in late 1975—seventeen years after the ‘‘July 26 Movement’’ came to power! Castro saw no problem with this, and blithely commented: ‘‘We are fortunate to be holding it now. Fortunate indeed! This way the quality of the Congress is endorsed by 17 years of experience’’ (Granma, 25 January 1976; quoted in Workers Vanguard, 12 March 1976). The congress itself was a carefully managed affair that concluded, as Stalinist congresses usually do, with the unanimous approval of the leadership.
Cuban Stalinism: ‘Pro-Family’ and Anti-Gay
Cuban children learn at an early age that women are responsible for childcare, cooking and cleaning. Unlike the Bolsheviks under Lenin and Trotsky, who openly declared their intention of liberating women through socializing domestic labor, the Cuban bureaucracy, like every other Stalinist regime, celebrates the ‘‘socialist family.’’ The Castroist ruling stratum promotes the nuclear family and all the associated social backwardness as a point of support for its own authoritarian rule over the proletariat. Women remain concentrated in traditionally female jobs. The higher the administrative layers of the party and state bureaucracy, the lower the proportion of women.
The encouragement of the family goes hand in hand with the persecution of homosexuals. In 1965 the regime set up special ‘‘Military Units to Aid Production’’ which were really prison camps, mostly for homosexuals. The First National Culture and Education Conference in 1971 virulently denounced the ‘‘pathological character’’ of homosexuality, and resolved that ‘‘all manifestations of homosexual deviations are to be firmly rejected and prevented from spreading.’’ Of the 100,000 people who left Cuba via the harbor at Mariel in 1980, roughly 10,000 were lesbians and gays. These people were forced into exile through a state-sponsored campaign of homophobia directed through the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. In the age of the AIDS pandemic, and the growth of homophobia, Cuba has the unpleasant distinction of being the only country in the world that forcibly confines people who test positive for the HIV antibody.
Castroism and Workers Democracy
The July 26th Movement that took power on New Years Day 1959 was an insurrectionary rural-based guerrilla movement. It was based in the Sierra Maestra mountains and was committed to a program of radical liberalism. After two years of guerrilla war, the rotten and corrupt Batista state apparatus collapsed, with the bulk of the officer caste fleeing to Miami. The July 26th Movement filled the power vacuum by forming a short-lived coalition with a few liberal politicians.
When a section of the bourgeoisie, backed by the American government, opposed some of the Castroites’ radical nationalist measures, the July 26th Movement split. A majority, headed by Fidel and his brother Raul, opted for the expropriation of the Cuban capitalists. In July 1961 the Castroites fused with the Partido Socialista Popular, a traditional Moscow-line Stalinist formation that had earlier had a minister in Batista’s government. The fused organization went on to form the Cuban Communist Party.
In the minds of New Leftists of the 1960s, the Castroites were light-years away from the colorless apparatchiks of Eastern Europe. Yet one-party Stalinist rule deformed the Cuban revolution from its inception. As in every other deformed workers state, the working class played no independent political role. This was the inevitable outcome of the victory of a rural-based guerrilla insurrection in which the urban working class remained on the sidelines. In 1961, in the heady early days, Fidel proclaimed that the revolution must be a ‘‘school of unfettered thought.’’ But soon the ‘‘barbudos,’’ as the bearded guerrilla fighters were known, were responding to all criticism with police repression.
The harassment of the ostensibly Trotskyist Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR) in the early years of the revolution is a case in point. POR members unconditionally defended the revolution against imperialism, but they also criticized the bureaucratism of the new regime. Castro’s political police answered by smashing their printing press, breaking up the plates of a Spanish-language edition of Trotsky’s Permanent Revolution and throwing five POR members into jail.
The Subjective Factor in History
For the ‘‘men of action’’ of the July 26th Movement, Marxist criticism and democracy within the left were simply impediments to ‘‘unity.’’ In October 1960, as the large-scale nationalizations were under way, Che Guevara, a left-winger within the July 26th Movement, expressed the contempt for Marxist theory that animated the young pragmatists:
‘‘Cuba’s is a unique Revolution, which some people maintain contradicts one of the most orthodox premises of the revolutionary movement, expressed by Lenin: ‘Without a revolutionary theory there is no revolutionary movement’….
‘‘The principal actors of this revolution had no coherent theoretical criteria….
‘‘Beginning with the revolutionary Marx, a political group with concrete ideas establishes itself. Basing itself on the giants, Marx and Engels, and developing through successive steps with personalities like Lenin, Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, and the new Soviet and Chinese rulers, it establishes a body of doctrine and, let us say, examples to follow. ‘‘The Cuban Revolution takes up Marx at the point where he himself left science to shoulder his revolutionary rifle…. We, practical revolutionaries, initiating our own struggle, simply fulfill laws foreseen by Marx, the scientist….the laws of Marxism are present in the events of the Cuban Revolution, independently of what its leaders profess or fully know of those laws from a theoretical point of view.’’
—‘‘We Are Practical Revolutionaries,’’ 8 October 1960, reprinted in Venceremos!, J. Gerassi, ed.
Despite their personal courage and dedication to the cause of the oppressed, the Castroists’ tendency to denigrate the role of the subjective factor in history constituted a political obstacle to the ultimate victory of the revolution. The ‘‘laws of Marxism’’ can only triumph through living, politically conscious human beings who apply them in the struggle to change the world. They do not operate autonomously or automatically.
The struggle for socialist revolution is a struggle to win the masses of working people and oppressed to the political program of revolutionary Marxism. The history of the Cuban revolutionaries themselves, bold and radical as they were, confirms that the road to human liberation lies only through consciousness. This is what Marx meant when he said that the working class must emancipate itself—it cannot be freed by some group of leaders, however well-intentioned and sincere. The role of the Leninist vanguard is to develop and struggle for the revolutionary program against the myriad forms of pseudo-socialist false consciousness (including Castroite Stalinism). The victory of socialism requires that the Marxist program, embodied in a Leninist party, is embraced by the masses of the oppressed and exploited.
The Cuban leadership remains far more popular at home than the grey bureaucrats of the former Soviet bloc ever were. Over the years there has been significant participation in the various mobilizations conducted by the regime. But popular support for the initiatives of the ruling stratum is no substitute for the exercise of political power. The ability to make suggestions or to have input into how campaigns are carried out is fundamentally different from the power to decide and set the priorities in the first place. In a healthy workers state working people must in fact, as well as in name, be the political decision makers.
Cuba’s ‘‘Revolutionary’’ Foreign Policy
The Castro regime has retained a certain luster for much of the petty-bourgeois left that has long since abandoned the once-popular Stalinist rulers of Vietnam. The ex-Trotskyists of Ernest Mandel’s ‘‘United Secretariat,’’ who once adulated the Castroites for their ‘‘evolution toward revolutionary Marxism,’’ are somewhat more reserved today. Yet they still ‘‘reject any sectarian attitude towards the Cuban leadership’’ and consider that, despite a few blemishes, the Castroites remain ‘‘revolutionary.’’ Mandel’s former partners in the ‘‘United Secretariat,’’ the Castro sycophants of Jack Barnes’ idiosyncratic U.S.-based Socialist Workers Party (SWP), feel no need for any critical fig-leaf. The Barnesites cite Cuba’s foreign policy as proof that Castro is carrying on the revolutionary internationalist traditions of Marx and Lenin. Yet Castro’s foreign policy over the years has generally been tailored to the requirements of the anti-revolutionary Kremlin bureaucracy.
In May-June 1968, when ten million workers and students brought France to the brink of revolution, Castro covered for the sellout of the strike by the French Communist Party. A few months later Havana supported the Soviet tanks that rolled into Prague to oust Alexander Dubcek’s reform Stalinists and install a faction more to Leonid Brezhnev’s liking. In June 1989 the Cuban bureaucracy apologized for the massacre of worker and student protesters in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square by the Chinese Stalinists.
Cuba’s record in Latin America is equally wretched. In the early 1970s Castro endorsed Salvador Allende’s popular-frontist ‘‘Unidad Popular,’’ a coalition government with sections of the Chilean bourgeoisie. This class-collaborationist policy disarmed the Chilean working class politically, and set the stage for the massacre of tens of thousands of leftists and militant workers in the aftermath of Pinochet’s September 1973 coup. Throughout the 1980s the Cubans advised the Nicaraguan Sandinistas against expropriating the bourgeoisie, and instead advocated a national-patriotic front with the capitalists. The Sandinistas searched in vain for the mythical ‘‘Third Road’’ between capitalism and socialism for nearly a decade, until a half-starved population voted them out in favor of the parliamentary wing of Reagan and Bush’s contra movement.
Castro apologists frequently point to Cuba’s support to the bourgeois-nationalist MPLA government in Angola against South Africa as evidence of Marxist internationalism. While revolutionaries militarily supported the Soviet-supplied MPLA/Cuban forces against the apartheid state and its Angolan allies, this was no struggle for workers power. The Cubans in Angola were Soviet proxies. When Gorbachev cut a deal with the White House in 1988, Cuban troops began pulling out.
On the other side of Africa, Cuban soldiers helped prop up Mengistu’s bloody Ethiopian regime (another Soviet client) during its long, brutal, losing war against the legitimate struggle of the Eritrean people for self-determination.
When the imperialists began their diplomatic preparations for war against the neo-colonial Iraqi regime in 1990, the Cuban Stalinists joined the hypocritical chorus condemning the invasion of Kuwait. Cuba did not even oppose trade sanctions against Iraq in the United Nations. Speaking to the UN General Assembly on 25 August 1990, Cuba’s delegate Ricardo Alarcon announced that ‘‘my government has taken the relevant steps to ensure that our country too complies’’ with the sanctions. Participation in the imperialist embargo of Iraq could only qualify as an example of Leninist ‘‘internationalism’’ to those, like Jack Barnes & Co., who are wilfully blind.
The Future of Castroism
The Castro regime still has a reservoir of support amongst Cuban working people. Having eliminated any competitors on the left, Castro can present his rule as the only alternative to life under the U.S. jackboot. Still, as the Cuban economy moves progressively closer to the ‘‘zero option,’’ powerful contradictions threaten to shatter the stability of the regime. As ordinary Cubans queue overnight for many consumer necessities, the contrast between the egalitarian rhetoric of the ruling caste and its bureaucratic privileges become more conspicuous and more maddening. The British Independent reported:
‘‘The slogan of the Union of Young Communists, for instance, is ‘Follow me!’ Young people shout it, with a mixture of mockery and rage, at Roberto Robaina, the leader of the Young Communists, as he rides in his chauffeur-driven car past the long and irritable queues of people who wait, interminably, for Havana’s overcrowded buses.’’
The Castroites have responded to the deepening discontent with denunciations of ‘‘subversives’’ and ‘‘fifth columnists.’’ They have also established neighborhood ‘‘rapid reaction squads,’’ which even make the loyal Fidelistas of the SWP squeamish (Militant, 18 October 1991).
No single personality inside or outside the bureaucracy personifies the forces of counterrevolution in Cuba as Yeltsin did in the USSR. Yet, the collapse of Stalinism in Eastern Europe and the USSR has had powerful repercussions. In an attempt to tighten central control and weed out potential dissidents, the PCC in October 1990 announced the abolition of half the national and regional party posts.
This move followed on the heels of the 1989 execution of General Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez, a popular hero of the Angolan war, for drug trafficking. Ochoa pleaded guilty to a raft of implausible charges after a classically Stalinist show trial. Following the elimination of this potential rival to Fidel, other top bureaucrats were also jailed. The most prominent was Jose Abrantes Fernandez, the Interior Minister, who was considered third in line after Fidel and his brother Raul.
The Castro regime has little to offer the workers and peasants of Cuba besides moral exhortations to work harder and consume less. But ‘‘peaceful coexistence’’ with the pirates of Wall Street is not an option. There is no place for ‘‘socialist Cuba’’ in George Bush’s New World Order.
For 30 years the chieftans of U.S. imperialism have been obsessed with overturning the Cuban revolution. Bush and the Pentagon know that a military intervention against Cuba would not be a walkover like the 1983 rape of Grenada or the 1989 assault on Panama.
Defend and Extend the Cuban Revolution! For Workers Political Revolution!
Today, in the wake of the collapse of Stalinism, the proletarian internationalism of Lenin and Trotsky has burning immediacy for the Cuban workers. In a historic sense the survival of the Cuban revolution has always depended on its extension. Even with the Soviet lifeline, the long-term viability of the revolution depended on the integration of the Cuban economy into a regional federation of socialist states. This perspective, that of permanent revolution, is counterposed to the dead-end ‘‘Patria o muerte’’ of the Havana regime.
The current global capitalist depression is a nightmare for the masses of working people in Latin America, as it is for millions north of the Rio Grande. Tens of millions of people in the Americas, consigned to a life of uncertainty, poverty and hunger are acutely aware of the profound irrationality of the capitalist world order.
It is the duty of every class-conscious worker to defend Cuba against the ‘‘democratic’’ counterrevolution promoted by the American ruling class. In the first place it is necessary to fight to break the embargo against Cuba. The workers movement of Latin America, Canada and the U.S. has the power to stop any imperialist attack in its tracks. One way to popularize the notion of political strikes against U.S. military aggression is by educating working people about the practical benefits the revolution brought the Cuban masses in terms of shelter, healthcare and education. These are questions of immediate importance to millions of workers in the U.S. and Latin America.
The way forward for the Cuban working class is not through endless belt-tightening and conciliation with imperialism and its regional vassals. To survive, the Cuban revolution must find allies through successful overturns of capitalism elsewhere in the region. This runs counter to the nationalist ‘‘pragmatism’’ of the bonapartist Castro regime and its autarchic schemes for animal-powered ‘‘socialism’’ on one island.
The defense of the Cuban Revolution is linked directly to the necessity for the workers to wrest political power from the hands of the PCC through proletarian political revolution. Such a revolution, which requires the creation of a Leninist-Trotskyist party to succeed, would instantly alter the present unfavorable balance of forces. The creation of genuine organs of direct revolutionary democracy would reinvigorate the Cuban Revolution and act as a powerful impetus to workers struggles throughout Latin America. It would not fail to find an echo in the growing Hispanic component of the American working class.
TRADE UNION MEMORANDUM
TRADE UNION MEMORANDUM
[Adopted by Third National Conference od the Spartacist League/US, 25 November 1972. Reprinted in Marxist Bulletin #9, “Basic Documents of the Spartacist League”]
I: The Struggle Against Labor Reformism and Workerism
The end of petty-bourgeois radical dominance within the left was presaged by the 1968 French general strike which clearly established the revolutionary potential of the working class for the present generation of young radicals. Around 1969, the absolute dominance of the black and war questions in the political life of the U.S. began to dissipate as the war-financed inflation generated a strike wave of major proportions. The traditional conflicts between the organized working class and capital were further revived by the economic downturn of 1970 which again made unemployment a major political issue and highlighted the irrationality of capitalism as a productive system. Caught between a strike wave generating large money wage increases and a weakened international competitive position, the Nixon administration imposed wage controls in mid-1971, thereby demonstrating that the labor movement, even under right-wing leadership, is the major enemy of the smooth functioning of the capitalist (i.e. profit motivated) system.
The inadequacy of New Left politics in the face of the general social crisis in the 1969-71 period, particularly the revival of working-class struggle, caused splits in the two key radical organizations–SDS and the Black Panthers. These splits destroyed the authority of these organizations and the general hegemony of New Left politics within the left. Arising out of the destruction of the New Left was the strengthening of those organizations adhering to proletarian socialism, in both its revolutionary and reformist forms, as well as the reconciliation of petty-bourgeois radicalism with bourgeois liberalism. The latter is most obvious in McGovern’s victory in the Democratic Party. The 1972 Democratic convention with its “tax the rich–give to the poor” rhetoric, its long-haired youth politicos, its black and women’s caucuses, conformed to the New Left populist image. A parallel development occurred in the black movement with the Spring 1972 Cleveland Black Power conference. Appropriately the dominant personality at that conference was Imamu Baraka (ex-Leroi Jones), grey eminence of Newark, who personifies the unity of 1960’s mainstream black nationalism with Democratic Party machine politics.
A significant section of the ostensible revolutionary movement is turning to the unions as their principal area of mass work. The CP has greatly revived its union activity through its youth group, YWLL, and Trade Unionists for Action and Democracy. The proletarianization policy of IS is particularly significant, since IS has become something of a barometer indicating the climate of radical public opinion. In three years, IS has gone from being the leading force behind that epitome of middle-class left-liberalism, the California Peace and Freedom Party, to moving their headquarters to Detroit and throwing their forces into various oppositional union caucuses. A parallel development is the replacement of the Panthers with their street-lumpen orientation by the Black Workers’ Congress with its point-of-production approach as the “most revolutionary” manifestation of black nationalism. It is clear that the unions are becoming a major arena of struggle between ourselves as a vanguard nucleus and the reformists, revisionists and petty-bourgeois nationalists in the ostensibly revolutionary movement.
The increasing union activism by ostensibly revolutionary organizations occurs against a background of rising class struggle and generalized rank-and-file discontent against an ancient, patently undemocratic and right-wing bureaucracy. This bureaucracy has now been rendered unstable and can be shattered. In this there is a certain analogy between the present situation and the early 1930’s. Having exhausted its historic usefulness, the central core of the bureaucracy has responded to new labor rebelliousness by moving to the right of the liberal bourgeoisie. The bureaucracy as a whole is increasingly isolated from its base and fragmented–the result of tailing after different political currents in bourgeois politics. This provides a renewed opportunity for revolutionary leadership to come to the head of mass labor struggles, displacing sections of the bureaucracy and threatening its continued existence.
While the possibility exists, however, for a qualitative altering of the relationship of forces in the labor movement in favor of revolutionary leadership, the fundamental question is whether the bureaucracy will be defeated by communism or renewed labor reformism, i.e. by revolutionists or slicker fakers. The danger of a dynamized labor reformism through the infusion of young erstwhile revolutionaires is indicated by the activities of the IS in pushing blocs with “leftist” bureaucratic aspirants, such as Art Fox, whose United National Caucus in the UAW is a classic opportunist formation replete with national chauvinism. The formation of a mass reformist labor party to head off and contain an inchoate revolutionary upsurge bypassing the existing bureaucracy is one way in which such a bureaucratic left could replace the old leadership, making the programmatic content of the demand for a workers party based on the trade unions a decisive question.
It is very likely that the new labor reformism will be associated with a workerist ideology having its roots in New Leftism. Both the IS and Black Workers’ Congress project varieties of New Left workerism. Even the CP, despite its formal adherence to Soviet Stalinist tradition and support of bourgeois liberalism, presents its politics as a cry from the soul of the American worker. The new labor reformism will be based on a program governed by the existing political consciousness of rank-and-file activists (i.e. participatory democracy); exclusionist and federalist organizational principles based on shop-floor or union demarcations; and a denial of the vanguard party principle, that of leadership embodied in professional revolutionaries whose world-view derives outside of and in some ways counterposed to all sections of existing, nationally-limited bourgeois society.
Workerism, the identification of revolutionary socialism with the existing workers movement, is one of the major false radical ideologies against which Marxism developed. As Marx polemicized against German workerist opponents in 1850:
“While we say to the workers: you have fifteen or twenty or fifty years of war and civil war to go through, not just to alter the existing circumstances, but to change yourselves and make yourselves fit for power, you on the contrary say: we must obtain power at once…. While we draw the workers’ attention to the undeveloped state of the German proletariat, you outrageously flatter the national sentiments and social prejudices of the German artisan…. Just as the democrats make a sacred entity of the word ‘people’ I so do you with the word ‘proletariat.”‘ (Mehring, Karl Marx)
The Spartacist tendency has also developed through major struggles against workerism at critical points in its history. The RT had to fight the Art Philips-Tim Wohlforth faction which was presenting the policy “everyone into the unions” as a cure-all for the SWP’s revisionism. This policy also meant abstention from a struggle against reformism in the black movement, which had attained a mass character and occupied a strategic place in American political life. The most important factional struggle in the SL’s history was against Turner-Ellens’ black workerism, which simultaneously represented a syndicalist liquidation of Trotskyism and a capitulation to petty-bourgeois nationalism.
Workerism is based on two inter-related concepts: (1) the identification of the struggle for socialist revolution with the struggle for the sectional interests of the working class within capitalism, and (2) the belief that the communist consciousness of the vanguard derives from its participation in working-class life and struggles. The first proposition leads directly to economism or labor reformism. As Lenin noted, organically the proletariat can only develop trade union consciousness. Socialist consciousness is based on knowledge of the history of the class struggle and, therefore, requires the infusion into the class-struggle process of socialist conceptions carried by declassed intellectuals organized as part of a vanguard party. Socialist revolution does not occur through the intensification of traditional class struggle, but requires a leap from a vantage point outside bourgeois society altogether.
In its second proposition, workerism sees communist consciousness as a function of the social composition of the party. Workers are viewed as the proletarian conscience of the party. In reality the communist vanguard creates itself by breaking its recruits from the dominant social and political attitudes of whatever section of society they are part of, including the proletariat. In this sense, the communist vanguard is in, but not of, bourgeois society. The communist vanguard maintains itself through constant struggle against the enormous social and ideological pressures that bourgeois society bears down on it in all areas of party work, particularly against the backward prejudices in the working class and particularly in periods of rising class militancy when the party is seeking to expand its influence in the unions.
In a country as rampant with national chauvinism as the U.S., workerist politics will take on an anti-communist character despite the subjective desires of its adherents. A prominent and essential policy for Trotskyists is the defense of the Sino-Soviet states against American imperialism, a policy which goes directly against one of the strongest prejudices of American workers. For that reason, all tendencies breaking from Trotskyism in a workerist direction (e.g. Johnson-Forrest, Ellens) rapidly adopted an anti-defensist position, as does anarcho-syndicalism in its pure form. Moreover, our priorities, relations with other tendencies and the like are as much determined by international as domestic developments. Workerist groups tend to echo the chauvinist union bureaucracy in claiming that an organization as concerned with the class nature of the Chinese revolution or the Chilean popular front as with what is happening in the shops is an alien element in the American working class.
II: To Build a Communist Opposition in the Labor Movement
Our transformation memo projected the penetration of a section of the cadre and a good part of our membership into the unions as a priority second only to the maintenance of a monthly press. The proletarianization policy is a necessary means to create communist opposition in the labor movement and should not be viewed as a virtue in itself. For an organization of our size and tasks, we should seek to have 30-40% of our membership active in trade union work. Historically, the percentage of SL trade union activists has been well below that figure. It decreased in the past year and a half due to rapid growth and difficulty in implanting comrades in selected unions, and then rapidly increased after a series of hiring successes to the current level of 32% (in current fractions of SL members). This has caused some considerable dislocation of SL public work in the harder-hit areas, such as New York, and required the RCY to carry an exhorbitant share of the public work of the common movement, with limited forces. The problem is exacerbated by a continuing pattern of too many members in marginal or dead-end jobs instead of on campuses, in fractions or in full-time party work.
The key organizational form for intervention in the unions is the caucus, the nucleus of an alternative, revolutionary union leadership, uniting members of the vanguard with those union activists who agree with that section of the party program for the labor movement. We strive to build the caucus in as political a way as possible. The growth of our caucus will not be primarily through the recruitment of politically backward militants drawn to us because of our leadership in local struggles. Rather, the caucus will grow through political struggle with other left and militant union formations leading to a process of splits and fusions. Thus, we project our caucuses growing in a manner similar to, although not identical with, the party. However, the establishment of our cadre as recognized militants with real constituencies is the essential building block and core of our caucus. Without such a base of reputable militants, our caucus actions would either be empty rhetoric or tail-ending forces much stronger than ourselves. The caucus program is a program for leading mass struggles. In general, caucus recruits should be of a significantly higher political level than that defined simply by the caucus program.
Recruitment to the caucus is not solely the task of the caucus, but that of the party as a whole. Relevant Workers Vanguard articles and their distribution at strategic plants and union meetings is an important part of caucus-building. Equally important is the direct party contacting and recruitment of known union oppositionists, particularly those associated with external radical organizations.
The character of any labor struggles we lead is exemplary. That means its principal value is not in the direct expansion of our social base, but as a verification of our political line in the eyes of advanced workers and the radical movement. Therefore, we seek to concentrate on building national caucuses in key national unions. Local organizers may have to resist the impulse to implant comrades in easily accessible or “hot” local situations, which, however, are ultimately isolated or transitory. In general, we seek to avoid scattering, and concentrate our forces in a few of the indicated local situations, so as to maximize our ability to intervene with a stable organizational structure.
Our perspective for work in the unions is necessarily long-range; therefore the acquisition of industrial skills is vital in order to maintain an industrialized core which has mobility, minimum Job security and protection, if not from all grueling, dead-end jobs, at least from their unlimited duration. The responsibility lies with the local committees not just to continue to organize industrialization of our members, but to systematically plan their skills acquisition and up-grading to be roughly in keeping with the general pattern of advancement in the various industries.
In this period, our intention is to concentrate in four national unions: Intermediate Industry (II), transport., communications and public employee.
Intermediate Industry (II)–It is probably the most important single union in the country industrially and politically. It is here that the debates between the tendencies of the working-class left, long held in sterile isolation from the class, promise to most rapidly develop into a serious competition for leadership of an important section of the class, thereby restoring a direct basis for judgment of mutually exclusive programs in and by the course of the class struggle, and posing the possibility of the re-establishment of a mass base for revolutionary leadership in the working class. This union is thus a key part of the perspective of transforming the SL from a propaganda group into the nucleus of a vanguard party. Having ridden in on a seasonal wave of hiring augmented by artificial election-year stimulation of the economy, however, our fraction still has but a fragile toe-hold, and could be wiped out easily. After having survived one year of the seasonal lay-off pattern, our fraction will have become qualitatively more secure.
A union with an important radical past, virtually all its early leaders were affiliated with various left-wing organizations. Most of the ostensibly revolutionary organizations concentrated forces in this union so that it became the principal industrial battleground for the left. Out of this battleground emerged a slick social-democratic regime that transformed the union into one of the pillars of the country’s liberal establishment. A strong radical current remained in the union into the McCarthy period. And, unlikemost other unions, small groups associated with the left maintained a certain continuous existence through the present.
Currently, the industry is facing serious import competition, which it is attempting to counter through qualitatively speeding-up the normally harsh pace of production and enlisting the union bureaucracy in its efforts to improve production. This has produced intolerable working conditions leading to wildcats in key plants, and to the virtually total isolation of the bureaucracy in the impatient ranks, as exemplified by virtual non-attendance of union meetings. Nevertheless, the union bureaucracy has managed to isolate and de-fuse these strikes, but the situation remains explosive in a number of key plants. Due to the grueling physical nature of the work (which produces an enormous turnover), the labor force is overwhelmingly young, volatile, and experiencing the intensified generational conflict of this period. In the main Midwestern centers, the industry employs large numbers of young Southerners who provide a certain base for Wallaceite racist-populist demagogy. A very significant portion of the labor force is black. In the late 1960’s, the union was the most important base for industrial black nationalist formations, which reflected the genuine grievances of this most oppressed section of the work force, but also intensified racial polarization in the shops.
Virtually every ORO is present in the union, with many groups having recently colonized in, so that there exist a number of small left caucuses, and a more fertile ground for eventual opponents work than on many campuses. In addition, there are significant remnants of the black nationalist formations. However, the only major national oppositional caucus is a classic opportunist swamp, led by an ex-radical, with a catch-all program and social-patriotic posture. However, the caucus does formally stand for such standard left positions as “30 for 40,” immediate withdrawal of the U.S. from Indochina, and a labor party. Recently, this caucus has received support from one of the more significant ostensibly revolutionary organizations, which has been colonizing its young members into the industry.
Women are being systematically hired into the industry for the first time since the general exclusion of women from the work force after World War II, and this has aided our ability to get hired. Part of a general “public relations” tactic being undertaken by major corporations in several fields and the federal government, the women in II–still relatively few in number–are being used as a way of conservatizing and introducing divisions into the work force (through such methods as giving women easier jobs ahead of higher-seniority males). Not eliminating the need for communists to raise inclusion of women in the work force as an immediate programmatic demand, this tendency instead provides an opportunity for us to concentrate on such issues as child care, sex discrimination and equal pay for equal work in a union which has traditionally stood for these demands and which, because of the unusually high solidarity naturally engendered in the work situation, provides an opportunity to turn the companies’ attempts at divisiveness into their opposite.
In initiating activity in this union, there were some reservations that the extremely arduous nature of the work would burn out our comrades. However, we have decided to push ahead as a major priority, while being sensitive to the problems and dangers involved. After intensive discussion, we arrived at a caucus-building perspective which is highly indicative of our general conceptions of union work. We projected a year’s time to consolidate our forces, develop a core of recognized militants and establish a public fraction presence. During this period, we would not engage in entry tactics, united fronts or other maneuvers with oppositional formations, since, given our very weak state, this would be de facto liquidationist and would tend to strengthen the more established formations. However, we will seek opportunities to criticize other oppositional caucuses and differentiate our fraction from them.
The danger we face at the hands of unscrupulous opponents, and the general need for security, was underlined when one of our members was fired for being a communist, disguised as a lay-off, just before completing the company probation period, probably because he was recognized by a member of a Stalinist ORO, which then passed the information on to its-contacts in the union bureaucracy. Despite the complete violation of seniority of the “lay-off,” and the longtime presence of radicals and left-wing activity in the plant, hard evidence of outside communist association was sufficient to accomplish this victimization.
The central character of the industry’s Midwest base area makes colonization of this area essential for the establishment of a viable fraction. This in turn requires the building of a complete branch, including provision for student work on nearby campuses, general public propaganda work, etc. Despite the heavy investment of resources and manpower required for this, and the as-yet fragile character of our fraction, the importance of this union to our exemplary trade union work and transformation into the nucleus of a vanguard party eliminates any doubt that we should undertake this move as soon as possible, consistent with our other central priorities (press expansion and augmenting the staff of qualified cadre in the center), hopefully by the Summer of ,1973.
Transport- A union with a Stalinist-radical history, the central leadership made the usual decisive right turn with the onset of the Cold War period. Spurred on by a worsening economic position, the leadership became increasingly corrupt, violent and dictatorial so that today it is one of the most bureaucratic unions in the country. Thus, the struggle for internal union democracy has played a large part in all oppositional formations, including ours.
The overriding problem facing the union has been the shrinkage of U.S. merchant transport due to foreign competition and “runaway” U.S. carriers.The deterioration of its economic base has eroded the union’s position, a trend qualitatively accelerated in the past 3-5 years. As a result the membership is relatively old and there are severe restrictions against new members. The membership is simultaneously open to radical solutions to the problem of maritime unemployment and desperately conservative. Thus, it is one of the unions in the country in which pension rights and benefits are major issues.
The main blows of our fraction have been directed at bureaucratic chauvinism. In addition to demands for a shorter work week, the call for the immediate nationalization of the industry and the creation of an international transport union have been extremely relevant to internal union politics. Equally important has been the struggle to eliminate the rigidly institutionalized “second-class citizenship” imposed on newer, younger members. Given the character of the membership, recruiting to our caucus has not been easy. Moreover, the union may very well be destroyed by the capitalist strangulation of the industry.
As this threat became clear with events of the past year, it was necessary to both step up the intensity of our caucus’ warning of the imminent demise of the industry under the treacherous, social-patriotic policies of the bureaucracy, and to re-affirm that, apart from the fate of the union caucus, we will seek to maintain a core of communist workers. The transport industry is a strategic international industry containing among the most militant and class-conscious groups of workers in every country. Historically, such communist workers have played a uniquely valuable role as internationalizing agencies in their national working classes.
As our oldest and best-established fraction, our leading comrades in this union have played an indispensible role in the establishment and growth of our trade union work generally, both before and during our effort at transformation, and have in addition been called upon to perform other party functions. This alone has held our caucus back from playing fully the role which it has acquired as the only viable alternative leadership group. Thus for no other reason were we prevented from having a well-known delegate at the recent (rarely-held) convention, which instituted an important new tactical turn of the bureaucracy to save its own neck by incorporating unrelated workers (heretofore used as separately-organized voting cattle to keep the central bureaucrats in power) into the union. Recent modest growth of our fraction through hiring efforts, recruitment and incorporation of more members into full membership in the union provides the basis for reversing this tendency in the next period and allowing the caucus to play a full political role.
Communications–The union was consolidated in the post-war period, the bureaucracy being formerly based on a company union and in the far right wing of the labor movement. It worked closely with the company and the government anti-communist apparatus, being a major funnel of CIA funds into the labor movement. Since the mid-1960’s, the industry has experienced considerable expansion requiring an increased labor force and a resultant inflow of young workers. The combination of youthful radicalism with the general rise of rank-and-file militancy in the late 1960’s produced numerous and large wildcat strikes, notably an exceptionally long and bitter one in New York City. The bureaucracy’s policy of starving wildcat strikes out has left a certain residue of demoralization. However, this large and growing union with its youthful and dynamic membership will undoubtedly be in the vanguard of a new upsurge of labor radicalism.
The main base of our caucus is the West Coast. It has established itself as a real oppositional pole and recruited potential communist cadre. In particular, it has won over a group of women militants originally organized around radical feminist politics. This is significant because a main element in our caucus program is the elimination of the rigid sexual division within the industry, with large numbers of women workers being in company unions. Attempts to extend the West Coast base through implantation in other areas has, as yet, not been successful. However, the creation of a nationwide caucus in this union remains a basic priority in our industrialization policy.
The importance of our caucus to the life of the union, and the extent of its threat to the uniquely debased and cynical local officialdom, has prompted both a high degree of ORO-backed left social-democratic demagogery and the most vicious, depraved and physically violent attacks ever suffered by our members in the trade unions. Burdened both by inexperience and the ravages of the recent spate of clique departures, our local leadership is nevertheless performing valiently and courageously under intense pressure.
In addition to the SL, a closely competing left-wing organization has made the union one of its major caucus-building targets. We have already engaged in sharp struggles with this tendency on the West Coast. It is likely that the communications union will be a major battleground between the SL and this “revolutionary” left social-democratic tendency.
Public employee- This large section of the labor force has been generally unorganized and is facing uncommon economic pressures due to the fiscal crisis of state and local government. Therefore, the public employee union is the most rapidly growing in the country and is quite likely to become the largest. Due to the presence of many young college graduates the union is relatively politically open and has mirrored the campus radicalism of the 1960’s. It was the first major union to take an anti-war position and its bureaucracy has played a key role in the liberal anti-war movement. With its growth and organic ties to the state apparatus, it has become one of the most important unions in Democratic Party politics.
As part of its general expansion, the union has absorbed a number of police and prison armed forces, thereby breaking the long-standing Gompersite (!) tradition against allowing the main strike-breakers into the organized labor movement. With the union’s liberal image and significant black and minority membership, this will be an explosive issue and one which our caucus has and will continue to focus on.
Located in the most radical section of the union, in which organizing drives against a reactionary state bureaucracy are the key question, our caucus has stood forth both as exemplary organizersand oppositionists, combatting the central bureaucracy’s efforts to quell the organizing and acquire large dues-paying membership blocks through mergers with company-union “associations,” and has made a noticeable impact at state and national conventions. In an arena heavily penetrated by OROs., our comrades have had an opportunity to conduct work and recruitment on a high level. While we will have to gut the leadership of this caucus in order to implement our more central perspective for work in II, we will retain the caucus for its excellent short-term recruitment perspective.
Due to its social composition and relatively open character, direct recruitment to the party will be easier than in other unions. For the same reasons, it will be a union in which there will be the most open competition between organizations claiming to be revolutionary. Since the union is easily accessible to our membership, it will be used as a back-up for members who can’t get into more selected fractions rather than as a primary target for implantation.
24 November 1972
[Adopted by Third National Conference, 25 November.,1972]
Rewriting Cuba
Rewriting Cuba
BOOK REVIEW: Cuba: The Revolution in Peril – by Janette Habel
By J. Leisler
In the year 1959, a tiny island with 10 million inhabitants burned its way into the consciousness of the world. The planet has not been quite the same since. Not only did the Cuban revolution upset the apple cart by eventually establishing the first, and so far the on1y, workers’ state in the Western hemisphere, but it forever transformed tens of millions of people’s concept of what is truly possible.
The reactions to this event were as varied as the vested interests and backgrounds of those who were politically active at the time. For the American bourgeoisie, this was their worst nightmare. “Ninety miles from our shore!” went the refrain. For the Soviet bureaucracy, this was an unexpected event with which they were initially unconnected, one that bore watching for dangers and opportunities. For the Cuban people, it was a time of celebration and hope that their long nightmare of humiliation and oppression was over.
For a group of ostensible Trotskyists, it was a much needed resting place for their hopes and dreams. This group was the United Secretariat of the Fourth International (USec), the international umbrella organization that sheltered the U.S.-based Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and the European followers of Ernest Mandel and Michel Pablo.
Since the inception of the Trotskyist movement it had been necessary to fight a war on two fronts. On the one hand, there was the struggle against the old and resilient enemy, capitalism; on the other, a difficult rearguard action against the Soviet bureaucracy led by Joseph Stalin and his successors. The Trotskyists regarded the latter as a necessary battle to bring the 1917 Russian Revolution back on track, believing that the bureaucracy would completely smother the revolution and thus create the conditions for capitalist restoration. How right they were (in this respect at least)! The founders of the SWP had, in their youth, built their hopes and dreams upon the USSR.
After a brief flirtation with Yugoslavia’s Tito regime in the late 1940s, under the social pressure of the bleak McCarthy years of the 1950s the SWP began to long for something fresh and new. The Cuban revolution seemed made to order. Here was a real revolution! Seemingly untainted by Stalinism, without a Soviet franchise operation to lead it, the July 26 Movement, after initial hesitancy, overturned the entire neocolonial society of the island nation. And so, in the eyes of USec, this was a healthy (as opposed to degenerated) workers’ state, unlike the Soviet Union. Fidel Castro soon became for them, against his will, an “unconscious Trotskyist.” In the
1980s, the SWP was to ditch Trotskyism and quit USec, but keep and intensify its Fidelism to the point of absurdity.
As for USec itself, they continued in their uncritical view of Cuba without going to the embarrassing extremes of the SWP. There has hardly been a word of criticism for Fidel and the Cuban revolution from this quarter—until now.
USec COMES CLEAN. . . ALMOST
It is this book, Cuba: The Revolution in Peril that breaks this silence. On the cover is a photo of a beleaguered Ernesto “Che” Guevara, rubbing his eyes. The preface was written by François Maspero, a leading member of USec. He begins with a discussion of caudillismo, a personalist form of dictatorship common in Latin American-history. Power is seized by armed force and comes to be embodied in one man who claims to represent the interests of the nation as a whole. It is a theme that will be repeated.
He goes on to describe this work as a book of “fidelity to a past, to a memory, and to a political project.” It is this fidelity that is simultaneously the book’s greatest strength and that is simultaneously the book’s greatest strength and greatest weakness. While many of the author’s criticisms of Cuba are sharp and insightful, there is a hesitancy about reaching the logical conclusions. There is a clear sense of loyalty to what the Cuban revolution represents, but only a vague sense of what it might take to salvage it.
It is clear that the author, Janette Habel, has a strong command of the facts. The book is well researched and, for anyone interested in the current situation in Cuba, it is well worth perusing. It is a highly detailed account, lucidly written, and it provides an excellent overview of the current crisis. Although the postscript is dated November 20, 1990, it is not difficult to get an idea of the present situation of Cuba by extending the conditions described into the post-Soviet era.
During the late 1960s, Cuba opted for a development strategy based on agricultural exports, chiefly sugar. Certainly, the fact that sugar was the chief export of Cuba since the time of Spanish colonial rule made this decision that much easier. Blazing a new economic trail is more difficult than quickening the pace on the road already taken. Nonetheless, economic dependence on sugar has played no small role in the domination of Cuba (since its independence from Spain in 1898) by the United States. Che Guevara had hoped to reduce the share of Cuba’s exports taken up by sugar from 80 percent to 60 percent. Why, then, did the Cuban leadership take this tack?
BUREAUCRATIC MISMANAGEMENT UNDERMINES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The U.S. economic embargo on Cuban products obviously made trade far more difficult, the U.S. having been formerly the main destination for Cuban goods. The Soviet Union was willing to purchase the bulk of Cuban sugar at a guaranteed price. World demand for sugar was on the rise, so more sugar available for sale meant more hard currency, which in turn meant more money to buy western technology. In addition, barter arrangements with Eastern Europe assured Cuba of a stable source of vital supplies. It was hoped that the modernization of the sugar industry would increase production and further accelerate the process of industrialization. These, plus technical considerations, were the main reasons for this policy.
A popular conception of Soviet subsidization of Cuban sugar is to regard Cuba as simply a welfare client of the USSR. There is some truth to this, but it is also true that those who dole out welfare rarely have their clients’ best interests at heart. Soviet and Eastern Bloc purchases of Cuban sugar (accounting for between 65 and 80 percent of Cuban sugar exported) have protected Cuba from the vagaries of the world market. Cuba has benefitted from the re-export of Soviet oil on the world market. Industrial production has increased, mostly for the home market. Cuba is one of the world’s leading producers of sugar cane harvesting and cutting machinery.
But this economic road has also proven to be strewn with potholes. Until 1976, the Soviet import price for sugar had been less than the price Cuba would have received had the U.S. market been available to it. Cuba has also been shortchanged in this manner where its chief mineral export, nickel, is concerned. In addition, Soviet sugar purchases have been tied to Cuban oil purchases.
When the world oil price fell in 1986, Cuba continued to purchase Soviet oil at the old rate. Neither is the Soviet technology that was imported an unmixed blessing, as much of it is of lower value than comparable western equipment and may be unsalable on the world market. Upon joining COMECON in 1972, Cuba agreed to repay debts to the USSR and Eastern Europe. As of 1986, the debt was to be repaid interest free over 25 years, and could be paid in kind. Fidel Castro, in 1987, estimated this debt to be $10 billion.
If relations with the Soviet Union and its allies were contradictory, relations with the industrial capitalist states were almost wholly negative. The United States, Western Europe, and Japan protect native sugar beet producers with low import quotas and price subsidies to farmers. The European Economic Community is a major exporter of sugar. The development of artificial sweeteners has reduced world demand for sugar. While world market sales of sugar account for between 20 and 35 percent of Cuban sugar exports by volume, they account for only 4.5 to 27.5 percent in total value. In 1985, Cuba’s debt to the West was $3 billion and climbing. As of 1984, the bulk of export earnings went to service interest payments on this debt.
THE PRICE OF SUGAR—CATCH-22
When the price of sugar rises, Third World sugar producers have tended to respond by flooding the market, causing a precipitous drop in prices. In addition, since 1975, the value of sugar as compared to oil has been falling. All of this leaves Cuba in a Catch-22 economic situation—industrialization requires western technology imports, which in turn require foreign exchange and consequently an increase in exports, while the price of manufactured products surges ahead of the price of agricultural commodities.
During the 1960s, the leadership of the Cuban deformed workers’ state debated two major options for overcoming this classic Third World economic predicament. The first, favored by Che Guevara, who was Minister of Industry before 1966, called for centralized planning of all major industries (he opposed nationalizing small shops) with strict accounting of production costs. Nationalized industry would be funded through the state budget. Wages would be based partly on an assessment of qualifications and partly on productivity. Moral incentives would be stressed over material ones, but bonuses would not be neglected. The second stressed the law of value, material over moral incentives, and touted managerial autonomy of enterprises over state planning.
Guevara lost the economic debate. In 1967, while Che was in Bolivia organizing his ill-fated attempt at continent-wide revolution (a kind of guerillaist socialist internationalism), the Castro leadership took neither of the above paths, but opted for a curious blend of both and neither. Central planning was dismantled, replaced with “special plans” promulgated from on high. Virtually all private business, even small shops and street vendors, were nationalized. Overtime pay and bonuses were done away with, work standards ignored. Residential rent was abolished, as were fees for telephone calls and other services. This was the period of the “revolutionary offensive.” It ended in 1970, with the failure of the special plan to produce 10 million tons of sugar.
This last special plan wreaked havoc with Cuba’s agriculture. Prices of produce were cut, and farmers had to grow cane with state subsidies. Later, rents on private land used to grow cane were cut in an attempt to force independent farmers to give up their land and work directly for the state. This caused shortages of produce and generated a black market. Protests occurred, and the leadership backtracked. In the mid-1970s, state produce prices rosé and the squeeze on farmers was halted. Efforts were made to promote producer co-ops.
The year 1972, when Cuba joined COMECON, was a major turning point in Cuba history. Soviet assistance and planning were copied. The Central Planning Board (JUCEPLAN) was introduced, ending the special plans. In 1975, the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) held its first congress. Along with the first five-year plan, the Economic Management and Planning System (SDPE) was instituted. This closely resembled the economic ideas of Che Guevara’s opponents during the 1960s. Profitability of enterprises was emphasized and plant managers were given broad autonomy over wages, work standards, and use of resources. Over a ten-year period, house and apartment ownership were encouraged, and free farmers’ markets were opened in 1980.
BUREAUCRATIC PRIVILEGE
The results of this program were mixed and generally disappointing. Bonuses often had little to do with the amount of extra effort exerted. Staff shortages appeared in many enterprises. Staff surpluses occurred frequently as well. Productivity increases were far short of expectations. Home ownership, allowed in order to encourage people to build on their own initiative, led to widespread theft of construction materials, illegal use of equipment, corruption, and workplace absenteeism. Subsequent wage reforms in 1980 more than doubled the salaries of top managers, while leaving the salaries of workers, except skilled technicians, substantially unchanged. Some private farmers were able to earn as much as 50,000 pesos a year, while the salaries of state farm workers were little over 1200 pesos a year. The free farmers’ markets were closed down in 1986.
The most destructive result of all was the rising social inequality. Managerial salaries were twice that of laborers, and middle-level state bureaucrats earned one and two-thirds to almost 3 times an average wage, substantial perks such as access to rationed goods, preferential housing, use of state autos, etc. not included. This may seem as nothing compared with American corporate CEOs earning million dollar salaries (perks also not included) that are a hundred times what they pay the workers, whom they are laying off by the thousands, regardless of company profits. But we are not discussing capitalism. This was a collectivized economy allegedly heading towards communism. People therefore expected some progress towards social equality, even slow progress. These circumstances acted as a drag on morale, making mass mobilizations that much more difficult.
Salaries are only the top of the iceberg. Cuban managers have substantial power over the means of production they are paid to administer, while workers have lost most of the limited control they gained as a result of the revolution. In addition, the attention paid to profitability has led to a disintegration of the social services the people have come to expect. Investment in social services has dropped from 29.3 percent of all investment in 1962 to just 15.6 percent in 1981. In ten years, the number of managers and administrative employees doubled, although even this increase couldn’t absorb the number of highly trained cadre turned out by Cuba’s educational system. The shortage of rural labor, partially the result of abysmally low salaries in this sector, only increases Cuba’s economic and social malaise. School truancy and desertion are rising, as are juvenile delinquency, prostitution, and trafficking in foreign currency, especially near tourist areas (which are being expanded in order to bring in foreign exchange).
At the close of the second session of the Third Congress of the PCC in December 1986, Castro announced the “process of rectification of errors and negative tendencies in all spheres of society.” The market reforms carried out under the SDPE were severely criticized, bureaucratic privileges were decried. Attempts were made to promote voluntary labor and revive the “microbrigades,’ and inculcate a sense of patriotic duty. Che Guevara, virtually unmentioned since 1970, was revived as a national icon, with Castro praising his “economic thought.” Ms. Habel is at least as skeptical of the efficacy of “rectification” as the youth of Cuba appear to be.
These matters are all skillfully covered, in more than adequate detail, in the first three chapters in the book. These are the best chapters of the book. In subsequent chapters, the effect of the USec view of Cuba becomes apparent. While Ms. Habel’s command of the material and her presentation do not disintegrate, it is here that interpretations of political reality run astray. Her recommendations for the future reflect this.
ONLY WORKERS’ DEMOCRACY CAN PRODUCE A RATIONAL ECONOMIC PLAN
Ms. Habel quite accurately describes political democracy as “a major absentee.” The work councils (consejos de trabajo) bear little resemblance to functioning workers’ councils. They have no authority outside of the workplace. Their members, elected by secret ballot, are charged primarily with resolving matters of work discipline, although they have some responsibility over wages, conditions, and transfers. By 1980 these councils had lost most of their limited power to the enterprise managers. The Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC) has some moderating influence over the arbitraryactions of management, and participation in the unions had increased in the 1970s. Workplace assemblies do discuss the central plan, and their input is considered. But there is no formal discussion of alternate proposals and no method by which actual decisions can be made by these assemblies, merely a passing upward of suggestions.
Entirely separate from the workplace structures are the organs of people’s power (OPPs). They are responsible for local investment programs and achieving centrally assigned objectives. These are directly elected at the local and provincial level. The local assemblies then elect delegates to the National Assembly of People’s Power. The deputies’ task is to explain policy and report to the electors.
Workers’ democracy is thus cut off at the knees. Under the rubric of “people’s power,” a truncated form of bourgeois democracy is offered. Actual policy is carried out by a “central group” of vice-presidents, ministers, Central Committee secretaries, department heads, and provincial OPP presidents. There is no formal means of control of these personnel or their decisions.
It is on this question of workers’ democracy that Ms. Habel’s narrative begins to reflect the traditional USec view of Cuba as a healthy workers’ state. Ms. Habel pins her hopes on a combination of “rectification,” a Cuban glasnost without perestroika, and a vague program of democratization. She seems to believe that it is possible for the leadership to mobilize the masses against the bureaucracy and newly arisen capitalist elements through “rectification” and use this as a basis for a strategic alliance between the leadership and the masses. She is correct in stating that the social weight of the bureaucracy will cause “rectification” from the top to fail. But she only dimly realizes just how cynical this “rectification” truly is. While harsh austerity measures are being implemented, bureaucratic privileges and excesses are being criticized, and some officials have been fired, no democratic advances have been made. While Castro and the clique around him may feel the need to ride roughshod over the bureaucracy from time to time, the bureaucracy is the horse upon which they must ride.
Because Castro and his immediate circle arose not from a Stalinist party but from the nationalist July 26 Movement, USec has lean unable to see Castroism as a variant of Stalinism. Ms. Habel is only able to concede bureaucratization and Stalinization from about 1972 onwards, blaming this chiefly on the USSR. But that only is when it became cast in stone.
The July 26 Movement was a peasant-based guerilla movement whose aims were overthrow of the Batista regime, agrarian reform, and national independence. Because agrarian reform ran into fierce resistance from U.S. economic interests and because U.S. control of the economy ran counter to true national independence, the victorious revolutionaries were forced to overturn the old property forms entirely. U.S.-owned industry and much of the property of the Cuban bourgeoisie were confiscated. The bulwarks of the former capitalist regime, the army and the police, were dismantled and replaced with a new revolutionary army and popular militia.
The expropriations required mass mobilizations. The peasants were organized into democratically run cooperatives. Workers took direct action in seizing factories and took the first steps toward democratic control of industry. Popular armed militias were formed. These were major gains, and it serves to explain why, even with increasing commandism and repression, mass organizations were able to exert their influence well into the 1970s.
CASTROISM: THIRD WORLD STALINISM UNDER THE GUN
But the guerillaist, elitist nature of the leadership would soon serve as a brake on progress. In 1960, the elected Fidelista leadership of the unions were arbitrarily replaced by cadre of the Popular Socialist Party (PSP), a Moscow franchise, that toed the government’s line. The autonomy of individual unions was curtailed by placing them under central leadership. Workers’ control of industry was actively opposed by the government, which gave trade unions the task of increasing production. Peasant cooperatives were transformed into state farms operated by the central government. A single party structure was created back in the early 1960s with the formation of the Integrated Revolutionary Organization (ORI) later renamed the PCC. This merged the July 26 Movement, the PSP and the Revolutionary Directorate into one organization, with the former PSP apparatus playing a major role. The publications of Trotskyist and other nonconforming groups were suppressed, as was the Trotskyist Revolutionary Workers Party (POR). Did all this go on without Stalinism or bureaucracy?
It is also difficult to understand how the level of repression in Cuba can be associated with anything but Stalinism. And yet Ms. Habel tells us that “while political repression in Cuba has nothing at all to do with Stalinist repression, it undoubtedly exists.” Not only do we have the above-mentioned acts, but also the stultification of cultural life through ideological interference by the state. Not mentioned at all is the serious repression of gays, which began in the 1960s and featured internment in labor camps. Another example of this repression is the Ochoa trial.
During the summer of 1989, an extraordinary trial was held. General Arnaldo Ochoa, a hero of the Angolan war, and more than a dozen codefendants, mostly officials of the military and police apparatus, were tried and convicted of trafficking in narcotics. Although Ms Habel admits that the defense did nothing more than bring forth admissions of guilt from its clients, she seems convinced of their guilt. No convincing evidence is provided. The only definitive statement in the chapter on the trial was that the defendants, due to past service, deserved better than a summary proceeding, and that the executions of Ochoa and three others were “not justified.”
By contrast, the Revolutionary Tendency (RT) of the SWP saw Cuba, between 1959 and 1960, as a society which was run by people who commanded a monopoly of force, but were not committed to either collective or private property. The bourgeoisie had been thoroughly routed, but the new state had not yet been consolidated. By 1961, Castro et al had expropriated the U.S. and Cuban bourgeoisie and had built a new state, with a new army and popular militia. However, because any organs of workers’ democracy that did exist were far too weak to contend for control of the state, the bureaucracy was able to dominate the working class and peasantry politically. This bureaucracy crystallized around Castro, Guevara, and the other leaders of the Sierra Maestra guerrillas. Cuba had therefore become a deformed workers’ state which required a struggle by the proletariat, led by a Trotskyist party, for direct political power, i.e., a political revolution. The Bolshevik Tendency is the heir of the RT, via the Spartacist League, and adheres to this position.
The political positions of USec with regard to Cuba are not entirely wrong. They at least still claim to see the need, as we do, to defend the Cuban revolution and its social gains unconditionally whenever and wherever the American behemoth threatens. But just as earlier blind loyalty convinced no one and was therefore a poor defense, the inability to make a clean break with Cuban Stalinism, which if taken seriously would have to involve a profound break with the whole tailist methodology and their whole history, makes it impossible to defend the revolution without giving undeserved political support to the bureaucracy.
The Cuban ship of state is sinking. The bureaucracy is incapable of defending the revolution. It is imperative that, along with the defense against imperialism, we propose the only possible way out of the impasse, regardless of how “practical” or popular it appears in the short term.
What is most disturbing about this book is the tentativeness with which Ms. Habel proposes solutions to the frightening dilemma of the Cuban revolution. The closest she comes to a concrete proposal is to call for “workers’ decision-making power and self-government.” Good, as far as it goes, but what does this consist of, and how is this to be put in place?
For our tendency, workers’ democracy means that all administrative officials are chosen by and responsible to representative institutions whose delegates are democratically elected by and recallable by the workers themselves. There are many possible variations on this theme, such as the Soviets of the 1917 Russian Revolution or the Workers’ Councils of the 1956 Hungarian uprising. These institutions are based upon, but by no means restricted to, workplace assemblies.
It should also be understood that workers’ democracy is never a gift. Whether or not there is a Cuban glasnost, the Castroite clique that heads the bureaucracy will neither simply hand over the reigns of power to the workers, nor build their democratic institutions for them. This can only be carried out through a workers’ political revolution that overturns the bureaucracy while maintaining collectivized property and the planned economy. As the PCC is a creature of the bureaucracy, it cannot be the mechanism through which this is to be done. Only a new communist party, a Trotskyist party, can lead this phase of the revolution. Why? Because a Trotskyist party is the only kind of organization that has precisely this perspective.
Ms. Habel has nonetheless made a valuable contribution to the existing literature on Cuba. Despite the muddling on the questions of workers’ democracy and Stalinism, her analyses are often sharp and illuminating. Too bad she isn’t in our camp.
Documento Principal da “Tendência Coletivo Lenin”
Documento de Declaração de Tendência
1. O que significa “continuidade” para os revolucionários?
Muitas das correntes que ainda reivindicam o trotskismo caem no erro de reafirmar a análise do Programa de Transição de que as forças produtivas pararam de se desenvolver. Para muitas delas, a defesa dessa análise acaba não tendo consequências práticas (fica como algo meramente formal), porém essa afirmação pode ser usada como uma forma de argumentar que é possível liderar a classe operária para acabar com o capitalismo apenas com demandas imediatas, sem um programa transitório. É o caso do lambertismo, que afirma que atualmente nenhuma reforma é possível de ser atendida pelo capitalismo e que, portanto, algo como uma campanha salarial ou uma reivindicação democrática acabaria assumindo caráter anticapitalista e, portanto, transitório (já que não pode ser atendida pelo sistema). Isso faz com que as correntes lambertistas defendam um programa extremamente rebaixado. Para uma análise mais completa dessa questão recomendamos aos camaradas a leitura do artigo A Tragédia do Lambertismo, de novembro de 2010.
O Programa de Transição também faz a previsão incorreta sobre a iminente perda de influência do stalinismo após a Segunda Guerra. Trotsky partia da previsão de que o período do pós-guerra seria marcado por fortes levantes do movimento operário (o que se mostrou verdadeiro) e o comprometimento do stalinismo com a manutenção da ordem capitalista (para preservar a burocracia soviética) colocaria tal corrente à direita do movimento de massas, levando-a a trair todas as lutas por vir. Isso abriria a possibilidade de a Quarta crescesse de influência com esse movimento e, progressivamente, faria com que o stalinismo se tornasse uma corrente marginal dentro do movimento de massas. Obviamente não foi isso que ocorreu. Não só a IV foi destruída organizativamente ao longo da guerra e nos anos seguintes, como o stalinismo foi levado a dirigir alguns processos importantes devido a circunstâncias excepcionais, reforçando seu prestígio frente às massas europeias e abrindo caminho para a traidora política das Frentes Populares em uma nova fase.
De certa forma, o pablismo representou uma resposta (equivocada até a medula) a essa avaliação errada e à necessidade dos trotskistas se rearmarem para a nova conjuntura do pós-guerra. A SL foi capaz de preparar tal rearmamento mantendo um programa transitório e a perspectiva de criar partidos bolcheviques que não se sujeitassem a tentar “empurrar” o stalinismo, o nacionalismo ou a socialdemocracia para a esquerda. Abrindo mão de tal avaliação errada, mas sem cair no impressionismo pablista para o qual o stalinismo tomaria o poder em todo o globo, a SL foi capaz de manter a prática revolucionária de utilizar palavras de ordem transitórias para dialogar com o baixo nível de consciência do proletariado, buscando elevá-lo a um patamar revolucionário. Mais do que isso, deu a resposta correta aos ascensos vistos na Europa e Ásia e que então (década de 1960) se expandia para a África e para as Américas. Não capitulou ao stalinismo e o combateu no movimento operário através da construção de colaterais programáticas.
Diferente da SL, que foi capaz de separar as avaliações conjunturais erradas de Trotsky de seu método transitório, Paulo utiliza uma crítica às análises econômicas da III e IV Internacionais (críticas essas que de novas nada têm) para atacar o núcleo programático de tais organizações, afastando-se delas por completo. Para uma análise mais profunda da crítica espartaquista à avaliação da estagnação das forças produtivas, recomendamos aos camaradas a leitura da Introdução feita pela TBI à sua edição de 1998 do Programa de Transição.
Outro avanço importantíssimo da SL foi a formulação de uma política revolucionária para a condição de casta oprimida e sobre-explorada das mulheres e negros. Nos anos 1960, sob a onda da chamada “Nova Esquerda”, ganhou um importante destaque a questão dessas castas. Enquanto a maior parte da esquerda se dedicou à construção de movimentos policlassistas, paralelos ao movimento sindical, como forma de responder às demandas desses setores, a SL formulou a política de integrar estas questões políticas à luta cotidiana dos trabalhadores, oposto à prática setorialista de lutar por estas questões separadas do movimento operário. A política da SL, como os camaradas bem sabem, consiste em levantar as demandas desses setores oprimidos dentro do próprio movimento sindical, integrando-as a partir de um corte de classe. Mas além de integrar as lutas setoriais com as lutas operárias, a SL deu a elas um conteúdo revolucionário, formulando palavras de ordem transitórias para responder às demandas desses setores de forma a fazê-los avançar em sua consciência. Talvez o maior exemplo que tenhamos até hoje da aplicação de tal política seja a atuação da SL no movimento pelos “Direitos Civis” dos negros nos EUA, na década de ’60.
Programa Político do Coletivo Lenin 2009-2011
PROGRAMA POLÍTICO
A libertação do proletariado e, com isso, a eliminação da base material de todas as formas de opressão social, depende da sua direção. O inventário das direções “socialistas” em potencial pode se reduzir, em última análise, a dois programas: reforma ou revolução. Pretendendo oferecer uma estratégia “prática” para a melhora gradual das injustiças das classes sociais, o reformismo trata de conciliar a classe operária com os requisitos do capital. Em contraste, o marxismo revolucionário está baseado no antagonismo entre capital e trabalho, e na conseqüente necessidade da expropriação da burguesia, por parte do proletariado, como pré-condição de qualquer progresso social importante.
Rejeitamos o foquismo ou guevarismo como orientação estratégica (embora reconhecendo que, às vezes, as guerrilhas podem ter valor tático suplementar), porque relega politicamente a classe operária organizada e consciente ao papel de espectadora passiva perante um “exército popular”. Um movimento guerrilheiro baseado no campesinato e dirigido por intelectuais de esquerda pequeno-burgueses não pode estabelecer o poder político da classe trabalhadora, independente da intenção subjetiva de sua direção.
Os setores oprimidos da população não podem se libertar sem a revolução proletária, numa estrutura social que originou e perpetua a sua opressão. Como Lênin apontou em O Estado e a Revolução:
Embora se oponham ao nacionalismo por uma questão de princípio, os leninistas não são neutros nos conflitos entre os povos oprimidos e o aparato estatal opressor. Na Irlanda do Norte, nós exigimos a retirada imediata e incondicional das tropas britânicas, e defendemos os ataques que o Exército Republicano Irlandês (IRA – hoje dissolvido) realizou contra tais alvos imperialistas, como a Força Policial Real de Ulster ou Exército Britânico. Do mesmo modo, nós apoiamos militarmente a Organização pela Libertação da Palestina contra as forças do Estado de Israel. Em nenhum caso defendemos atos terroristas dirigidos contra as populações civis, mesmo sendo claro que o terrorismo criminoso do Estado Sionista contra os palestinos, assim como o do exército britânico e seus aliados protestantes contra os católicos da Irlanda do Norte, é muitas vezes maior que os atos de terror dos oprimidos.
Os leninistas apóiam o direito democrático básico de qualquer indivíduo emigrar para qualquer país no mundo. Como no caso de outros direitos democráticos, isto não é nenhum tipo de imperativo categórico. Nós não defenderíamos, por exemplo, a emigração de qualquer indivíduo que significasse uma ameaça à segurança militar dos Estados Operários degenerados ou deformados. O direito de imigração individual, se exercido numa escala suficientemente larga, pode entrar em conflito com o direito à autodeterminação de uma nação pequena. Portanto, os comunistas não levantam a bandeira de “Abrir as Fronteiras” como uma exigência programática geral. Na Palestina, por exemplo, durante as décadas de 1930 e 1940, o imenso influxo de imigração sionista criou a base para a expulsão forçada do povo palestino de sua própria terra. Nós não reconhecemos o “direito” de migração ilimitada dos Han ao Tibete, nem de cidadãos franceses à Nova Caledônia.
Após o fim da URSS, os Estados Operários que sobraram precisaram recorrer a uma política semelhante à NEP, abrindo as suas economias para o capital imperialista. Por isso, China, Cuba e Vietnã destruíram a planificação econômica, que era a maior conquista da revolução. Mesmo assim, o fato do aparelho de Estado nesses países não ser controlado pela burguesia, e sim pela burocracia (uma casta pertencente à classe trabalhadora), faz com que ele seja um ponto de apoio para a volta de uma economia planificada e para a luta contra a recolonização pelo imperialismo. Por isso, continuamos a defender incondicionalmente esses Estados contra a restauração do domínio da burguesia.
As tentativas de encobrir diferenças importantes e apagar linhas de demarcação política interna só podem enfraquecer e desorientar um partido revolucionário. Uma organização cuja coesão é mantida por diplomacia e consenso no máximo denominador comum tem como consequência a ambigüidade programática (em vez de acordo programático e de princípios, e luta pela clareza política). Uma organização desse tipo está apenas esperando a primeira prova séria posta pela luta de classes para acabar rachando.
Pelo Renascimento da Quarta Internacional! Pela construção do Partido Revolucionário dos trabalhadores!
Dentro do CI, a seção mais importante era o Socialist Workers Party americano (SWP). Também era a seção mais forte na época de fundação da internacional. Havia se beneficiado da colaboração direta de Trotsky e tinha quadros na sua direção que remontavam aos primeiros anos do Comintern. O colapso político do SWP como organização revolucionária, assinalado pelo seu entusiasmo acrítico em relação ao castrismo nos anos 60, e culminando com a sua unificação com os pablistas em 1963, foi um golpe enorme para todos os comunistas.
O PCI francês, o outro componente principal do CI, manteve as suas posições revolucionárias até o início dos anos 1970 quando, capitulando à política de frente única antiimperialista do POR boliviano, passou a se desviar cada vez mais à direita, o que terminou por levá-lo a adotar um programa social-democrata de entrismo sui generis nos partidos reformistas.
Coletivo Lenin rompe relações com a IBT
Através da presente declaração, originalmente publicada em dezembro de 2010, o Coletivo Lenin rompeu publicamente relações com a Tendência Bolchevique Internacional (IBT) e estabeleceu relações fraternais com o Reagrupamento Revolucionário, um racha da IBT de 2008. Reproduzimos este documento para atestar o programa e as concepções do Coletivo Lenin na época, em contraste com a sua atual degeneração.
1) Que a corrente considerasse a destruição da União Soviética e demais Estados operários deformados do Leste Europeu como derrotas contrarrevolucionárias. Consequentemente, seria necessário que ela defendesse a participação temporária em frentes militares com as frações da burocracia stalinista que se opusessem à restauração do capitalismo, em todo lugar em que estas demonstrassem resistência.
— Healy “Reconstructs” the Fourth International
- Defendemos a teoria da acumulação do capital de Rosa Luxemburgo, com sua conclusão de que o capitalismo está levando a sociedade à barbárie. Essa posição, entretanto, nunca nos levou a nenhum tipo de discordância prática, mas simplesmente chamava a atenção para que discutíssemos o entendimento leninista do imperialismo.
- Reivindicamos as teorias do marxista brasileiro Ruy Mauro Marini. Encaramos países como Brasil, Índia, Israel, Rússia e África do Sul enquanto subimperialistas, ao invés de semicolônias dominadas. Nesses países, a fusão do capital nacional com o estrangeiro estabeleceu uma base para a exploração e o controle de outros países dentro de seus raios regionais de influência. Esse é o caso do Brasil em relação aos demais países da América do Sul, por exemplo. Assim, no caso hipotético de uma guerra entre o Brasil e a Bolívia, emblocaríamos militarmente com esta contra seu opressor regional, por entendermos que uma vitória brasileira elevaria consideravelmente o nível de exploração dos trabalhadores bolivianos. Também reconhecemos que países subimperialistas são, ao mesmo tempo, países dependentes e, assim, baseados no mesmo motivo, os defenderíamos de ataques imperialistas. Não negamos, entretanto que qualquer liberdade real em relação à opressão imperialista, seja para as semicolônias, seja para os países subimperialistas como o Brasil, só pode ser atingida através de uma revolução socialista.
- Assim como a maioria das organizações latinoamericanas, porém diferentemente da IBT e outros pequenos grupos de propaganda baseados em países economicamente mais desenvolvidos, aceitamos em nossas fileiras camaradas que possuem crenças religiosas. Como a entrada para a organização pressupõe acordo com suas posições políticas (incluindo a defesa da ciência, a separação entre igrejas e o Estado, a defesa dos direitos democráticos das mulheres, GLBTTs, e outras questões similares), relevamos possíveis contradições pessoais entre a teoria marxista e aspectos da crença religiosa, desde que o militante respeite a disciplina da organização. Enquanto marxistas, somos materialistas e defensores da ciência, reconhecemos o papel histórico que religiões organizadas cumprem em servir aos interesses das classes dominantes e lutamos para educar todos os nossos militantes nesse sentido.
- Apesar de defendermos que o Estado chinês permanece sendo um Estado operário deformado, também reconhecemos que largas porções da economia chinesa têm sido privatizadas através do aval de seus dirigentes stalinistas. Tais medidas prejudicaram consideravelmente e colocaram em cheque o caráter (burocraticamente) planejado de sua economia. Acreditamos que tais medidas impulsionadas pelos governantes burocratas criam largas aberturas e possibilitam a vitória de uma contrarrevolução capitalista. Também enxergamos fortes paralelos com o período da NEP, na União Soviética, durante os anos 1920. Lá, a combinação de uma pouco desenvolvida economia planejada, com a reintrodução temporária de formas capitalistas de produção, colocou em risco a natureza do modelo econômico dominante, porém, similarmente, não foi decisivo em determinar o caráter de classe do Estado.
- Acreditávamos que a IBT possuía um foco extremamente exagerado em continuar a explorar suas diferenças históricas com a SL, em detrimento daquilo que deve ser a principal tarefa de um grupo de propaganda trotskista, ou seja, buscar engajar aqueles grupos mais dinâmicos que estão dando um giro à esquerda ou possuem uma ativa vida interna, principalmente entre seus militantes de base, no que diz respeito a discussões, polêmicas, etc. Apesar de reconhecermos a importância história da Liga Espartaquista em seus primórdios, bem como a importância de educar nossos camaradas sobre seus feitos e formulações, a realidade é que a Liga Espartaquista de hoje em dia, assim como seus companheiros da Liga Comunista Internacional, tem sido já há muitos anos uma organização estagnada, que vem diminuindo em tamanho e que, além de estar se encaminhando cada vez mais para a direita, possui uma base militante extremamente despolitizada. Provavelmente baseados no mesmo motivo pelos quais busca continuar a perseguir suas diferenças históricas com a SL, a liderança da IBT planejava que mantivéssemos nosso foco em perseguir polêmicas com os seguidores de Jan Norden que, ao menos no Brasil, também visivelmente diminuíram e envelheceram ao longo dos anos. Ao mesmo tempo, nos pareceu que a IBT possui pouquíssimo interesse em buscar polemizar com grupos mais dinâmicos e cujos militantes podem de fato cumprir algum papel na luta pela refundação de um movimento revolucionário. Em um primeiro momento, vimos isso enquanto uma diferença tática, provavelmente derivada do fato da liderança da IBT se encontrar presa em um momento político há muito ultrapassado, mas não tínhamos ainda compreendido plenamente as razões para tal passividade e rotineirismo.
Guerrillas in Power
A Bureaucratic, Anti-Working-Class Regime
Guerrillas in Power
[First printed in Workers Vanguard # 102, March 25, 1976]
As part of a broader effort to “institutionalize” its rule, the recent congress of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) approved a new “socialist” constitution for the country to replace the bourgeois “Fundamental Law” of 1940 (see “Castro Holds First her CP Congress,” WV No. 100, 12 March 1976). Prime Minister Fidel Castro also made use of the occasion to present the “revised standard version” of the history of the Cuban revolution.
The extensive overview was doubly significant in the context of the new constitution, since one of Castro’s key original demands- from the attack on the Moncada on 26 July 1953 until taking power from the dictator Batista on 1 January 1959 –was precisely for a return to the 1940 constitution. This raises the crucial questions of the class character of the guerrilla movement, the nature of the revolution it carried out, and the causes and significance of the shift from a “democratic” bourgeois program to the expropriation of the bourgeoisie.
These issues are of tremendous significance for communists as they concern the most fundamental questions of revolutionary strategy in the backward capitalist countries. Can the petty bourgeoisie-traditionally considered by Marxists as a vacillating group, incapable of giving independent class leadership–carry out a socialist revolution, as the revisionist “United Secretariat” claims? Or has Cuba remained throughout a capitalist state, as the Maoists and Gerry Healy’s fakeTrotskyist “International Committee” contend? On the other hand, if. as uniquely put forward by the international Spartacist tendency, the Castro regime has since late 1960 been a deformed workers state, how was it formed, and what implications does this have for the Trotskyist theory of permanent revolution?
A Closet Communist?
In his opening speech to the PCC congress, “Comandante” Castro repeatedly praised the policies of the Stalinist leaders of the Soviet Union. Having long ago become locked into the Soviet orbit, Castro now seeks to project his current policies back onto the militant youth who stormed the army barracks in Santiago in 1953 and the nucleus of the Rebel Army that initiated guerrilla struggle in the Sierra Maestra mountains three years later.
Castro includes among the “solid pillars” on which the leaders of the 26th of July Movement based themselves “the principles of Marxism-Leninism.” He goes on, “Even though this was not the way of thinking of all those who had embarked upon the road of revolutionary armed struggle in our country, it was that of its main leaders” (Granma, 28 December 1975). Castro also claimed that among the young combatants there was “a deep respect and admiration for the old Communists” of the pro-Moscow People’s Socialist Party(PSP), who “had held aloft with unyielding firmness the noble banners of MarxismLeninism.”
The reality was considerably different. Castro’s speech was silent on the program of the anti-Batista movement, but in an oblique aside for the benefit of those who know something of the struggle during the 1950’s, he added: ” … not only the most resolute action was necessary, but also astuteness and flexibility on the part of revolutionaries …. The proclamation of socialism during the period of insurrectional struggle would not have been understood by the people, and imperialism would have directly intervened in our country with its troops.”
A similar theme can be found in many right-wing attacks on Castro, which charge that he “betrayed the revolution” against Batista and hoodwinked the people. Certain left-wing apologists for the Havana regime also put forward the myth of Castro the “closet Marxist-Leninist” who “pulled a fast one” on the imperialists. “The leaders of the Revolution had to know the people and talk to them in terms they were ready to understand,” wrote Edward Boorstein in The Economic Transformation of Cuba (1968). Others, such as the ex-Maoist Progressive Labor Party (PL), who attempt to criticize Castro from the left claim they were initially captivated by ”Che [Guevara’s slick way of moving Cuba to socialism behind everybody’s backs” (Jake Rosen, “Is Cuba Socialist?” PL, November 1969). Professing that they “no longer believe[d] in nifty gimmicks,” PL concluded that Cuba was still capitalist. The truth is more complex-more dialectical-than such simple-minded talk of Castro and Guevara as con artists.
A Radical Jacobin Democrat
All these “explanations” come down to a conspiracy theory of history and ignore the real social character of Castro’s movement. To begin with, Castro himself did not even pretend to be part of the workers movement during the struggle against the U.S. backed dictatorship. Instead, he was a radical Jacobin petty-bourgeois democrat, following in the footsteps of “the Apostle” of Cuban independence, Jose Marti. H is political background was as a liberal student leader and constitutionalist lawyer. He was for a time head of the student government at the University of Havana, and in 1948 voted for Eduardo Chibas, candidate of the Ortodoxo Party, who was running for president of the country on an anti-corruption program. In 1952, Castro was a candidate for the Cuban Congress on the Ortodoxo slate, but a coup d’etat by former military strongman Fulgencio Batista forestalled the elections.
After the March 10 coup, the young lawyer’s first action against the dictator was not to undertake agitation among the workers and peasants, but instead to appeal to an emergency court in the capital to arrest Batista for violating the Code of Social Defense! Leo Huberman and Paul Sweezy’s simplistic apology for Castro (Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution,1960) commented: “When his petition for the imprisonment of Batsita was rejected by the court. Fidel decided there was only one way in which the usurper could be overthrown — revolution.” His goals were listed as “honest government” and a “truly sovereign Cuba.”
The methods which the young lawyer then resorted to were well within the framework of traditional Latin American bourgeois politics. Various pseudo Marxists – from Castro himself to the followers of fake-Trotskyist Ernest Mandel -pretend today that the Cuban guerrilla “strategy” was somehow to the left of traditional Stalinist reformism because it engaged in “armed struggle.” They “forget” that in the unstable conditions of Latin America, just about every political tendency has at one time or another “picked up the gun.” Castro’s first attempt at revolutionary action, for instance, was nothing but an old-style pronunciamiento.
The plan for the assault on the Moncada was to. surprise the 1,000 soldiers quartered there, seize their arms, then take over the radio station and broadcast the last speech of Eduardo Chibas (who had committed suicide in 1951), followed by a call to arms inviting the Cuban people to rise up against the dictator. Similar actions have been carried out scores of times in Mexico, Bolivia, Peru or Argentina. However, in this case it failed, partly due to bad planning, and most of the 200 attackers were killed during the attack or brutally murdered by Batista’s torturers in the mopping-up operation which followed.
Program of the 26th of July Movement
At his trial the following September, Castro (who had been caught hiding in the hills around the eastern provincial capital) was able to turn the tables on the government with a dramatic speech indicting the regime for its oppression of “the people.” In this speech, later edited into a pamphlet entitled “History Will Absolve Me,” Castro laid out five “revolutionary laws” that would have been immediately proclaimed after the capture of the Moncada barracks.
These projected decrees show quite clearly the social content of the revolution which the July 26 rebels were planning. The first was to return to the constitution of 1940; second was to grant land titles to tenants and squatters (with the state indemnifying former owners on the basis of rental values they would have received over the next ten years); the third provided for profit sharing, the fourth that cane growers would get 55 percent of sugar production (instead of the lion’s share going to the mills), and the last was to confiscate “ill-gotten gains of all who had committed frauds during previous regimes.”
As the cold-warrior journalist academic Theodore Draper wrote: “There is virtually nothing in the social and economic program of History Will Absolve Me that cannot be traced at least as far back as … the 1935 program of Dr. Grau San Martins’s Autentico party, let alone the later propaganda of Chibas” (Castroism: Theory and Practice, 1965).
Castro’s anti-Batista struggle following the catastrophic landing of the yacht Granma in Oriente province in December 1956 is usually thought of exclusively in terms of a tiny guerrilla band gradually winning support from the jibaros (peasants). But the leader of the tiny 26th of July Movement was simultaneously negotiating with a number of prominent bourgeois politicians. Thus the “Manifesto of the Sierra Maestra,” dated July 1957 and the most widely circulated of the rebel documents, was signed by Castro, Raul Chibas (brother of Eduardo) and Felipe Pazos, ex-president of the National Bank of Cuba.
The Castro-Chibas-Pazos manifesto called for “democratic, impartial elections” organized by a “provisional neutral government”: “dissociat[ion] [of] the army from politics: freedom of the press: “sound financial policy” and “industrialization”: and an agrarian reform based on granting ownnership to squatters and tenants (with prior indemnification of owners). The ten point program was to be carried out by a Civilian Revolutionary Front, made up of representatives of all opposition groups.
The final programmatic statement from the Sierra Maestra, issued in October 1958, as the Batista regime was crumbling, was “Law No. 3” on agrarian reform. Based on the principle of land to the tiller, it did not mention cooperatives or state farms.
When Fidel and Raul Castro swept out of the Sierra Maestra to link up with Ernesto “Che” Guevara and Camilo Cienfuegos in the plains of Camaguey province and then march on to Havana, the Rebel Army was far from being a mass organization, counting only 1,100 soldiers. most of them peasants.
The provisional government, installed with Castro’s approval was hardly dominated by 26th of July ministers. The president was Manuel Urrutia, a former judge: the prime minister was Jose Miro Cardona, former head of the Havana Bar Association; the foreign minister was Roberto Agramonte, the Ortodoxo presidential candidate in 1952: and Felipe Pazos was again head of the National Bank. In the new armed forces, the head of the Revolutionary Air Force was Pedro Diaz Lanz. By the end of the year, all of these men had defected to the U.S., joining the ex-batistianos in Miami. Miro was later to be the puppet head of a “Revolutionary Council” set up by the CIA to serve as the front for its Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961.
The policies adopted by the new regime during its early months were certainly a radical departure from the laissez-faire debauchery and wholesale corruption of the Batista “government,” which was something akin to having Al Capone in the White House. However, the actions of the revolutionary government did not exceed the limits of the capitalist regime.
Among the first steps were the slashing of electric rates by half in rural areas, up to 50 percent cuts in rents for the poor. and the implementation of the agrarian reform law of the Sierra Maestra together with seizure of the estates of Batista henchmen. In the United States, the bourgeois press, led off by Time magazine, whipped up a reactionary publicity campaign against the war crimes trials of the bloodstained butchers of the Batista regime (of whose bestialities the imperialist media had reported nothing). In all only 550 of the most notorious criminals were executed. with the broad approval of virtually all classes of the Cuban population.
But while this first post-Batista government was headed by authentic liberal bourgeois politicians, real power was in the hands of the Rebel Army, which is why the openly counterrevolutionary leaders left without waging any kind of fight. The guerrilla struggles in the hills had been militarily marginal, but they succeeded in crystallizing the massive popular hatred for the Batista regime. By the time the leaders of the 26th of July Movement entered the capital, the official army and police apparatus -the core of the state power- had collapsed. The Castroites proceeded to sweep it away, and organize a new repressive apparatus recruited and organized along quite different lines.
The guerrilla army was a petty-bourgeois formation, politically heterogeneous, with its leadership recruited from among ex-students and proffessionals and the ranks from the peasants of the sierra. While Castro and the rest of the leadership had signed various programs, manifestos, etc., with oppositional liberals. their previous direct connections with the bourgeoisie had been broken. Most importantly, the Rebel Army was not faced with a combative and class conscious proletariat, which would have polarized the petty-bourgeois militants, drawing some to the workers’ side and sending others straight into the arms of Urrutia, Miro & Co. Consequently, what existed in Havana following the overthrow of Batista was an inherently transitory and fundamentally unstable phenomenon a petty-bourgeois government which was not committed to the defense of either bourgeois private property or the collectivist property forms of proletarian class rule (see “Cuba and Marxist Theory,” Marxist Bulletin No. 8).
The Consolidation of a Deformed Workers State
While such a regime was temporarily autonomous from the bourgeois order -that is, a capitalist state, namely armed bodies of men dedicated to defending a particular property form, did not exist in the Marxist sense- Castro could not escape from the class struggle. After I January 1959 a new bourgeois state power could have been erected in Cuba. as occurred following the departure of the French colonial rulers in Algeria in 1962. In the Algerian case, this process was aided by the conclusion of the neo-colonial Evian Accords, explicitly protecting the property of French colons, and the fact that power was handed over to a regular army which played little role in the guerrila fighting.
However, in Cuba U.S. imperialism was far from accommodating and soon began a sharp economic struggle against the new rulers in Havana which rapidly grew into military actions. This imperialist pressure, in turn, pushed the core of the Cuban leadership to the left, while leading other segments of the 26th of July Movement to join the bourgeois liberals and batistianosin exile.
The first sharp clash with the domestic bourgeoisie came over the proclamation of a moderate agrarian reform law in May. The new law expropriated all land over 999 acres, to be paid in bonds of the revolutionary government which could be redeemed in 20 years. The reaction was predictable: landowners declared this was “worse than Communism” and the U.S. State Department sent a pious note deploring that American investors had not been consulted beforehand.
The next move by Castro which stirred the ire of the capitalists was the removal of Felipe Pazos from the National Bank where he was replaced by Guevara. In February 1960, Russian deputy prime minister Mikoyan visited Cuba and signed an agreement to purchase 1 million tons of Cuban sugar yearly. This relieved Cuba of its hitherto almost exclusive reliance on the U.S. for foreign trade, and when on 29 June 1960 US owned oil refineries refused to accept crude petrolium imported from the USSR, they were nationalized. On July 3, the American Congress approved a cutting off Cuba’s sugar quota, and two days later Castro seized U.S.-held property (primarily sugar mills) on the island.
Meanwhile the the polarization within the diverse Castroite movement had proceeded apace. Already in July 1959, President Urrutia had provoked a government crisis by denouncing the PSP and Communism; almost simultaneously, air force head Diaz Lanz called on defense minister Raul Castro to purge Communists from the armed forces. Diaz soon fled to the U.S., and Urrutia resigned and was replaced by Osvaldo Dorticos. In October, the military commander of Camaguey province, Hubert Matos, tried to launch a regional rebellion together with two dozen of his officers, but was quickly overpowered and arrested.
Not only in the new armed forces was the differentiation taking place. The Havana organization of the 26th of July Movement and its newspaper Revolucion throughout early 1959 were a source of aggressive anti-Communism.
The crisis between the right and left wing came to a head in the battle over the trade unions, where David Salvador had been installed as head of the Cuban Labor Federation (CTC) to replace Batista’s gangster crony Eusebio Mujal. Salvador immediately dissolved the working unity between the PSP and the 26th of July in the labor movement which had been established in late 1958, and assigned all seats on the CTC executive committee to non-Communists. In the November 1959 CTC congress there was a showdown, and after a personal intervention by Fidel Castro the back of the anti-PSP wing (which reportedly included a number of ex-mujalistas) was broken. Salvador resigned a few months later, and control of the unions passed to longtime Stalinist Lazaro Pena (see J. P. Morray, The Second Revolution in Cuba, 1962).
The culminating step in the nationalizations came in the fall of 1960, with a series of rapid-fire seizures (tobacco factories. American banks, and then, on October 13. all banks and 382 business enterprises). By mid-October all agricultural processing plants: all chemical metallurgical. paper. textile and drug factories: all railroads. ports. printing presses, construction companies and department stores were nationalized. Together this made the state the owner of 90 percent of the industrial capacity of Cuba.
The Permanent Revolution
With the takeover of capitalist property in Cuba, for the first time in the Western Hemisphere -and only “90 miles from Florida”- the world witnessed the expropriation of the bourgeoisie as a class. This naturally made the Cuban revolution an object of hatred for the imperialists. It also made Castro and Cuba into objects of adoration by would-be revolutionaries of all sorts and a large spectrum of petty-bourgeois radical opinion. The New Left. with its hard anti-Leninism, grabbed instinctively for a revolution “by the people” but without a Leninist party or the participation of the working class.
For ostensible Trotskyists, however, the Cuban revolution posed important programmatic questions. The theory of permanent revolution held that in the backward capitalist regions the bourgeoisie was too weak and bound by its ties to the imperialists and feudalists to achieve an agrarian revolution, democracy and national emancipation, objects of the classical bourgeois revolutions. Trotsky’s analysis of the Russian revolution of 1905 led him to his insistence that the proletariat must estahlish its own class rule, with the support of the peasantry, in order to accomplish even the democratic tasks of the bourgeois revolution: and it would from the beginning be forced to undertake socialist measures as well, making the revolution permanent in character.
The Cuban revolution demonstrated that even with a leadership that began its insurgency with no perspective of transcending petty-bourgeois radicalism, real agrarian reform and national emancipation from the yoke of Yankee imperialism proved to be impossible without destroying the bourgeoisie as a class. It vindicated the Marxist understanding that the petty bourgeoisie composed of highly volatile and contradictory elements lacking the social force to independently vie for power- is unable to establish any new, characteristic mode of property relations, but is forced to fall back upon the property forms of one of the two fundamentally counterposed classes in capitalist society, the bourgeoisie or the proletariat.
Thus the Castro leadership, under exceptional circumstances due to the collapse of the Batista regime in the absence of a powerful working class able to struggle for state power in its own right, was pushed hy the pressure of U.S. imperialism’s frenzied hostility into creating a deformed workers state which in power increasingly duplicated the mode of rule of the degenerated USSR as the Castroists consolidated a bureaucratic state apparatus. The evolution of the Cuban leadership from petty-bourgeois radicals to the administrators of a deformed workers state (and the incorporation of the Cuban Communists) confirmed Trotsky’s characterization of the Russian Stalinists as a petty bourgeois caste resting upon the property forms established by the October Revolution. Moreover, the Cuban revolution provides a negative confirmation that only the class-conscious proletariat, led by a Marxist vanguard party, can establish a democratically governed, revlutionary workers state, and thus lay the basis for the international extension of the revolution and open the road to socialism.
Unlike the Russian Revolution which required a political counterrevolution under Stalin to become a bureaucratically deformed workers state, the Cuban revolution was deformed from its inception. The Cuban working class, having played essentially no part in the revolutionary process, never held political power, and the Cuban state was governed by the whims of the Castroist clique rather than being administered by democratically elected workers councils (soviets).
The revisionist current which had emerged from within the Trotskyist movement in the late 1950’s saw in Cuba the perfect justification for its abandonment of the construction of Trotskyist vanguard parties. By ignoring the crucial index of workers democracy and thus sliding over the qualititative difference between a deformed workers state such as Stalinist Russia or Castroist Cuba and the healthy Russian workers state of Lenin and Trotsky, the European supporters of the “International Secretariat” (I.S.) embraced the Cuban revolution as proof that revolutionary transformations could take place without the leadership of a proletarian vanguard. Cuba became the model of the “revolutionary process” under “new conditions” -and the schema to which the revisionists have clung despite the failure of countless guerrifla struggles in Latin American to duplicate the “Cuban road.”
For the American Socialist Workers Party (SWP), however, Cuba was a watershed in the degeneration of that party as a repository of revolutionary Trotskyism. During the 1950’s it had fought Pablo’s notion of “deep entrism” in the mass reformist parties. But with its revolutionary fibre weakened under the impact of McCarthyism, the SWP leaders were desperately searching for a popular cause which could enable them to break out of isolation.
SWP leader Joseph Hansen crowed enthusiastically:
“What provision are there in Marxism for a relolution. obviously socialist in tendency but powered by the peasantry and led by revolutionist;. who have never professed socialist aims …. It’s not in the books! …. If Marxism has no provisions for such phenomena, perhaps it is time provisions were made. It would seem a fair enough exchange for a revolution as good as this one.”
“The Theory of the Cuhan Revolution:” 1962 [our emphasis]
Having declared the revolution “socialist in tendency” and equated it with Russia under Lenin, Hansen could not simply ignore the crucial question of workers democracy. “It is true that this workers state lacks. as yet, the forms of proletarian democracy,” he wrote. But he immediately added. “This does not mean that democracy is lacking in Cuba.”
The SWP tops took the convergence on the Cuba question as the opportunity to propose a reunification with the I.S. In a 1963 document. “For Early Reunification of the World Trotskyist Movement.” the SWP wrote of “the appearance of a workers state in Cuba—the exact form of which is yet to be settled”; the “evolution toward revolutionary Marxism [of] the July 26 Movement” and concluded:
“Along the road of a revolution beginning with simple democratic demands and ending in the rupture of capitalist property relations. guerrilla warfare conducted by landless peasant and semi-proletarian forces, under a leadership that becomes committed to carrying the revolution through to a conclusion, can play a decisive role in undermining and precipitating the downfall of a colonial and semi-colonial power …. It must he consciously incorporated into the strategy of building revolutionary Marxist parties in colonial countries.”
In response to this open revisionism, Healy and his International Committee followers simply thrust their head in the sand like an ostrich and declared that Cuba, even after the 1960 nationalizations, is “a bonapartist regime resting on capitalist state foundations,” one not qualitatively different from Batista’s regime. But within the SWP the Revolutionary Tendency (RT,. forerunner of the Spartacist League U.S.) was able to analyze the post-1960 Cuban regime as a deformed workers state and point out the significance of that characterization for Marxist theory.
In a resolution that was submitted as a counter document to the “For Early Reunification … ” document of the SWP leadership, the RT made clear that “Trotskyists are at once the most militant and unconditional defenders against imperialism of both the Cuban Revolution and the deformed workers’ state which has issued therefrom.” But it added: “Trotskysists cannot give confidence and political support, however critical. to a governing regime hostile to the most elementary principles and practices of workers’ democracy … ” (“Toward the Rebirth of the Fourth International.” June 1963).
Directly rejecting the SWP’s embracing of guerrillaism and Castroism in place of the Trotskyist perspective of proletarian revolution, the RT resolution summarized:
“Experience since the Second World War has demonstrated that peasant based guerrilla warfare under petit-bourgeois leadership can in itself lead to nothing more than an anti-working class bureaucratic regime. The creation of such regimes has come about under the conditions of decay of imperialism, the demorallization and disorientation caused by Stalinist betrayals, and the absence of revolutionary Marxist leadership of the working class. Colonial revolution can have an unequivocally progressive significance only under such leadership of the revolutionary proletariat. For Trotskyists to incorporate into their strategy revisionism on the prolelarian leadership in the revolution is profound negation of Marxism-Leninism….”
Polêmica com a Liga Espartaquista sobre a Ocupação do Haiti
Polêmica com a LRP sobre o Fim da URSS
No curso da troca de polêmicas realizadas até seu debate com a LRP, a SL havia respondido a muitos dos desafios polêmicos propostos pela LRP sobre uma ampla variedade de questões. Um artigo da LRP ao qual eles não responderam, no entanto, foi uma polêmica sobre a questão russa, tradicionalmente uma questão central para a SL e um ponto chave separando os dois grupos. Observando a análise da SL sobre a vitória da contrarrevolução capitalista na URSS, o artigo afirma:
Introdução à Série Polêmica Marxista
Escrito por Samuel Trachtenberg no mesmo ano de sua ruptura com a Tendência Bolchevique Internacional (TBI) e da fundação do projeto Reagrupamento Revolucionário, o seguinte artigo é a introdução para uma série de polêmicas já publicadas e também planejadas. Entretanto, o reproduzimos enquanto uma introdução aos documentos aqui disponibilizados com o objetivo de apresentar a nossa organização de um ponto de vista histórico. A tradução para o português foi realizada em 2011 por Leandro Torres e Rodolfo Kaleb.
Polêmica com o IG / LQB
17 de agosto de 2010
Enquanto critica corretamente muitas das posições atuais da Liga Espartaquista (SL) [organização dos EUA], a liderança do Grupo Internacionalista [IG – organização internacional que dirige a Liga Quarta Internacionalista do Brasil, LQB] persiste rigidamente na defesa da suposta integridade política de tal organização até o momento em que eles forma expulsos dela em 1996. Os líderes do IG escolheram construir a sua organização em torno desse mito e, mais especificamente, continuam insistindo que a SL estava “singularmente correta” ao longo dos anos ‘80 em seu entendimento distorcido das posições trotskistas sobre o stalinismo e a defesa da União Soviética. Tendo eles próprios sido antigos líderes centrais da SL, que participaram ativamente no desenvolvimento de sua linha política, a defesa do histórico da mesma sempre foi uma questão de proteção dos seus próprios legados pessoais e prestígio burocrático. Como consequência da teimosa insistência do Partido Comunista Alemão em defender a sua política, que permitiu que Hitler ascendesse ao poder sem resistência (“Primeiro Hitler, depois nós”), Leon Trotsky foi forçado a concluir que qualquer organização que colocasse o prestígio da sua liderança na frente de falar a verdade, merecia ser descartada de qualquer propósito revolucionário.
Em política, é inevitável, quando se segue adiante com a lógica de uma posição errada em uma questão, que em última instância isso tenha consequências imprevistas em uma ou várias outras questões que poderiam parecer, num primeiro momento, não ter relação com a política original. Após o recente terremoto no Haiti, a SL colheu o que plantou quando ela, escandalosamente e de forma inesperada, acabou apoiando a ocupação do Haiti pelo exército dos Estados Unidos, acreditando nas palavras de Obama de que ele estava lá para prover ajuda às sofridas massas haitianas (veja A Liga Espartaquista apoia as tropas americanas no Haiti, de fevereiro de 2010).
Haiti, Afeganistão e Líbano
Castroism, Trotskyism, and the SWP
Castroism, Trotskyism, and the SWP
by Goeffry White
[First printed in Spartacist West Vol 1. No. 3 [no date], circa early 1966]
A new step in the evolution of the Castro regime was signalized at the Havana Tricontinental Congress last month by Castro’s closing denunciation of “counter-revolutionary Trotskyism.” The tendency of the conference itself was to paper over the profound differences which exist among the groups represented there with militant and left-sounding phraseology.
Castro’s closing speech contained a long section denouncing the role of Trotskyism and the Fourth International. He characterized Trotskyist participation in the Guatamalan guerrilla movement as “infiltration” and the pushing of the program of the Fourth International there as ” … a true crime against the revolutionary movement, to isolate it from the masses by corrupting it with stupidities, the dishonor, and the repugnant and nauseating thing that is Trotskyism today within the field of politics.” He also attacked as Trotskyist and “villanous” articles by Adolfo Gilly in the Monthly Review giving political reasons for Guevara’s departure from the Cuban scene. Raising these specific attacks to the level of political generalization, Castro said: “If Trotskyism at a certain stage represented an erroneous position within the field of political ideas, in later years it became a vulgar instrument of imperialism and reaction.” Thus Castro, in 1966, embraces in its most crude form the rationalization of the purge trials of the thirties, and paraphrases Vyshinsky’s orations to the Moscow court.
Castro’s espousal of a line which would cause embarrassment to even the more sophisticated Stalinists of Moscow today raises serious questions on both the immediate and long-range levels. Why did Castro find it desirable to push this line at this particular moment? The conference took place at a time when the revolutionary movement, especially in Latin America, is in a serious state of disarray, and at the same time revolutionary pressures from the masses are on the rise. The Latin American revolution can no longer be contained by a purely reformist and constitutional program. Hence the constant emphasis on “armed struggle” at the conference. But the bourgeois reformists like Allende of Chile and Jagan of British Giana and the Stalinists and Stalinoids who dominated at least the Latin American section of the conference are faced with the problem of maintaining their control of the movement and keeping it within acceptable bounds. These bounds are defined as those which will not upset the international diplomatic applecart of coexistence, or by providing an example of victorious genuine proletarian revolution, undermine the political position of the entrenched bureaucracies. An attack on Trotskyism by the conference’s most prestigeful and untainted figure, an attack in which even the Monthly Review is included in the amalgam, serves a double purpose. In the first place, it makes it more difficult for Trotskyists, semi-Trotskyists, and other left elements in Latin America to take advantage of the left rhetoric of the reformers to develope a genuinely revolutionary movement. In the second place, it serves as an indication to the bourgeois and Stalinist reformists of the region and to the co-existers of the Kremlin that the conference forces will keep the revolution within the limits that they define as acceptable. Anti-Trotskyism thus serves simultaneously as a prophylaxis against the effects of the left turn required by the objective situation and as the cement to bind together widely divergent social and political elements.
That Castro should follow such a course should be no surprise to serious Marxists, although the crudity with which the job was done is indeed surprising. In the category of “serious Marxists,” however, we cannot include the leadership of the SWP-YSA and its chief spokesman (we would blush to say theoretician), Joe Hansen.
The SWP has for years sought to ride the coat-tails of “The Lenin of the Caribbean,” has proclaimed Cuba to be a genuine uncorrupted workers’ state, and has reduced its own role largely to that of a spokesman and apologist for Fidelismo. Minorities which attempted to make a serious analysis of the new Cuba and who committed the unpardonable crime of warning that this peasant-petty bourgeois anti-working class regime would evolve in precisely the Stalinist direction it has taken were expelled. These groups became the nucleii of the Spartacist and ACFI organizations, all that is left of Trotskyism in the USA after the SWP revisionists completely degutted the movenent.
For this party which has staked its future on the revolutionary role of Castroism, Castro’s counter-revolutionary attack creates a major crisis. The attack could not be ignored, and in the January 31 Militant, Joe Hansen, the SWP’s international expert, undertook the thankless task of disguising the extent of the disaster. Hansen’s and the SWP’s history and deeply revisionist world outlook make it impossible for him to present a Marxist analysis, however. The key to his approach is in the headline: IN ANSWER TO CASTRO’S ATTACK ON “TROTSKYISM.” The quotation marks around “Trotskyism” reflect the basic ”Who? Us?” approach of Hansen’s article. A major section of this piece is devoted to attacks on the Posadas group (which merits attack well enough, but not in this context). However, this attempt to get out of the line of fire is obviously not enough, and Hansen does go further. He speculates on Castro’s reasons for the attack, suggesting two possibilities; one, that “It was a political concession made in the Kremlin’s direction” and two, that it was designed for “camouflage” for the left line of the conference.
Neither of these explanations is remotely adequate and what is missing from both is any political analysis of the role of Castroism itself, its ideology and its social character. Hansen can only regard Castro’s attack as a regrettable error and end by saying: “It is to be hoped that he will soon see the necessity to rectify his stand on this important question.” The trouble is that in a state in which the working class does not have and never did have political power, in which power is vested in a petty bourgeois formation based on mass peasant support and collectivised property, the political and ideological needs of the new bureaucracy are essentially similar to those of the other established bureaucratic leaderships. In a deformed worker’s state not qualitatively different from Yugoslavia or China the dramatic attack on Trotskyism is not only totally in character but even a political necessity. No arm twisting from the Kremlin is required. Hansen and the SWP, however, can never admit this. They have called on the Cuban working class to rely completely on the Castro regime, and condemned those who would call on Cuban workers to organize their own independent party. They have subordinated their own political work to the Fidelista cult and to the peasant guerilla, and have sought to influence others abroad to do the same. Thus the SWP-YSA is hopelessly tied in with and compromised with Castroism, and it is too late for them to disentangle themselves. Committed to Castro as they are, were the SWP leaders principled politicals, only two courses, would be open to them. One would be to accept Castro’s evaluation and liquidate. The other would be to admit their errors in accomodating to Castroism, and more important, to analyze the reasons, ideological and social, why they followed this disasterous course. Were they to choose the latter, a necessary corollary would be to restore the party membership of those minorities whom they excluded for the crime of having a correct analysis of the character of the Cuban state.
However, being vulgar empiricists and opportunists, they will do neither, and will sweep the mess under the rug while waiting for a new and better Messiah. In an editorial accompanying the Hansen article, they demonstrate their unwillingness to change even in the face of such a blow. The Havana conference is hailed as ” … a step forward for the revolutionary struggle in Latin America.” The strongest word they can find to criticise the false unity of the conference is “dubious.” One paragraph mentions Castro’s speech–in the context of a breech in the United Front. The SWP and its co-thinkers abroad, however, will pay a heavy price in loss of prestige, influence, and membership, to say nothing of revolutionary honor. Honest revolutionaries in the SWP-YSA will see to it that this price is not mitigated.
For those who are involved in principled politics, or who take principled politics seriously, Castro’s symbolic embrace of the most sordid aspects of Stalinism is of profound significance. To be dazzled by numbers, power and prestige, to seek to short circuit the arduous and most often undramatic task of organizing and clarifying the working class independently and against all reformist and opportunist middle class tendencies is to render oneself helpless in the face of such developments as Castro’s speech, which are unexpected to opportunistic hero-worshippers. The building of revolutionary and Trotskyist movements takes on in this context a renewed and pressing importance.
Carta de Ruptura de Sam Trachtenberg com a TBI
A carta de rompimento a seguir, feita por Samuel Trachtenberg, foi enviada em 25 de setembro de 2008.
Camaradas,
Essa carta de rompimento não deve vir como uma surpresa para vocês. Enquanto tive problemas e fiz críticas direcionadas à liderança da TBI nos anos anteriores, por mais de um ano agora eu tenho constantemente batido de frente com ela sobre o desenvolvimento presente e futuro da TBI e o seu interminável rastro de panelinha, intriga, manobra e métodos desleais em geral através dos quais a Troika (Tom Riley, Bill Logan e Adaire Hannah) têm mantido seu controle sobre o grupo por todos esses anos.
Eu sigo convencido da necessidade e da possibilidade de derrubar a sociedade capitalista, mas essa possibilidade só pode se atingida através do reagrupamento dos subjetivamente revolucionários pelo mundo numa base programaticamente sadia pela reconstrução da Quarta Internacional. Por mais correto que esteja o programa formal escrito por enquanto, a história mostrou que o tipo de organização na qual a TBI se transformou, um grupo estático, estagnado, dominado por uma liderança permanente maquiavélica profundamente enraizada, jamais pode fazer com que os camaradas mais jovens cresçam, se desenvolvam, e dessa forma prestem um papel nesse processo. Nós perdemos os camaradas argentinos primeiramente por estas razões, e é apenas uma questão de tempo até que os atuais simpatizantes latinoamericanos do grupo descubram isso eles próprios. Daniel DeLeon, um dos pioneiros do marxismo norte-americano, também era bastante “ortodoxo” no seu tempo, mas ele liderava uma seita rígida hipercentralizada e autoritária cuja contribuição foi principalmente literária. Nãoé acaso que muitos poucos na história do SLP (Partido Trabalhista Socialista), o grupo de DeLeon participaram na fundação do PC/EUA.
Sob esta luz, talvez a situação da seção neozelandesa seja a mais instrutiva. De um ponto em que era o maior grupo que reivindicava o trotskismo no país, ela regrediu para quatro geriatras semiativos. Eu suspeito que a razão para isso seja que a sua reputação é tal que a maioria dos ativistas da Nova Zelândia não iria querer chegar nem a 10 metros de distância dela. A reputação de Logan e Hannah como líderes da Liga Espartaquista, combinada com o seu aparente fracasso em romper completamente com suas práticas passadas (como expressas em suas sessões de desmoralização interna e a perseguição a Peter De Waal), são amplamente conhecidos nos círculos de esquerda da Nova Zelândia e debatidos em vários grupos de discussão na internet. Mas enquanto havia inicialmente algum protesto entre os membros quando esses incidentes ocorreram, os líderes foram capazes de seguir em frente e a manutenção da capacidade da direção em repetir o tratamento atroz com outros críticos, concorde-se ou não com as suas críticas, estabeleceu um padrão ruim no qual o grupo ainda vive atualmente. Eu fortemente sugiro aos camaradas que leiam os documentos sobre a perseguição da célula da Bay Area (disponível em inglês). Não é preciso ser um fã de Gerald Smith ou Fred Ferguson para ficar perturbado com a maneira típica de um Zinoviev com a qual a liderança lidou com eles. Trotsky lidava com tais diferenças de forma radicalmente diferente como qualquer um pode perceber lendo A Crise da Seção Francesa, onde questões semelhantes de uma imprensa “popular” mantida dentro da disciplina estavam em controvérsia.
PS: Enquanto o novo grupo terá um foco em polêmicas, ele não terá um foco tão estreito na TBI. Eu não formarei uma “tendência externa”. Enquanto tal orientação fazia sentido para um partido de massas envolvido em combate diário, como a Internacional Comunista, ela não faz sentido para um grupo puramente literário com menos que 40 pessoas pelo mundo. Essa orientação já não fazia sentido para um grupo como a SL, e a TBI nunca conseguiu sair desse foco limitado. Essa foi uma lição que eu aprendi. Mas eu escreverei polêmicas com a TBI quando a necessidade surgir e certamente irei responder a quaisquer acusações. Uma análise histórica mais ampla do que a apresentada nessa carta virá em breve.
Março de 2012
Carta de Ruptura com o PSTU
Aos Trotskistas
As Ações do PSTU em Comparação às Tarefas da IV Internacional
Escrita em agosto de 2009, esta carta de ruptura foi publicada originalmente no primeiro número da revista Revolução Permanente, em setembro de 2009. Ela marca a ruptura de Rodolfo Kaleb e Leandro Torres com o PSTU e sua decisão de ingressar no Coletivo Lenin. Notas de revisão foram adicionadas para fins de esclarecimento, destacando-se os trechos comentados com sublinhados.
“Encarar a realidade de frente; não buscar a linha de menor resistência; chamar as coisas pelos seus nomes; falar a verdade às massas, não importa o quão amarga ela seja; não temer os obstáculos; ser verdadeiro nas pequenas coisas como nas grandes; basear seu programa na lógica da luta de classes; ser ousado quando a hora da ação chegar – essas são as regras da Quarta Internacional”
Castro in Moscow
Castro in Moscow
by P. Jen
[First printed in Spartacist#1, February-March 1964]
Premier Fidel Castro, caught in the complex web of Washington-Peking-Moscow relationships, has begun to become, more clearly enmeshed in the machinations of the Russian leadership. Statements made in both Castro’s Soviet TV interview of January 21, and the Joint Soviet-Cuban Communique of January 22 reveal unmistakably that Khrushchev hail begun to consolidate his grip on the PURS (the Cuban party) and its leader. Although there will undoubtedly be further vacillations, Castro has, without question, begun to trail behind the Soviet Union in foreign policy.
Castro, appearing on Moscow TV January 21, said, “At the same time [after the October missile crisis] there was a relaxation of international tension, a relaxation in the cold war. All this was a result of the policy and the efforts of the Soviet Union and the socialist camp on’ beha,lf of peace.” (Emphasis added.)
One of the “concrete” results of those efforts was, in the Joint Soviet-Cuban Communique of” January 22, greeted favorably by the Cuban government: “The government of the Republic of Cuba regards the successes achieved by the Soviet Union in the struggle for the discontinuation of nuclear tests and the agreement on nonorbiting of vehicles with nuclear weapons as a step forward promoting peace and disarmament.”
Giving further support to the policies of the Soviet bureaucracy: “Comrade Fidel Castro expressed his approval of the measures taken by the Central Committee of the CPSU to eliminate the existing differences and to consolidate cohesion and unity in the ranks of the international communist movement.” (Joint Soviet-Cuban Communique.)
It is clear from this that in the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute Castro has unequivocally joined’ “the ieaders of the CPSU,” who, in the words of the Chinese “are the greatest of all revisionists as well as the greatest of all sectarians and splitters known to history.” (Printed Feb. 4 in Jenmin Jih Pao, the Chinese CP daily paper.)
Not only Soviet policy, but Soviet political life in general, and the leader of the CPSU in particular, have received the approval of Fidel Castro. “I am very much interested in Soviet experience” Castro said on Soviet TV Jan. 21. “I am very interested in the role played by your Party, the role of the advanced detachment, the role of organizer and inspirer of all the activity in the Soviet Union. I am interested in the participation of the Party on all labour fronts-in agriculture, in industry, in cultural activities, in all spheres of production, in all spheres of politics, and in the army. My attention is attracted hy the wonderful role which the Party has been playing in the Soviet Union for nearly half a century now!’
For the last three-almost four decades, however, “the wonderful role which the Party has been playing, in the Soviet Union” has included Stalin’s frame-up trials; the decapitation of the Red Army on the eve of World War II; the betrayals of the proletarian revolution in China (1925-27), Germany (1929-33), France (1934-36; 1945-present), Italy (1944-present), Iraq (1958), etc.; and the present strategic outlook of capitulation to imperialism.
“We have been able to appreciate,” said Castro on Moscow TV, “the way in which the Party [CPSU] has trained specialists, has fostered the revolutionary way of thought, in the people, trained astronauts, scientists, has produced the cadres who are today developing the economy and the entire life in the Soviet Union, has produced the cadres who are now building communism. The Party is a symbol of revolutionary continuity and the people’s confidence in themselves.” (emphasis added.)
Castro’s evaluation of Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, the leader of this so-called “Communist” Party which is building “communism” in a single country, is full of warmth and admiration. “I have full right to evaluate and admire this man, who combines in one person so many splendid qualities: intellect, excellent character, kindness and strength – the qualities which make him a great leader. And the more I know Comrade Nikita Sergeycvich, the more time I spend with him, the more warmer grow my feelings for him, the more I admire him, the higher is my opinion of him as a man.” (Castro on Moscow TV, Jan. 21.) ,,’
Fidel Castro’s words supply their own commentary. Those who want the full text of his interview on Moscow TV, as well as the Joint Communique, can find these in the supplement in the Moscow News, January 25, 1964.
For socialists who saw in Castro’s militant stand a revolutionary communist leadership or some reasonable facsimile thereof, the recent swing to the right must come as a surprise and even a shock. Castro’s perceptible yielding to Soviet economic pressure, while perhaps mistakenly understandable from one point of view (that of building the national economy), is inexcusable from another (that of the international proletarian revolution), and in fact strategically defeats the former. It is only on the basis of the proletarian revolution in the advanced countries that the Cuban economy can develop to it’s full potential. Tactical considerations must be seen as a part of and subordinate to strategic ones. Flowing from the empiricism of the Cuban leadership the strategic aim (if it ever existed) of world proletarian revolution has been sacrificed to the narrow, short-sighted, “pragmatic” goal of stable prices for Cuban sugar. If it is still objected that Castro had no choice, then we, at least, do not have to apologize for his actions In Moscow. Castro indeed had no choice: he was the prisoner not only of his own policies, but also of his historical origin which was the basis for those policies. Suffice it to .say that if our movement had come to power in Cuba it would have been out of a quite different historical situation. We criticize the Castro leadership as part ot the process of building the Bolshevik leadership that will be an integral part of such a situation. The historical game of changing places with various leaders is not one that Marxistst engage in. Soviet economic blackmail techniques are, of course, well known to the people of Albania and China, and it is to Castro’s credit that he held out as long as he did.
The vacillation of the Castro leadership between the positions put forward by the Soviet and Chinese bureaucracies, and its adherence, more or less, to the line of the latter, has permitted many socialists to indulge in certain illusions as to the nature of the Cuban leadership-illusions which that leadership has itself begun to dispel.
Moreover, these same socialists are harboring an even more fundamental illusion in their belief that a proletarian revolutionary outlook motivates the superficially revolutionary Chinese position. As long as the Maoist leadership speaks with a revolutionary vocabulary, many socialists are inclined to take it at its word. Nevertheless, it is clear from the whole history of the Chinese revolution that the attempt to build a following around the CCP line is only !or the purpose’ of putting pressure on imperialism in order to force the latter to accommodate itself to the present Chinese state government.
The rightward shift of the Castro leadership has now posed the question of Marxist theory and its relation to practice before all those who consider themselves to be revolutionary communists. If the revolutionary workers’ movement is to go forward it will have to come to grips with this and other questions, and arrive at a solution based on the independent action of the working class.
The Cuban leadership, while responding to the pressure of the masses, yet stands above and is organizationally independent of them. This organizational independence is a consequence of its historical origin, in which it came to power as the leadership not of workers’ and peasants’ soviets, but of a guerilla army. From this social basis flows the empirical and not Marxist nature of the Cuban leadership, as was stated clearly by “Che” Guevara: “In order to know where Cuba is going, the bp.st thing is to ask the government of the U.S. just how far it intends to go.”
If many socialists who supported the Castro government as opposed to the counter-revolutionary Khrushchev regime did not see the need for a dialectical view of society, trusting instead to the “natural” course of events, their idealistic impressionism has at least been dealt a rude biow by the empirical wanderings of the Castro leadership.
The strategy of Marxists in the epoch of imperialist decay flows from our comprehension of the total and all sided development of the international class struggle, and thus from the needs of the international proletariat. This view, which grasps the interdependence and interrelatedness of all phenomena, has nothing ill common with the empiricism of not only the Cuban leadership, but also, unfortunately, many communists as well.
The Cuban leaders has reacted empirically to all the pressures, not only of the, U.S. imperialists, but of the Soviet bureaucrats as well, and have not only failed to carry out the essential tasks facing the revolutionary workers’ movement, but have not even comprehended what these tasks are. And they have failed to comprehend these tasks precisely because of their incapacity, flowing from their social origins as a bourgeois democratic peasant movement, to think any other way except empirically. Empiricism, the ideology of the bourgeoisie after it has established its power, is necessarily the method of all tendencies which do not base themselves on the strategy of world proletarian revolution.
Even the most elementary bourgeois democratic reforms cannot be maintained in the backward countries except under the dictatorship of the proletariat. To depend other similar movements leading revolutions as far-reaching in their social transformations as the Cuban revolution has been is to let the initiative pass over ‘into the hands of imperialism. It was only the Incapacity of Amencan Imperialism to accommodate itself to a radical petty bourgeois revolution that forced the Castro regime to go as far as it did – farther, indeed, than anyone in the July 26 movement had planned. The European imperialists have so far been more astute than their American confreres. The former have more correctly gauged the tIde of the nationalist movement and have yielded. much of their political and some of their economic power in Africa and Asia precisely to avoid what happened in Cuba. They permit the “socialist” Ben Bellas and Nkrumahs to rant against the imperialists; the latter would rather lose face than face the loss of areas for investment, even if such investment faces certain restrictions.
The justifiably tremendous tide of enthusiasm for, the Cuban revolution has. overflowed into the kind of uncritical adulation of the Castro leadership that is entirely unacceptable to Marxists. The causes of this are, however, clear: the smallness of the American communist movement; the relative quiescence of the American .working class; and the success of a radical petty bourgeois revolution that has defied American imperialism and stirred the imaginations not only of the oppressed colonial workers and peasants but of Americans radicals as well. In the face of the tremendous tasks that face so few revolutionary communists in this country, some of us have looked eIswhere and have become worshipers of the acomplished fact – Fidel Castro and Mao Tse Tung, not to mention Jimmy Hoffa and Malcolm X. Those of us who do not harbor any illusions about these leaders are attacked as sectarians. However, our analysis, in the case of Castro, has been dramatically confirmed. It is necessary to face the truth, unflinchingly, purge ourselves of all easy romantic notions, and get down to, the critical task of building a Marxist party in this country. A party based on illusions will never lead the working class to power.
Defend the Cuban Revolution!
Statements on the Cuban Missile Crisis
Declaration on the Cuban Crisis
The Cuban revolution is now at its hour of greatest peril. The result of the round trip of the Soviet missiles has been to make a deal between Khrushchev and Kennedy at the expense of the Cuban people no longer merely a perspective but an immediate threat. U.S. armed aggression in the form of an all-out invasion of Cuba, though still not the optimum variant of U.S. imperialism, is now for the first time guaranteed the tacit support of the Kremlin if a formal “negotiated” settlement restoring U.S. hegemony in the Caribbean cannot be imposed on the Cuban people.
In this situation the duty of the Trotskyists toward the Cuban revolution only begins with demonstrations of sympathy and support for Cuba. The obligation of the Trotskyists, which no other tendency can even claim to fulfill, is to provide a political analysis, a political line upon which the defense of the revolution must be based.
The decisive point in the political line in defense of the Cuban revolution against all its enemies is explicit denunciation of the counter-revolutionary role of the Stalinist bureaucracy in the concrete instance of Cuba. The Cuban revolution cannot be defended by arms under the control of Kremlin bureaucrats whose only interest is to turn the revolution to the service of Russian foreign policy, including selling it out entirely if the price is right. The only defense of the Cuban revolution is the determination of the Cuban people to resist by any and all means, and the conscious solidarity of the international working class against all the enemies of the revolution. The false policy of the Castro leadership, its political bloc with the Stalinists, has gravely undermined this defense.
The International Committee of the Fourth International, in its statement entitled “Defend the Cuban Revolution” published in the November 3rd Newsletter, defined the basic lines of a Trotskyist defense of the Cuban revolution, particularly in its statements: “Installation of Soviet missile bases in Cuba is not for the defense of the Cuban revolution, but part of the diplomatic game of Khrushchev…the setting up of Soviet missile bases as a substitute for international working-class struggle cannot defend the revolution…the counter-revolutionary policy of Stalinism prepares the crushing of the Cuban revolution, not its defense.” We ask the editorial board of the Militant to print this I.C. statement.
We furthermore ask the PC to adopt the political line of the International Committee declaration as the basic line of the party in its defense of the Cuban revolution. This should be the starting point of a campaign for international working-class solidarity with the Cuban revolution based on the establishment of workers’ democracy in Cuba and full, open collaboration of the Cuban revolution with the international working-class movement in all phases, military as well as political, of revolutionary defense.
****
November 30, 1962
Roger Ahrams (New York)
Dorothy Bell (Oakland-Berkeley)
Emily Cavalli (Oakland-Berkeley)
Joyce Cowley (San Francisco)
Paul Curtis (Oakland-Berkeley) (1)
Maria di Savio (San Francisco)
Roy Gale (San Francisco)
Lynne Harper (New York)
Larry Ireland (New York)
Rose Jersawitz (Oakland-Berkeley)
Stanley Larson (Oakland Berkeley)
Ed Lee (Oakland-Berkley)
Albert Nelson (New York)
Shane Mage (New York)
Charlotte Michaels (New York)
Roger Plumb (Oakland-Berkeley)
Tony Ravich (New York) (2)
Leigh Ray (San Francisco)
James Robertson (New York)
Shirley Stoute (New York)
Marion Syrek, Jr. (Oakland-Berkeley)
Polly Volker (San Francisco)
Geoffrey White (Oakland-Berkeley)
Jack Wolf (Connecticut) (2)
(1) “I take exception to the last sentence of paragraph three. There may have been no alternative for the Castro leadership. The policy however, is a false one.”
(2) “I favor publication of the I.C. statement on the Cuban crisis. I am in general sympathy with this statement.”
Defend the Cuban Revolution
From The Newsletter (published by the Socialist Labour League, London) November 3, 1962
Statement by the International Committee of the Fourth International
The U.S. imperialists are bent upon the destruction of the Cuban revolution and have shown that they are even prepared to risk the danger of world war. The Cuban Revolution, expropriating U.S. capital in Cuba, makes it necessary for U.S. imperialism to take these measures in order that their strangle-hold over all Latin America shall not be threatened. Wall Street seized the pretext of Soviet missile bases to bring a showdown.
The working class of the world must act to prevent the Cuban Revolution from being crushed. Such action must be independent of the policies of Khrushchev and the Soviet bureaucracy. Their line of peaceful co-existence designed only to preserve their own privileged rule by diplomatic deals, is opposed to the spread of the Cuban Revolution and to independent workers’ action, which are the only guarantees of Cuba’s defence. Installation of Soviet missile bases in Cuba is not for the defence of the Cuban Revolution, but part of the diplomatic game of Khrushchev.
A heavy responsibility rests on the shoulders of the official leadership of the Labour movement for their failure to support the Cuban Revolution by fighting the capitalists in their own countries.
The International Committee of the Fourth International calls on all its sections to take their place in all actions for the defence of the Cuban revolution from the U.S. imperialists.
Cuba, as a sovereign state, has the right to accept whatever military aid it decides. But the setting up of Soviet missile bases as a substitute for international working-class struggle cannot defend the revolution. On the contrary, it shows the dangers of the policy of peaceful co-existence in exposing the Cuban Revolution to enormous dangers, providing a pretext for U.S. intervention. In this situation, the counter-revolutionary policy of Stalinism prepares the crushing of the Cuban Revolution—not its defence.
Any policy of United Nations intervention or of summit agreements over Cuba must be opposed. Such methods will destroy the revolution, which only the international independent class action of the workers can defend.
We stand for the defence of the USSR and of the Cuban Revolution, but such defence means determined opposition to the Stalinist bureaucracy and its methods.
In the advanced countries, especially the USA, the working class must organise actions in full support of the workers and peasants of Cuba. End the blockade! End the invasion preparations!
In Latin America, a decisive struggle against U.S. imperialism and its agents, for the extension of the revolution, must be waged to defend Cuba. Without this action, and without defeat of the Stalinist policies of defence of Cuba, the fate of that revolution will repeat the story of Greece, Guatemala and Spain.
We call particularly on the members of the Communist Parties to oppose the policies of their leaders to break from the policy of agreement with the imperialists, to demand independent class action in defence of Cuba.
The sections of the International Committee of the Fourth International must take part in all actions in defence of Cuba, struggling within these movements to build an independent, anti-imperialist movement led by the working class.
28.10.1962
[Reprinted in Marxist Bulletin No. 3 Part 1. Originally posted online at http://www.bolshevik.org/history/MarxistBulletin/MB3_PtI_12.html and http://www.bolshevik.org/history/MarxistBulletin/MB3_PtI_13.html }
Open Letter to the International Socialists
Open Letter to the International Socialists
[Reprinted in 1917 #21, 1999 as “From Cliff to Trotsky”. Copied from http://www.bolshevik.org/Leaflets/Openletr.html ]
1 May 1998
Dear comrades,
I was an active member of the IS for three years (September 1994 to December 1997), but I am no longer a member of your organization. I think I owe it to IS comrades to explain my differences. I hope you will seriously consider what I have to say.
I was expelled by Abbie Bakan on December 10, 1997 for allegedly `infiltrating’ the International Socialists (IS) on behalf of the International Bolshevik Tendency (IBT) and the Trotskyist League of Canada (TL). The allegation is an obvious lie – anyone who knows anything about the IBT and the TL knows that they are competing organizations. Even if I wanted to `infiltrate’ the IS, which of course I didn’t, it would be impossible to do so on behalf of both of these groups.
This does not mean that I did not develop differences with the IS on several critical issues. However, I did not have sinister motives. In the period from when I began to develop some serious differences until I was expelled, I carried out all my responsibilities as a full member of the organization attending paper sales and meetings, as well as paying dues. I did resign my post as Fredericton branch convenor, which I think was the honourable thing to do, given my growing doubts about much of the group’s basic political orientation. I also corresponded with the IBT and TL, a fact I did not try to conceal. In a phone conversation with Carolyn Egan in mid-November, I asked if this was acceptable to the IS. She said it was acceptable and that the IS didn’t want to lose me. When I was expelled, Abbie’s ultimatum was that if I continued talking to the IBT or TL, I would no longer be a member of the organization. This is consistent with the IS policy of sealing its members off from political competition. It was likely that I would have left the IS at some point, but it should have been on my own terms.
The Political Period
The IS characterizes the era that we are living through as one of `economic instability and political volatility’. This is generally correct, but it leaves out a lot. Globally the capitalists have been on the offensive for the past decade. This primarily results from their victory in the `Cold War’ over the USSR which strengthened US imperialism and its allies. The existence of the Soviet Union as a counterweight to the NATO imperialists strengthened the hand of various nationalists in their conflicts with imperialism and played a key role in the defeats of imperialism in China, Cuba and Vietnam. One of the first fruits of the disintegration of the USSR under Gorbachev was the crushing of the Iraq in the murderous 1991 Desert Storm attack. The ultimate collapse of the Soviet bloc led directly to a series of major concessions and retreats by leftist forces globally, e.g., South Africa, Nicaragua and El Salvador.
Of course history did not come to an end when the Stalinist regimes did – the working class has continued to struggle. But we must recognize that the recent significant struggles (Ontario, France, South Korea) have had a defensive character and that generally the level of political consciousness is far behind the level of struggle. The consciousness of the proletariat has been lowered, not raised, by the destruction of the Soviet Union (which, while it was not genuinely socialist, was correctly seen by many workers as having an economy that, since 1917, had operated outside the dictates of global capitalism). One consequence of the imperialist victory in the Cold War is that the word `socialism’ has been temporarily erased from the vocabulary of many in the workers’ movement. The capitalists have also concluded that socialism is dead – which is one reason they are being so aggressive about take backs. Particularly in Western Europe after World War Two, the capitalists made important concessions in terms of the social wage because they wanted to undercut the appeal of `socialist’ East Europe.
The IS leadership says that there are `deep pools of bitterness’. Yes there are, but so what!? Bitterness does not equal class consciousness. Unemployed German workers joined the Nazis in the 1930’s because they were bitter. Socialist Worker noted that many workers embittered by Bob Rae’s NDP government in Ontario turned around and voted for the capitalist parties.
Lenin said that class struggle does not automatically produce revolutionary consciousness. Those who don’t understand this always tend to overestimate (and tail) existing movements in the class, and downplay the party question and the need for revolutionaries to fight for leadership. Lenin called this tendency `economism’. If the working class is revolutionary in itself, it doesn’t need a party to lead it.
The working class, through its own struggles for existence, can only achieve trade-union consciousness – a form of bourgeois ideology. This is because working class struggle tends to be sectional and national. The role of the vanguard party is to bring political class consciousness (an understanding of history, of the various social classes and oppressed groupings in society and of the common interest shared by workers internationally) to the most advanced workers from outside the framework of their own immediate experience:
`We have said that there could not have been Social-Democratic consciousness among the workers. It would have to be brought to them from without. The history of all countries shows that the working class, exclusively by its own effort, is able to develop only trade union consciousness, i.e., the conviction that it is necessary to combine in unions, fight the employers, and strive to compel the government to pass necessary labour legislation, etc. `
“…the spontaneous struggle of the proletariat will not become its genuine class struggle until this struggle is led by a strong organization of revolutionaries’.
– V. I. Lenin, What Is To Be Done? (1902)
The initial members of a communist movement will naturally come to revolutionary politics as intellectuals (Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Trotsky all came from such backgrounds). Life on the shop floor may give workers a gut-level hatred of their boss, but it does not automatically give them an understanding of the operation of the capitalist system as a whole. This does not mean that workers cannot become Marxist revolutionaries, but to do so requires investigation independently of their work experience.
The Party Question
An unbalanced view of the state of the class struggle leads the IS to overestimate the possibilities for the left in general and itself in particular. This has produced a recruitment policy that was best summed up by Alex Callinicos of the British Socialist Workers Party as: `If it walks, sell it the paper; if it buys the paper, recruit it’. There is an amazing contradiction between this definition of membership and the IS claim to be building a Leninist vanguard. The `open recruitment’ policy, apart from anything else, makes the IS extremely vulnerable to infiltration by fascists and the state.
In the 1903 Bolshevik/Menshevik split over the criteria for membership, what side would the IS really be on? In his 1959 book, Rosa Luxemburg, Tony Cliff, founder of the IS tendency, wrote: `for Marxists in the advanced industrial countries, Lenin’s original position can much less serve as a guide than Rosa Luxemburg’s’. This statement was edited out of further editions of the book, but it shows that the party question is not a question of principle for the IS, but one that changes according to the historical juncture. Luxemburg herself came to recognize that Lenin had been right against her on the necessity for a revolutionary vanguard party, as opposed to an all-inclusive `party of the whole class’. ISers? Lenin argued for a high commitment to politics and activity as a criterion for membership? agreed? Now take a look at your branch membership list. `Nuff said.
Leon Trotsky, leader of the Russian Revolution and founder of the Red Army, opened The Transitional Program with the lines: `the world socialist revolution as a whole is chiefly characterized by a historical crisis of the leadership of the proletariat’ (The Death Agony of Capitalism and the Tasks of the Fourth International, 1938). The party question is the central one for revolutionaries.
A real revolutionary group must be made up of serious people, committed to the revolutionary program. This defines the membership of a Leninist group. But in the IS you can be a lot of things – a feminist, a social democrat or an anarchist. These are all forms of bourgeois consciousness. It is the task of Marxists to argue with people like this, to win them away from such illusions – not to recruit them as they are and thereby dilute the organization. To feminists, we say `draw a class line, not a sex line’; to social-democrats, we say `you have to break the power of the bourgeois state’; to anarchists, we say, `the proletariat needs a state to defend its revolution’. Only those who reject feminism, socialdemocracy or anarchism, and embrace Marxism, can be recruited. If you started a rock-climbing club, would you let people join who thought you should go scuba-diving instead? The IS has too many people going in too many different directions. As a whole, they have no direction. This is what Lenin had to say about those who put artificial unity over political principle:
`We are marching in a compact group, along a precipitous path, firmly holding each other by the hand. We are surrounded on all sides by enemies, and we have to advance almost constantly under their fire. We have combined, by a freely adopted decision, for the purpose of fighting the enemy, and not of retreating into the neighbouring marsh, the inhabitants of which, from the very outset, have reproached us with having separated ourselves into an exclusive group and with having chosen the path of struggle instead of the path of conciliation. And now some among us begin to cry out: Let us go into the marsh! And when we begin to shame them, they retort: What backward people you are! Are you not ashamed to deny us the liberty to invite you to take a better road! Oh, yes, gentlemen! You are free not only to invite us, but to go yourselves wherever you will, even into the marsh. In fact, we think that the marsh is your proper place, and we are prepared to render you every assistance to get there. Only let go of our hands, don’t clutch at us and don’t besmirch the grand word freedom, for we too are `free’ to go where we please, free to fight not only against the marsh, but also those are turning towards the marsh!’
– Ibid.
Chris Harman of the British SWP referred to Lenin’s analogy to explain the kinds of problems that arise with low-level recruitment:
‘ The revolutionary party exists so as to make it possible for the most conscious and militant workers and intellectuals to engage in a scientific discussion as a prelude to concerted and cohesive action. This is not possible without general participation in party activities. This requires clarity with organizational decisiveness. The alternative is the `marsh’ – where elements motivated by scientific precision are so mixed up with those who are irremediably confused as to prevent any decisive action, effectively allowing the most backward to lead. The discipline necessary for such a debate is the discipline of those who have `combined by a freely adopted decision’. Unless the party has clear boundaries and unless it is coherent enough to implement decisions, discussion over it decisions, far from being `free,’ is pointless’.
– Party and Class (1969)
The IS leaders will say that refusing to recruit people who don’t understand or agree with your program is a characteristic of `small group mentality’ and is `sectarianism’. They will deny that the IS is accommodationist and claim that if you don’t recruit new youth as soon as you meet them you will never see them again. But if there really is a radicalization, won’t people show up more than once? Why sign up people who aren’t really interested or committed when you know that in a few weeks or a month they will drift off? The constant turnover produced by the `Open Recruitment’ policy has produced a less political organization and an overall lowering of the level of the membership.
An organization built in this way is doomed either to be bypassed by great events or to betray. One of the main reasons the Second International supported their own rulers in the First World War was because they built a `broad’ inclusive organization on low common denominator (that is, reformist) politics. This ensured that at critical moments they could not offer decisive revolutionary leadership to the working class. The IS leadership knows this history, but is incapable of drawing the operational conclusions. When people criticize this policy, the response they get is that they are `self-important’ and that they should get busy recruiting.
The priority of revolutionaries must be to forge a politically principled vanguard of the working class. In periods in which the working class is not on the offensive small revolutionary groups that make `growth’ their top priority must politically adapt to the existing (bourgeois) consciousness of the class. Such groups can never lead a working-class revolution.
`Don’t Bomb Iraq’ or `Defend Iraq’?
Being a revolutionary is not easy. It means saying unpopular things a lot of the time, but the task of revolutionaries is to `say what is’. You have to raise a revolutionary program to be able to win people to revolutionary politics. In 1915, the Bolsheviks said `Turn the Guns Around!’ It was unpopular, and people hated them for it, but they kept on saying it because it was correct. By 1917, when the brutalized, impoverished, war-weary Russian proletariat understood that the Bolsheviks had told them the truth there was a mass radicalization that turned the Bolsheviks into a mass party and led directly to the October Revolution.
In the 1991 Gulf War, the IS abandoned the Leninist position of military defence of Iraq so that they could enter anti-war coalitions with their liberal-left milieu. Because of their lack of political principles, they would not distinguish between an imperialist power (US) and an imperialist victim (Iraq). In the recent Gulf crisis, the slogan of the British SWP was `Don’t Bomb Iraq’. Does this mean that it is OK to starve Iraq as an alternative; is it OK for the US imperialists to use diplomatic pressure? It is bad enough to tail behind progressive movements, but don’t tail France, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. The IS, in this case, bowed to the pressure of bourgeois ideology.
Opportunism & NDP Loyalism
IS opportunism is clearly displayed in Canada by the perpetual call for a vote to the New Democratic Party (in Britain it is the Labour Party). This is explained by referring to Lenin’s tactic of critical support. But in the early 1920s, when Lenin advanced this tactic, there was a wide layer of militant workers following the recently created Labour Party. Since it hadn’t been in government, and claimed to be a workers’ party committed to socialism, many advanced elements of the working class had deep illusions in it. Lenin’s proposal was designed to help put Labour into office to expose its real procapitalist character and shatter the illusions of the workers who supported it.
Lenin also proposed that the Communist Party should seek to organizationally affiliate the CP with the Labour Party. How different the situation is today! The NDP and New Labour retain a connection to the union bureaucracy, but they do not even pretend to run on a working-class programme. They are very clear that capitalism has nothing to fear with them in power – as they have proven time and again.
The task of revolutionaries is to break illusions. But for supposed Marxists to call for voting for the social democrats when they run on an overtly pro-capitalist programme and point to their record of union-bashing and attacks on the poor and oppressed can only create illusions.
The treatment of the NDP in the internal bulletin released prior to last year’s election (April 23, 1997) notes that in Ontario the labour bureaucracy had pulled back from confrontations with the Mike Harris government in order to campaign for the NDP: `Union militants are expected to replace their picket signs with lawn signs’. The document goes on:
‘we have to be the memory of the class. In the middle of the Bob Rae years of despair, when thousands were leaving the party, we argued against the stream to still vote for the NDP. Our vote has nothing to do with its record. It is the only party that is based on the union movement and not the corporations. We know it will sell-out’.
This is an astounding statement, when you think of it. Firstly because the IS almost never goes `against the stream’. But secondly because it so brazenly admits that its electoral support to the NDP has nothing to do with the existence of illusions of the workers, but merely the fact that it is connected to the labour bureaucrats. The NDP is so far to the right that it cannot really be accused of `selling out’ – it runs on its record of blatantly attacking workers, and the IS calls for electing it! The Steering Committee document continues:
`We were criticized by people like Jack Layton [a prominent left-NDP municipal politician in Toronto] for taking this position [i.e., voting NDP]. Their support to the NDP is based on illusions that the NDP will make a difference. When they saw the NDP implement Tory cuts, they abandoned the party’.
Bob Rae’s government was so hated by working class people for acting like Tories that Layton wanted to get some distance from it. But not the IS leadership! Apparently without seeing the obvious contradiction, the leadership document goes on to quote Lenin’s famous comment on critical support:
`I want to support [the Labour Party] in the same way as the rope supports a hanged man – that the impending establishment of the government of the [Labour Party] will prove that I am right, will bring the masses over to my side, and will hasten the political death of the [Labour Party]…’
The NDP in power had hung itself – the best elements in its base were melting away were. Yet still the IS supported the social democrats. This is exactly the opposite of what Lenin advocated. Instead of seeking to rally some of the thousands of workers who were deserting the NDP in disgust at its betrayals, and direct them to the left into supporting independent labour candidates against NDPers who backed the hated Social Contract, Socialist Worker used its credentials to try to corral left-wing voters for Rae.
The confusion of the IS policy on the NDP is perhaps best summed up by the Steering Committee in the following:
`So we call for a vote to the NDP. But we do not support the NDP. We organize a revolutionary socialist organization that is an opponent of the NDP’s, whose goal it is to replace it. We vote for the NDP, but we do not campaign for them or join the party’.
If the NDP (or Tony Blair’s Labour Party in Britain) was worth voting for, if it commanded the allegiance of a sizeable number of socialist-minded workers who had illusions in it, then it would make sense to campaign for it, or perhaps even affiliate to it, in order to make contact with and influence that layer of militants. But when there is no such layer because the social democracy is so nakedly pro-capitalist, then there is no reason for revolutionaries to call for militant workers to vote for it. In fact, by doing so, Marxists can actually help create illusions among leftist workers that there is some reason to still vote NDP.
Of course the IS likes to present its votes to the NDP and Labour Party as a `class vote’ against the bosses’ parties. But that is revealed as just so much cynical doubletalk by the fact that the IS internationally is also willing to call for votes to openly bourgeois parties – such as the South Africa’s African National Congress in 1994 and South Korean presidential candidate Kim Dae Jung in 1992. Despite all the fine talk about working class independence, the IS bottom line is always determined by popularity.
Those who don’t believe that the working class can be won to Marxism through the intervention of socialists putting forward a revolutionary program end up adapting to the existing consciousness and watering down their politics.
Some years ago the American International Socialist Organization (ISO) supported the Teamsters for a Democratic Union (TDU) as they campaigned for state intervention to `clean up’ the union. Now that the courts have thrown out the TDU-backed teamster president Ron Carey, the ISO is singing a different tune:
‘ Government intervention was widely viewed as a step forward, especially since the government set up the first direct elections for Teamster presidency ? which elected Ron Carey in 1991.
‘ But it only was a matter of time before the government, having established its right to intervene in the unions, would go against the interests of the rank and file’.
– Sharon Smith in Socialist Review #212, `A Crime to Organize’
Marxism is useless if you don’t argue it with people. What’s the good of opposing state intervention after the fact? The ISO didn’t have the guts to raise the Marxist slogan of class independence when it really mattered. Their new position is nothing but commentary. The ISO’s failure to raise a Marxist program when it really mattered is evidence that they don’t believe that the working class can be won to revolution through the intervention of a vanguard party. So they water things down.
Democratic Centralism or Bureaucratic Centralism?
Some ISers who agree with some of these points may think, `well, we made some mistakes, nobody’s perfect, but we are a democratic group and our mistakes are correctable’. But these `mistakes’ form a pattern – one which can only be broken by going to the roots of the whole IS tradition. And the IS leadership is very resistant to any kind of fundamental political discussion. IS national meetings don’t usually feature much political discussion. Mostly they repeat old affirmations: `the period is great, we’ve got to recruit’. Any opposition to the leadership is taken care of very quickly, and in a way designed to prevent serious political discussion. In Vancouver, the Steering Committee recently split the branch to isolate a democratically elected branch leadership. In my own case, it took only slightly more than a month to expel me after it became known that I was developing differences.
The lack of democracy is particularly clear in the way the international group runs. The IS internationally is a bureaucratic centralist organization. The individual members at the national level have no say in determining the international line of the group. The Central Committee of the British SWP simply gives orders to the other national leaderships. When the SWP leaders decided in the early 1990s that it was time for a `turn’, the membership had no say in this. Periodic delegated international conventions and an elected international leadership (as in the Fourth International under Trotsky) could provide the possibility of democratically evaluating and correcting the line of the group. But at the same time it would also pose the `risk’ that members might not agree with everything laid down by the British C.C. Trotsky stood for a democratic centralist international:
‘ We stand not for democracy in general, but for centralist democracy. It is precisely for this reason that we place national leadership above local leadership and international leadership above national leadership’.
– ‘ An Open Letter to All Members of the Leninbund’, February 6, 1930
The means used to short-circuit serious political debate internally are also extended in an attempt to shelter ISers from political discussion with people outside the group as well. Organizations such as the Trotskyist League and the Bolshevik Tendency are excluded from all IS public meetings purely on the basis of their politics – to avoid any uncomfortable questions they might raise. I admit that I once agreed with, and participated in, the IS exclusion policy. I regret this and now reject this policy 100 percent. I also regret and repudiate anything I may have said in ignorance about these groups in the past.
The IS policy is not even limited to the groups standing furthest to its left. At Marxism `97 IS members were instructed not to talk to or even take leaflets from members of other groups: `hear no evil – read no evil!’ In an internal memo written after the Montreal anti-poverty conference in January 1996 where Labour Militant and other groups turned up, the IS leadership admitted that `no matter how bonkers the politics of some of these sects, they can grow just like us…’ But the conclusion was that it is a `terrible mistake’ to even talk to any of them:
‘ Talking to members of one of these groups is not the same as talking to a contact. They are poison, and we have to turn our back hard on them. It is a distraction for us to be spending time analyzing their politics, discussing their paper, etc. It sucks us into the otherworldly milieu of the small sects. They are irrelevant’.
For similar reasons the IS generally avoids or at least tries to minimize situations where its members end up working closely with members of other groups even when they share a common objective (like to defend Mumia Abu Jamal). If the politics of all the other groups were indeed so irrelevant to the issues facing the working class there would not be much need for discussion. But the fact is that they often discuss the same issues that the IS does, even if they sometimes draw different conclusions or propose different tactics. Whether they are right or wrong on a particular question, a policy of simply refusing to read, discuss or debate with them is not aimed at helping develop a rounded Marxist consciousness – it can only tend to prevent IS members from seriously thinking about politics.
The IS leadership’s policy of refusing to discuss or debate other elements of the left is exactly the opposite to that of Lenin and Trotsky. IS members should ask themselves why the writings of all the great revolutionaries (Marx, Lenin and Trotsky) are full of polemics and political criticisms of other leftists. They wrote lots of articles directed at shades of leftist opinion that were much smaller and more `irrelevant’ in relative terms, than the other Canadian left groups. They were not afraid of politically engaging their political rivals, and they knew that the best way to educate their members and supporters was by drawing what Lenin called `lines of demarcation’ through political polemics.
Marxism is a science. A science can only develop if all shades of opinion are able to be heard. I believe that the revolutionary left would be in much better shape if differences were debated thoroughly and openly. Real revolutionaries practice workers’ democracy – they don’t just advocate it in the abstract. Political exclusions and attempts to prevent your members from reading or discussion other points of view on the left only make sense if you have something to hide. These techniques are designed to help the IS `Go for Growth’, but in the end they can only end up depoliticizing the IS.
Revolutionary Continuity
It is very important to know the history of the Marxist movement and particularly of your own organization. An organization’s history tells you a great deal about why it is where it is today and where it is likely to go. In the IS little attention is paid to the group’s history. Most members pick up this information informally in bits and pieces. Many people know that in Canada the IS originated in the 1970s as a group within the Waffle – a left-nationalist faction of the NDP.
For those who don’t know, Tony Cliff, founder of the IS tendency internationally, was expelled from the Fourth International for refusing to support North Korea against American imperialism and its South Korean puppet in the Korean War. Cliff said that North Korea, like the USSR, was `state capitalist’. In fact they were not capitalist – which is why the US was so hostile to it. North Korea was modelled on the Soviet Union under Stalin – the old landed ruling class and their imperialist patrons’ property had been expropriated, the economy was collectivized and the dictatorial Kim Il Sung regime monopolized all political power.
One thing that Tony Cliff and the IS leadership have never been able to explain is why, if is was incorrect to call for a victory of the North Korean Stalinists against the US and its South Korean puppets in the 1950s, was it okay to support the North Vietnamese Stalinists against the US and its South Vietnamese puppets 15 years later? The forces involved in the two conflicts were virtually identical. The only thing that was different – and for the IS this is decisive – was the degree of popularity. In the early 1950s the Cold War was at its height and there was a massive wave of anticommunist hysteria. Tony Cliff’s declaration that Russia and its allies were `capitalist’ meant that he no longer had to defend it or the other deformed workers’ states (including North Korea and China) against imperialism. This was clearly a direct result of the enormous ideological pressures of McCarthyism bearing down on the left. But by the late 1960s, with the New Left, the Vietnamese were popular with the radicalizing students the IS sought to recruit. So Cliff switched the IS line to defending the (popular) Stalinists against imperialism. Trotsky said that opportunists always know which way the wind is blowing.
Conclusion
I would like to make it clear that I have no personal animosity toward comrades in the IS. I know there are plenty of dedicated people in the group who really want to be communists and to fight to change the world. Unfortunately, they are in the wrong organization.
The IS’s flawed analysis of the period and faulty understanding of the party question is connected to its history of political adaptation to prevailing winds. The fact that the analysis of the period and so much more originates largely by bureaucratic decree from the SWP CC adds to the difficulty of attempting any serious change in the group’s direction. The leadership is constantly saying, `we’re on the verge of something big – look at the American, British, and Greek groups – just push a little harder’. This keeps members running, but they aren’t really going in any direction. They are like chickens with their heads cut off – running around a lot, but not really getting anywhere.
When the big break doesn’t come, people get demoralized. I’ve seen some good people move away from revolutionary politics after a period of frantic activity. When this happens the IS rarely makes much effort to keep them and instead tends to say `they were no good, let’s recruit some new people’. The raw, relatively politically inexperienced people who are constantly being recruited to regenerate the group have the advantage of making it very easy for the regime to get what it wants internally. In the last few months, I have done some reading about other groups which took a similar approach in the past. Some of them grew to thousands of people, but ultimately fell apart because what holds a group together is the set of ideas, the program, shared by the members. Groups like the IS which place a higher value on short-run success than winning influence for their ideas, end up spitting out a lot of good people, many of who drift away from the left.
The only way to build a serious group is on the basis of a serious, consistently revolutionary program and consistently politically principled activity. Some may say that the IS is the biggest group in Canada, and that their `sectarian’ opponents are too small to influence things. Being small is no virtue, but it is better to have a revolutionary group of whatever size than a bigger revisionist one. Because a small revolutionary group has the possibility of one day leading to victory, whereas an opportunist one (like the IS) never can, no matter how big it gets. There are a lot of individuals in the IS who can have a large impact on the direction of the revolutionary left in this country. But the road to revolution is a precipitous path and there are not shortcuts. It is sometimes difficult, but it is always necessary, to tell the working class the truth. A revolutionary group must have the courage to openly side with Iraq against Canadian imperialism in a military conflict in the Persian Gulf or to vote for leftist opponents of the capitalist ANC in South Africa. I declare for the International Bolshevik Tendency. After considerable study I have come to the conclusion that the IBT represents real revolutionary continuity – from the formerly revolutionary Spartacist League, through the Revolutionary Tendency, the American Socialist Workers Party, Trotsky’s Fourth International and back to the Bolshevik Party that led the Russian proletariat to power. The IBT is the living embodiment of the program of Lenin and Trotsky – the program of Bolshevism.
The only possibility for the future of humanity on this planet is communism. This can only come about through a proletarian revolution led by vanguard party. I look forward to future discussions with IS members about how such a party can be created.
REFORGE THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL – WORLD PARTY OF SOCIALIST REVOLUTION!
Yours for workers’ democracy
Stephen Johnson
former IS member, Fredericton
Trabajo de masas y lucha fraccional
Trabajo de masas y lucha fraccional: Algunos ejemplos históricos
Esta carta fue escrita por James Cannon a una militante del Socialist Workers Party de Chicago durante la lucha contra la fracción pablista de Cochran-Clarke. Ha sido traducida del Internal Bulletin del SWP, Vol. 15, No. 12 (mayo de 1953). Más tarde fue publicada en inglés en el libro Speeches to the Party de Cannon. Esta versión fue publicada en Spartacist en español no. 27, Diciembre de 1996.
Los Angeles, California
9 de abril de 1953
Chicago
Estimada Hildegarde:
Entre otras cosas interesantes, en tu carta dices: “Aquí ya algunos de nuestros camaradas en los sindicatos están diciendo, ‘Quisiera que esto se acabara.’ De hecho, la atmósfera de aquí es un tanto ponzoñosa.” Yo estaba a la espera de un informe de algún desarrollo como ese. Por experiencia, incluyendo la mía propia, sé que esto sucede siempre en toda lucha partidista.
Antes de que tuviera la oportunidad de empaparme en la política revolucionaria, me hallé envuelto en un torbellino de lucha fraccional en el ala izquierda del Partido Socialista en 1919. Yo había venido del movimiento de masas y luchas huelguísticas en el viejo IWW [Obreros Industriales del Mundo], y mi primera reacción fue de consternación y desaliento. Estaba ansioso por que el fraccionalismo pasara y por volver al trabajo constructivo. Me tomó algún tiempo aprender que las luchas fraccionales son gajes del oficio.
Menciono esto para mostrar que comprendo y simpatizo con los militantes sindicares de Chicago que están reaccionando del mismo modo ante la “atmósfera ponzoñosa” de la presente controversia, aunque no estoy de acuerdo con ellos. Durante lo más candente de la lucha contra la oposición pequeñoburguesa en 1939-40, tuvimos expresiones similares de los activistas sindicales en el partido, y yo lo reporté al camarada Trotsky. Puedes encontrar el intercambio de cartas sobre este punto en mi The Struggle for a Proletarian Party (La lucha por un partido proletario), página 175 y en En defensa del marxismo de Trotsky, página 196.
Estoy seguro de que los camaradas de Chicago no se sentirán ofendidos ante la observación de Trotsky de que tal actitud de impaciencia en medio de una lucha ideológica seria “no es raro que esté conectada con la indiferencia teórica.” Nadie nace siendo marxista. El marxismo debe aprenderse, y es muy posible que nuestros impacientes militantes sindicales de Chicago descubran, como lo han hecho otros antes, incluyéndonos a ti y a mí, que las luchas fraccionales en el partido revolucionario pueden también tener un lado positivo, a pesar de su costo, como escuela en la que uno puede aprender política marxista más rápido y de manera más completa que en tiempos normales de la vida del partido.
Las lecciones que se aprenden en una lucha seria, de la discusión que debe llevar a la decisión, calan hondamente y no se olvidan con facilidad. Pienso que todos hemos aprendido algo en relación a esto de las experiencias pasadas. Estoy seguro de que en esta ocasión sucederá lo mismo, ya que la lucha que se está abriendo en el partido es de hecho muy seria.
La aversión de los activistas sindicales a las luchas fraccionales no es de ningún modo una manifestación únicamente negativa. Están interesados en el trabajo constructivo, y sin eso nunca construiremos un movimiento. Les repele la gente dificultosa que nunca parece contenta a menos que esté lanzando insultos. Engels les llamaba desdeñosamente “buscapleitos”, y sin embargo no dudó un momento en combatirlos. Las objeciones que presentan los militantes sindicales ante este tipo de atmósfera son muy comprensibles. Pero todos hemos tenido que aprender que las luchas fraccionales no pueden evitarse volviéndoles la espalda. Nuestros grandes maestros, que -como en todo lo demás- sabían cómo tomar las luchas fraccionales, nos explicaron esto hace mucho tiempo. Engels escribió a Bernstein en 1888: “Parece que todo partido obrero, en un país grande, sólo puede desarrollarse mediante luchas internas, y esto está basado en las leyes del desarrollo dialéctico en general.”
* * *
El rehusarse a entrar plenamente en una lucha fraccional porque uno quiere hacer su trabajo en paz, sólo tiene como resultado el entregar el partido a “buscapleitos” y revisionistas -que muy frecuentemente son la misma cosa- y esa es una manera segura de arruinar al partido, como otros partidos han sido arruinados en el pasado. Ese es un modo seguro de deshacer todo el trabajo constructivo de los militantes sindicales y otros activistas en un lapso de tiempo relativamente corto.
Algunas veces esto puede suceder mediante un único error de la dirección, motivado por una falsa política. Por ejemplo, el grupo de Burnham-Shachtman, que temporalmente tuvo una mayoría en el CP [Comité Político] de nuestro partido a comienzos de 1939 mientras me hallaba ausente en Europa, ya estaba infectado con el germen de la estalinofobia y lo cuidaban dedicadamente para mantenerlo calientito. Cuando Homer Martin, entonces presidente del UAW inició arbitrariamente una escisión en el sindicato, el CP, bajo Burnham y Shachtman, mandó a nuestros camaradas en la industria automotriz a que apoyaran la aventura de Martin. Estaban motivados por la circunstancia de que los estalinistas tenían una posición fuerte, si no es que dominante, en la mayoría opuesta a Martin.
Nuestros camaradas que estaban en el terreno, conociendo mejor la situación y no queriendo aislarse de la mayoría del CIO, objetaron fuertemente esta política del CP de Burnham-Shachtman. Se opusieron a la decisión, no en una manera indisciplinada y destructiva, sino de una manera política, y tuvieron éxito en hacer que se cambiara la decisión. Esto les permitió permanecer en la corriente principal del movimiento que se mantenía fiel al CIO. Los militantes del sindicato automotriz que estaban bajo la influencia de los lovestonistas se fueron con la desdichada escisión de Martin hacia la AFL, y corno resultado quedaron eliminados del sindicato de un solo golpe, por un paso político en falso. Nuestros camaradas, en cambio, gracias a la política correcta que siguieron, pudieron integrarse mejor que nunca al sindicato automotriz reconstruido del CIO. La posición falsa que tornó originalmente la dirección Burnham-Shachtman en la famosa “crisis automotriz” de 1939 fue una de las cuestiones que llevaron a su caída y a su repudio por parte del partido.
* * *
Menciono este ejemplo -uno de los muchos que se pueden citar de la historia de nuestro movimiento- para mostrar lo inseparablemente ligado que está el trabajo constructivo de los activistas sindicales con la línea política y la dirección del partido. Hay tiempos, y el presente es uno de ellos, en los que la línea política y la dirección del partido son puestos en cuestión. No conocemos otra manera de resolver tal disputa más que mediante discusiones abiertas, que a veces toman la forma de luchas fraccionales y, mediante la decisión final del partido en una convención democrática. Es así corno se hacen las cosas en un partido democrático: los miembros mismos discuten y deciden qué política y qué dirección quieren. Las irritaciones inevitables del “fraccionalismo” ocasional son un precio pequeño que pagar por una genuina democracia en el partido.
Nuestros militantes sindicales harán bien en repensar este asunto; en considerar que ellos tienen interés en esta disputa; que si permanecen indiferentes y se hacen a un lado pueden terminar con una política que no corresponda a las necesidades de la situación, y con una dirección que obstaculice en lugar de ayudar en su trabajo. Esas cosas han sucedido anteriormente. Es mucho mejor alarmarse ante ello de antemano, y tratar de prevenirlo mediante una participación consciente y activa en la determinación de la disputa, que lamentarse después de una mala decisión.
* * *
Uno de los proyectos que he anhelado hacer desde hace tiempo, y al que espero dedicarme ahora que estoy cómodamente establecido en la hospitalaria ciudad de Los Angeles, es escribir una biografía política y una evaluación de Debs. Creo que la generación joven podría beneficiarse de un trabajo corno ese, el cual no ha sido realizado adecuadamente hasta ahora.
El ensayo que proyecto tendría dos lados. Primero, trataría de mostrar a Debs en todo su esplendor como héroe proletario; como el prototipo y modelo del revolucionario de las masas, el organizador sindical, el líder de huelgas, el inspirador de la juventud. Ese lado del proyecto sería una tarea muy grata para mí, pues quiero muchísimo el recuerdo de Debs.
Pero me sentiría obligado a tratar otro lado de Debs; lo que considero es su lado más débil, el cual nunca ha sido adecuadamente examinado y explicado por otros biógrafos y evaluadores. De hecho, nunca se ha tocado; y el verdadero retrato del Debs real, “el hombre con su contradicción”, con su lado débil así corno su lado fuerte, nunca se ha esbozado.
Si alguna vez ha habido un hombre de buena voluntad, ese fue Debs; era alguien que se entregaba, un trabajador constructivo, un constructor. Pero era un poquito “bueno” en demasía corno para ser el dirigente que requiere un partido revolucionario. Debs no soportaba las disputas. Huía de los “buscapleitos” como de la plaga. No podía aguantar los embrollos en las controversias, especialmente si estaban contaminadas con intrigas y “maniobrerismo”, que desafortunadamente no siempre están ausentes incluso en las disputas del partido. Temía a las luchas fraccionales y a las escisiones por encima de todo, y simplemente huía de ellas.
Como resultado de todo esto, Debs le volvió la espalda a los asuntos internos del Partido Socialista de los Estados Unidos. Debs, el líder más influyente, vertió toda su energía, y a final de cuentas su vida, en la agitación popular de masas, en la organización y en la lucha, y permitió que hombres más pequeños que él -más pequeños en todos los aspectos, a mi juicio, y especialmente en temperamento revolucionario- condujeran la maquinaria del partido y dieran forma a la política del partido.
Nunca hubo en ningún sitio un grupo de huelguistas en apuros que pidieran ayuda a Debs sin que él tomara el siguiente tren para llegar al lugar y tomar posición en el piquete de huelga, para elevar su coraje con palabras de noble elocuencia. Pero lo que Debs no podía hacer era ir a una reunión de discusión del partido, durante una lucha fraccional; o a una acalorada discusión en el comité; o a una convención donde se tomarían decisiones contundentes. Pensaba que su influencia en el movimiento de masas, su popularidad entre los miembros del partido, el entusiasmo revolucionario que generaba cada vez que hablaba, eran suficientes para darle forma al curso del partido. Pensaba que podía mantener al partido sobre la línea revolucionaria por el mero peso de su ejemplo. Pero estaba equivocado.
Los estafadores oportunistas, los “socialistas de municipalidad”, los hombres de corta visión que querían reducir el programa del socialismo a pequeños objetivos, fueron más listos que Debs y lo superaron con sus maniobras, y lo usaron para sus propósitos en lugar de que él los usara para los suyos. Esa fue, en mi opinión, la gran falla y el gran fracaso de Debs. Y fue por eso que al final su gloria fue ensombrecida por la tragedia. Simpatizaba con el ala izquierda del Partido Socialista, pero fue incapaz de irse con ellos en la escisión de 1919. Murió como miembro de un Partido Socialista desacreditado, que la nueva generación de jóvenes revolucionarios había evitado con desdén.
* * *
Toda la carrera de Debs es la prueba más completa y convincente de que uno no puede ser un revolucionario efectivo completo si se confina al trabajo de masas y a la agitación, mientras deja a otros los asuntos internos del partido, incluyendo las disputas y las luchas fraccionales.
No, esa es también la tarea del revolucionario proletario. Si su deber requiere que entre plenamente en la controversia; si tiene que aprender a lidiar con los “buscapleitos” de Engels, e incluso si resulta un poco manchado por las calumnias — no puede pedir que se le exente. Su trabajo de masas tiene poca utilidad y poco sentido sin el partido. Y el curso y la dirección del partido se deciden, en última instancia, por lo que ellos y otros como ellos dicen y hacen al respecto.
Trotsky escribió una vez que un revolucionario se prueba bajo todo tipo de circunstancias y en todo tipo de acciones, desde las huelgas y peleas callejeras hasta la lucha revolucionaria por el poder, pero que la prueba más importante de todas es su actitud hacia las disputas dentro de su propio partido.
* * *
El mundo conoce a Marx como el autor de El capital. Pero nosotros, sus discípulos, también lo conocemos como el fundador y líder de la I Internacional, y como el inspirador teórico del movimiento obrero socialista que creció durante su vida. La lucha de Marx y Engels durante el período de la I Internacional, y en el reagrupamiento del movimiento obrero después, hasta el fin de sus vidas, fue una lucha con dos aspectos.
Por un lado, lucharon por la unidad de la clase obrera, resumida en la gran consigna del Manifiesto comunista:“¡Proletarios de todos los países, uníos!”. Por otro lado, lucharon por la claridad del único programa que podía hacer esta unidad consciente y efectiva, y al fin victoriosa. Esta lucha por la claridad programática, que nunca cejaron, los involucró en incesantes controversias y polémicas, que nunca buscaron evitar. Al contrario, lucharon abiertamente contra todo intento de contrabandear la ideología burguesa hacia el movimiento obrero bajo los diversos disfraces del anarquismo y el oportunismo.
Las grandes batallas de Marx y Engels contra los anarquistas bakuninistas, contra los lasalleanos, contra la conciliación con la confusión en nombre de la unidad, la cual provocó el comentario clásico al programa de Gotha – todo ello fue una lucha fraccional de comienzo a fin. Sin ello el movimiento político revolucionario no podría haberse construido y mantenido; sus sucesores no podrían haber mantenido sin rupturas la línea de continuidad con el pensamiento de Marx; y nosotros y nuestro partido no estaríamos aquí hoy. Debemos nuestra existencia política a las valientes batallas fraccionales que lidiaron los fundadores del socialismo científico y los dos grandes discípulos que vinieron después de ellos.
* * *
El peso principal de la lucha por la transformación socialista de la sociedad no está en la lucha directa de los obreros contra la burguesía. Los obreros son tan aplastante mayoría, y su fuerza se multiplica tantas veces por su posición estratégica en la producción, que si se unieran para actuar conscientemente por sus propios intereses, su victoria sobre la burguesía sería pan comido. Pero no están unidos, no tienen conciencia de clase. La razón de ello es la influencia de la ideología burguesa en las filas de los obreros.
Dicha influencia es traída a las filas obreras de diversas maneras, pero su representante más directo es la burocracia sindical. Es por eso que nuestra lucha principal contra la burguesía toma en primer lugar la forma de la lucha contra sus agentes en el movimiento obrero. Nadie ha superado todavía la definición clásica dada por De Leon de los farsantes sindicales conservadores como “los lugartenientes laborales de la clase capitalista”. A Lenin le agradaba especialmente esta notable caracterización, y nadie jamás enfatizaría más que él la primacía de la lucha contra estos lugartenientes laborales de la clase capitalista.
La lucha por el socialismo es impensable sin una lucha por hacer revolucionarios a los sindicatos. Eso es lo que le da una importancia tan trascendente al trabajo partidista en los sindicatos. Los militantes sindicales del partido que reculan ante las luchas fraccionales en su propio partido, y que incluso imaginan que están contra el fraccionalismo en general, deberían explicarse a sí mismos el hecho de que su propia lucha diaria contra la traicionera burocracia es una lucha fraccional dentro del movimiento obrero. También ahí [el aire] se vuelve “ponzoñoso” a veces, y muy a menudo se ve mezclado con todo tipo de antagonismos personales. Pero en el fondo no es una disputa personal, y no hay manera de evitarla.
Como se ha dicho, su causa es la presión de la influencia capitalista representada por los burócratas charros y en cierta medida por la aristocracia obrera. Pero esta presión e influencia de la clase dominante no se limita a los sindicatos, aunque se revela en ellos en su forma más crasa. Lo permea todo en la sociedad presente. Eso no es extraño, considerando todos los instrumentos de educación, propaganda y comunicación que están monopolizados por la clase dominante: la iglesia, la escuela, la prensa, el radio, etc.
La experiencia de cien años ha mostrado que la influencia y la ideología burguesas también son llevadas en diversas maneras indirectas a las organizaciones políticas de los obreros, incluso a las más avanzadas, y frecuentemente llega a dominar en ellas; eso trae como resultado la transformación de estas organizaciones políticas en soportes del régimen capitalista en lugar de ser órganos de lucha en su contra.
Esta es la verdadera explicación, como Lenin nos enseñó, de la caída de la II Internacional. La lucha en contra de esta influencia burguesa, representada por la dirección oportunista, fue primero una lucha fraccional dirigida por Lenin dentro de las filas de una sola organización internacional. Después de la escisión, y de la formación de la III Internacional, la lucha continuó, siendo todavía, en esencia, una lucha fraccional entre las dos internacionales dentro del movimiento obrero amplio.
* * *
Fue también la presión de la influencia burguesa lo que llevó a la degeneración y caída finales de la III Internacional. La lucha que Trotsky dirigió en contra de esta degeneración comenzó como una lucha fraccional dentro de una sola organización. Y en cierto punto culminó en la formación de la IV Internacional. Hoy sigue siendo una lucha fraccional entre el trotskismo y el estalinismo por la influencia y la dirección del movimiento más amplio de la clase obrera.
* * *
La historia más reciente, en cuyo hacer muchos de nosotros hemos sido participantes directos, sigue la misma línea general que la de nuestros antecesores. Nuestro partido no ha estado inmune a los problemas internos que han ocurrido en todas las organizaciones políticas obreras en estos cien años. Hemos asegurado nuestra existencia y nuestra unidad enfrentándolos francamente y lidiando con ellos.
Las presiones no sólo recaen sobre el movimiento obrero amplio, sino también sobre la vanguardia, e incluso sobre la vanguardia de la vanguardia — que es exactamente lo que el SWP y sus organizaciones afines en el movimiento mundial representan. Los problemas que demandan solución bajo la influencia de estas presiones externas producen diferencias de opinión en nuestras filas, así como en otras partes. A menudo estas diferencias, relacionadas a puntos particulares, se resuelven con la libre discusión en nuestro partido democrático, sin organización o luchas fraccionales. Esto es lo que sucedió en 1948 cuando tuvimos una diferencia de opinión extremadamente seria ante la política de la elección presidencial. Una experiencia similar fue la discusión sobre los cambios de la posguerra en Europa Oriental.
Estos ejemplos, así como la manera en que estas disputas se resolvieron sin lucha interna, son suficientes para mostrar que uno no debe saltar a conclusiones apresuradas cada vez que se manifiesta una diferencia de opinión en nuestras filas, y excluir la posibilidad de lograr un acuerdo y la reconciliación mediante una discusión calmada y amistosa. Pero por otro lado, es bueno tener en mente lo que Trotsky dijo en 1939: “cualquier lucha fraccional seria en un partido es siempre en última instancia un reflejo de la lucha de clases.” Tal fue ciertamente el caso en nuestra lucha contra la oposición pequeñoburguesa en 1939-40. Esa fue una lucha larga y dura por la existencia del partido como organización revolucionaria.
También en aquel entonces muchos obreros, especialmente los activistas sindicales deseosos por continuar con su trabajo, se impacientaron con la larga discusión. Pero, ¿qué le habría pasado al SWP si no hubiéramos luchado y ganado entonces, con el apoyo de los cuadros proletarios? Desde el comienzo mismo de la lucha caracterizamos a la oposición de Burnham-Shachtman como una fracción pequeñoburguesa. Y si una caracterización fue alguna vez comprobada hasta la saciedad por la evolución subsecuente de las personas involucradas, lo fue esa.
Me imagino que es difícil para algunos de los camaradas más jóvenes en el partido convencerse de que Burnham, el teórico actual del programa de la guerra preventiva contra la Unión Soviética y los movimientos revolucionarios alrededor del mundo, fue alguna vez miembro de nuestro partido. Pero lo era, y lo recordamos bien. Más que eso, fue un contendiente por la dirección del partido que denunciaba a los líderes actuales del mismo como “burócratas conservadores”. Escribió una detallada condena de nuestros horribles “métodos organizativos” en un documento clásico en su género llamado “La guerra y el conservadurismo burocrático”, que está publicado como apéndice de mi libro The Struggle for a Proletarian Party.
Cualquiera que sea la opinión de nuestros camaradas más jóvenes sobre nuestro “fraccionalismo” en la actual lucha partidista, seguramente que no nos condenarán por nuestro fraccionalismo en la lucha contra Burnham y Cía., o en cualquier caso no deberían hacerlo, puesto que el partido le debe a esa lucha su existencia y sus magníficos logros durante y después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial.
* * *
No titubeamos en caracterizar desde el comienzo a la oposición de Burnham-Shachtman como una oposición pequeño-burguesa. Esto fue en parte porque habíamos tenido experiencias previas y muchas indicaciones de la lucha por venir. Y cuando se levantaron en oposición al momento de comenzar la Segunda Guerra Mundial, sabíamos qué sucedía con ellos y cómo caracterizarlos.
La caracterización de la oposición actual en el SWP no puede ser tan precisa en esta etapa. Todavía no sabemos qué línea tomará en su evolución ulterior, y menos lo saben ellos. Pero ya hay cierto número de hechos inquietantes que ponen absolutamente en claro a todos los que tengan ojos para ver y estén dispuestos a hacerlo, que vamos a tener una lucha seria. No se la puede evitar por las siguientes razones:
1. Los cochranistas formaron una fracción en la dirección y en las filas del partido antes de que lanzaran un programa. En esto han seguido directamente los pasos de la oposición pequeñoburguesa que tenía una fracción completamente formada antes de que desplegaran sus banderas en septiembre de 1939. En el lenguaje leninista, tal procedimiento siempre se ha considerado como una ofensa criminal contra el partido.
2. La fracción de Cochran es una combinación sin principios de diversos elementos que tienen diferentes puntos de vista acerca de muchas de las cuestiones en disputa, y solo les une su oposición al “régimen” del partido. En nuestro movimiento tales combinaciones siempre se han considerado antileninistas.
3. Los argumentos subterráneos de la fracción de Cochran en contra del régimen no son sino un refrito de viejos chismes y calumnias sacadas de la acusación sumaria de Burnham conocida como “La guerra y el conservadurismo burocrático”. Ya he contestado a esta acusación sumaria en mi libro The Struggle for a Proletarian Party de modo que no me detengo más en este punto.
4. La fracción de Cochran está cínicamente alentando y estimulando el sentimiento de conciliacionismo al estalinismo en las filas del partido. El conciliacionismo al estalinismo es ajeno y hostil a los principios y a la tradición de nuestro movimiento.
5. En la organización local de Nueva York. y en el CP, la fracción Cochran se ha declarado en franca revuelta contra los principios leninistas de organización que han gobernado el funcionamiento interno del partido desde su creación hace 25 años. El rebelarse contra el centralismo democrático siempre ha sido una señal distintiva del menchevismo.
6. Al conducir una lucha sin principios en contra de la dirección del partido, subterráneamente durante más de un año, y ahora abiertamente, los líderes de la fracción de Cochran se han abandonado a un frenesí fraccional que efectivamente “ha emponzoñado la atmósfera del partido”. Sus métodos de conducir la lucha fraccional desorientan y corrompen a camaradas más jóvenes e inexpertos que necesitan una discusión calmada y explicaciones pedagógicas para avanzar en su educación política.
Estas manifestaciones, tomadas en conjunto son características bien conocidas de una fracción que ha perdido la cabeza y no sabe a dónde va. Llámese como quiera a esas manifestaciones, pero no son manifestaciones de leninistas con confianza en sí mismos, que se yerguen ante toda presión y siguen un curso consciente y premeditado.
Esperaremos para ver el curso de esta combinación sin principios. Entretanto, nos esforzaremos por explicar al partido en la discusión política las cosas como las vemos. El próximo pleno del Comité Nacional sin duda va a condenar a la fracción de Cochran como una combinación sin principios y revisionista, y explicará sus razones al partido en resoluciones sin ambigüedades.
Entonces será el turno de los miembros del partido para discutir y eventualmente para decidir. La tarea más importante de todo miembro en el próximo período es estudiar y discutir todos los puntos en cuestión, y tomar una posición sobre ellos. Nadie tiene derecho de abstenerse, pues la prueba más importante para un revolucionario -citando de nuevo a Trotsky- “es su actitud ante las disputas en su propio partido.”
Fraternalmente,
J.P. Cannon
Contra la teoría del capitalismo de Estado
Contra la teoría del capitalismo de Estado
Respuesta al compañero Cliff
por Ted Grant (1949)
[Copiado de OBRAS COMPLETAS DE TED GRANT · VOLUMEN I. ]
El documento del compañero Cliff titulado La naturaleza de la Rusia estalinista, a primera vista da la impresión de erudición y análisis científico. Sin embargo, un examen más cuidadoso demostrará que ninguno de los capítulos contiene una tesis elaborada. El método que utiliza es hacer toda una serie de paralelismos basados en citas, y demuestra su punto débil en el hecho de que las conclusiones no están apoyadas por el análisis. De sus tesis no es posible llegar a la conclusión de si la Rusia estalinista sigue siendo un sistema progresista (a pesar de sus deformaciones) o si, por el contrario, como Cliff ahora supone, juega el mismo papel reaccionario que el capitalismo o el fascismo. La debilidad se muestra más severamente en el hecho de no sacar conclusiones prácticas. ¿Hay que defender a Rusia o el partido revolucionario debe ser derrotista? En lugar de responder decididamente a esto en el transcurso del análisis, tiene que hacerlo a posteriori.
A pesar de afirmar el compañero Cliff que la burocracia estalinista es una nueva clase, en ninguna parte de su tesis hace un auténtico análisis o da pruebas de por qué y cómo tal clase se constituye en clase capitalista y no es un nuevo tipo de clase.
Esto no es accidental. Proviene del método. Comienza con la idea preconcebida del capitalismo de Estado y todo está ajustado artificialmente a esa concepción. En vez de aplicar el método teórico de los clásicos del marxismo a la sociedad rusa en su proceso de desarrollo y movimiento, él ha realizado el trabajo recogiendo citas e intentándolas comprimir en una teoría.
En ninguna parte del documento Cliff plantea el criterio principal para los marxistas a la hora de analizar un sistema social: ¿La nueva formación conduce al desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas? La teoría del marxismo está basada en el desarrollo material de las fuerzas productivas como fuerza motora del progreso histórico. La transición de un sistema a otro no se decide subjetivamente, está basada en las necesidades de la propia producción. Es sobre estas bases y sólo sobre estas bases, sobre las que se erige la superestructura: el Estado, la ideología, el arte, la ciencia… Es verdad que la superestructura tiene un efecto secundario importante sobre la producción, e incluso dentro de ciertos límites, como Engels explicó, desarrolla su propio movimiento independiente. Pero en última instancia, lo decisivo es el desarrollo de la producción.
Marx explicó que la justificación histórica para el capitalismo, a pesar de los horrores de la revolución industrial, a pesar de la esclavitud de los negros en África, a pesar del trabajo infantil en las fábricas, las guerras de conquista a través del planeta, la realidad es que era una etapa necesaria en el desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas. Marx demostró que sin la esclavitud, no sólo la antigua esclavitud, sino la esclavitud en la primera época del desarrollo capitalista, el desarrollo moderno de la producción habría sido imposible. Sin esto nunca se podrían haber preparado las bases materiales para el comunismo. En Miseria de la Filosofía Marx escribió:
“Lo mismo que las máquinas, el crédito, etc., la esclavitud directa es la base de la industria burguesa. Sin esclavitud no habría algodón; sin algodón no habría industria moderna. La esclavitud ha dado su valor a las colonias, las colonias han creado el comercio universal, el comercio universal es la condición necesaria para la gran industria. Por lo tanto, la esclavitud es una categoría económica de la más alta importancia.
“Sin esclavitud, América del Norte, el país de más rápido progreso, se transformaría en un país patriarcal. Borren Norteamérica del mapa del mundo y tendrán la anarquía, la decadencia completa del comercio y de la civilización moderna” (Carlos Marx, Miseria de la filosofía. Buenos Aires, Ed. Cartago, 1987, p. 88).
Por supuesto, la actitud de Marx hacia los horrores de la esclavitud y la revolución industrial es bien conocida. Sería una burda distorsión de la posición de Marx argumentar que como él escribió el párrafo antes mencionado, entonces estaba a favor de la esclavitud y del trabajo infantil. Como tampoco hoy se puede argumentar contra los marxistas que como apoyan la propiedad estatal en la URSS, entonces justifican los campos de concentración y otros crímenes del régimen de Stalin.
El apoyo de Marx a Bismarck1 en la guerra franco-prusiana estaba dictado por consideraciones similares. A pesar de la política de ‘hierro y sangre’ de Bismarck, y la naturaleza reaccionaria de su régimen, la unificación nacional de Alemania facilitaría el desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas, Marx dio un apoyo crítico a la guerra de Prusia contra Francia. El criterio básico era el desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas. A la larga, todo lo demás deriva de esto.
Cualquier análisis de la sociedad rusa debe partir de esas bases. Una vez más Cliff admite que mientras el capitalismo está declinando y decayendo a escala mundial, todavía mantiene un papel progresista en Rusia con relación al desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas, entonces lógicamente, debería decir que el capitalismo de Estado es la próxima etapa de la sociedad, o al menos para los países atrasados. Contradictoriamente, muestra que la burguesía rusa no es capaz de llevar adelante el papel que cumplió la burguesía en Occidente y, consecuentemente, la revolución proletaria es inevitable.
Si en Rusia tenemos capitalismo de Estado (precedido por una revolución proletaria), entonces está claro que la crisis del capitalismo sobre la que nos hemos basado durante las pasadas décadas no era insoluble, sino simplemente los dolores de parto de una etapa nueva y superior del capitalismo. La cita que nos da de Marx —que ninguna sociedad desaparece de la escena hasta que ha agotado todas las posibilidades para desarrollar las fuerzas productivas—, indicaría que, si su argumento es correcto, ante nosotros se abre una nueva época, la época del capitalismo de Estado. Esto destruiría por entero las bases teóricas del movimiento leninista- trotskista. Cliff dice, sin explicar por qué, que si cogemos la teoría de la revolución degenerada, debemos abandonar la teoría de la revolución permanente.
No obstante, no consigue ver que aceptar la teoría del capitalismo de Estado, la teoría de la revolución permanente, que está basada en la idea de que el capitalismo se ha agotado a escala mundial y que es incapaz de llevar adelante ni siquiera las tareas de la revolución democrático burguesa en los países atrasados, debería ser abandonada. En Europa del Este, los ‘capitalistas de Estado’ habrían realizado las tareas de la revolución burguesa sobre la tierra, etc., Cliff da un rodeo sobre este tema de la revolución agraria, que en los países atrasados, como decía Trotsky, sólo el proletariado podría llevarla a cabo. Si los partidos ‘capitalistas de Estado’ de los estalinistas pueden cumplir esta tarea, no sólo se arroja por la borda la teoría de la revolución permanente, sino también la viabilidad del nuevo Estado capitalista en un sentido histórico.
Si la tesis del compañero Cliff es correcta, que hoy en Rusia existe capitalismo de Estado, entonces no puede evitar la conclusión de que el capitalismo de Estado ha estado existiendo desde la Revolución Rusa y que la función de la propia revolución fue introducir este sistema capitalista de Estado en la sociedad. A pesar de sus tortuosos esfuerzos para trazar una línea entre las bases económicas de la sociedad rusa antes del año 1928 y después, las bases económicas de la sociedad rusa en realidad han permanecido intactas.
EL USO INCORRECTO DE LAS CITAS
El compañero Cliff intenta demostrar que Trotsky estaba acercándose a la postura de que la burocracia era una nueva clase dominante. Para tal propósito cita los libros Stalin y El pensamiento vivo de Carlos Marx:
Cliff escribe:
“Un paso claro en la dirección de una nueva evolución de la burocracia como clase gobernante encuentra expresión en el último libro de Trotsky, Stalin, donde escribe: ‘Lo esencial del Termidor fue, y no puede menos de ser, social en cuanto a carácter. Su finalidad era cristalizar una nueva capa privilegiada, crear un substrato nuevo para la clase económicamente superior. Había dos pretendientes a este papel: la pequeña burguesía y la misma burocracia. Ambas combatieron unidas [en la batalla para vencer] la resistencia de la vanguardia del proletariado. Una vez conseguido esto, cerraron una contra otra en feroz acometida. La burocracia llegó a asustarse de su aislamiento, de su divorcio del proletariado. Sola, no podía aplastar al kulak ni a la pequeña burguesía, que había crecido y continuaba creciendo sobre la base de la NEP; tenía que contar con la ayuda del proletariado. De ahí su esfuerzo concertado por presentar su lucha contra la pequeña burguesía, por los productos sobrantes y por el poder, como la lucha del proletariado contra las tentativas de restauración capitalista” (Tony Cliff, La naturaleza de Rusia estalinista, junio de 1948, p. 10).
Y el compañero Cliff comenta:
“La burocracia, dice Trotsky, mientras pretende luchar contra la restauración capitalista, en realidad, utilizó sólo al proletariado para aplastar a los kulaks, para ‘cristalizar una nueva capa privilegiada, crear un substrato nuevo para la clase económicamente superior’. Uno de los pretendientes al papel de clase económicamente dominante, según él, es la burocracia. Hace un gran énfasis en esta formulación cuando asocia este análisis con la lucha entre la burocracia y los kulaks con la definición de Trotsky de la lucha de clases. Dice: ‘La lucha de clases no es otra cosa que la lucha por la apropiación de plusvalía’. El que se apropia de la plusvalía domina la situación, posee riqueza, posee el Estado, tiene la llave de la Iglesia, los tribunales, de las ciencias y el arte (Ibíd., p. 10).
Y Cliff concluye:
“La lucha entre la burocracia y los kulaks, fue según la última conclusión de Trotsky, ‘la lucha… por la plusvalía excedente”.
Para ilustrar la forma en que el compañero Cliff ha construido su idea, examinemos estas citas en su contexto y veremos como la conclusión que emana es precisamente la contraria de la que él pretende.
“El kulak, juntamente con el industrial modesto, trabajaba por la completa restauración del capitalismo. Así se inició la irreconciliable brega alrededor del producto sobrante del trabajo nacional. ¿Quién dispondrá de él en el próximo futuro: la nueva burguesía o la burocracia soviética? Esta fue la inmediata cuestión planteada. Quien disponga del producto sobrante cuenta con el poder del Estado. Así comenzó la lucha entre la pequeña burguesía, que había ayudado a la burocracia a quebrantar la resistencia de las masas obreras y de sus portavoces de la oposición izquierdista, y la misma burocracia termidoriana, que había ayudado a la pequeña burguesía a dominar a las masas agrarias. Era una porfía descarada por el poder y la renta.
“Evidentemente, la burocracia no derrotó a la vanguardia proletaria, se libró de las complicaciones de la revolución internacional y legitimó la filosofía de la desigualdad, para rendirse luego a la burguesía y convertirse en criado suyo, y ser acaso desplazada a su vez de la olla del Estado” (León Trotsky, Stalin. Buenos Aires, Editorial El Yunque, 1975, p. 275).
Cliff hace que Trotsky parezca un loco, al aparecer contradiciéndose a sí mismo debido a la yuxtaposición de dos citas y, de ahí, que Trotsky estaba cambiando su postura sobre el carácter de clase de la burocracia. Unas pocas páginas más allá, Trotsky explica su idea, demuestra el carácter orgánico de la decadencia del capitalismo en todas partes. Sólo sobre estas bases las fuerzas productivas nacionalizadas se han mantenido en Rusia. La tendencia general de la economía en los últimos cincuenta años a escala mundial ha sido hacia la estatalización de las fuerzas productivas. Los propios capitalistas, en parte, se han visto obligados al “reconocimiento de las fuerzas productivas como fuerzas sociales” (Engels). En realidad, esta es la clave de la explicación de por qué Rusia sobrevivió a la guerra. La desorientación del movimiento que es expresada en el documento deCliff, en gran parte es debida al fracaso en comprender las implicaciones de esta tendencia. En su libro sobre Stalin, Trotsky plantea la posibilidad teórica de que la burocracia continuara gobernando durante algunas décadas.
Unas páginas más allá de las citadas por Cliff, Trotsky dice lo siguiente:
“La contrarrevolución se inicia cuando comienza a desarrollarse el carrete de las conquistas sociales progresivas. Y este desarrollo no parece tener fin. Pero siempre se conservan algunas de tales conquistas. Así, a despecho de monstruosas deformaciones burocráticas, la base clasista de la URSS continúa siendo proletaria. Pero recordemos que este proceso de desarrollo aún no ha terminado, y que el futuro de Europa y del mundo durante tos próximos decenios no se ha decidido todavía. El Termidor ruso habría abierto indudablemente una nueva era de dominio burgués, si tal dominio no se hubiese desacreditado en todo el mundo. En todo caso, la lucha contra la igualdad y el establecimiento de diferencias sociales muy profundas no ha conseguido hasta ahora eliminar la conciencia socialista de las masas ni la nacionalización de los medios de producción y de la tierra, que fueron las conquistas socialistas básicas de la Revolución” (Ibíd., p. 285).
Creemos que esto demuestra suficientemente que Cliff ha tomado una cita del Stalin de Trotsky y la ha sacado fuera de contexto. En su última obra, como en las otras sobre el tema ruso, Trotsky mantuvo una postura consecuente en su caracterización de la Unión Soviética. No es posible sacar la conclusión de ninguno de sus escritos de que él modificase su postura fundamental.
¿PUEDE HABER LUCHA ENTRE DOS SECTORES DE LA MISMA CLASE? REVOLUCIÓN FRANCESA – REVOLUCIÓN RUSA
Para entender la Revolución Rusa podemos tomar la analogía de la Revolución Francesa cuya similitud y rumbo son notables, aunque obviamente diferentes en sus bases económicas. Como es sabido, el dominio de la burguesía en Francia quedó marcado en la revolución de 1789. Marx explica el papel progresista de los Jacobinos revolucionarios: esta dictadura revolucionaria de los sans-culottes fue más lejos que el régimen burgués. Debido a que ellos hicieron una limpieza de todos los desperdicios feudales y lograron en meses lo que para la burguesía hubiese requerido décadas. Esto fue seguido por la reacción termidoriana y la contrarrevolución bonapartista.
Cualquiera que compare la contrarrevolución bonapartista con la revolución —al menos en su superestructura—, haría encontrado una enorme diferencia, como entre el régimen de Lenin y Trotsky en Rusia y el de Stalin en los últimos años. Para los observadores superficiales la diferencia entre los dos regímenes era fundamental. Napoleón había reintroducido muchas órdenes, condecoraciones y rangos similares a los del feudalismo; restauró la Iglesia; incluso se coronó a sí mismo Emperador. Fue una contrarrevolución basada en la nueva forma de propiedad introducida por la propia revolución. Las formas de propiedad o relaciones de propiedad burguesas seguían siendo la base de la economía.
Cuando estudiamos la historia de Francia, vemos la variedad de formas, gobiernos y superestructuras que se desarrollaron en el transcurso de la lucha de clases. La restauración de la monarquía tras la derrota de Napoleón, las revoluciones de 1830 y 1848, ¿qué lucha de clases había? Existía un reparto diferentede la renta, pero después de todas estas revoluciones, la economía seguía siendo burguesa.
La historia posterior de Francia conoció la dictadura de Luis Bonaparte, la restauración de la democracia burguesa y la república, y en los últimos días, el régimen de Petain. En todos estos regímenes había diferencias en la división de la renta nacional entre las clases y diferentes estratos de la propia clase dirigente. Aún así, calificamos a todos estos regímenes como burgueses, ¿Por qué? Sólo puede deberse a la forma de propiedad.
Dado el atraso de la Unión Soviética, que Cliff explica muy bien, y el aislamiento de la revolución, ¿por qué no debería ocurrir un proceso similar? En realidad pasó. Volvamos al libro Stalin de Trotsky. El Viejo era muy claro. Tras la cita donde Trotsky muestra que la esencia del termidor no podría ser sino social en su carácter y que era la lucha por el producto excedente, continuó explicando lo que esto significaba. Continuemos donde se detuvo Cliff:
“Aquí cesa la analogía con el termidor francés. La nueva base social de la Unión Soviética se hizo intangible.Defender la nacionalización de los medios de producción y de la tierra es ley de vida o muerte para la burocracia, pues tal es el origen social de su posición dominante. Esa era la razón de su lucha contra el kulak. La burocracia podía sostener esta contienda, y resistir hasta el fin, sólo con la ayuda del proletariado. La mejor prueba del hecho de que había hecho recluta de este apoyo fue el alud de capitulaciones por parte de representantes de la nueva oposición. La lucha contra el kulak, la pugna contra el ala de derecha, contra el oportunismo (las consignas oficiales de aquel período), parecieron a los trabajadores y a muchos representantes de la oposición izquierdista como un renacimiento de la dictadura del proletariado y de la revolución socialista. Les advertimosentonces: no se trata solo de lo que se hace, sino también de quien lo hace. En condiciones de democracia soviética, esto es, de autonomía obrera, la lucha contra los kulaks pudiera no haber asumido una forma tan convulsiva, pusilánime y bestial, y haber conducido a un alza general del nivel económico de las masas, a base de industrialización. Pero la lucha de la burocracia contra el kulak era una singular contienda (librada) sobre las espaldas de los trabajadores; y como ninguno de los gladiadores confiaba en las masas, como ambos temían a las masas, la pelea revistió un carácter convulsivo y sanguinario. Gracias al apoyo del proletariado, terminó en victoria para la burocracia. Pero no añadió nada al peso específico del proletariado dentro de la vida política del país. (Ibíd., p. 288. El subrayado es nuestro).
Cuando Trotsky habla aquí de ‘la creación de un nueve substrato para la dominación económica de clase’ claramente explicaba es el proletariado, que domina mediante la forma de propiedad estatal. Cliff dice: “Uno de los pretendientes al papel de clase económicamente dominante”, dice él, “es la burocracia. Hay que hacer un gran énfasis en esta afirmación…”.Aquí vemos los peligros del método de trabajo basado en ideas preconcebidas y el intento de seleccionar citas para adecuarlas a estas ideas.
En este mismo capítulo, Trotsky muestra la similitud y las diferencias con la Revolución Francesa y, por qué, la reacción adoptó una forma diferente en Francia a la que tomó en Rusia:
“Los privilegios de la burocracia tienen otra fuente de procedencia. La burocracia se apropió de aquella parte de la renta nacional que pudo asegurarse por el ejercicio de la fuerza o en virtud de su autoridad, o bien por su intervención directa en las relaciones económicas. En cuanto a la producción nacional sobrante, la burocracia y la pequeña burguesía pronto pasaron de la alianza a la enemistad. El dominio del producto sobrante abrió a la burocracia la ruta del poder” (Ibíd., p. 40).
El tema para Trotsky está suficientemente claro. La lucha por el producto excedente puede darse no sólo entre diferentes clases, sino también entre diferentes estratos y distintos grupos representando a la misma clase.
¿FUNCIONA LA LEY DEL VALOR DENTRO DE LA ECONOMÍA RUSA?
Toda la parte del documento de Cliff dedicada a la ‘ley del valor’ es poco sólida desde un punto de vista marxista. Del modo más complicado y de una manera peculiar él explica que la ley del valor no se aplica dentro de la economía rusa, pero sí en sus relaciones con el capitalismo mundial. Encuentra la base de la ley del valor, no en la sociedad rusa, sino en el entorno capitalista mundial. “Ahora descubrimos la importancia que tienen las relaciones internas en Rusia cuando las extraemos de la influencia de la economía mundial.
“La abstracción ha solucionado una cuestión fundamental: que la fuente de actividad de la ley del valor no se encuentra en las relaciones internas de la propia economía rusa. En otras palabras, esto nos ha llevado muy cerca de solucionar el problema de si la economía rusa está subordinada a la ley del valor mostrándonos donde no buscar su fuente (Cliff, p. 98. El subrayado es nuestro).
Según el marxismo, es en el intercambio donde la ley del valor se manifiesta. Y esto se aplica para todas las formas de sociedad. Por ejemplo, la forma en la que se extingue el comunismo primitivo es a través del intercambio y el trueque entre las diferentes comunidades primitivas. Esto llevó al desarrollo de la propiedad privada. En la sociedad esclavista, de la misma forma, los productos del esclavo se convertían en mercancías cuando éstas eran intercambiadas. A través de este proceso, apareció la ‘mercancía de las mercancías’: el dinero. De este modo fue el producto esclavizó al productor y, al final, la contradicción causada por la economía monetaria llevó a la destrucción de la vieja sociedad esclavista. Bajo el feudalismo, el intercambio de la plusvalía producida por los terratenientes y barones autosuficientes en su ‘economía natural’ se convertía en mercancías y, de hecho, fue el principio del desarrollo capitalista mediante el ascenso del capital comercial.
Por tanto, si sólo era en el intercambio entre Rusia y el mundo exterior en el que se manifestaba la ley del valor, lo que significaba es que la plusvalía rusa era intercambiada sobre la base de la ley del valor. Qué consecuencias tendría eso para la economía interna es una cuestión diferente que debería ser resuelta.
Sin embargo, a causa del pequeño grado de participación de la Unión Soviética en el mercado mundial, en comparación con la producción total de Rusia, Cliff se da cuenta, inevitablemente, de la debilidad de esta afirmación. De este modo, asombrosamente, Cliff encuentra le ley del valor manifestándose no en elintercambio sino en la competencia. Incluso esto no sería tan malo si explicara que esta competencia en el mercado mundial se daba en las líneas capitalistas clásicas para los mercados. Pero no puede defender esto porque discreparía con los hechos. Así que introduce un nuevo concepto. ¡Encuentra su ‘competencia’ y su ‘ley del valor’ en la producción de armamentos!
La presión del capitalismo mundial obliga a Rusia a dedicar una gran proporción de los ingresos nacionales a la producción de armamentos y defensa. Cliff encuentra aquí su ley del valor. ¡La ley del valor se manifiesta en la competencia armamentística entre dos sistemas sociales! Esto sólo se puede describir como una concesión a la teoría de Shachtman del colectivismo burocrático. Si esta teoría es correcta, se aplicaría entonces la teoría de la existencia de una economía totalmente nueva, nunca antes vista en la historia ni prevista por el marxismo.
Aquí de nuevo tenemos que hacer una advertencia acerca del uso indiscriminado de citas y la amalgama de ideas para formar una ‘tesis’. En realidad este documento no es sobre el capitalismo de Estado, sino que se trata de un híbrido uniendo el colectivismo burocrático y el capitalismo de Estado. Si esta parte del documento de Cliff significa algo en absoluto, llevaría directamente al camino del colectivismo burocrático de Shachtman.
Esta idea está en parte tomada de Hilferding2 que sostenía firmemente que la ley del valor no se aplicaba en Rusia y en la Alemania nazi, y que éstas eran formaciones sociales totalmente nuevas. También está basado en un malentendido de algunos pasajes de Imperialismo y Economía Mundial de Bujarin, donde él defendía sobre la base del ‘capitalismo de Estado’ —la unión orgánica de los trust con el capital financiero— y en la que él, junto con Lenin, brillantemente profetizaron una forma de dictadura que más tarde se vio realizada en el fascismo italiano y en el nazismo. No era la propiedad estatal de los medios de producción, sino la fusión del capital financiero con el Estado. De hecho Bujarin escogió como uno de sus ejemplos clásicos de este Estado… EEUU.
El argumento del armamentismo corresponde a una categoría mística no económica. En el mejor de los casos, incluso si lo aceptásemos como correcto, sólo explicaría por qué Rusia produce armamentos, pero no cómo o sobre qué bases económicas son producidos los armamentos. Incluso si Rusia fuera un Estado obrero sano, dentro de un cerco imperialista, existiría la absoluta necesidad de producir armamentos y competir en la producción y técnica de armas con los sistemas capitalistas rivales. Pero este argumento sobre los armamentos está completamente equivocado. La mayor parte de la producción en Rusia no es armamentística sino de medios de producción. De nuevo esto podría explicar porque la burocracia está intentando acumular medios de producción a una velocidad frenética, pero no explica nada del sistema económico de la propia producción. Es verdad que probablemente en un Estado obrero sano la acumulación de armas por razones sociales sería más pequeña (política internacionalista y revolucionaria hacia los obreros en otros territorios), pero no obstante esto tendría lugar bajo la presión del imperialismo mundial.
Un ritmo más rápido o más lento en el desarrollo de los medios de producción no necesariamente nos dice el método por el que éstos son producidos. Cliff dice que la burocracia está desarrollando los medios de producción debido a la presión del imperialismo mundial. Bien. Sin embargo, todo esto de nuevo lo único que nos dice es por qué el ritmo es más rápido. Desde el punto de vista incluso de la economía política burguesa clásica, el argumento de Cliff es pura evasiva. Simplemente plantea lo que debe ser demostrado.
No es casualidad que Trotsky señalara en La revolución traicionada que todo el contenido progresista de la actividad de la burocracia estalinista y su preocupación, fuera el aumento de la productividad del trabajo y la defensa del país.
Hemos visto que si la ley del valor sólo se aplica debido a la existencia del capitalismo en la economía mundial,entonces sólo se aplicaría a aquellos productos intercambiados en el mercado mundial. Pero Cliff sostiene dos tesis contradictorias con relación a la economía rusa. Por otro lado dice:
“Esto no significa que el sistema de precios en Rusia es arbitrario, dependiente del capricho de la burocracia. La base del precio también aquí son los costes de producción. Si el precio tiene que se utilizado coma una correa de transmisión a través de la cual la burocracia dirige la producción en general, debería acomodarse a su propósito y reflejar tanto como sea posible el coste real, es decir, el trabajo socialmente necesario absorbido en los diferentes productos” (Cliff, p. 94, el subrayado es nuestro).
Dos páginas mas allá Cliff describe como el punto central e intenta demostrar:
“…en las relaciones económicas dentro de la propia Rusia, no se puede encontrar la autonomía de la actividad económica, la fuente de la ley del valor, actuando” (Cliff. p. 96. El subrayado en el original).
En la primera cita, Cliff muestra precisamente el camino en el que la ley del valor se manifiesta internamente en la sociedad rusa. Aunque se abstraiga del mercado mundial, dejando a un lado el efecto recíproco que indudablemente tiene, cuando Cliff dice que ‘el coste real, es decir, el trabajo socialmente necesario absorbido en los diferentes productos’ debe reflejar los precios reales, está diciendo que la misma ley se aplica tanto en la sociedad rusa como en la capitalista. La diferencia es que mientras en la sociedad capitalista se manifiesta a ciegas por las leyes del mercado, en Rusia la actividad consciente juega un papel importante. A este respecto, la segunda cita rechaza abrumadoramente el argumento de Ciiff de que en el capitalismo que existe en Rusia bajo estas condiciones la ley del valor no opera a ciegas, sino que lo hace conscientemente. En la sociedad capitalista, la ley del valor, como él dice, se manifiesta a través de la ‘autonomía de la actividad económica’, por ejemplo, es el mercado el que domina. La primera cita demuestra claramente que el mercado —y este es el punto central— está dentro de unos límites dados determinados y controlados conscientemente y, por tanto, no es capitalismo como lo entienden los marxistas.
Cliff dijo antes que la ley del valor no funcionaba en Rusia. Aquí precisamente está demostrando cómo funciona: no en las líneas del capitalismo clásico, sino en las de una sociedad transicional entre el capitalismo y el socialismo.
Vemos por tanto que Cliff pretende que Rusia es una sociedad capitalista y encuentra la fuente de la ley básica de la producción de capitalista fuera de Rusia. Ahora, en cualquier sociedad capitalista en la que el fondo de reserva está en manos de la clase capitalista, como Engels explicó:
“…si ese fondo de producción y reserva existe efectivamente en manos de los capitalistas, si efectivamente ha surgido por la acumulación de beneficios (prescindiendo aquí por el momento de la renta de la tierra), entonces consiste necesariamente en la acumulación del excedente del producto del trabajo, suministrado por la clase obrera a la clase de los capitalistas, sobre la suma de salarios pagada por la clase de los capitalistas a la clase trabajadora. Pero en este caso, el valor no se determina por el salario, sino por la cantidad de trabajo; la clase trabajadora suministra, pues, a la clase capitalista, en el producto del trabajo, una cantidad de valor mayor que la que recibe como paga en el salario, y entonces el beneficio del capital se explica, como todas las demás formas de apropiación de producto del trabajo ajeno y no pagado, como mero elemento de esta plusvalía descubierta por Marx” (Federico Engels, Anti-Dühring. Madrid, Editorial Crítica, 1978, p. 201).
Esto indica que donde existe trabajo asalariado, donde hay acumulación de capital, la ley del valor debe aplicarse, no importa lo complicada que sea la forma en que pueda manifestarse. Además Engels explica en respuesta a las cinco clases de valor de Dühring3 y los ‘costes naturales de producción”, que en El Capital Marx se ocupa del valor de las mercancías y en ‘toda la sección de El Capital que trata del valor no hay ni la más leve indicación de hasta que punto Marx considera la teoría del valor de las mercancías aplicable a otras formas de sociedad’. En este sentido está claro que en la sociedad transicional también: ‘El propio valor no es más que la expresión del trabajo socialmente necesario materializado en un objeto’. Aquí sólo es necesario preguntar: ¿Qué determina el valor de las máquinas, bienes de consumo, etc., producidos en Rusia? ¿Es arbitrario? ¿Qué determina los cálculos de la burocracia? ¿Qué es lo que ellos miden con el precio? ¿Qué determina los salarios? ¿Son pagos salariales por la fuerza de trabajo? ¿Qué determina el ‘dinero’? ¿Qué determina los beneficios de las empresas? ¿Existe el capital? ¿Está abolida la división del trabajo?
A estas preguntas Cliff da dos respuestas contradictorias. Por un lado acepta que la ley del valor es sobre la que se desarrollan todos los cálculos y el movimiento de la sociedad rusa. Pero por el otro, él encuentra que la ley del valor sólo se aplica como resultado de la presión del mundo exterior, si bien no explica de una manera seria como ocurre esto.
EL PAPEL DEL DINERO EN RUSIA
Lo sorprendente es que el propio Cliff señala que la burocracia no puede determinar arbitrariamente los precios. Tampoco puede determinar la cantidad de dinero en circulación de manera arbitraria. Y esto ha sido así en toda sociedad donde el dinero (recordemos, la mercancía de las mercancías) ha jugado un papel. Engels trató este problema, preguntando oportunamente a Dühring:
“Si el puñal [no importa quien lo maneje, burócrata, capitalista o gobierno. TG] tiene esa virtud económica mágica que le atribuye el señor Dühring, ¿por qué no ha conseguido a la larga ningún gobierno infundir a un dinero malo el ‘valor de distribución’ del dinero bueno o a los assignants el del oro?” (Ibíd., p. 197).
En La revolución traicionada, Trotsky explica este problema de una manera muy clara. Muestra que las categorías económicas propias del capitalismo aún permanecen en la sociedad transitoria entre el capitalismo y el comunismo, la dictadura del proletariado. Aquí está la clave: las leyes permanecen, pero son modificadas. Algunas de las leyes del capitalismo se aplican y otras son anuladas. Por ejemplo, Trotsky argumenta:
“El papel del dinero en la economía soviética, lejos de haber terminado, debe desarrollarse a fondo. La época transitoria entre el capitalismo y el socialismo, considerada en su conjunto, no exige la disminución de la circulación de mercancías, sino, por el contrario, su extremo desarrollo. Todas las ramas de la industria se transforman y crecen, se crean nuevas incesantemente, y todas deben determinar cuantitativa y cualitativamente sus situaciones recíprocas. La liquidación simultánea de la economía rural que producía para el consumo individual y el de la familia, significa la entrada en la circulación monetaria, de toda la energía de trabajo que se dispersaba antes en los límites de una granja o de las paredes de una habitación. Por primera vez en la historia,todos los productos y todos los servicios pueden cambiarse unos por otros” (León Trotsky, La revolución traicionada. Madrid, Fundación Federico Engels, 1991, p. 94, el subrayado es nuestro).
¿Cuál es la clave de este enigma? Sólo se puede encontrar en el hecho de que tenemos una sociedad transitoria. El Estado puede ahora regular, pero no arbitrariamente, sólo dentro de los límites de la ley del valor. Cualquier intento de violarla y pasar más allá de los límites estrictos impuestos por el desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas, inmediatamente termina en la reafirmación de la dominación de la producción sobre el productor. Esto es lo que Stalin tuvo que descubrir con relación al precio y al dinero cuando la economía rusa sufrió una crisis de inflación que distorsionó y desbarató complemente el plan. La ley del valor no es eliminada, sino que es modificada. Esto es lo que Trotsky quería decir cuando escribió:
“La nacionalización de los medios de producción, del crédito, la presión de las cooperativas y del Estado sobre el comercio interior, el monopolio del comercio exterior, la colectivización de la agricultura, la legislación sobre la herencia, imponen estrechos límites a la acumulación personal de dinero y dificultan la transformación del dinero en capital privado (usuario, comercial e industrial). Sin embargo, esta función del dinero, unida a la explotación no podrá ser liquidada al comienzo de la revolución proletaria, sino que será transferida, bajo un nuevo aspecto, al Estado comerciante, banquero e industrial universal. Por lo demás, las funciones más elementales del dinero,medida de valor, medio de circulación y de pago, se conservarán y adquirirán, al mismo tiempo, un campo de acción más amplio que el que tuvieron en el régimen capitalista” (Ibíd. p. 94, el subrayado en el original).
Sólo hay que plantear el problema en este sentido para ver que cualquier análisis económico debe conducir a la conclusión de que tenemos una sociedad transicional, en la cual se aplican algunas leyes propias al capitalismo y otras propias al socialismo. Después de todo este es el significado de transición.
Aunque Cliff no reconoce esto, en realidad lo admite, cuando dice que la burocracia conscientemente regula (aunque dentro de unos límites) la tasa de inversión, las proporciones entre los medios de producción y los medios de consumo, el precio de los artículos de consumo, etc., está demostrando que determinadas leyes básicas del capitalismo no se aplican.
¿En Rusia existe transformación de dinero en capital? Polemizando con Stalin, Trotsky responde lo siguiente para demostrar que las inversiones se hacen sobre la base de un plan, pero sin embargo, lo que se invierte es el valor de la plusvalía producida por los trabajadores. Trotsky demuestra la falacia básica de la idea de Stalin de que el Estado podría decidir y regular sin relación a la economía. Deberíamos añadir que Stalin nunca negó que existiera producción de mercancías en Rusia.
A pesar del hecho de que sólo hay un ‘patrón’ en Rusia, no obstante, el Estado compra fuerza de trabajo. Es verdad que debido al pleno empleo, que normalmente colocaría al vendedor de la mercancía fuerza de trabajo en una posición fuerte, el Estado ha impuesto algunas restricciones a la venta libre de fuerza de trabajo, como en el período de pleno empleo bajo el fascismo. O incluso en Gran Bretaña, donde existe la misma situación, mediante regulaciones y estratagemas los patronos hacen que el Estado intervenga para compensar las ventajas que resultarán de esta situación para 1a venta de fuerza de trabajo. Pero sólo aquel que argumenta con abstracciones podría afirmar que la fuerza de trabajo está anulada.
Es verdad que en la economía capitalista clásica existía venta libre de fuerza de trabajo. No obstante, en El CapitalMarx dedicó toda una parte a demostrar las feroces leyes que se introdujeron contra el naciente proletariado después de que la Peste Negra en Inglaterra mermara tanto la población que el proletariado se encontró en una posición favorable para pedir salarios más altos. ¿Esto significaba que las leyes básicas del marxismo no se aplicaban? Al contrario, Marx estaba tratando con un capitalismo ‘puro’, del que sacó las leyes fundamentales. La distorsión de este u otro elemento no modificará las leyes fundamentales. Por eso la Alemania nazi, a pesar de las muchas perversiones, seguía siendo fundamentalmente un sistema de economía capitalista, porque la economía estaba dominada por la producción sobre la base de la propiedad privada.
Sólo hay que comparar al trabajador esclavo de Siberia con el proletariado de las ciudades rusas para ver la diferencia. Uno es un esclavo basado en el trabajo esclavo, el otro es un esclavo asalariado. Uno vende su fuerza de trabajo, el otro es sólo un instrumento del propio trabajo. Hay está la distinción fundamental.
No es en absoluto accidental que el ‘dinero’ usado por el Estado deba necesariamente tener las mismas bases que el dinero en la sociedad capitalista. No es casualidad, como explicó Trotsky, que el único dinero real en Rusia (o en cualquier economía en transición, incluso en un Estado obrero ideal), deba estar basado en el oro. La reciente devaluación del rublo en Rusia fue en sí misma una notoria confirmación del hecho de que la ley de la circulación del dinero, y así de la circulación de las mercancías, mantenga su validez en Rusia. En una economía en transición las categorías económicas de dinero, valor, plusvalía, etc., deben necesariamente continuar como elementos de la vieja sociedad dentro de la nueva.
Cliff argumenta que ‘la fuente más importante de ingresos estatales es el impuesto sobre el volumen de negocios, que es un impuesto indirecto’. Presenta material interesante demostrando las tremendas cargas que el impuesto sobre el volumen de negocios impone a las masas.
Sin embargo, el impuesto sobre el volumen de negocios al que se refiere en conexión con la explotación de las masas, en una manera indirecta, demuestra que la ley del valor se aplica en la sociedad rusa. Cliff muestra como el impuesto sobre el volumen de negocios se aplica en Rusia. Pero no comprende que este impuesto debe estarbasado en algo. No importa cuanto el Estado pueda añadir al precio introduciendo un impuesto adicional, el precio debe estar basado en algo: ¿Que otra cosa puede ser sino el valor del producto, el trabajo socialmente necesario contenido en él?
Engels ridiculizó el impuesto de Dühring, fuera del cual la plusvalía es desarrollada, cuando él dice:
“… o bien los supuestos gravámenes y tributos representan una suma de valor real, a saber, una suma producida por la clase trabajadora y productora de valor, pero que se apropia la clase de los monopolistas; esa suma de valor consta entonces de trabajo no pagado; en este caso, a pesar del hombre con el puñal en la mano, a pesar de los supuestos tributos y del supuesto valor de distribución, nos encontramos con la teoría marxiana de la plusvalía” (Ibíd., p. 196).
El impuesto sobre el volumen de negocios en Rusia y las demás manipulaciones de la burocracia, de ninguna manera invalidan la ley del valor. ¿Cuál es la esencia de la ley del valor? El valor del producto está determinado por la cantidad media de tiempo de trabajo socialmente necesario. Ese debe ser el punto de partida. Estonecesariamente se manifiesta a través del intercambio. Marx dedicó una gran parte de su primer volumen de El Capital a explicar el desarrollo histórico de la clase de mercancía, desde el cambio casual entre salvajes mediante sus transiciones, hasta llegar a la producción de mercancías por excelencia, la producción capitalista.
Incluso en una economía capitalista clásica, la ley del valor no se revela directamente. Como ya es sabido, las mercancías se venden por encima o por debajo de su valor. Sólo involuntariamente la mercancía se venderá por su valor real. En el tercer volumen de El Capital, Marx explica el precio de producción de las mercancías. Es decir, el capitalista sólo consigue el coste de producción de sus mercancías más la tasa media de beneficio. De este modo, algunos capitalistas cobrarán por debajo de la tasa real y otros por encima. Debido a la diferente composición orgánica de los distintos capitales, la ley del valor sólo se manifiesta de esta complicada manera. Esto se efectúa, desde luego, a través de la competencia. El monopolio es sólo una evolución más complicada de la ley del valor en la sociedad. Debido a la posición dominante conseguida por algunos monopolios, no sólo pueden obtener un precio por encima del valor de las mercancías, sino que también pueden vender otras mercancías por debajo de su valor. Pero los valores totales producidos por la sociedad seguirían aún siendo los mismos.
¿HABÍA PLUSVALÍA ANTES DE 1928? LA DIVISIÓN ARBITRARIA DE CLIFF
A este respecto, Cliff no es del todo coherente. Shachtman, en su intento de negar que Rusia es una sociedad en transición donde las leyes capitalistas continúan funcionando, además de las leyes de la futura sociedad, al menos lo argumenta consistentemente. Dice que la ley del valor no funciona y, por tanto, tampoco lo hacen todas las leyes que emanan de ella. No es plusvalía lo que se produce, sino producto excedente; no es fuerza de trabajo lo que venden los trabajadores, ya que ellos son esclavos, etc., Cliff, sin embargo, admite que la producción de mercancías continúa, que la fuerza de trabajo y la plusvalía permanecen. Pero una vez que estas categorías marxistas son aceptadas como válidas para la sociedad rusa, entonces evidentemente la ley del valor debe funcionar internamente, sino toda la posición se convierte en un disparate.
Toda la contradicción, una contradicción dentro de la propia sociedad y no impuesta arbitrariamente, es el concepto de la dictadura del proletariado. Si se considera el problema en abstracto, se puede comprobar que este es un fenómeno contradictorio: la abolición del capitalismo y sin embargo la continuación de las clases. El proletariado no desaparece, se eleva a la posición de clase dirigente y suprime a la clase capitalista. Pero en el transcurso de este período la clase obrera permanece. Por tanto, el producto excedente se produce en forma de plusvalía, tanto hoy como lo fue con Lenin y Trotsky.
Sólo hay que plantear el problema: ¿Qué era la plusvalía producida cuando Rusia era aún un Estado obrero,aunque con deformaciones burocráticas? ¿Cuál fue el proceso mediante el cual el producto excedente antes de 1928 misteriosamente se convertiría en plusvalía después de 1928? ¿Cuál fue este curioso e inexplicable proceso? Nos gustaría hacer la siguiente pregunta: ¿La existencia de capitalismo fuera de Rusia antes de 1928 tuvo un efecto similar sobre la economía de Rusia? Desde luego. De hecho, un efecto mayor debido a la debilidad de la economía
Más lejos aún, dejando a un lado el período de 1917 a 1923, ¿cuál fue la situación de 1923 a 1928 cuando la burocracia se estaba consolidando? Entonces existían aún más elementos capitalistas individuales en la economía del país de los que hoy existen. La presión del capitalismo mundial desde un punto de vista económico era indiscutiblemente mayor. Sólo con plantear el problema se demuestra la arbitrariedad del método.
El abuso de poder, el consumo legal e ilegal de plusvalía por parte de la burocracia, necesariamente tuvo lugar incluso en las primeras etapas del control burocrático. El compañero Cliff ha construido un esquema sin cuerpo, que no guarda relación con la realidad, para hacer una distinción entre los dos períodos: el período en el que la burocracia representaba a un Estado obrero degenerado y el período en el que la burocracia se convierte en clase capitalista. ¿Cuál es la diferencia según Cliff? Por muy increíble que pueda parecer, la burocracia realmente ganó sus ingresos y sólo desde 1928 en adelante, consumía plusvalía. Cliff escribe:
“Las estadísticas que tenemos a nuestra disposición muestran concluyentemente que aunque la burocracia tuvo una posición privilegiada en el período precedente al Plan Quinquenal, bajo ningún concepto puede decirse que recibió plusvalía del trabajo de otros. Se puede decir concluyentemente, que con la introducción del Plan Quinquenal, los ingresos de la burocracia consistían en gran medida de plusvalía” (p. 45).
Esto es una variación con el análisis hecho no sólo por Trotsky sino también por otros marxistas de la época en relación a este problema. Lo primero de todo, incluso en el más ideal de los Estados obreros, es que en el período transitorio inevitablemente existirá un cierto consumo de plusvalía por los especialistas y los burócratas. De no ser así, tendríamos la introducción inmediata del comunismo,sin desigualdades o la continuación de la división entre el trabajo intelectual y el manual. Sólo hace falta hacer referencia aquí a lo que planteaba la Oposición de Izquierdas sobre este mismo problema. Al comienzo de 1927, la Oposición de Izquierdas comentó la enorme parte de la plusvalía que estaba siendo consumida por el aparato burocrático. Protestaron por que “el privilegiado e inflado aparato administrativo está devorando una parte muy considerable de la plusvalía” (ver La revolución traicionada).
Está claro que desde 1920 en adelante, la burocracia consumía una gran parte de la plusvalía, legítima e ilegítimamente. Como Marx explicó, en cualquier caso, en un Estado obrero en el período transitorio, la plusvalía será utilizada para construir rápidamente la industria y así preparar el camino para una transición, lo más rápida posible, hacia la igualdad y después completar el comunismo.
¿De qué otra cosa estaba hablando Lenin en 1920 y 1921 cuando subrayaba el paso atrás que los bolcheviques se habían visto obligados a dar, cuando pagaban a los especialistas conforme a las normas burguesas y al ‘viejo modo burgués’?
LAS ECONOMÍAS EN TRANSICIÓN DEL CAPITALISMO AL SOCIALISMO
Lo más significativo de todas las tendencias que buscan revisar la postura de Trotsky sobre la cuestión rusa, es que siempre se ocupan del problema en abstracto y nunca explican concretamente las leyes de la sociedad transitoria entre capitalismo y socialismo, y como funcionaría esta sociedad. Esto no es accidental. Un estudio concreto del problema les llevaría a la conclusión de que la economía fundamental en Rusia es la misma que bajo Lenin y no podría ser de otro modo.
El germen del modo capitalista de producción, el cual comenzó bajo el feudalismo a través del desarrollo de la producción de mercancías, reside en la función de los artesanos y comerciantes independientes. Cuando alcanza una cierta etapa tenemos relaciones capitalistas con una superestructura feudal. Ésta estalla en pedazos con la revolución y entonces las posibilidades latentes de la producción capitalistas tienen la posibilidad de liberarse de las restricciones feudales.
La esencia de la revolución (capitalista y proletaria) consiste en el hecho de que las viejas relaciones y las antiguas formas no se corresponden con el nuevo modo de producción ya maduro. Para librarse de estas restricciones, las fuerzas productivas tienen que organizarse sobre una base diferente y toda la historia humana y su movimiento, consiste en el desarrollo de este antagonismo en sus diversas etapas en diferentes sociedades.
Sin embargo, la revolución burguesa no destruye inmediatamente y de golpe el feudalismo. Aún permanecen elementos feudales poderosos, incluso al día de hoy existen aún vestigios del feudalismo en países capitalistas sumamente desarrollados.
Se puede hablar de modo de producción feudal en el sentido de la superestructura, pese a las bases capitalistas que se han desarrollado por abajo. O se puede hablar incluso de modo de producción feudal en su principio donde los gérmenes del capitalismo y la posibilidad de desarrollo del capitalismo se podrían discernir levemente.
El error fundamental de esta teoría del ‘capitalismo de Estado’ y sus abstracciones relacionadas con el período en transición, residen en el fracaso a la hora de distinguir entre el modo de producción y el modo de apropiación. En cada sociedad clasista hay explotación y plusvalía que es utilizada por la clase explotadora. Pero esto en sí mismo no nos dice nada acerca del modo de producción.
Por ejemplo, el modo de producción bajo el capitalismo es social en contradicción con la forma individual de apropiación. Como Engels explicó:
“Así se consumaba la división entre los medios de producción, concentrados en las manos de los capitalistas, y los productores reducidos a la propiedad exclusiva de su fuerza de trabajo. La contradicción entre producción social y apropiación capitalista [léase individual o privada, como Engels ya había explicado, TG] se manifiesta como contraposición entre el proletariado y la burguesía” (Engels, Anti-Dühring, p. 282).
La economía en transición que, como Lenin señaló, puede y variará enormemente en diferentes países y distintos momentos, e incluso en el mismo país en diferentes momentos, también tiene un modo social de producción, pero con apropiación estatal y no con apropiación individual como bajo el capitalismo. Esta es una forma que combina características tanto socialistas como comunistas.
Bajo el capitalismo, el sistema de producción de mercancías por excelencia, el producto domina completamente al productor. Esto proviene de la forma de apropiación, y la contradicción entre la forma de apropiación y el modo de producción: ambos factores proceden de la propiedad privada de los medios de producción. Una vez conseguida la propiedad estatal, cualquiera que fuera el sistema resultante, no puede ser capitalismo, porque esta contradicción básica habrá sido eliminada. El carácter anárquico de la producción social con la apropiación privada desaparece.
Bajo el socialismo también, existirá un modo social de producción pero también habrá un modo social de distribución. Por primera vez la producción y la distribución estarán en armonía.
Por tanto, simplemente con señalar las características capitalistas en Rusia hoy, (trabajo asalariado, producción de mercancías, consumo de una gran parte de la plusvalía por la burocracia), no es suficiente para decirnos la naturaleza del sistema social. Aquí también es necesaria una visión global. Sólo se pueden entender las relaciones sociales en la Unión Soviética tomando la totalidad de las relaciones. Desde el mismo inicio de la revolución varias escuelas sectarias han elaborado las ideas más insostenibles como resultado de su fracaso al hacer un análisis.
“¿Pero qué significa la palabra ‘transición’?. ¿Significa, aplicada a la economía, que el orden actual contiene elementos, partículas, pedazos tanto del capitalismo como del socialismo? Todos admitirán que es así. Pero no todos los que admiten esto tienen la preocupación de examinar la naturaleza exacta de los elementos que constituyen las distintas formas socioeconómicas que existen en Rusia actualmente. Y aquí está el meollo de la cuestión” (Lenin, Left wing childshness and the petty-bourgeois mentality. Obras Completas, Volumen 27, p. 335, en el original en inglés).
Abstraer una parte conduce al error. Lo que da vueltas sobre el fenómeno ruso es precisamente el carácter contradictorio de la economía. Esto además se ha agravado por el atraso y aislamiento de la Unión Soviética. Esto culmina en el régimen totalitario estalinista y las peores características del capitalismo quedan en evidencia—las relaciones entre directores y hombres, trabajo a destajo, etc.—. En lugar de analizar estas contradicciones, el compañero Cliff se esfuerza todo lo posible por tratar de encajarlas en el patrón de las leyes ‘normales de producción capitalista’.
Además la tendencia baja el capitalismo para las fuerzas productivas, no sólo es su centralización sino incluso llevar adelante medidas de estatalización, y esto puede llevar a una conclusión equivocada. Para probar que ‘el capitalismo de Estado’ en Rusia es en última instancia el mismo capitalismo individual y con las mismas leyes, Cliff cita el siguiente pasaje de Anti-Dühring:
“Cuantas más fuerzas productivas asume [el Estado], tanto más se hace capitalista total y tantos más ciudadanos explota. Los obreros siguen siendo asalariados, proletarios. No se supera la relación capitalista, sino que, más bien, se exacerba. Pero en el ápice se produce la mutación. La propiedad estatal de las fuerzas productivas no es la solución del conflicto, pero lleva ya en sí el medio formal, el mecanismo de la solución” (Ibíd., p. 289).
En realidad, Engels está diciendo precisamente lo contrario. Reexaminemos los pasajes y veamos cómo extraemos diferentes conclusiones:
“Si las crisis descubren la incapacidad de la burguesía para seguir administrando las modernas fuerzas productivas, la transformación de las grandes organizaciones de la producción y el tráfico en sociedades anónimas y en propiedad del Estado muestra que la burguesía no es ya imprescindible para la realización de, aquella tarea. Todas las funciones sociales de los capitalistas son ya desempeñadas por empleados a sueldo. El capitalista no tiene ya más actividad social que percibir beneficios, cortar cupones y jugar a la bolsa, en la cual los diversos capitalistas se arrebatan los unos a los otros sus capitales. Si el modo de producción capitalista ha desplazado primero a trabajadores, ahora está haciendo lo mismo con los capitalistas, lanzando a éstos, como antes a muchos trabajadores, a engrosar la población superflua, aunque no, por el momento, el ejército industrial de reserva.
“Pero ni la transformación en sociedades anónimas ni la transformación en propiedad del Estado suprimen la propiedad del capital sobre las fuerzas productivas. En el caso de las sociedades anónimas, la cosa es obvia. Y el Estado moderno; por su parte, no es más que la organización que se da la sociedad burguesa para sostener las condiciones generales externas del modo de producción capitalista contra ataques de los trabajadores o de los capitalistas individuales. El Estado moderno, cualquiera que sea su forma, es una máquina esencialmente capitalista, un Estado de los capitalistas: el capitalista total ideal. Cuantas más fuerzas productivas asume en propio, tanto más se hace capitalista total, y tantos más ciudadanos explota. Los obreros siguen siendo asalariados, proletarios. No se supera la relación capitalista, sino que, más bien se exacerba. Pero en el ápice se produce la mutación. La propiedad estatal de las fuerzas productivas no es la solución al conflicto, pero lleva ya en sí el medio formal, el mecanismo de la solución” (Ibíd., pp. 289-290, el subrayado es nuestro).
La idea antes mencionada está clara. En la medida que las fuerzas productivas se han desarrollado ahora más allá del marco de las relaciones capitalistas (es decir, el germen de la contradicción que ha crecido hasta convertirse en una enfermedad maligna del sistema social, reflejándose a través de las crisis), los capitalistas están obligados a ‘socializar’ grandes medios de producción, primero a través de sociedades anónimas y más tarde, incluso ‘estatalizar’ sectores de las fuerzas productivas. Esta idea particular fue expresada claramente por Lenin en El imperialismo fase superior del capitalismo, donde demostraba que el desarrollo de los monopolios y la socialización del trabajo eran de hecho elementos del nuevo sistema social dentro del viejo.
Una vez que las fuerzas productivas han alcanzado esta etapa, el capitalismo ya ha realizado su misión histórica y debido a esto la burguesía se hace más y más innecesaria. De ser una necesidad para el desarrollo de las fuerzas de producción, ahora es ‘innecesaria’ y ‘parasitaria’. Se transforman en parásitos de la misma manera y por la misma razón que los señores feudales se convirtieron también en ‘parásitos’ una vez completada su misión.
Esto es simplemente un indicio de la madurez del capitalismo para la revolución social. Marx en El Capital demostró que el crédito y las sociedades anónimas eran ya una señal de que las fuerzas productivas habían rebasado los límites de la propiedad privada. Engels había demostrado que las fuerzas productivas sociales obligan a los capitalistas a reconocer su carácter como fuerzas productivas sociales y no sólo individuales.
Donde quiera que sea, el Estado capitalista está obligado a tomar posesión de uno u otro sector de la economía, pero las fuerzas productivas no pierden su carácter como capital. Lo esencial del problema es que donde tenemos estatalización completa, es decir cambios cuantitativos en cualitativos, el capitalismo cambia en su contrario.
Engels lo explica de otra manera: ‘Pero en el ápice se produce la mutación (de las relaciones capitalistas)’. ¿Si la propiedad estatal de las fuerzas productivas no es la solución al conflicto, contiene en sí los medios formales y la clave para la solución?
Si se tiene en cuenta el hecho de que a esto sigue el pasaje citado previamente en la misma sección, en el que Engels define el modo capitalista de producción (como producción social, apropiación individual), si aceptásemos las conclusiones de Cliff deberíamos concluir que Engels se contradice a sí mismo. Pero en su contexto, lo que Engels quiere decir está claro. Explica que la solución a las contradicciones del capitalismo reside en el reconocimiento de la naturaleza social de las fuerzas productivas modernas: ‘por tanto, el modo de producción, apropiación e intercambio de acuerdo con el carácter social de los medios de producción’. Pero él demuestra que este ‘reconocimiento’ precisamente consiste en hacer valer la planificación y organización conscientes, en lugar de toques ciegos de las fuerzas del mercado sobre las bases de la propiedad individual. Sin embargo, esto no se puede hacer de golpe. El control social se puede hacer sólo ‘de manera gradual’. La forma transitoria hacia esto es la propiedad estatal. Pero una vez conseguida la propiedad estatal no se eliminan todas las características del capitalismo, si no sería propiedad social, es decir, se introduciría inmediatamente el socialismo.
De la misma forma que en el desarrollo de la sociedad tenemos el nuevo dentro del viejo sistema, en la sociedad en transición tenemos aún lo viejo dentro de lo nuevo. La estatalización total marca el límite extremo del capital. La relación capitalista se transforma en su contrario. Los elementos de la nueva sociedad que estaban creciendo dentro de la vieja, ahora se hacen dominantes.
Lo que causa el conflicto dentro del capitalismo es que las leyes se manifiestan ciegamente. Pero una vez que el conjunto de la industria es nacionalizada, por primera vez el control y la planificación pueden ser ejercidos conscientemente por los productores. El control y la planificación, sin embargo, en sus primeras etapas, tendrán lugar dentro de unos límites determinados. Esos límites estarán determinados en el nuevo orden social por el nivel tecnológico existente.
La sociedad no puede pasar del reino de la necesidad al reino de la libertad de la noche a la mañana. Sólo sobre las bases de un desarrollo ilimitado de las fuerzas productivas, la libertad, en el más pleno sentido, se hará realidad. Se alcanzará la etapa en la que se establecerá la ‘administración de las cosas’. Antes de que se consiga esta etapa, la sociedad debe pasar a través del período de transición. Pero una vez abolida la propiedad privada, inmediatamente el control y la planificación se convierten en una posibilidad real y, por vez primera, también se deja atrás el reino de la necesidad. Ahora es posible hablar de ‘libertad’, pero ésta sólo en el sentido de que la necesidad es conscientemente reconocida. En esta etapa (el período de transición) Engels destacaba:
“Con eso el carácter social de los medios de producción y de los productos —que hoy se vuelve contra los productores mismos, rompe periódicamente el modo de producción y de intercambio y se impone sólo, violenta y destructivamente, como ciega ley natural— será utilizado con plena consciencia por los productores, y se transformará, de causa que es de perturbación y hundimiento periódico, en la más poderosa palanca de la producción misma.
“Las fuerzas activas en la sociedad obran exactamente igual que las fuerzas de la naturaleza —ciega, violenta, destructivamente—, mientras no las descubrimos ni contamos con ellas Pero cuando las hemos descubierto, cuando hemos comprendido su actividad, su tendencia, sus efectos, depende ya sólo de nosotros el someterlas progresivamente a nuestra voluntad y alcanzar por su medio nuestros fines. Esto vale muy especialmente en las actuales gigantescas fuerzas productivas” (Ibíd., p. 290, el subrayado es nuestro).
Engels, citando a Hegel, hizo un resumen de las relaciones entre libertad, necesidad y el período transitorio:
“La libertad es la realización de la necesidad. La ‘necesidad’ está ciega sólo en la medida en que ésta no es entendida” (Ibíd., p. 136).
Marx y Engels sólo aludieron al carácter contradictorio del período de transición. Dejaron su elaboración para las siguientes generaciones, apuntaron las leyes generales. Pero sí que demostraron la necesidad de la propiedad estatal como el Estado transitorio necesario para el desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas. Engels explicó la necesidad del Estado durante esta etapa por dos razones:
1) Tomar medidas contra la antigua clase dirigente.
2) Porque la sociedad en transición no puede garantizar inmediatamente lo necesario para todos.
La lógica de la tesis de Cliff es que en la sociedad de transición no hay vestigios de capitalismo en la economía interna. Aunque el compañero Cliff pudiera argumentar vehementemente que él está de acuerdo con la necesidad del Estado en el período de transición, es evidente que él no ha encontrado las razones económicas que hacen el Estado y el carácter que asume necesarios durante este período. Antes de que pueda ser introducido el socialismo, debe necesariamente haber un tremendo desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas, muy superior al logrado bajo el capitalismo
Como explicó Trotsky, incluso en EEUU no hay aún suficiente producción para garantizar la introducción inmediata del socialismo. Por tanto, tendrá que haber aún, un período durante el cual las leyes capitalistas funcionen de una forma moderada. Por ejemplo, en EEUU, este período sería de corta duración. Pero no sería posible saltar por completo esta etapa. ¿Cuáles son las leyes capitalistas que permanecerían? El compañero Cliff no sólo falla al responder a esto, sino que cae en la trampa del colectivismo burocrático, por que no reconoce que el dinero, la fuerza de trabajo, la existencia de la clase obrera, la plusvalía, etc., son aún vestigios del viejo sistema capitalistaque sobrevivieron incluso bajo el régimen de Lenin. Es imposible introducir inmediatamente la producción y la distribución social. Y particularmente este era el caso en la Rusia atrasada.
En una carta a Conrad Schmidt en 1890, Engels dio un magnifico ejemplo de la aproximación materialista al problema de la economía de la transición del capitalismo al comunismo:
“También en la Volks-Tribüne ha habido una discusión acerca de si la distribución de los productos en la sociedad futura se hará de acuerdo con la cantidad de trabajo o de otra manera. La cuestión ha sido enfocada desde un punto de vista muy ‘materialista’, en oposición a ciertas frases idealistas sobre la justicia. Pero, por extraño que esto parezca, a nadie se le ocurrió pensar en que el modo de distribución depende esencialmente de la cantidad de productos a distribuir, y que esta cantidad varía, naturalmente, con el progreso de la producción y de la organización social y que, por tanto, tiene que cambiar también el modo de distribución. ‘Sin embargo, para todos los que han participado’ en la discusión, la ‘sociedad socialista’ no es algo que cambia y progresa continuamente, sino algo estable, algo fijo de una vez para siempre, por lo que también debe tener un modo de distribución fijo de una vez para siempre. Razonablemente, lo único que se puede hacer es: 1) tratar de descubrir el modo de distribución que se haya de aplicar al principio, y 2) tratar de establecer la tendencia general que habrá de seguir el desarrollo ulterior. Pero acerca de esto no encuentro ni una sola palabra en toda la discusión” (Federico Engels, Carta a Conrad Schmidt, en Obras Escogidas de Marx y Engels. Moscú, Editorial Progreso, 1981, Volumen III, p. 511).
En Anti-Dühring, Engels señaló:
“La producción directamente social, igual que la distribución inmediatamente social, excluyen todo intercambio de mercancías, también, por tanto, la transformación, de los productos en mercancías (al menos, en el interior de la comunidad), y con ello, también su transformación en valores” (op. cit., p. 319, el subrayado es nuestro).
Pero sólo el socialismo puede realizar esto. En el período de transición, la distribución aún permanece de una manera indirecta —sólo gradualmente la sociedad obtiene el control total sobre el producto— y, por tanto, la producción de mercancías y el intercambio entre los diferentes sectores de la producción ocurre necesariamente. La ley del valor se aplica y debe aplicarse hasta que los productores tengan acceso directo al producto. Esto sólo puede ocurrir con el completo control de la producción y de este modo la distribución social directa, es decir, cada individuo toma aquello que necesita.
Marx se ocupó de este problema en el Volumen III de El Capital, (capítulo 49), donde trata el problema de la producción capitalista en su conjunto:
“Según esto, una parte de la ganancia y, por tanto, también de la plusvalía y, por consiguiente, también del plusproducto en que se representa (desde el punto de vista del valor) solamente el trabajo nuevamente añadida, sirve de fondo de seguro… Es también la única parte de la plusvalía y del plusproducto, esto es, del plustrabajo, que tendría que seguir existiendo tras la abolición del modo capitalista de producción, además de la parte destinada a la acumulación, esto es, la ampliación del proceso de reproducción… y el hecho de que todo capital nuevo surja de la ganancia, la renta del suelo o de otras formas da renta, es decir, del plustrabajo, conduce a la idea falsa de que todo valor de las mercancías proviene de la renta” (Carlos Marx, El Capital. Madrid, Editorial Akal, Volumen III, capítulo 49, p. 309).
En este capítulo Marx realiza un análisis del proceso de producción, en sus propias palabras, ‘el valor de la suma total del fruto del trabajo (que), está en discusión, en otras palabras, el valor de la suma total del capital social’.
Repitiendo esto en el mismo capítulo, en respuesta a Storch, un economista burgués, decía lo siguiente:
“En primer lugar, es una abstracción falsa considerar a una nación cuyo modo de producción se basa en el valor y que además está organizada capitalistamente, como un cuerpo que trabaja para las necesidades nacionales.
“En segundo lugar, tras la supresión del modo capitalista de producción, pero conservando la producción social, seguirá predominando la determinación del valor en el sentido de que serán más esenciales que nunca la regulación del tiempo de trabajo y la distribución del trabaja social entre los distintos grupos de producción y, finalmente, la contabilidad sobre todo esto” (Ibíd., p. 314)
Esto está en la línea de los comentarios dispersos hechos por Marx y Engels en varías ocasiones con relación al período de transición: donde Engels explica que bajo el capitalismo las sociedades anónimas y la propiedad estatal están fuera del marco propiamente hablando de la producción capitalista; donde Marx ya señaló que el crédito también extiende la producción más allá de su marco incluso antes de la transición a la dictadura del proletariado.Tras eso, como demuestran los pasajes de arriba y también en la Crítica del Programa de Gotha, Marx consideraba que la ley burguesa, la distribución burguesa y en ese sentido el Estado burgués aún permanecen.
Discutiendo el papel del dinero y el Estado en el período de transición, Trotsky desarrolló esta idea inclusa más allá:
“Los dos problemas, el del Estado y el del dinero, tienen diversos aspectos comunes, pues se reducen ambos, a fin de cuentas, al problema de problemas que es el rendimiento del trabajo. La imposición estatal y la imposición monetaria son una herencia de la sociedad dividida en clases, que no puede determinar las relaciones entre los hombres más que ayudándose de fetiches religiosos o laicos, a los que coloca bajo la protección del más temible de ellos, el Estado —con un gran cuchillo entre los dientes—. En la sociedad comunista, el Estado y el dinero desaparecerán y su agonía progresiva debe comenzar en el régimen soviético. No se podrá hablar de victoria real del socialismo más que a partir del momento histórico en que el Estado sólo lo sea a medias y en que el dinero comience a perder su poder mágico. Esto significará que el socialismo, liberándose de los fetiches capitalistas, comenzará a establecer relaciones más límpidas, más libres y más dignas entre los hombres.
“Los postulados de ‘abolición’ del dinero, de ‘abolición’ del salario, o de ‘eliminación’ del Estado y de la familia, característicos del anarquismo, sólo pueden presentar interés como modelos de pensamiento mecánico. El dinero no puede ser ‘abolido’ arbitrariamente, no podrían ser ‘eliminados’ el Estado y la familia; tienen que agotar antes su misión histórica, perder su significado y desaparecer. El fetichismo y el dinero sólo recibirán el golpe de gracia cuando el crecimiento ininterrumpido de la riqueza social libre a los bípedos de la avaricia por cada minuto suplementario de trabajo y del miedo humillante por la magnitud de sus raciones. Al perder su poder para proporcionar felicidad y para hundir en el polvo, el dinero se reducirá a un cómodo medio de contabilidad para la estadística y para la planificación; después, es probable que ya no sea necesario ni aun para esto. Pero estos cuidados debemos dejarlos a nuestros biznietos, que seguramente serán más inteligentes que nosotros.
“La nacionalización de los medios de producción, del crédito, la presión de las cooperativas y del Estado sobre el comercio interior, el monopolio del comercio exterior, la colectivización de la agricultura, la legislación sobre la herencia, imponen estrechos límites a la acumulación personal de dinero y dificultan la transformación del dinero en capital privado (usuario, comercial e industrial). Sin embargo, esta función del dinero, unida a la explotación no podrá ser liquidada al comienzo de la revolución proletaria, sino que será transferida, bajo un nuevo aspecto, al Estado comerciante, banquero e industrial universal. Por lo demás, las funciones más elementales del dinero,medida de valor, medio de circulación y de pago, se conservarán y adquirirán, al mismo tiempo, un campo de acción más amplio que el que tuvieron en el régimen capitalista” (Trotsky, La revolución traicionada, pp. 93-94).
En resumen. Antes de que la propiedad privada de los medios de producción sea abolida, el mercado es dominante sobre el hombre que está indefenso ante las leyes de la economía que él mismo ha creado. Tras su abolición, el hombre comienza por primera vez a tomar el control consciente. Pero la conciencia aquí sólo significaelreconocimiento de la ley, no la abolición de la ley. Esta es una peculiaridad del período de transición, porque el hombre ahora entiende la naturaleza de las fuerzas productivas, hasta el punto de ejercer el control sobre ellas, pero no puede transcender a los límites del desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas. Sin embargo, ahora que las fuerzas productivas han sido liberadas de las trabas de la producción capitalista individual, pueden ser desarrolladas a un ritmo y con tal expansión que muy rápidamente pueden ser transformadas, de la propiedad estatal como forma intermedia, a la propiedad social por parte de la sociedad. Una vez ha sido lograda esta etapa (socialismo), entonces hay producción y distribución real por primera vez. El dinero se difumina, la ley del valor se desvanece, el Estado se diluye. En otras palabras, todas las fuerzas restrictivas que eran un reflejo necesario de los límites de la técnica y el desarrollo de la producción en una etapa determinada, ahora desaparecen con la desaparición de la división del trabajo. Hasta que llegue ese momento, todas las características señaladas arriba, características capitalistas heredadas de la vieja sociedad capitalista, persisten durante el período de transición.
La postura del compañero Cliff en relación al período de transición es de desconcierto, al igual que la de Shachtman y todos los demás que han intentado revisar la postura de Trotsky sobre Rusia. Y por muy buenas razones. Si se considera la teoría del período de transición a la luz de la experiencia rusa, sólo hay una de dos conclusiones posibles: o Rusia hoy es aún un Estado en transición, que ha sufrido horribles distorsiones, o Rusia fue un Estado obrero desde su inicio. No hay más alternativas.
LA TEORÍA MARXISTA DEL ESTADO. DOS CLASES, UN ESTADO. LA CONTRADICCIÓN DE CLIFF
En el primer capítulo de su trabajo, el compañero Cliff se esfuerza por demostrar que el análisis de Trotsky sobre el Estado ruso contradice la teoría del Estado desarrollada por Marx y elaborada por Lenin.
El primer capítulo contiene un esquema elaborado para demostrar que dos clases no pueden usar una misma maquinaria estatal. Cliff cree que ha encontrado un error fundamental en Trotsky, tomando las ideas desarrolladas por el Viejo en diferentes momentos y en distintas circunstancias, las contrapone entre sí. Toma, por ejemplo, una cita de Trotsky de las primeras etapas de la degeneración de la burocracia y la expulsión de la Oposición de Izquierdas, cuando él defendía la reforma del Estado soviético y, a propósito, también por la reforma del Partido Bolchevique que controlaba el Estado. (Fue en esta etapa cuando Trotsky escribió la Carta al CC del PCUS exigiendo que Stalin fuese destituido). Quién podía negar que los acontecimientos internacionales se desarrollaran de una manera diferente a la esperada. ¿Era posible, teóricamente, que el Partido Bolchevique expulsara a la burocracia y restableciera un Estado obrero sano? Cliff contrapone a esto la cita de La revolución traicionada en la que Trotsky dice que si los trabajadores de Rusia llegasen al poder, purgarían el aparato estatal, y si la burguesía llegara al poder ‘una purga del aparato del Estado sería, desde luego, también necesaria en este caso. Pero una restauración burguesa probablemente tendría que limpiar menos gente que un partido revolucionario’. Cliff responde a esto:
“Si aceptamos que el proletariado debe hacer pedazos la máquina del Estado que existe al llegar al poder, mientras que la burguesía sí puede usarlo, o si aceptamos que ni el proletariado, ni la burguesía pueden usar el aparato estatal existente (la ‘purga del aparato del Estado necesariamente implica un profundo cambio que transformaría la cantidad en calidad’), ante ambas suposiciones debemos llegar a la conclusión de que Rusia no es un Estado obrero. Aceptar que el proletariado y la burguesía pueden usar la misma maquinaria estatal como instrumento de supremacía es equivalente a justificar la base teórica de la democracia y a repudiar el concepto revolucionario de Estado expresado por Marx, Engels, Lenin y Trotsky. Aceptar que las diferentes capas, grupos o partidos de una e igual clase no pueden basarse en la misma maquinaria estatal es igual a rechazar el concepto marxista del Estado” (Cliff, p. 4).
Todo este método formalista es la causa de la debilidad de Cliff. Habría sido posible para Trotsky en las primeras etapas tratar el problema en abstracto. Pero tuvo que ocuparse de la situación en concreto y dar una respuesta concreta. Una vez aceptada la imposibilidad de reformar el partido estalinista, la imposibilidad de reformar el Estado soviético (suponemos que Cliff también cree que ésta era la tarea hasta 1928 al decir que Rusia era un Estado obrero degenerado), entonces toda la cuestión debe ser examinada desde una óptica diferente. Es ajeno al método marxista buscar contradicciones aisladas, reales o aparentes. Lo que hace falta es un examen de una teoría en su desarrollo general amplio, en su movimiento y sus contradicciones.
Pero examinemos el propio proceso de pensamiento de Cliff sobre esta materia. Él tampoco puede evitar caer en la trampa que intenta poner a Trotsky. Capítulo 1 (nada menos que 18 páginas), dedicado a demostrar la imposibilidad de que dos clases utilicen el único Estado. Pero, he aquí, que contemplamos el capítulo 4 y ¡se produce el milagro!, ¡el abismo insalvable es cruzado! Tanto la clase capitalista como el proletariado de Rusia han utilizado precisamente la misma maquina del Estado. ¿Por qué? ¡Por qué se producía más plusvalía! Dándose cuenta de este dilema, Cliff se ve obligado a avanzar en un camino realmente nuevo y único: la burocracia no consumía plusvalía antes de 1928, pero con la introducción del Plan Quinquenal, el Estado fue cambiando de un Estado obrero a un Estado capitalista. Cualquier enemigo de la Cuarta Internacional inmediatamente podría contestar que el Estado de Stalin, sobre estas bases, es simplemente una extensión y profundización del Estado de Lenin. Pero en el sentido económico nada ha cambiado básicamente. Hemos tratado esto en los capítulos precedentes. Resulta significativo que sólo sea en el aspecto económico —y esto es lo sorprendente— donde Cliff plantee en su teoría. A pesar del título de su primer capítulo: ‘Un examen de la definición de Rusia como un Estado obrero degenerado’, no se ocupa de la cuestión política, ni aquí, ni en ningún otro capítulo. Así es como Cliff ve la transformación de un Estado obrero en un Estado capitalista:
“Las estadísticas que tenemos a nuestra disposición muestran concluyentemente que aunque la burocracia tuvo una posición privilegiada en el período precedente al Plan Quinquenal, bajo ningún concepto se puede decir que haya recibido plusvalía del trabajo de otros. Puede decirse, incuestionablemente, que con la introducción de los planes quinquenales, los ingresos de la burocracia consistían en una gran cantidad de plusvalía” (Ibíd., p. 45).
En otras palabras, Cliff ve la transición de un sistema a otro no haciendo pedazos la maquinaria del Estado. ¿Cómo cuadra esto con su esquema del capítulo 1?
Cliff intenta fabricar un puente artificial entre el Estado obrero y el Estado capitalista, porque él no ha sido capaz de encontrar el golpe asestado a la maquinaria del Estado obrero, esto le lleva a buscar diferencias entre los dos períodos —antes de 1928 y después—. Al hacer esto, cae en concepciones formalistas y abstractas sobre el Estado obrero anterior a 1928. Como hemos demostrado en capítulos anteriores, incluso en el Estado obrero mas sano, según Marx, debe necesariamente producirse plusvalía para desarrollar la industria hasta el punto donde el Estado, el dinero, el propio proletariado y todos los demás vestigios del capitalismo hayan desaparecido. Mientras la clase obrera exista como clase, se producirá plusvalía.
Una declaración de la Oposición de Izquierdas de 1927 señalaba que la burocracia estaba consumiendo una gran parte de la plusvalía. El método que utiliza Cliff para introducir este tema es totalmente incorrecto. En lugar de dedicarse a la tarea de demostrar su tesis, hace afirmaciones ciegas y las presenta como ya demostradas. ¡Qué en el capítulo 4 contradice todo lo que ha dicho en el capítulo l. eso es otra cuestión! Examinemos la forma en la cual el compañero Cliff resume este capítulo 4, donde clama abiertamente que se ha conseguido una transición, sin una revolución y sin destruir la maquinaria estatal.
Comienza así:
“En este capítulo describiremos la transformación del carácter de clase del Estado ruso, de un Estado obrero a un Estado capitalista. Haremos esto ocupándonos de los siguientes puntos…” (Ibíd., p. 33).
Después pasa a detallar algunos cambios económicos que no tienen nada que ver con la estructura o transformación del poder estatal y termina con el apartado: ‘Por qué el Plan Quinquenal significa la transformación de la burocracia en clase dirigente’. Todos los argumentos económicos en este capítulo no tienen nada que ver con el Estado o su derrocamiento.
Cliff trata finalmente la diferenciación en el ejército, la introducción de privilegios para los oficiales, disciplina militar, etc., Aquí simplemente repite que Trotsky habló miles de veces sobre la transformación de la burocracia en una casta incontrolada. Pero veamos sus conclusiones:
“De nuevo el Plan Quinquenal marca el punto decisivo. Entonces la organización y la estructura del ejército comenzaron a cambiar de manera fundamental. De un ejército de trabajadores, con deformaciones burocráticas, se ha convertido en el cuerpo armado de la burocracia como clase dirigente… (Ibíd. p. 59).
Veamos ahora si lo que excluye una revolución social gradual descarta también una contrarrevolución gradual:
“Si los soldados de un ejército construido jerárquicamente se esfuerzan por conseguir el control decisivo sobre el ejército, ellos inmediatamente se encontrarán con la oposición de la casta de oficiales. No hay forma de destituir tal casta excepto por la violencia revolucionaria. En contra de esto, si los oficiales de una milicia del pueblo cada vez son menos y menos dependientes de la voluntad de los soldados, podrían convertirse en una burocracia institucional, su transformación en casta independiente de los soldados se puede realizar paulatinamente. La transición de un ejército permanente a una milicia no se puede conseguir sino va acompañada por una tremenda oleada de violencia revolucionaria; por otro lado, la transición de una milicia a un ejército permanente, como resultado de las tendencias dentro de la propia milicia, puede y debe ser paulatina. La oposición de los soldados al ascenso de la burocracia llevaría por último al uso de la violencia contra los soldados. Pero esto no excluye la posibilidad de una transición gradual de una milicia a un ejército permanente. Lo que se aplica al ejército, se aplica igualmente al Estado. Un Estado sin burocracia o sin una burocracia débil dependiente de la presión de las masas, gradualmente se transformará en un Estado en el cual la burocracia está libre del control de los trabajadores” (Ibíd., p. 82, el subrayado es nuestro).
Cliff se propone demostrar que se puede dar una transición paulatina de un Estado obrero a un Estado capitalista, y cierra su capítulo reproduciendo una cita de, nada más y nada menos, Trotsky, al que ha desacreditado tan severamente en su primer capítulo como si fuera una autoridad en esta materia. Cliff escribe lo siguiente:
“Los juicios de Moscú4 fueron la guerra civil de la burocracia contra las masas, una guerra en la cual sólo una parte estaba armada y organizada. Ellos presenciaron la consumación de la liberación total de la burocracia del control popular. Trotsky, que pensaba que los juicios de Moscú y la Constitución eran pasos hacia la restauración del capitalismo individual por medios legales, se retractó en ese momento de la idea del cambio gradual de un Estado proletario a un Estado burgués. ‘Volver hacia atrás la película del reformismo’. Trotsky escribió: ‘En realidad, la nueva constitución… abre para la burocracia caminos ‘legales’ para la contrarrevolución económica, por ejemplo, la restauración del capitalismo por medio de un ‘golpe frío’ (La Cuarta Internacional y la Unión Soviética, Tesis adoptadas por la Primera Conferencia Internacional de la Cuarta Internacional, Génova, julio de 1936)” (Ibíd., p. 82, subrayado en el original).
Observamos claramente las tesis de Cliff y su método incorrecto, comenzando con la tesis de que Trotsky no es marxista cuando dice que dos clases pueden usar una misma maquinaria estatal, y cuando Cliff termina diciendo precisamente lo mismo utilizando como autoridad al mismo Trotsky.
LA NACIONALIZACIÓN Y EL ESTADO OBRERO
En la página 2 de su trabajo, Cliff da una cita de La revolución traicionada:
“La nacionalización del suelo, de los medios de producción, de los transportes y de los cambios, así como el monopolio del comercio exterior, forman las bases de la sociedad soviética. Para nosotros, esta adquisición de la revolución proletaria define a la URSS como un Estado proletario” (op. cit., p. 248).
Una de las conclusiones de Cliff es que, en este caso, ‘ni la Comuna de París ni la dictadura Bolchevique eran Estados obreros, por que no nacionalizaron totalmente los medios de producción’. Vemos como Cliff basa su caso en si la clase obrera tiene o no el control sobre la maquinaria estatal. Trataremos el tema del control obrero en el último capítulo. El método de Cliff es separar las bases económicas de un Estado obrero del control obrero de la maquinaria estatal. Durante un período transitorio, de corta o larga duración, sería posible para el proletariado tomar políticamente el poder y no proceder económicamente a transformar la sociedad. Esta era la situación en Rusia cuando el proletariado tomó el poder en octubre de 1917, realmente no emprendieron la nacionalización hasta que se vieron obligados en 1918. Pero si el proletariado no procede a realizar la transformación económica entonces, inevitablemente, el régimen proletario estará condenado al fracaso y al colapso. Las leyes de la economía siempre llegan hasta el final. O el proletariado procede a nacionalizar toda la economía o, inexorablemente, el sistema capitalista surgirá predominante. Cliff no consigue demostrar en qué se diferenciarían las formas básicas de la economía rusa bajo un Estado obrero sano. Se refugia en el consumo de plusvalía de la burocracia pero elude el tema principal.
No importa si Cliff se basa en la experiencia de la Comuna de París o en la primera etapa de la Revolución Rusa. Se aplicaría igual lo antes mencionado. Estos regímenes eran una transición hacia el dominio económico completo del proletariado. Estas transiciones son más o menos inevitables en el cambio de una sociedad a otra. Tanto en el caso de la Comuna de París como en el de la Revolución Rusa, no se podrían completar si el proletariado no procedía a nacionalizar la industria. ¿Ha olvidado Cliff que una de las principales lecciones enseñadas por Marx, y aprendida por los bolcheviques, fue el fracaso del proletariado francés al no nacionalizar el Banco de Francia? De este modo, vemos como un Estado puede ser un Estado proletario sobre la base del poder político o puede ser un Estado proletario sobre la base de la economía, o bien puede ser una transición entre ambos.
Las mismas leyes se aplicarían a la contrarrevolución por parte de la burguesía. El Viejo decía correctamente que en el caso de la contrarrevolución burguesa en Rusia, la burguesía podría, durante un tiempo, incluso conservar la propiedad estatal antes de destruirla y reinstaurar la propiedad privada. A un estudioso le podría parecer que puede existir un Estado obrero y un Estado burgués sobre la base de la propiedad estatal, o que puede haber un Estado obrero o un Estado burgués sobre la base de la propiedad privada. Sin embargo, es obvio que sólo se puede llegar a esta forma de razonar si no se tiene en consideración el movimiento de la sociedad en una dirección u otra.
No sólo eso, sino que se pueden desarrollar toda clase de relaciones imprevistas debido a la estructura clasista de la sociedad y el Estado. Tomemos el ejemplo de Rusia. En 1917 al tomar el control de los sóviets, los bolcheviques estaban ante una situación descrita por Trotsky en la Historia de la Revolución Rusa, donde, debido a la mayoría menchevique, en cierto sentido la burguesía gobernaba a través de los sóviets —¡los órganos de poder obrero por excelencia!—. De acuerdo con el esquema de Cliff, ¿cómo es posible que pudiera ocurrir esto? Desde luego, los bolcheviques no habían tomado el poder, la burguesía había utilizado a los mencheviques y a través de ellos, los sóviets en el período de transición, para eliminarlos después como hicieron en Alemania después de 1918.
En la transición de una sociedad a otra, está claro que no existen abismos insalvables. No es dialéctico pensar en categorías rígidas y acabadas, el Estado obrero o el Estado capitalista. Está claro que cuando Marx hablaba del choque de la vieja forma de Estado con relación a la Comuna de París, él da por sentado que la economía se transformaría a un ritmo mayor o menor y que ésta estaría en consonancia con las formas políticas. Veremos más tarde con relación a Europa del Este que Cliff adopta el mismo método formalista.
LA CONCEPCIÓN IDEALISTA DEL ESTADO
Trataremos aquí la naturaleza del Estado. Según los marxistas, el Estado surge como el instrumento necesario para la opresión de una clase sobre otra. El Estado, en última instancia, como explicaban Marx y Lenin, consiste en grupos de hombres armados y sus apéndices. Esa es la esencia de la definición marxista. No obstante, hay que tener cuidado al utilizar generalizaciones marxistas, que indudablemente son correctas, en un sentido absoluto. La verdad es siempre concreta, pero si no analizamos las ramificaciones particulares y las circunstancias concretas, inevitablemente llegaremos a errores y abstracciones. No basta más que observar la forma tan prudente con la que Engels trata este tema, incluso cuando generalizaba. En El origen de la familia, la propiedad privada y el Estado, Engels escribió:
“Pero a fin de que estos antagonistas, estas clases con intereses económicos en pugna, no se devoren a sí mismos y a la sociedad en una lucha estéril, se hace necesario un poder situado aparentemente por encima de la sociedad y llamado a amortiguar el choque, a mantenerlo en los límites del “orden”. Y ese poder —nacido de la sociedad, pero que se pone por encima de ella y se divorcia de ella más y más— es el Estado (Engels, op. cit.,pp. 183-4).
En la siguiente página continúa así:
“…Y si no, examínese nuestra Europa actual, donde la lucha de clases y la rivalidad en las conquistas han hecho crecer tanto la fuerza pública, que amenaza con devorar a la sociedad entera e incluso al Estado mismo” (Ibíd., p. 185). Engels demuestra que una vez ha surgido, el Estado dentro de ciertos límites, desarrolla un movimiento independiente propio y debe necesariamente hacerlo bajo unas condiciones determinadas: “Dueños de la fuerza pública y del derecho a recaudar los impuestos, los funcionarios aparecen ahora como órganos de la sociedad situados por encima de ésta” (Ibíd., p. 185, subrayado en el original).
Contrariamente a la concepción de Cliff, cuando dice que el Estado juega un papel directo, se observa el cuidado meticuloso con el que Engels trata el tema del papel independiente del Estado, concerniente naturalmente, a la sociedad. En todo el material de Cliff, olvida el hecho de que el Estado en determinadas condiciones puede jugar y juega un papel relativamente independiente en la lucha entre las clases. Es su esquema ‘lógico’: o es un Estado obrero, directamente controlado por los trabajadores, o debe ser un Estado capitalista. En el método de Cliff no hay margen para la interacción de fuerzas. De nuevo contrastamos esto con lo que dice Engels:
“Como el Estado nació de la necesidad de amortiguar los antagonismos de clase y como, al mismo tiempo, nació en medio del conflicto de esas clases, por regla general es el Estado de la clase más poderosa, de la clase económicamente dominante, que se convierte también, con ayuda de él, en la clase políticamente dominante, adquiriendo con ello nuevos medios para la represión y explotación de la clase oprimida. (…) Sin embargo, excepcionalmente, hay períodos en que las clases en lucha están tan equilibradas, que el poder del Estado, como mediador aparente, adquiere cierta independencia momentánea respecto a ambas” (Ibíd., pp. 185- 186).
De nuevo, Engels escribe:
“La esencia de la sociedad civilizada es el Estado, una maquinaria esencialmente destinada a reprimir a la clase oprimida y explotada, y que en todos los períodos típicos es exclusivamente el Estado de la clase dominante” (Ibíd., p. 190).
Es notable la diferencia entre la formulación de Cliff y las cuidadosas formulaciones de Engels… “esto es normalmente”, en “períodos típicos”, etc., ¿Por qué el proletariado no puede tomar posesión de la máquina del Estado ya disponible? No es por razones místicas, sino debido a ciertos hechos muy concretos. En el Estado moderno todas las posiciones claves están las manos de aquellas personas que están bajo el control de la clase dirigente: han sido especialmente seleccionados por su educación, opiniones y condiciones de vida para servir a los intereses de la burguesía. Los oficiales del ejército, particularmente los de más alto rango, funcionarios y las industrias nacionalizadas, son los técnicos clave, son moldeados en sus ideas y opiniones para servir los intereses de la clase capitalista. Todas las posiciones de mando en la sociedad son puestas en manos de personas en las que la burguesía puede confiar. Esa es la razón por la cual la maquinaría del Estado es una herramienta en manos de la burguesía y no puede ser usada par el proletariado y, por tanto, debe hacerla añicos. ¿Qué significa hacer añicos la maquinaria del Estado? Por no decir más, las ideas de Cliff sobre este tema parecen ser muy confusas.
Es posible que muchos, quizá incluso la mayoría de los oficiales del Estado burgués, sean utilizados por el proletariado una vez éste llegue al poder. Pero estarán subordinados a los comités y organizaciones obreras. Por ejemplo, en la Unión Soviética, en sus primeros días después de que el ejército zarista fuera disuelto, el Ejército Rojo era dirigido por ex oficiales zaristas. Igualmente en el aparato del Estado donde una proporción de los funcionarios eran los mismos ex funcionarios zaristas. Debido a factores históricos desfavorables, esto más tarde jugó un papel importante en la degeneración del régimen ruso. No en vano, Lenin decía que el Estado soviético es ‘una máquina zarista… apenas barnizada de socialismo’. (A propósito, esta caracterización honesta está muy lejos del idealizado y falso dibujo del Estado bajo Lenin y Trotsky que presenta Cliff). Cómo pudo darse el proceso de degeneración teniendo en cuenta el idílico cuadro pintado por Cliff sería difícil de entender. No obstante, de esto trataremos en la última parte.
El proletariado, según el concepto clásico, destroza la vieja maquinaría estatal y procede a crear un semiestado. Sin embargo, está obligado a utilizar los viejos técnicos. Pero el Estado, incluso bajo las mejores condiciones, en un país avanzado con un proletariado culto, sobrevive como un instrumento burgués y debido a esto, la posibilidad de degeneración está implícita en ello. Por esta razón los marxistas insisten en el control de las masas, asegurar que el Estado no seguirá su evolución como una fuerza independiente. Tan rápido como sea posible debe disolverse en la sociedad.
Por las mismas razones mencionadas arriba, en determinadas condiciones, el Estado consigue una cierta independencia de la base que originalmente representaba. Engels explicaba que aunque la superestructura es dependiente de la base económica, sin embargo, tiene un movimiento independiente por sí mismo. Durante un período bastante prolongado, puede haber un conflicto entre el Estado y la clase a la que representa el Estado. Por eso Engels dice que el Estado ‘normalmente’ o en ‘períodos típicos’ representa directamente a la clase dirigente. Los grandes maestros marxistas han analizado el fenómeno del bonapartismo al que Engels se refería arriba. En El Dieciocho Brumario de Luis Bonaparte, Marx señalaba cómo los soldados borrachos de Luis Napoleón, en nombre de la ‘ley, el orden y la familia’, disparaban a la burguesía a quien, es de suponer representaban.
Sólo se puede entender la sociedad de clases si se tiene en cuenta la compleja interdependencia dialéctica y el antagonismo de todos los factores dentro de ella. Los formalistas normalmente se pierden en uno u otro lado del problema. Por ejemplo Cliff escribe:
“… Es necesario hacer un gran cantidad de acrobacias mentales para pensar que Mikolajcik5 y su ILK, que huían al extranjero o se consumían en las prisiones, eran los dirigentes de Polonia, como considerar que los dirigentes de Rusia son los esclavos peores de Siberia” (op. cit. p. 13)
¿Era la burguesía bajo Luis Napoleón la clase dirigente? Se necesita una alta dosis de acrobacia mental para responder a esto.
Cuando consideramos el desarrollo de la sociedad, los factores económicos deben ser considerados como los dominantes. La superestructura que se desarrolla sobre esta base económica se aleja de la base a la que representa y se convierte en antagonista de ella. La esencia de la teoría marxista sobre la revolución es que con los cambios graduales en la producción bajo el embrión de la vieja forma, por ejemplo, la superestructura tanto en la propiedad como en el Estado, se desarrolla una contradicción que sólo puede ser resulta aboliendo la superestructura y reorganizando la sociedad sobre la base del nuevo modo de producción que se ha desarrollado dentro de la vieja.
La economía es decisiva. Debido a esto, los maestros marxistas explicaron que a la larga la superestructura debe estar en correspondencia con ella. Una vez que se ha abandonado el criterio de la estructura económica básica de la sociedad, son posibles toda clase de construcciones superficiales y arbitrarias. Nos perderíamos inevitablemente en el laberinto de la historia, como Perseo en la mitología de la antigua Grecia que se perdió en el Palacio de Minos y sin un hilo para poder salir. El hilo de la historia es la estructura económica básica de la sociedad, o la forma de propiedad, su reflejo legal.
Tomemos un caso extremadamente rico en ejemplos, la historia de Francia. La revolución burguesa tuvo lugar en 1789. En 1793 los jacobinos6 acapararon todo el poder. Como Marx y Engels señalaron, ellos fueron más allá del marco de las relaciones burguesas y realizaron una saludable tarea histórica debido a que, realizaron en pocos meses lo que para la burguesía habría requerido décadas o generaciones conseguir, la limpieza total de todos los restos feudales. A pesar de todo, este régimen permanecía arraigado en las bases de las formas burguesas de propiedad. Este fue seguido por el Thermidor francés y el gobierno del Directorio, después llegó la dictadura clásica de Napoleón Bonaparte. Napoleón reintrodujo muchas formas feudales, se coronó Emperador y concentró un poder supremo en sus manos. Aún así calificamos este régimen como burgués. Con la restauración de Luis XVIII el régimen seguía siendo capitalista… Y luego tuvimos no una sino dos revoluciones —1830 y 1848—. Estas revoluciones tuvieron consecuencias sociales importantes. Conllevaron cambios significativos incluso en el propio personal del Estado. Aún así, caracterizamos a ambas como revoluciones burguesas, en las cuales no cambió la clase que ostentaba el poder.
Vayamos más allá. Después de la Comuna de París de 1871 y la sacudida de las relaciones sociales que ésta supuso, tuvimos la organización de la Tercera República, con una democracia burguesa que duró décadas. Ésta fue seguida por Petain, después el régimen de colaboración de los estalinistas con De GaulIe y ahora el gobierno Quielle7. Al examinar por un momento la extraordinaria diversidad de regímenes, para alguien que no sea marxista, le parecería absurdo clasificar en la misma categoría, al régimen de Robespierre y el de Petain. En cambio los marxistas los definimos básicamente igual —regímenes burgueses—. ¿Cuál es el criterio? Sólo uno: la forma de propiedad, la propiedad privada de los medios de producción.
Tomemos del mismo modo la variedad de regímenes existentes en los tiempos modernos para ver las extremas diferencias que se dan en las superestructuras y que poseen la misma base económica. Por ejemplo, comparar el régimen de la Alemania nazi o el de la socialdemocracia Británica. Son muy diferentes en la superestructura, muchos teóricos de las escuelas no marxistas o ex marxistas han encontrado en ellos nuevas estructuras de clase y un nuevo sistema social. ¿Por qué decimos que representan a la misma clase y al mismo régimen? A pesar de la diferencia en la superestructura, la base económica de estas sociedades permanece siendo la misma. Si tomamos la historia de la sociedad moderna, tenemos muchos ejemplos donde la burguesía es expropiada políticamente ypermanece siendo la clase dirigente. Trotsky describe perfectamente el régimen del bonapartismo, o como Marx lo denominó, ‘el dominio descubierto de la espada sobre la sociedad’.
Vemos qué ocurrió en China con Chiang Kai Shek había, con la escoria de los gánsteres de Shanghai, aplastado a la clase obrera. Los banqueros le ofrecían banquetes y le aplaudían corno el benefactor y salvador de la civilización.
Pero Chiang quería algo mucha más material que las alabanzas de sus maestros. Bruscamente, encarceló a todos los ricos industriales y banqueros de Shanghai, consiguiendo un rescate millonario antes de liberarlos. Había hecho el trabajo para ellos y ahora pedía su precio. Él no había aplastado a los obreros de Shanghai sólo para el beneficio de los capitalistas, sino también porque esto significaba poder y beneficio para él mismo y su camarilla. Todavía alguien puede atreverse a decir que los banqueros que estaban en la cárcel no eran la clase dirigente porque no ostentaban el poder político. La burguesía china (¡no los marxistas!) estaba reflejando tristemente la complejidad de la sociedad, donde una buena parte del botín de la plusvalía extraída de los trabajadores iba a sus propios perros guardianes, mientras que muchos de su clase languidecían en prisión.
La burguesía en esas condiciones es expropiada políticamente, en ese momento la fuerza desnuda es la que domina la sociedad. Una enorme parte de la plusvalía es consumida por la cúpula del ejército y la burocracia. Pero eso en interés de estos mismos burócratas, la expropiación capitalista de los trabajadores continuará y, por tanto, mientras ellos puedan seguir exprimiendo, mantendrán alejada a la burguesía, sin embargo, ellos defienden la propiedad privada. Esto significa que la burguesía continua siendo la clase dominante.
Aquí está la respuesta a aquellos que afirman que es un sofisma decir que la clase obrera puede ser la clase dominante mientras una parte importante de ella está encarcelada en Siberia. A menos que nos guiemos por las formas de propiedad básicas, los marxistas perderemos el rumbo. Se pueden dar muchos ejemplos en la historia de la manera en que un sector de la clase dominante ataca a otro sector de la misma. Por ejemplo, en las Guerras de las Rosas en Gran Bretaña las dos fracciones de los barones gobernantes se exterminaron prácticamente entre sí. En una época u otra de la historia, sectores importantes de la clase dominante han Estado en las cárceles o fueron ejecutados. Sólo hay que ver la amenaza que supone Hitler para sus oponentes burgueses. No sólo perdieron su propiedad sino también sus vidas.
Con relación al papel del Estado, la cuestión más importante sería responder a lo que Cliff no puede responder: si el Estado debe ser un instrumento de una clase y ¿a qué clase representa en Rusia y Europa del Este? No puede representar a la clase capitalista porque ha sido expropiada. Tampoco se puede decir que represente los intereses del campesinado o de los pequeños propietarios de las ciudades. Bajo un régimen fascista o bonapartista, incluso aunque los gánsteres puedan tener a la burguesía cogida por la garganta, sin embargo, hay una clase capitalista para cuyos intereses está funcionando el conjunto de la economía. Si la burocracia no representa al proletariado, como dijo Trotsky, es una forma especial de bonapartismo en el sentido que defiende la nacionalización de los medios de producción, la planificación y el monopolio del comercio exterior. ¿A quién representan los burócratas estalinistas? La respuesta de Cliff es que la burocracia constituye la nueva clase dominante, la clase capitalista de Rusia. Pero al considerar seriamente esto se demostraría que esto no puede ser. Está diciendo que el Estado es una clase. La burocracia controla el Estado, el Estado ostenta los medios de producción, por tanto, la burocracia es una clase. Esto es esquivar el tema, está diciendo de hecho que el Estado tiene el Estado.
Según Lenin el Estado:
“… Este ha sido siempre determinado aparato al margen de la sociedad y consistente en un grupo de personas dedicadas exclusiva o casi exclusivamente o principalmente a gobernar. Los hombres se dividen en gobernados y en especialistas en gobernar, que se colocan por encima de la sociedad y son llamados gobernantes, representantes del Estado.
“Este aparato, este grupo de personas que gobiernan a otros, se apodera siempre de ciertos medios de coerción, de violencia física, ya sea que esta violencia sobre los hombres se exprese en la maza primitiva o en tipos más perfeccionados de armas, en la época de la esclavitud, o en las armas de fuego inventadas en la Edad Media o, por último, en las armas modernas, que en el siglo XX son verdaderas maravillas de la técnica y se basan íntegramente en los últimos lo gros de la tecnología moderna.
“Los métodos de violencia cambiaron, pero dondequiera existió un Estado, existió en cada sociedad, un grupo de personas que gobernaban, mandaban, dominaban, y que, para conservar su poder, disponían de un aparato de coerción física, de un aparato de violencia, con las armas que correspondían al nivel técnico de la época dada. Y sólo examinando estos fenómenos generales, preguntándonos por qué no existió ningún Estado cuando no había clases, cuando no había explotadores y explotados, y por que apareció cuando aparecieron las clases; sólo así encontraremos una respuesta definida a la pregunta de cuál es la esencia y la significación del Estado.
“El Estado es una máquina para mantener la dominación de una clase sobre otra” (Lenin, El Estado. Moscú, Editorial Progreso, 1981, p. 18).
El Estado por su misma naturaleza está compuesto de burocracia, oficiales, generales, jefes de policía, etc., Pero éstos no constituyen una clase, son el instrumento de una clase e incluso pueden entrar en antagonismo con esta clase. Pero por sí mismos no pueden ser una clase.
Debemos preguntar a Cliff: ¿qué sector de la burocracia tiene el Estado? No pueden ser todos los burócratas, la propia burocracia está dividida jerárquicamente. El pequeño funcionario es tan parte de la burocracia como el gran burócrata. ¿Cuál es entonces el estrato dominante en la sociedad soviética? Esto claramente es un sin sentido. En la sociedad, o en cualquier sociedad con clases, no importa cuán privilegiados sean los de arriba, ellos manejarán el instrumento para proteger a la clase dominante que tiene una relación directa con los medios de producción, por ejemplo, en el sentido de su propiedad. Sabemos a quién representaban Napoleón, Bismarck, Chiang Kai Shek, Hitler, Churchill y Attlee. Pero ¿A quién representan los burócratas? ¿A los burócratas? Afirmar esto sería erróneo. En otra parte del documento hemos visto que las relaciones de la burocracia con los medios de producción son necesariamente de parasitismo y participa del mismo parasitismo que la burocracia nazi. No son una categoría necesaria e inevitable para el modo de producción en particular. En el mejor de los casos ellos tiene derecho a salarios de superintendencia. Y sí toman más, lo hacen de la misma forma que la burocracia nazi consumía parte de la plusvalía producida por los trabajadores. Pero no eran una clase.
Se podrían dar innumerables ejemplos para demostrar que un Estado capitalista presupone propiedad privada, la propiedad individual de los medios de producción. El Estado es el instrumento de dominio, no puede ser en sí mismo la clase que domina. La burocracia es sólo una parte del aparato del Estado. ‘Ostentaría’ el Estado, en el sentido que se levanta sobre la sociedad y se convierte en relativamente independiente de la economía dominante. Ese fue el caso en la Alemania nazi, donde la burocracia dictaba a los capitalistas lo que deberían producir, como deberían producirlo, etc., para el propósito de la guerra. También en la economía de guerra, Gran Bretaña, EEUU y en otros países, el Estado dictaba a los capitalistas qué y cómo deberían producir. Esto no les convierte en una clase dominante. ¿Por qué? Porque estaban defendiendo la propiedad privada.
Cliff afirma que la burocracia dirige y planifica la industria. ¿De quién es la industria que ellos dirigen y planifican? En la sociedad capitalista, los directores planifican y dirigen la industria en las empresas y trust individuales. Pero esto no les convierte en propietarios de esas empresas. La burocracia dirige toda la industria. En ese sentido es verdad que tienen más independencia de su base económica que otra burocracia o maquinaria estatal haya tenido en toda la historia humana. Pero como Engels subrayó y debemos volver a subrayar, en última instancia las bases económicas son decisivas. Si Cliff va a argumentar que es su función como directores la que hace que los burócratas se conviertan en clase dominante, entonces claramente tampoco acertaría al hacer una definición marxista de la clase capitalista. Él está calificando a la burocracia rusa de clase, pero debe elaborar una teoría y ésta es a qué clase pertenece.
El Estado es un instrumento de la clase dominante, de coerción, un policía glorificado. Pero el policía no es la clase dominante. El policía puede convertirse en irrefrenable, puede volverse un bandido, pero no se convierte en un capitalista o señor feudal.
QUÉ OCURRIÓ EN EUROPA DEL ESTE
Los acontecimientos en Europa del Este y la naturaleza de los Estados que han surgido sólo pueden ser explicados por medio de la teoría marxista-leninista del Estado, y sólo las concepciones de Trotsky pueden explicar los acontecimientos en Europa del Este desde este punto de vista.
En primer lugar es necesario entender que ocurrió en Europa del Este con el avance del Ejército Rojo. No se puede negar (dejando a un lado por el momento la cuestión de Alemania) que en todos los países de los Balcanes y Europa del Este, el avance del Ejército Rojo terminó en un movimiento revolucionario no sólo entre los trabajadores, sino también entre los campesinos. La razón de esto reside en el contexto general de todos estos Estados; antes de la guerra, a parte de Checoslovaquia, el capitalismo era muy débil. En estos países había decadentes dictaduras feudal-militar-capitalistas, cuyos regímenes eran completamente incapaces de desarrollar más las fuerzas productivas de sus respectivos países. La crisis económica mundial del capitalismo fue especialmente exacerbada en estos países, debido a la debilidad y a la división artificial de la zona que había sucedido a la I Guerra Mundial. El termino balcanización proviene de esta parte de Europa. Dividida en pequeños y débiles Estados, con un carácter abrumadoramente agrario, con una industria muy débil, esta zonas se convirtieron inevitablemente en semicolonias de las grandes potencias. Francia, Gran Bretaña, hasta cierto punto Italia, y después Alemania, se convirtieron en el poder dominante en esta zona. A través de sus relaciones comerciales, la industria alemana dominaba las atrasadas economías de Europa del Este en los Balcanes. En todos estos países el capital extranjero jugó un importante papel. En la mayoría de ellos, las inversiones extranjeras eran dominantes debido a la poca industria existente.
Con la ocupación de estos países por Hitler, no sólo fue expropiado el capital ‘no ario’, sino también los capitalistas nativos en su mayoría fueron excluidos y reemplazados por los bancos y trust alemanes. El capital alemán se apoderó de los lugares decisivos —todas las posiciones y sectores claves de la economía—. El capital que quedaba era propiedad de colaboradores y en gran parte colaboracionistas, y permanecían subordinados al capital alemán.
El régimen estaba formado de colaboracionistas que dependían de las bayonetas para su apoyo. El poco apoyo popular que tenían los regímenes anteriores a la guerra —dictaduras policiaco- militares—, en el transcurso de la guerra desaparecieron. El colapso del poderoso imperialismo alemán y la victoria del Ejército Rojo, indudablemente dio un impulso a la revolución socialista. Por ejemplo en Bulgaria en 1944, cuando el Ejército Rojo cruzó la frontera, se produjo una sublevación en Sofía y otras grandes ciudades. Las masas comenzaron a organizar sóviets y comités obreros. Los soldados y los campesinos organizaron comités y los trabajadores ocuparon las fábricas.
Acontecimientos similares tuvieron lugar en todos los países de Europa el Este a parte de Alemania. Examinemos lo que ocurrió en Checoslovaquia. Aquí también el avance el Ejército Rojo fue seguido de la insurrección en Praga, la toma de fábricas por los trabajadores y la tierra por los campesinos. También hubo confraternización en las fronteras de Bohemia y Moravia entre los checos y las masas alemanas.
Los elementos de la revolución proletaria fueron rápidamente seguidos por la contrarrevolución estalinista. El problema con Cliff es que ha separado los elementos de la revolución proletaria de la contrarrevolución estalinista que siguió inmediatamente.
Tomemos dos ejemplos: Bulgaria y Checoslovaquia. En Bulgaria tuvimos una situación que se ha desarrollado una y otra vez a través de la trágica historia de las masas obreras. El poder real estaba en manos de la clase obrera. El Estado burgués estaba destrozado. ¿Cómo? Los alemanes se habían ido, los oficiales no tenían el control de los soldados, la policía se había escondido, los terratenientes y capitalistas no tenían el control. Había un vacío, un período clásico de dualidad de poder donde las masas no eran lo suficientemente conscientes para organizar su propio poder y la burguesía demasiado débil para ejercer su dominación.
Esta no es una situación desconocida para los marxistas: Alemania 1918, Rusia 1917, España 1936. Quizá una comparación con España sería útil. Aquí también las masas tomaron las fábricas y la tierra en Catalunya y Aragón. El ‘gobierno burgués’ estaba suspendido en el aire. Las masas aplastaron totalmente a la policía y al ejército. Sólo había una fuerza armada, las milicias obreras. Todo lo que necesitaban las masas era organizar sóviets o comités, echar al gobierno fantasma y tomar el poder.
Se conoce suficientemente lo que ocurrió después. Los estalinistas procedieron a formar una coalición no con la burguesía —los propietarios de las fábricas y la burguesía habían huido al lado de Franco como consecuencia de la insurrección de las masas—, sino con la ‘sombra de la burguesía’. Los estalinistas hicieron esto en España con el propósito expreso de destruir la revolución socialista por miedo a las repercusiones en Rusia y, desde luego, debido a la alineación internacional existente y su deseo de demostrar a los imperialistas franceses y británicos, que no tenían nada que temer. En España, por tanto, paulatinamente, ayudaron a que la sombra adquiriera ‘cuerpo’.
Poco a poco, reconstruyeron un ejército capitalista y una fuerza policial capitalista, bajo el control de la clase capitalista. Una vez esto había sido logrado, la tierra fue devuelta a los terratenientes y las fábricas a sus propietarios. La consecuencia de esto se vio al final de la guerra civil cuando el Estado burgués —la maquinaria militar burguesa que ellos habían ayudado a crear—, organizó un golpe de Estado que establecía una dictadura militar en el territorio republicano y rápidamente ilegalizó al propio Partido Comunista.
En Bulgaria, como en los otros países de Europa del Este, los estalinistas procedieron a llegar a un acuerdo conlasombra de la burguesía. La revolución socialista había comenzado y existía el peligro de que llegase hasta el final. Esto, desde luego, los estalinistas lo temían. Pero por otro lado, además no querían pasar el poder a la burguesía.Descarrilaron la revolución socialista organizando un denominado Frente Patriótico en Bulgaria y encarrilaron el movimiento de las masas con consignas chovinistas y antialemanas. La confraternización en Bulgaria rápidamente fue castigada, los sóviets formados en el ejército fueron disueltos, los comités obreros y campesinos fueron mutilados. Formaron un frente de ‘Unidad Nacional’, la unión de toda la nación. Pero la diferencia con España era que aquí las posiciones claves en ésta denominada coalición, donde la sombra de la burguesía no ostentaba el poder, permanecían firmemente en manos estalinistas. Tenían la policía y el ejército. Seleccionaron el personal clave y dirigente. Todas las posiciones importantes en la administración pública estaban en manos de herramientas obedientes. Claramente, detrás de la pantalla de unidad nacional concentraban el poder estatal en sus manos.Habían creado un instrumento a su propia imagen, una maquinaria estatal según el poder de Moscú. El proceso era tan claro como el agua en el caso de Checoslovaquia. Cuando los estalinistas entraron en el país no había gobierno. Los alemanes con sus traidores y colaboracionistas habían huido. Los comités formados por las masas tenían el control de las empresas industriales y la tierra. Los estalinistas dirigían el gobierno de Benes8 desde Moscú. El poder real, los puestos clave, estaban firmemente en sus manos; conservaron el ‘cuerpo’ y dejaron a la burguesía la sombra.
En parte para destruir la revolución socialista, en parte para llegar a un compromiso con el imperialismo norteamericano, permitieron a ciertos sectores de la economía conservar en sus manos las empresas privadas. Pero el poder decisivo, por ejemplo, los cuerpos armados de hombres, estaban organizados por ellos y bajo su control. No era ésta la misma maquinaria estatal de antes. Era una nueva maquinaria estatal de su propia creación.Para descarrilar la revolución los estalinistas utilizaron el chovinismo y dieron al país un terrible golpe con la expulsión de los alemanes. El instinto original de las masas era en líneas internacionalistas. Los informes de Checoslovaquia demuestran que al principio había confraternización entre los checos y los alemanes. Cliff no ve el elemento de la contrarrevolución, las actividades de la burocracia para destruir la revolución.
Desde luego, el intento de los estalinistas de mantener un compromiso con la burguesía —no hay que olvidar con su control y su poder del Estado— no podría durar indefinidamente. Las sombras pueden adquirir ‘cuerpo’. El intento de la burguesía norteamericana de instalar sus puntos de apoyo en Europa del Este con los restos de la burguesía y de aquellos sectores de la economía que ellos controlaban, con el Plan Marshall como moneda, era una señal de peligro. Con una velocidad precipitada, la burocracia actuó y ordenó a todos los Estados de Europa del Este rechazar al Plan Marshall. Toda la historia ha demostrado la imposibilidad de mantener dos formas antagónicas de propiedad. Aunque la burguesía era muy débil, había comenzado a ganar una base, debido al hecho de que ellos mantenían una buena proporción de la industria ligera bajo su control. El creciente antagonismo de EEUU, la imposibilidad de depender de la burguesía, su incompatibilidad con el Estado proletario, con el poder en manos de la burocracia, la obligó a tomar medidas para completar el proceso. Aquí deberíamos añadir que Trotsky vio en la extensión de la propiedad nacionalizada a las zonas de dominación estalinista, una prueba de que Rusia era un Estado obrero. Los acontecimientos de febrero sobre los que se centró la atención mundial, subrayaron de una manera dramática el proceso que estaba teniendo lugar en todas las zonas dominadas por los estalinistas.
El factor decisivo fue que los estalinistas tenían el apoyo de los trabajadores y campesinos en la nacionalización y la división de la tierra. Todo lo que Cliff vio fue que la maquinaria del Estado permanecía igual, cabe suponer que como estaba bajo los alemanes. ¡Sin duda eso es lo que desearía la burguesía!
Según todos los observadores los estalinistas, debido a sus arreglos y a la desilusión de las masas en las fábricas, probablemente habrían perdido votos en las futuras elecciones. Los elementos burgueses se estaban haciendo fuertes, basándose en la pequeña burguesía de las ciudades y entre los trabajadores y campesinos desilusionados. Paulatinamente, la burguesía esperaba conseguir el control del Estado y organizar una contrarrevolución con la ayuda el imperialismo anglonorteamericano. Aunque la burocracia tenía el control de la maquinaria del Estado, éste era precario en virtud a la forma en la que se había obtenido.
Para completar el proceso, como Trotsky ya había previsto, la burocracia estaba obligada a recurrir a las masas,mediante la creación de Comités de Acción que burocráticamente eran controlados desde arriba, aunque sin embargo eran relativamente democráticos por abajo. Los estalinistas armaron a los trabajadores, organizaron una milicia obrera. En estas condiciones, esto naturalmente favorecía el entusiasmo de las masas. Incluso los trabajadores socialdemócratas que odiaban y desconfiaban de los estalinistas, participaron entusiastamente en estas medidas contra la burguesía. Trotsky dijo una vez que contra un león se usa un arma y contra una pulga una uña. Enfrentados con el aparato del Estado estalinista, con el movimiento de masas como una amenaza, la burguesía estaba impotente.
Sin embargo, la formación de los Comités de Acción, el armamento de los trabajadores, significaba necesariamente que se estaba formando un embrión del nuevo régimen. Por supuesto, la burocracia rápidamente procedió a aplastar la independencia de las masas y totalizar el régimen. Se organizaron rápidamente nuevas elecciones siguiendo las directrices de Moscú, con una única candidatura y una supervisión estricta.
Ante estos acontecimientos, Cliff se pregunta:
“¿Cuál es entonces el futuro de la Cuarta Internacional? ¿Cuál es su justificación histórica? Los partidos estalinistas tienen todas las ventajas sobre la Cuarta Internacional —un aparato estatal, organizaciones de masas, dinero, etc.—. La única ventaja de la que carecen es la ideología internacionalista de clase…
“Si una revolución tiene lugar en los países del Este de Europa sin una dirección proletaria revolucionaria, deberíamos concluir que en el futuro, en las revoluciones sociales, como en el pasado, las masas harán el combate pero no lo dirigirán. En todas las luchas de la burguesía, no fue la propia burguesía quien hace el combate, sino las masas que creían que eran sus intereses. Los sans-culottes de la Revolución Francesa luchaban por la libertad, igualdad y fraternidad, mientras la meta real del movimiento era el establecimiento del dominio de la burguesía. Este fue el caso en un momento en que la burguesía era progresista. En las guerras imperialistas reaccionarias, cuanto menos saben las masas del auténtico propósito de la guerra, mejores soldados son. Aceptar que las ‘nuevas democracias’ son Estados obreros, significaba aceptar que en principio la revolución proletaria, corno las guerras burguesas, está basada en el engaño a las personas…
“Si estos países son Estados obreros entonces ¿para qué el marxismo? ¿Por qué la Cuarta Internacional? Podríamos ser observados por las masas sólo como aventureros o como impacientes revolucionarios cuyas diferencias con los estalinistas son meramente tácticas” (op. cit., pp. 14-15).
Cliff ha hecho las preguntas a las personas equivocadas. En realidad se debería haber hecho a sí mismo estas preguntas y darse también las respuestas. Si su teoría es correcta, entonces toda la teoría de Marx se convierte en ana utopía. Cliff piensa que si él pone la etiqueta de ‘capitalismo de Estado’ sobre el fenómeno del estalinismo, entonces ha salvado su conciencia y ha restaurado el papel perdido de la Cuarta Internacional, para su propia satisfacción. Aquí vemos el fetichismo del cual Marx habló y que incluso afecta al movimiento revolucionario: cambiar el nombre de las cosas para así intentar cambiar su esencia.
No es posible explicar o enhebrar los hilos históricos de clase de los acontecimientos actuales sin la existencia y degeneración del Estado obrero en Rusia. Sólo se pueden unir los acontecimientos de Europa del Este a la Revolución de Octubre de 1917. Es inútil para Cliff argumentar que la burocracia utilizó a las masas en Checoslovaquia, sin plantearse la cuestión de quien las utilizó en 1917. ¿Fue la Revolución de Octubre seguida por el estalinismo? Las buenas intenciones o los deseos subjetivos de la dirección bolchevique o la clase obrera, están fuera de lugar. Según la teoría de Marx, ninguna sociedad sale de la escena hasta que ha agotado todas las posibilidades de desarrollar las fuerzas productivas dentro de ella. Si un nuevo período de capitalismo de Estado es lo que nos amenaza —y esto necesariamente se desprende de la teoría de Cliff—, por qué no puede haber límite económico al desarrollo de la producción bajo el denominado capitalismo de Estado, hablar de esto en un período de desintegración del capitalismo mundial se reduce a simple fraseología. Tenemos el absurdo de que una nueva revolución — una revolución proletaria en 1917—, cambió orgánicamente la economía a capitalismo de Estado. Tenemos la no menos absurda postulación de que una revolución en Europa del Este, donde toda la clase capitalista ha sido expropiada… ¿para instalar qué? ¡El capitalismo! Un momento de reflexión serio demostraría que no es posible para Cliff mantener esta postura con relación a Europa del Este sin trasladar el mismo argumento también a la propia Rusia.
El propio Cliff señala que en la revolución burguesa las masas combatieron y la burguesía recogió los frutos. Las masas no sabían por qué estaban luchando, sino que luchaban en realidad por el dominio de la burguesía. Tomemos la Revolución Francesa. Se preparó y tenía su ideología en las obras de los filósofos de la Ilustración, Voltaire, Rousseau, etc., Sin embargo, ellos realmente creían en la idealización de la sociedad burguesa. Creían en los codicilos de libertad, igualdad y fraternidad que predicaban. Como ya se sabe, y el propio Cliff cita a Marx para demostrarlo, la Revolución Francesa fue más allá de su base social. Terminó en la dictadura revolucionaria de lossans-culottes que fueron más allá de los límites de la sociedad burguesa. Como Marx explicaba, esto tuvo el saludable efecto de conseguir en pocos meses lo que de otra manera hubiera costado a la burguesía décadas. Los dirigentes del sector revolucionario de la pequeña burguesía que ejercían esta dictadura —Robespierre, Danton, etc.— sinceramente creían en las doctrinas de los filósofos e intentaron ponerlas en práctica. No pudieron hacerlo porque era imposible ir más allá de la base económica de la sociedad. Era inevitable que perdieran el poder y sólo prepararon el camino a la sociedad burguesa. Si el argumento de Cliff es correcto, se podría llegar a la conclusión de que lo mismo ocurrió en Rusia y Marx era el profeta del nuevo capitalismo de Estado, Lenin y Trotsky fueron los Robespierre y Carnat de la Revolución Rusa. El hecho de que Lenin y Trotsky tuvieran buenas intenciones no tiene nada que ver, como eran buenas las intenciones de los dirigentes de la revolución burguesa. Ellos simplemente prepararon el terreno para el dominio del nuevo Estado de la clase capitalista.
Si el hecho de que la burocracia utilizase a las masas checoslovacas constituye una prueba de que esto era capitalismo de Estado, no hizo menos la burocracia rusa utilizando al proletariado en la revolución de 1917. Sin embargo, esta teoría no puede satisfacer a nadie. El hecho de que la burocracia, porque Rusia es un Estado obrero con toda su degeneración, haya asimilado Europa del Este en la economía e instantáneamente estrangulado el desarrollo de la revolución socialista, quiere decir que al mismo tiempo, conscientemente han llevado adelante de forma abreviada un proceso que se prolongó durante muchos años en Rusia. Debería quedar claro que sin la existencia de un fuerte Estado obrero degenerado, contiguo o cercano a estos países, estos procesos habría sido imposibles, a no ser que el proletariado hubiera vencido con una revolución sana en líneas clásicas y extendiendo la revolución.
¿Significa esto que los estalinistas han realizado la revolución y por tanto no es necesaria la Cuarta Internacional? Muchas veces en la historia nos enfrentamos a una situación complicada. Por ejemplo, en la Revolución de Febrero que derrocó al zarismo, las masas cayeron bajo la influencia de los mencheviques y socialrevolucionarios. Esto significaba que las masas, habiendo completado una tarea, el derrocamiento del zarismo —una revolución política— creó nuevas barreras en su camino y tuvieron que derribarlas con una segunda revolución — una revolución social, Octubre—. El hecho de que las masas hayan realizado la revolución social básica en Europa del Este, aunque esta revolución inmediatamente haya sido burocratizada por la burocracia termidoriana, significa que ahora sólo tienen que hacer una segunda revolución —la revolución política—.
Cliff tiene sólo que plantear la pregunta: ¿Cuales son las tareas de la Cuarta Internacional en Rusia? Son idénticas a las de Europa del Este. Para conseguir el socialismo las masas deben tener el control de la administración y el Estado. Los estalinistas nunca podrán proporcionar esto y sólo se puede lograr con una nueva revolución. Sólo se puede conseguir con el derrocamiento de 1a burocracia de Europa del Este, así como en Rusia, por tanto la tarea de la Cuarta Internacional es clara, la lucha por una revolución política para establecer una democracia obrera, unsemiestado y la transición rápida al socialismo sobre las bases de la igualdad. La forma de propiedad no cambiará.El hecho de que Cliff llame a esto una revolución social no modifica nada.
Donde Trotsky encontraba pruebas del Estado obrero en la extensión de las formas de propiedad, Cliff encuentra las pruebas de lo contrario.
Cliff podría decir que a menos que la clase obrera tenga el control directo del Estado, éste no puede ser un Estado obrero. En ese caso, tendríamos que rechazar la idea de que existía un Estado obrero en Rusia, excepto posiblemente en los primeros meses. Incluso aquí es necesario repetir que la dictadura del proletariado se realizó a través del instrumento de la vanguardia de la clase, por ejemplo, el partido, y en el partido a través de la dirección del mismo. En las mejores condiciones esto se efectuará con la mayor democracia tanto dentro del Estado como en el partido. Pero la propia existencia de la dictadura, su necesidad para conseguir el cambio del sistema social, es ya una prueba de las profundas contradicciones sociales que se pueden encontrar, en circunstancias históricas desfavorables, que son un reflejo dentro del Estado y dentro del partido. El partido, no más que el Estado, puede automática y directamente reflejar los intereses de la clase. Lenin por este motivo pensaba que los sindicatos eran un factor necesario para la defensa de los trabajadores contra su Estado, así como un baluarte para la defensa del Estado.
Si fue posible para el partido de la clase obrera (la socialdemocracia), especialmente a través de su dirección, degenerar y fracasar directamente a la hora de reflejar los intereses de la clase antes del derrocamiento del capitalismo, ¿por qué es imposible para el Estado establecido por los trabajadores seguir un modelo similar? ¿Por qué no puede el Estado ganar independencia de la clase, y parasitariamente enriquecerse, mientras al mismo tiempo (en sus propios intereses) defender las nuevas formas económicas creadas por la revolución? Como hemos visto antes, Cliff trata de hacer una distinción para trazar una línea metafísica en 1928, cuando pensaba que la plusvalía no era consumida por la burocracia y después cuando sí lo era. A parte de basarse en hechos incorrectos, es una forma simplista de examinar el fenómeno.
En realidad, la forma de la transición de una sociedad a otra, ha sido más compleja de lo que cabría prever para los fundadores del socialismo científico. Tanto como a cualquier otra clase o formación social al proletariado le ha sido dado el privilegio de tener inevitablemente un tránsito tranquilo en la transición a su dominio y, por consiguiente, una desaparición tranquila e indolora en la sociedad, es decir, el socialismo. Esa era una variante posible. Pero la degeneración tanto de la socialdemocracia como del Estado soviético en determinadas condiciones no era en absoluto accidental. Representaba, en un sentido, las relaciones complejas entre una clase, sus representantes y el Estado, la cual, más de una vez en la historia, la clase dominante, burguesía, feudal o esclavista, tuvo causas para lamentarlo. Refleja, en otras palabras, la multiplicidad de factores históricos que forman la base del factor decisivo: el económico.
Contrasta el amplio punto de vista de Lenin con el mecanicista de Cliff. Lenin insistía una y otra vez en la necesidad de estudiar los períodos de transición de las épocas pasadas, especialmente del feudalismo al capitalismo, para entender las leyes de la transición en Rusia. Él habría rechazado la concepción de que el Estado surgido en Octubre tendría que seguir una norma preconcebida, o de otra forma sino dejaría de ser un Estado obrero.
Lenin sabía bien que el proletariado, su partido y dirección no le había dado el poder para que les llevara, sin contradicciones, tranquilamente al socialismo una vez que el capitalismo había sido derrocado. Esta es necesariamente la única conclusión que se debe extraer de las normas categóricas kantianas afirmadas por Cliff. De hecho Lenin subrayó que la dictadura del proletariado cambiaría tremendamente en diferentes países y en distintas condiciones.
Sin embargo, Lenin insistía constantemente en el punto de que en la transición del feudalismo al capitalismo, la dictadura de la ascendente burguesía se reflejaba en la dictadura de un hombre. Una clase podría gobernar a través del dominio personal de un hombre. Cliff es bastante complaciente al aceptar esta concepción cuando se aplica a la burguesía. Pero de sus argumentos se podría llegar a la conclusión de que tal cosa sería imposible en el caso del proletariado. El dominio de un hombre implica absolutismo, dictadura arbitraria encarnada en un único individuo, sin derechos políticos para la clase dominante a cuyos intereses, en última instancia, él representa. Pero Lenin sólo hizo este comentario para demostrar que bajo determinadas condiciones la dictadura del proletariado podría realizarse también a través de la dictadura de un hombre. Lenin no desarrolló esta idea. Pero hoy a la luz de la experiencia de Rusia y Europa del Este, y con los acontecimientos en China, podemos profundizar y entender no sólo el presente sino también los acontecimientos del pasado.
Mientras la dictadura del proletariado puede ser realizada a través de la dictadura de un hombre por que esto implica la separación del Estado de la clase a la que representa, también significa que el aparato casi inevitablemente tenderá a hacerse independiente de su base y así adquirirá intereses creados propios, incluso hostiles y ajenos a la clase que representa como en el caso de la Rusia estalinista. Cuando estudiamos el desarrollo de la sociedad burguesa, vemos que la autocracia de un individuo, con determinadas contradicciones sociales, servía a las necesidades del desarrollo de esa sociedad. Está claramente demostrado en el dominio de Cromwell y Napoleón. Pero aunque ambos mantenían una base burguesa, en un estadio determinado de la autocracia burguesa, pasa de ser un factor favorable para el desarrollo de la sociedad capitalista a un obstáculo para el pleno y libre desarrollo de la producción burguesa. Entonces, la dictadura del absolutismo se debilita. En Francia e Inglaterra necesitaron de revoluciones políticas adicionales antes de poder cambiar la autocracia burguesa por la democracia burguesa. Pero sin la democracia burguesa en su plenitud, el libre desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas hasta los límites alcanzados bajo el capitalismo habría sido imposible.
¿Si esto se aplica a la evolución histórica de la burguesía por qué no se puede aplicar al proletariado en un país atrasado y aislado donde la dictadura del proletariado ha degenerado en la dictadura de un hombre?
Para que el proletariado tome el camino del socialismo es necesaria una nueva revolución, una revolución política, que transforme el Estado bonapartista proletario en una democracia obrera. Tal concepción coincide con la experiencia del pasado. El capitalismo ha pasado a través de muchas fases, contradictorias y tormentosas, (estamos lejos de haber acabado con ellas aún, como vemos en nuestra época), y en unas condiciones históricas dadas ha llevado a que el proletariado tenga el gobierno en Rusia. Y también por una reacción mutua, la fase bonapartista que están atravesando Europa del Este y China, terminará inevitablemente en nuevas revoluciones políticas en todos estos países para instalar la democracia obrera como requisito previo para la transición al socialismo.
Es en la interrelación entre las clases y su Estado, bajo determinadas condiciones históricas, donde encontramos la explicación a la degeneración estalinista, no en la idea mística de que un Estado obrero, en unas condiciones concretas, debe ser una perfecta democracia obrera o si no el Estado se transformará en una clase. A la larga, el factor económico, como en la sociedad burguesa, con muchas agitaciones y catástrofes, emergerá triunfante.
La clase obrera se ha enriquecido con la experiencia histórica y extrayendo sus lecciones, derrocará triunfalmente el absolutismo estalinista, y organizará una democracia obrera sana a un nivel muy superior. Entonces, el Estado, más o menos, corresponderá con la forma ideal elaborada por Marx y Engels.
Nicaragua: ¿Una nueva Cuba?
Nicaragua: ¿Una nueva Cuba?
Extracto de Workers Vanguard No. 238, 17 de agosto de 1979. Esta versión fue impresa en Spartacist en español No. 08, agosto de 1980.
El mes pasado cuando 100.000 personas llenaron la recién bautizada Plaza de la Revolución de Managua para aclamar el derrocamiento, bajo dirección sandinista, de la sangrienta dinastía de Somoza, instalada hace 45 años por los marines estadounidenses, los revolucionarios de todo el mundo aclamaron junto a las masas nicaragüenses la caída del dictador. Fue la primera derrota seria del imperialismo norteamericano desde que el ejército revolucionario cubano aniquiló a los gusanos organizados por la CIA en Playa Girón.
Durante las dos décadas después de la derrota imperialista en Cuba, la burguesía norteamericana y sus “gorilas” locales ―obsesionados por el espectro de una “nueva Cuba” ― han desatado una venganza terrible contra los obreros, campesinos e intelectuales de América Latina: la invasión de los marines a la República Dominicana en 1965, la caza y el asesinato del Che Guevara por la CIA, el derrocamiento de la democracia burguesa en Brasil y Uruguay, y luego una campaña salvaje de terror contra la izquierda, con 30.000 obreros y militantes de izquierda asesinados en Chile en 1973 y millares de muertos más en la Argentina unos años después. Pero cuando el graduado de West Point “Tacho” Somoza huyó a Miami con todo el mando militar de su Guardia Nacional, fue la primera revolución popular contra una dictadura de derechas desde el momento en que el Ejército Rebelde de Fidel Castro entró en La Habana el 1º de enero de 1959.
¿Se convertiría Nicaragua en una nueva Cuba? No sorprende que todo el mundo se planteaba esta pregunta no sólo en la primera plana del Washington Post y en los pasillos del Pentágono, sino también entre los militantes de izquierda por toda América Latina. Mientras los comentaristas de Guerra Fría Rowland Evans y Robert Novak lamentaron que “América Central se vuelve roja”, la mayoría de los periodistas burgueses, así como el Departamento de Estado, sostienen que se puede evitar una nueva Cuba.
El futuro camino político y económico de Nicaragua, al menos visto desde lejos, no está categóricamente predeterminado. (Al contrario de Irán, donde el carácter religioso claramente reaccionario de la oposición jomeinista al sha permitió a los revolucionarios pronosticar de antemano la naturaleza del nuevo régimen.)
La destrucción del régimen somocista ha dañado severamente al orden burgués nicaragüense. Somoza tenía más motivo que Luis XIV para decir “El estado soy yo”. La familia de Somoza no solamente constituyó el componente mayor de la clase burguesa, siendo propietaria de gran parte de los sectores claves de la economía. El poder estatal se había reducido a la guardia personal pretoriana de Somoza. La guerra civil la destruyó.
Al negociar con la junta revolucionaria las condiciones para el desalojamiento de Somoza, el Departamento de Estado no se preocupaba tanto de añadir al futuro gobierno unos cuantos burgueses conservadores más sino de conservar la Guardia Nacional. Y los sandinistas sí consintieron que los oficiales “honestos y patrióticos” de la Guardia serían integrados en un nuevo ejército nacional, sin represalias contra ninguno.
¡Qué traición más cruel del pueblo nicaragüense, que ha visto masacrar a sus maridos, niños y padres a manos de los pistoleros somocistas en uniforme!
El ejército particular de Somoza, sin embargo, no se fió en los dirigentes sandinistas, cualesquiera fuesen las promesas que estos dieran a Carter, para protegerse contra la furia de sangre de sus víctimas. Cuando huyó su jefe. La Guardia se desmoronó en una masa de refugiados despavoridos. La imagen de las tropas de Somoza dejando sus armas, quitándose los uniformes y subiendo a gatas a los helicópteros para escapar recuerda a escenas parecidas durante la caída de Saigón. La mayoría de los aviones de la fuerza aérea somocista, apoderados por las tropas en fuga, ahora están aparcados en las pistas de aterrizaje de Guatemala y Honduras. Precipitándose hacia El Salvador, guardias desesperados desviaban unas barcas pesqueras; otros se formaron en una columna desordenada que cruzó a toda prisa la frontera con Honduras, mientras los militares más desgraciados se refugiaban en las iglesias, los campamentos de la Cruz Roja y las embajadas extranjeras. Con suerte algunos llegarán a ser juzgados por sus crímenes atroces.
Somoza dejó un país en ruinas. Toda ciudad importante había sido bombardeada mientras Estelí, que desde septiembre pasado ha sido la escena de repetidas batallas fuertes, hoy día es un pueblo casi desierto. Las fábricas están destrozadas; se han perdido las cosechas. Como los autobuses servían de barricadas durante los combates, el transporte ha sufrido un colapso total. Los cientos de miles que regresan de los campos de refugiados encuentran a un país que ha quedado sin viviendas ni empleos. Decenas de miles han muerto en la lucha.
El vacío del poder en Nicaragua resulta en igual medida de la desorganización grave del orden burgués como de la debilidad de la clase obrera, desprovista de conciencia y organización. Este vacío proporciona a los sectores pequeñoburgueses y sus representantes Sandinistas radicales un peso social y una autonomía excepcionales frente a los decisivos campos de clase contrapuestos, el proletariado y el capitalismo. Ahora el ejército guerrillero sandinista constituye la fuerza militar dominante. Y la cuestión clave: si entre estas fuerzas radicales burguesas y pequeñoburguesas se va a constituir de nuevo un aparato estatal capitalista o si la revolución llevará a una ruptura con el sistema capitalista-imperialista.
La destrucción de la Guardia Nacional somocista, igual que la destrucción hace 20 años del ejército cubano de Batista, ha abierto un período en el cual todavía no está fundamentalmente determinada la naturaleza de clase del estado naciente. Los comandantes sandinistas han prometido respetar la propiedad privada ―pero también lo hizo el primer gobierno de la Revolución Cubana. Como decíamos hace tres años:
“ … lo que surgió en La Habana luego del derrocamiento de Batista fue un fenómeno necesariamente transitorio y fundamentalmente inestable ― un gobierno pequeñoburgués que no estaba comprometido ni a la defensa de formas de propiedad privada burguesa, ni a formas de propiedad colectivista del dominio proletario…. este régimen era temporalmente autónomo del orden burgués (o sea, no existía en el sentido marxista un estado capitalista, en otras palabras no existían los cuerpos armados dedicados a la defensa de las formas particulares de propiedad de la burguesía)”
― “Guerrilleros en el poder”, Spartacist (edición en español) No. 7, junio de 1979
Las lecciones de Cuba
Así es que la Revolución Cubana proyecta su larga sombra sobre Nicaragua, y no principalmente porque Castro ha apoyado durante años a los guerrilleros sandinistas. El Ejército Rebelde de Castro era una fuerza pequeño burguesa heterogénea temporalmente independiente de la burguesía. Normalmente, al llegar al poder, formaciones de esa índole se han convertido en nuevos regímenes burgueses bonapartistas, integrados en el sistema imperialista. Pero el caso cubano tenía un desarrollo excepcional llevando a una ruptura con el orden capitalista-imperialista.
Al llegar al poder los guerrilleros del Movimiento 26 de Julio establecieron un gobierno de coalición con antiguos políticos burgueses, quienes además ocuparon los puestos más altos: Manuel Urrutia presidente, José Miró Cardona primer ministro y Roberto Agramonte ministro de relaciones exteriores. Pero las reformas iniciales de Castro, más que toda la reforma agraria de junio de 1959, provocaron una reacción violenta del imperialismo de EE.UU., que lanzó un boicot económico y fomentó la contrarrevolución en la isla. Castro por su parte reaccionó con medidas cada vez más radicales, que ahuyentaron todo apoyo burgués. Temiendo la ira del poderío yanqui, la burguesía cubana en su mayoría huyó a los EE.UU. esperando volver en la estela de los marines.
Para defenderse contra el imperialismo estadounidense y el sabotaje económico de la burguesía cubana, entre junio y diciembre de 1960 el régimen castrista expropió la propiedad capitalista. Al realizar esta transformación social los radicales pequeñoburgueses del Movimiento 26 de Julio también pasaron a constituirse en una burocracia estalinista de un estado obrero deformado, que expropió políticamente y oprime a los obreros y campesinos cubanos. Como hemos señalado:
“… la burocracia estalinista rusa es, en uno de sus aspectos contradictorios centrales ―es decir, el de ser la correa de transmisión de la presión del mundo burgués sobre un estado obrero― una formación pequeñoburguesa. La parte decisiva de los castristas pudo hacer la transición hacia la dirección de un estado obrero deformado porque, en ausencia del igualitarismo y la democracia proletaria de un estado ganado directamente por la clase obrera, nunca tuvieron que trascender o alterar fundamentalmente sus propios apetitos sociales pequeñoburgueses radicales, sino sólo transformarlos y redirigirlos.”
― Prefacio a Cuadernos Marxistas No. 2, “Cuba y la teoría marxista” (1973)
Las figuras principales en el derrocamiento de Somoza han sacado, cada una a su manera, algunas lecciones de esta historia en sus intentos de evitar una nueva Cuba. Un par de años atrás la agrupación más numerosa entre los sandinistas, los “terceristas”, decidió que declararse a favor de un socialismo al estilo cubano sería levantar una barrera a una alianza amplia en contra de Somoza. Por lo tanto, dejaron su castrismo y asumieron un programa puramente nacionalista burgués. La burguesía antisomocista, representando a la gran mayoría de los capitalistas nicaragüenses, respondió favorablemente y después ha intentado domesticar a los guerrilleros sandinistas.
La revolución social desde arriba llevada a cabo en Cuba ocurrió solamente porque el régimen bonapartista de Castro se enfrentó con condiciones históricas excepcionales. Entre ellas, un factor decisivo fue la beligerancia de los EE.UU. hacia el gobierno rebelde cubano. Esta experiencia también ha sido aleccionadora para el imperialismo norteamericano, y en muchos círculos de Washington se reconoce ahora que la ciega hostilidad a Castro de los EE.UU. en 1959 ayudó a empujarle hacia las expropiaciones que querían impedir. Así, parece que hoy por hoy los dirigentes norteamericanos han elegido la zanahoria y no el palo en Nicaragua.
Al mismo tiempo, los dirigentes norteamericanos no se disponen a entregar un cheque en blanco a los sandinistas. Managua ha pedido que los EE.UU. la provean de armamento para el nuevo Ejército Popular. El retraso de Washington en acordarlo incitó al famoso jefe guerrillero y nuevo subministro del interior “Comandante Cero” (Edén Pastora) a amenazar que la junta recurriría al “bloque socialista” para conseguir armas, aunque más tarde el ministro del interior Borge repudió esta declaración.
A pesar de las repetidas afirmaciones del régimen sandinista que desea buenas relaciones con Washington, la retórica antinorteamericana procedente de Managua intranquiliza a los diplomáticos de los EE.UU. Según el Washington Post (7 de agosto de 1979), Barricada, el órgano oficial del gobierno y único periódico actualmente editado en el país, describe la revolución antisomocista como una derrota para “el imperialismo U.S.A.” y hace referencia a la Organización de Estados Americanos como “el Ministerio de Colonias del Departamento de Estado”. El deseo del imperialismo yanqui de tratar con el régimen nicaragüense va a afectar mucho su desarrollo y puede resultar decisivo en producir la reconsolidación de un estado comprometido a la defensa de las formas de propiedad capitalista. Pero por muy astuta que sea la política de Washington, la suerte del régimen nicaragüense también depende del desarrollo de la lucha de clases al interior de Nicaragua.
El futuro de la revolución nicaragüense
Este gobierno de guerrilleros “marxistas-leninistas” y grandes capitalistas no lo va a encontrar fácil dominar a un país cuya economía está arruinada, cuyo ejército ha huido y cuyas masas esperan más de la revolución que únicamente unos lemas de “una nueva Nicaragua”. No hace falta ser marxista para darse cuenta de que el gobierno provisorio de reconstrucción nacional es todo menos que un equipo gobernante estable dedicado a algún programa definido. Como informó Alan Riding en el New York Times del 22 de julio (de 1979):
“Anastasia Somoza Debayle fue derrocado la semana pasada porque llegó a unir a casi todos los sectores de Nicaragua en contra de él. En el calor de la guerra, incluso causó la formación de un gobierno provisorio de reconstrucción nacional compuesto de aliados de lo más improbables. ¿Pero será capaz de funcionar en el poder esta mezcla de clases e ideologías cómo funcionaba en la oposición?”
“En realidad, cuanto más la oposición se acercaba al poder, más frágil parecía la coalición. Siempre era fácil redactar denuncias conjuntas de la dictadura, pero era menos sencillo para los hombres de negocios, conservadores, intelectuales socialdemócratas y guerrilleros marxistas concordar en lo que debiera reemplazarla.”
Parece que los guerrilleros sandinistas han entregado a los representantes burgueses la mayor parte del poder gubernamental. De la docena (más o menos) de ministros solamente dos son de la dirección sandinista; los demás son grandes capitalistas, curas y tecnócratas. Pero el verdadero poder no se ubica en estos ministerios. Castro tampoco fue ministro en el primer gobierno pos batistiano; él fue simplemente comandante del Ejército Rebelde. Si los dirigentes sandinistas han sido generosos en la distribución de carteras ministeriales a sus aliados burgueses, no han permitido que ellos tomasen el mando de los fusiles.
Se podría imaginar que molestaría a Fidel Castro que los sandinistas, a quienes ofreció amistad cuando eran débiles, ahora rechazan a Cuba como modelo revolucionario. Pero no, el “líder máximo” estalinista se ha juntado al coro proclamando que los sandinistas representan un sistema social propio de Nicaragua:
“…a los temores expresados por alguna gente… que Nicaragua se va a convertir en una nueva Cuba. Los nicaragüenses le han dado una magnífica respuesta, no. Nicaragua se va a convertir en una nueva Nicaragua, que es una cosa muy distinta.”
― Discurso del 26 de julio, reproducido en Perspectiva Mundial, 3 de septiembre de 1979
Puede que un sector decisivo de los cuadros sandinistas junto con sus aliados burgueses actuales reconstituirán un estado burgués bajo el dominio del imperialismo yanqui. Pero ésa no es la única posibilidad. Un ascenso de lucha social combativa desde abajo (p.ej., ocupaciones de tierra por los campesinos, venganza popular contra los guardias somocistas), sobre todo si provoca una reacción de hostilidad por parte de los EE.UU., puede presionar a un sector de los sandinistas pequeñoburgueses radicales hacia la izquierda, conduciendo a una revolución social burocráticamente deformada. Pero por otra parte, tal ascenso, especialmente con la ausencia de una dirección revolucionaria consciente, bien podría terminar en una contrarrevolución sangrienta de la burguesía criolla en alianza con los imperialistas norteamericanos.
Hay otro camino, por el cual se encuentra la verdadera perspectiva de la victoria de una revolución nicaragüense: la llegada de la clase obrera como fuerza independiente y consciente luchando por el poder. La creación de órganos independientes de poder obrero (p.ej., milicias obreras, comités de fábrica, soviets) pondría recíprocamente las bases para el desarrollo rápido de un partido proletario revolucionario (leninista). El desarrollo de las fuerzas proletarias revolucionarias amenazaría a los apetitos bonapartistas pequeñoburgueses de todas las alas de la dirección sandinista; un sector de este movimiento pequeñoburgués muy probablemente pasaría a los obreros y a su vanguardia, mientras otros elementos se retirarían al campo de la reacción burguesa.
La actual “unidad” de la revolución antisomocista será destrozada, de alguna manera u otra, por el conflicto de clases. En sí la derrota de Somoza plantea la redistribución radical de la propiedad capitalista en Nicaragua. Este multimillonario sanguinario fue propietario de más de un 30 por ciento de toda la tierra cultivable del país, además de un ganado vacuno enorme. Tenía la participación predominante en la compañía aérea nacional, poseía la compañía naviera más grande del país, el matadero más grande, varias empresas constructoras y mucho más. Ahora el nuevo régimen ha tomado posesión de todo.
¡Obreros al poder! ¡Por un partido trotskista!
Qué hacer con esta propiedad inmensa será un campo de conflicto mayor entre las distintas clases sociales que actualmente apoyan a la junta sandinista/burguesa. Los campesinos esperan y van a exigir que las haciendas de Somoza sirvan de base para una revolución agraria radical e igualitaria. Los políticos burgueses de Managua intentarán transferir la antigua riqueza de Somoza a sus propios bolsillos y a los de sus amigos. El ministro de reforma agraria, el sandinista Jaime Wheelock, propone convertir la mayoría de las tierras de Somoza en granjas cooperativas, una propuesta que debe desagradar a sus “compañeros” ministeriales burgueses, que tienen su propia hambre de tierra. Además, los terratenientes burgueses seguramente temen que las tomas de tierra muy bien pueden extenderse más allá de las fincas de “Tacho” hasta las suyas. Es posible que, como en la Cuba de 1959, el alcance y la naturaleza de la reforma agraria puedan motivar la primera explosión importante entre ministros burgueses como Alfonso Robelo (“el rey del aceite de cocina” de Nicaragua) y radicales pequeño burgueses como Wheelock.
Ni pueden ni quieren las masas de Nicaragua vivir como antes vivían. Pero para llevar a cabo una revolución socialista, las masas radicalizadas han de ser políticamente dirigidas y organizadas por un partido revolucionario de vanguardia, basándose fundamentalmente en el proletariado y con una perspectiva internacional. Con la ausencia de tal partido leninista (trotskista), Nicaragua podrá como máximo llegar a ser una nueva Cuba, es decir, a una revolución social deformada que impone a la clase obrera una burocracia, estrechamente nacionalista, parásita y opresiva. El “socialismo en una sola república bananera” no puede ser sino un obstáculo al desarrollo de la revolución socialista en América Latina.
Pero el Secretariado Unificado (SU) seudotrotskista no reconoce la necesidad de una vanguardia leninista porque toda su perspectiva es de presionar a los sandinistas pequeñoburgueses para que hagan “una nueva Cuba”. La declaración del SU del 20 de junio, “Solidaridad con la lucha del pueblo nicaragüense” (Intercontinental Press, 9 de julio de 1979), no llega a mencionar la necesidad de un partido proletario revolucionario. En lugar de eso, estos revisionistas declaran que el Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional es la “vanguardia… del pueblo de Nicaragua”. Pero la fracción “tercerista” dominante tiene un programa puramente democrático-burgués, mientras las otras dos fracciones sostienen la revolución “en dos etapas” de corte estalinista. Estando ahora en el poder, los sandinistas no sólo han afirmado su intención de dirigir una Nicaragua capitalista, sino también han tomado medidas para efectuarlo.
En Nicaragua la tarea inmediata a la que se enfrenta un partido revolucionario es de oponerse a los esfuerzos de la junta sandinista/burguesa dirigidos a restaurar un estado capitalista. Los dirigentes sandinistas ya han manifestado su aspiración bonapartista de asegurar un monopolio del poder militar. Una de las primeras medidas de la junta revolucionaria fue de mandar que todos los civiles entregaran los fusiles, muchos de ellos adquiridos cuando los guardias abandonaron en masa sus armas. Dado el caos revolucionario, es poco probable que este decreto se haya cumplido. Una reivindicación urgente que un partido revolucionario en Nicaragua debe enarbolar es que las masas trabajadoras guarden sus armas, y que se establezcan milicias obreras independientes del régimen sandinista/burgués.
Un partido revolucionario emprendería la agitación a favor de tribunales populares para enjuiciar a los criminales de la Guardia Nacional escondidos en las iglesias y los campamentos de la Cruz Roja. Exigiría una revolución agraria radical e igualitaria, la expropiación de la industria y el comercio y la reconstrucción de la economía sobre una base socialista. Las expropiaciones no deben ser limitadas solamente a la propiedad de Somoza. Más que todo, los trotskistas han de hacer propaganda por un gobierno excluyendo a la burguesía antisomocista y basado en los órganos democráticos de la clase obrera y sus aliados campesinos. Claramente tal lucha revolucionaria no puede limitarse únicamente a Nicaragua, sino debe afanarse por crear los Estados Unidos Socialistas de América Latina.
Mario Muñoz a Salvo
¡Libertad para todas las víctimas de represión derechista en Argentina y Chile!
Mario Muñoz a Salvo
Informe del PDC – agosto de 1976. Esta versión fue impresa en Spartacist en español No. 4, mayo de 1977.
El 4 de agosto, Mario Muñoz Salas, el dirigente minero chileno que había sido víctima de una persecución policíaca durante cuatro meses, llegó a salvo a Viena, Austria. La liberación de este valiente dirigente sindical de clase de las manos de la junta sanguinaria de Videla, es un triunfo para la clase obrera internacional y es como un faro de esperanza para las decenas de miles de refugiados del terror derechista todavía atrapados en Argentina.
Mario Muñoz fue recibido en el aeropuerto de Viena por una delegación que abarcaba a representantes del Comité para Salvar la Vida de Mario Muñoz, y el Comité de Defensa de los Prisioneros Obreros y Marinos en Chile; la tendencia espartaquista internacional y su sección simpatizante, los BoIcheviques-Leninistas Austriacos (OBL); Albrecht Konecny, presidente de la Generación Joven del Partido Socialista de Austria; y representantes de la prensa austriaca. Al llegar, Muñoz agradeció al gobierno austriaco por haberle concedido un visado y expresó su reconocimiento a todos quienes acudieron a su defensa. Expresó preocupación por la suerte de su compañera y sus hijos quienes no han podido salir de Argentina, y por todas las víctimas de la represión derechista todavía atrapadas en Argentina.
La tarea del Comité para Salvar la Vida de Mario Muñoz no se verá culminada hasta que éste se haya reunido con su familia [1]. En nombre del Comité, su cocoordinador estadounidense, el Partisan Defense Committee quiere expresar su profundo agradecimiento a los individuos y a las organizaciones que contribuyeron generosamente con su tiempo, energía, consejos atentos y su apoyo financiero para salvar la vida de este dirigente obrero ejemplar.
La campaña internacional para salvar la vida de Mario Muñoz fue decisiva para lograr el salvoconducto para salir de Argentina auspiciado por las Naciones Unidas, y para que el gobierno austriaco recibiera a este perseguido dirigente sindical chileno y a su familia. Este triunfo es prueba de la fuerza de la protesta internacional en el espíritu de la solidaridad obrera, la misma solidaridad a la cual se ha dedicado Mario Muñoz. Frecuentemente, una campaña de defensa se puede edificar debido a las reputaciones internacionales de conocidos intelectuales y artistas que caen víctimas del terror reaccionario. Pero dirigentes obreros y militantes como Mario Muñoz, aunque respetados en sus propios países, son muchas veces ignorados por ser desconocidos en el extranjero. Las campañas de defensa para éstos sólo pueden establecerse por medio de la protesta de masas y propaganda enfocada sobre el movimiento laboral de forma antisectaria, y también recogiendo el apoyo más amplio de todos los que se preocupan por los derechos humanos.
El Comité para Salvar la Vida de Mario Muñoz pudo alistar el apoyo de centenares de organizaciones laborales y socialistas, de dirigentes de organizaciones obreras y de derechos ciudadanos, además de personalidades destacadas en cuatro continentes. Fueron aprobadas innumerables resoluciones; cartas fueron escritas; se hicieron indagaciones, y se enviaron muchos telegramas en favor de la causa de Mario Muñoz. Aparecieron artículos y cartas respecto a la situación peligrosa de Muñoz, y de otros refugiados políticos amenazados en Argentina, en Le Monde, en el New York Times, el New York Review of Books, el Toronto Globe and Mail y el Toronto Star, el Australian Tribune y el Morning Herald de Sydney, y en otras publicaciones sindicales y socialistas. Se recogieron más de US$20.000, de los cuales US$1O.000 durante las últimas dos semanas de la campaña cuando se supo que el gobierno austriaco estaba dispuesto a aceptar a Muñoz y su familia. Una delegación internacional organizada por el Comité para Salvar la Vida de Mario Muñoz se reunió con el Alto Comisario para Refugiados de la ONU, el príncipe Sadruddin Aga Khan, en Ginebra el 16 de julio de 1976. Incluidos en la delegación fueron representantes de la Juventud Socialista de Austria, la Confederación Mundial del Trabajo, la Asociación Internacional de Juristas Católicos, la Asociación de Juristas Progresistas de Suiza, la Sociedad de Amigos de Francia, el Comité de Defensa de los Prisioneros Obreros y Marinos en Chile, y el Comité para Salvar la Vida de Mario Muñoz. El Alto Comisario prometió la cooperación de la ONU en conseguirle a Muñoz un salvoconducto para salir de Argentina.
Aún antes del golpe de estado de Videla, el Partisan Defense Committee movilizó protestas contra el creciente terror derechista en Argentina. El 5 de diciembre de 1975, el Comité convocó una manifestación frente a la delegación argentina ante la ONU en protesta contra la detención de 13 individuos, entre los cuales se cuentan diez refugiados chilenos y Richard y Cristina Whitecross, acusados de actuar como enlaces para el suministro de materiales y fondos a la resistencia chilena. Sólo los Whitecross fueron liberados y el Partisan Defense Committee continuará sus esfuerzos hasta que sean liberados los 11 que quedan.
A sólo 48 horas de haber tomado el poder la junta de Videla, con el cínico pretexto de respetar los derechos democráticos, la policía argentina se lanzó la búsqueda de Mario Muñoz con órdenes de fusilarle en el acto. El 25 de marzo allanaron su casa y golpearon brutalmente a su familia, e inclusive raptaron a su niño de dos meses para utilizarlo de rehén. Muñoz, minero desde la edad de 14 años, era un dirigente obrero ampliamente respetado en Chile. Después del golpe sangriento de Pinochet en septiembre de 1973, Muñoz y su familia, junto con miles de obreros y campesinos chilenos, se vieron forzados a huir, cruzando los Andes para buscar refugio en Argentina. Muñoz continuó ayudando a sus hermanos de clase durante los años difíciles del exilio. El brutal allanamiento policíaco del 25 de marzo no sólo señaló que era perseguido en dos países, sino que también Videla, iba a seguir los pasos de Pinochet. El ataque sobre la familia de Muñoz fue el primer tiro en el desencadenamiento de la represión salvaje que se iba a derramar sobre el movimiento obrero argentino y sobre miles de refugiados políticos que habían huido del terror reaccionario de países vecinos, sólo para ver la sombra oscura de ese terror acecharlos en su refugio inseguro.
La fachada democrática del golpe de estado “caballeroso” e “incruento” al principio fue aceptada y perpetuada por tales periódicos como el New York Times. Al principio, muchas personas solicitadas por el Comité para Salvar la Vida de Mario Muñoz no estaban al corriente o negaban la extensión del terror en Argentina. Pero el peligro para los refugiados fue demostrado de nuevo con la detención el 10 de abril y la extradición a Chile el 27 de abril del dirigente del MIR Edgardo Enríquez. El Partisan Defense Committee se unió a la protesta internacional contra este abuso descarado de los convenios de asilo por la junta de Videla. Después, Zelmar Michelini y Hector Gutiérrez Ruíz, dos liberales de la oposición de la dictadura uruguaya, fueron secuestrados y asesinados por los gánsteres de la AAA en colaboración con las autoridades argentinas. El 2 de julio, Mario Muñoz y otros 12 refugiados chilenos fueron arrancados brutalmente del lugar de refugio que les fue asignado por la ONU, y golpeados y torturados por la policía argentina. A Muñoz le amenazaron con deportarle a Chile, pero al día siguiente todos fueron liberados. Sólo el apoyo movilizado por la campaña para salvar a Mario Muñoz impidió su deportación y asesinato por la policía secreta chilena.
A medida que la realidad de la supresión viciosa de todo derecho humano por la junta llegó a ser demasiado descarada para disfrazarla con una retórica democrática, y mientras que montones de cadáveres, víctimas de asesinatos por la policía y la AAA no podían ocultarse más, la campaña para salvar la vida de Mario Muñoz encontró eco en la repugnancia internacional contra el terror de Videla, una repugnancia intensificada por las consecuencias desastrosas del sanguinario golpe de estado pinochetista. La campaña para salvar la vida de Mario Muñoz, aún con sus recursos modestos, ha jugado un papel sustancial en desenmascarar la fachada democrática del “golpe caballeroso”, y al enfocar la protesta internacional contra el terror de Videla. El Comité para Salvar la Vida de Mario Muñoz dio el toque de alarma no sólo para este dirigente obrero en peligro, sino también para miles de militantes de izquierda y dirigentes obreros argentinos, así como para los refugiados políticos amenazados con deportaciones, encarcelamientos y asesinato por la dictadura militar argentina y sus escuadrones de muerte parapoliciales. Mario Muñoz es el símbolo de la situación desesperada de miles de víctimas de la represión derechista sudamericana. El éxito de esta campaña contribuye a la lucha para su libertad. Ya el viernes 6 de agosto el Alto Comisario para Refugiados de la ONU anunció que Austria, Gran Bretaña, Canadá, Francia, Noruega y Suiza recibirán a casi 2.000 refugiados latinoamericanos procedentes de Argentina.
Partisan Defense Committee
El Partisan Defense Committee es una organización de defensa antisectaria y de lucha de clases, conforme con la política de la Spartacist League de EE.UU. El comité es partidario a favor del lado de los trabajadores y de los oprimidos en la lucha contra sus explotadores y opresores. En su partidismo el Partisan Defense Committee es antisectario y se aferra a la defensa de los trabajadores en su conjunto, sin consideración sectaria o fraccional. Nuestra política es la de la lucha de clases. Mientras utilizamos todos los procedimientos legales disponibles, no tenemos confianza en la justicia de las cortes, sino que al contrario confiamos en la fuerza de la protesta de las masas. Nos oponemos a toda legislación antilaboral y a la intervención gubernamental en los asuntos de la izquierda y del movimiento laboral, particularmente cuando tales intervenciones fingen avanzar los intereses de los oprimidos. No defendemos a grupos como el llamado “Ejército de Liberación Simbionés”, que desatan un terror sin discriminación y cuyas víctimas al azar no son enemigos de los oprimidos. Tampoco defendemos los derechos democráticos de grupos de acción fascistas como el Klan, los nazis o las AAA, cuyo único objeto es la destrucción de los derechos democráticos y de organizaciones obreras, y el genocidio de minorías nacionales, raciales y religiosas. Al contrario, los derechos democráticos, las organizaciones obreras y los oprimidos sólo se pueden defender con movilizaciones de masas contra tales grupos.
El Partisan Defense Committee se opone sin condición alguna al gansterismo dentro de la izquierda y del movimiento obrero, porque esta violencia envenena la posibilidad futura de acciones conjuntas, debilita nuestras fuerzas y nos expone a un ataque por el gobierno. Igualmente, el Comité se opone al estrecho fraccionalismo que muchas veces estropea las campañas de defensa. Buscamos crear una organización internacional de defensa obrera, la cual todos los trabajadores y oprimidos considerarán suya, en la tradición de la lnternational Labor Defense durante los años 1925-28, bajo su fundador y primer secretario, James P. Cannon. El Partisan Defense Committee celebra la victoria que representa el salvamento de Mario Muñoz con llevar adelante la batalla para ganar la libertad para todas las víctimas de la represión derechista en Sudamérica y a través del mundo. Agradecemos el apoyo de todos en esta lucha.
[1] Posteriormente la familia se ha reunido en Europa.
The Trotskyist Position in Palestine
[Published in Fourth International, May 1948. This version copied from http://www.internationalist.org/stream1948.html ]
Against the Stream
The following editorial is translated from the Kol Ham’amad (Voice of the Class), Hebrew organ of the Revolutionary Communist League of Palestine, Section of the Fourth International. It exposes the reactionary role of the United Nations’ partition plan, which stifles the rising tide of class struggle in Palestine, blurs class lines and creates an atmosphere of antagonistic “national unity” in both of the national communities in Palestine. As we can see from the editorial, the CP of Palestine has not escaped the nationalist hysteria in both camps, and has split into two national parties.
Only the Palestinian Trotskyists have maintained the Socialist position by calling upon Jewish and Arab workers to break away from the class enemies within their ranks and conduct their independent struggle against imperialism. Despite the present high tide of chauvinism accompanying the new “Hebrew” state set up by Hagana arms on one side, and the invasion of the Arab “Liberation” army on the other, the internationalist working class program put forward by the Trotskyists will alone provide the means of solving the Palestine problem. – Ed. [of Fourth International]
Politicians and diplomats are still trying to find a formula for the disastrous situation into which Palestine has been plunged by the UNO deciding upon partition. Is this a “breach of international peace” or are we dealing with merely “hostile acts”? As far as we are concerned there is no point in this distinction. We are daily witnessing the killing or maiming of men and women, old and young, Jew or Arab. As always, the working masses and the poor suffer most.
Not so very long ago the Arab and Jewish workers were united in strikes against a foreign oppressor. This common struggle has been put to an end. Today the workers are being incited to kill each other. The inciters have succeeded.
“The British want to frustrate partition by means of Arab terrorism,” explain the Zionists. As if this communal strife were not the very instrument by which partition is brought about! It was easy for the imperialists to foresee that and well may they be satisfied with the course of events.
WHAT AXE HAVE BEVIN-CHURCHILL TO GRIND?
Britain was a loser in the last world war. She has lost the bulk of her foreign assets. Her industry is lagging behind. Building up her productive apparatus requires dollars and manpower.
“Keeping order” in Palestine costs England over 35 million Pounds a year, an amount which exceeds the profit she can extort from this country. Partition will release her from her financial obligations, enable her to employ her soldiers in the productive process while her source of income will remain intact. – But this is not all. By partition a wedge is driven between the Arab and Jewish worker. The Zionist state with its provocative lines of demarcation will bring about the blossoming forth of irredentist (revenge) movements on either side, there will be fighting for an “Arab Palestine” and for a Jewish state within the historic frontiers of Eretz Israel (Israel’s Land).” As a result the chauvinistic atmosphere created thus will poison the Arab world in the Middle East and throttle the anti-imperialist fight of the masses, while Zionists and Arab feudalists will vie for imperialist favors.
The price Britain has to pay for the advantages gained by partition is to renounce her ruling monopoly in this country. On the other hand, Wall Street has to come out into the open and contribute its share toward the foul business of safeguarding imperialist positions. This, of course, blackens the “democratic” reputation of the dollar state while at the same time it addes to the prestige of Great Britain. Partition, therefore, is a compromise between the imperialist robbers arising from a changed power constellation.
THE FUNCTION OF THE UNO
If the Anglo-American imperialists had forced this “solution” on Palestine of their own, the rotten game would have been patent in the whole Arab East. However, they dodged – the problem was passed on to the UNO. The function of the UNO was to sweeten the bitter dish cooked in the imperialist cuisine, dressing it, in Bevin’s words, with the twaddle of the “conscience of the world that has passed judgement.” Exactly. And the diplomats of the lesser countries danced to the tune of the dollar flute, reiterating the “public opinion of the world.” And the peculiar casts in this performance enables Great Britain to appear as the Guardian Angel overflowing with sympathy for either side.
And the Soviet Union? Why did not her representative call the UNO game the swindle it really is? – Apparently the present foreign policy of the SU is not concerned with the fighting of the colonial masses. And as the Palestine question is a second-rate affair for the “Big,” the Soviet diplomats saw fit to dwell upon what Stalin had said about the “the Soviet Union being ready to meet America and Britain halfway, economic and social differences notwithstanding.
This is how the UNO has “solved” the Palestinian problem. Yet it is the same unsavory dish that has been set for India, Greece and Indo-China.
WHAT DO JEWS STAND TO GAIN BY PARTITION?
The Zionists were overcome with a sense of triumph when offered the bone by the UNO cooks. “Our work, our righteous cause have won… before the forum of the nations.”
The Zionists have been in the habit of asking “justice” from the enemies of the Jewish people ever since Herzl: from the Tsar, the German Kaiser, the British Imperialists, Wall Street. Now they saw their chance. Wall Street is distributing loans and “political independence”. Of course, not for nothing. The price has to be paid in blood.
The Jewish state, this gift of Truman’s and Bevin’s, give the capitalist economy of the Zionists a respite. This economy rests on very flimsy foundations. Its products cannot compete on the world market. Its only hope is the inner market from which the Arab goods are debarred. Thus the problem of Jewish immigration has come to be a problem of live or die. The continuous flow of immigrants who would come with the remnants of their possessions is apt to increase the circulation of goods, will allow the bourgeois producers to dispose of their expensive wares. Mass immigration would also be very useful as a means to force down wages which “weigh so heavily” on the Jewish industry. A state engaged in inevitable military conflicts would mean orders from the “Hebrew Army,” a source of “Hebrew” profits not to be underrated at all. A state would mean thousands of snug berths for Zionist veteran functionaries.
WHO IS GOING TO FOOT THE BILL?
The workers and the poor. They will have to pay the stiff prices following the ban on Arab goods. They will break down under the yoke of numberless taxes, direct and indirect. They will have to cover the deficit of the Jewish state. They are living in the open, having no roof over their heads, while their institutions have “more important business” to attend to.
The Jewish worker having been separated from his Arab colleague and prevented from fighting a common class struggle will be at the mercy of his class enemies, imperialism and the Zionist bourgeoisie. It will be easy to arouse him against his proletarian ally, the Arab worker, “who is depriving him of jobs and depressing the level of wages” (a method that has not failed in the past!). Not in vain has Weitzmann said that “the Jewish state will stem Communist influence.” As a compensation the Jewish worker is bestowed with the privilege of dying a hero’s death on the altar of the Hebrew state.
And what promises does the Jewish state hold out? Does it really mean a step forward toward the solution of the Jewish problem?
The partition was not meant to solve Jewish misery nor is it likely to do so. This dwarf of a state which is too small to absorb the Jewish masses cannot even solve the problems of its citizens. The Hebrew state can only infest the Arab East with anti-Semitism and may well turn out – as Trotsky said – a bloody trap for hundreds of thousands of Jews.
PARTITION IS GRIST IN THE MILL OF THE ARAB REACTIONARIES
The leaders of the Arab League reacted to the decision on partition with speeches full of threats and enthusiasm. As a matter of fact, a Zionist state is to them a godsend from Allah. Calling up the worker and fellah for the “holy war to save Palestine” is supposed to stifle their cries for bread, land and freedom. Another time-honored method of diverting an embittered people against the Jewish and communist danger.
In Palestine the feudal rule has of late begun to lose ground. During the war the Arab working class has grown in numbers and political consciousness. Jewish and Arab workers stood up against the foreign oppressor, against whom they together went on strikes. A strong leftist trade union had come into existence; and the “Workers Asssociation of the Arabs of Palestine” had been well on the way of freeing itself from the influence of the Husseinis. The murder of its leader, Sami Taha, committed by hirelings of the Arab High Committee could not restrain this development. But where the Husseinis failed, the decision of the imperialist agency, the UNO succeeded. The partition decision stifled the class struggle of the Palestine workers. The prospect of being at the hands of the Zionist “conquerors of soil and labor” is arousing fear and anxiety among the Arab workers and fellahs. nationalist war slogans fall on fertile soil. And feudal murderers see their chance. Thus the policy of partition enables the feudalists to turn back the wheels of history.
A FIRST SUMMARY
The early crop of partition policy: Jews and Arabs are drowned in a sea of chauvinist enthusiasm. Triumph on the one hand, rage and exasperation on the other. Communists are being murdered. Pogroms among Jews instigated. A tit for tat of murder and provocation. The “strafing expeditions” of the Haganah are oil for the propaganda machine of the Arab patriots in their campaign to enlist the masses for more bloodshed. The military conflict and the smashing to pieces of the workers’ movements are a boon to the chauvinist extremists in either camp.
WHAT ABOUT THE JEWISH “COMMUNISTS”?
The patriotic wave makes sitting on the fence very uncomfortable. The Zionist “Socialist” parties soon “corrected” their anti-imperialist phrases and stubborn “resistance” against “cutting up the country to pieces” and gave way to full and enthusiastic support of the imperialist partition policy. That was a trifling matter, a question of merely changing Zionist tactics.
Yet the Communist Party of Palestine might have been expected to take up a different position. Have they no repeatedly warned against the fatal results bound to come with the establishment of a Jewish state? “Partition must needs be disastrous for Jew and Arab alike … partition is an imperialist scheme intended to give British rule a new lease on life…” (evidence given by the PCP before the Anglo-American Commission of Enquiry on Mar. 25, 1946). The secretary of the party loyally stuck to this attitude as late as July 1947 when he said before the UNO commission: “We refuse the partition scheme pointblank, as this scheme is detrimental to the interests of the two peoples.” However, after this scheme had been pulled off with the support of the Soviet representatives, Kol Ha’Am(the Stalinist central organ) hastened to declare that “democracy and justice have won the day (!).” And overnight there appeaed a newly baptized party: the name of Communist Party of Palestine was changed to Communist Party of Eretz Israel (Communist Party of the Hebrew Land). Thus even the last vestige of contact with the Arab population was broken off. The gap that still separated them from Zionism was finally bridged. Instead of being the vanguard of the anti-imperialist struggle of the Arab and Jewish masses, the Palestine Communist Party became the “Communist” tail of the “left” Zionists. Precisely in an hour when Zionism shows to everyone its counter-revolutionary face, its blatant servility to imperialism. Thus the Communist Party itself held up all its former exposure of imperialist and Zionist deceoptions to ridicule.
Why have they gone bankrupt?
The policy of the Palestine Communist Party lacks a continuous line. The policy of the P.C.P. reflects both the needs deriving from the class war of the Jewish worker in Palestine and the needs of Soviet foreign policy. The needs of class war, however, require a consistent international policy, the negation of Zionism, of its discrimination beween Arab and Jew. On the other hand, the need to adjust the party line to the diplomatic maneuvers of the S.U. calls for an “elastic” policy, one that lacks backbone. As a result we find the notorious shilly-shallying and zigzagging, which has harnessed the PCP now to the Zionist wagon. The fifth wheel!
AND THE ARAB “COMMUNISTS”?
The Arab Stalinists, the “National Liberation League,” did not fare better than their Jewish counterparts. They were in a pretty fix having to justify the Russian support of the Jewish state. The Arab workers could not be expected to accept this line. Not by a long shot. They knew the meddling of Soviet diplomacy for what it was: breaking up the Palestine workers’ unity and a treacherous blow. After the pro-partition declaration of Zarapkin, the National Liberation League people found themselves surrounded by scorn and hostility.
The policy of the Soviet Union has undermined the position of the League among the Arab toilers. Thus it opened a door to the reactionary, chauvinist campaign against the “red danger”. At present, the National Liberation League stands for peace and it is busy exposing the provocative role played by the British government. But since it had cried out for “national unity” (with the feudal Husseinis, the present war instigators during the past years), its present atitude fails to convince. But the National Liberation League did convince the Arab workers that the driving force behind its policy is not the interest of the Palestine proletariat, but that of the Kremlin.
A WAR OF DEFENSE?
The two camps today mobilize the masses under the mask of “self-defense.” “We have been attacked, let us defend ourselves!”- say the the Zionists. “Let us ward off the danger of a Jewish conquest!” – declares the Arab Higher Committee. Where does the truth lie?
War is the continuation of politics by other means. The war led by the Arab feudalists is but the continuation of their reactionary war on the worker and the fellah who are striving to shake off oppression and exploitation. For the feudal effendis “Salvation of Palestine” means safeguarding their revenues at the expense of the fellahin, maintaining their autocratic rule in town and country, smashing the proletarian organizations and international class solidarity.
The war waged by the Zionists is the continuation of their expansionist policy based on discrimination between the two peoples: they defend kibbush avoda (ousting of Arab labor), kibbush adama (ousting of the fellah), boycott of Arab goods, “Hebrew rule.” The military conflict is a direct result of the Zionist conquerors.
This war on neither side be said to bear a progressive character. The war does not release progressive forces or do away with social and economic obstacles in the path of the development of the two nations. Quite the opposite is true. It is apt to obscure the class antagonism and to open the gate for nationalist excesses. It weakens the proletariat and strengthens imperialism in both camps.
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
Each side is “anti-imperialist” to the bone, busy detecting the reactionary – in the opposite camp. And imperialism is always seen – helping the other side. But this kind of exposure is oil on the imperialist fire. For the inveigling policy of imperialism is based upon agents and agencies within both camps. Therefore, we say to the Palestinian people, in reply to the patriotic warmongers: Make this war between Jews and Arabs, which serves the end of imperialism, the common war of both nations against imperialism!
This is the only solution guaranteeing a real peace. This must be our goal which must be achieved without concessions to the chauvinist mood prevailing at present among the masses.
How can that be done?
“The main enemy is in our own country!” – this was what Karl Liebknecht had to say to the workers when imperialists and social democrats were inciting them to the slaughter of their fellow workers in other countries. In this spirit we say to the Jewish and Arab workers: the enemy is in your own camp!
Jewish workers! Get rid of the Zionist provocateurs who tell you to sacrifice yourself on the altar of the state!
Arab worker and fellah! Get rid of the chauvinist provocateurs who are getting you into a mess of blood for their own sake and pocket.
Workers of the two peoples, unite in a common front against imperialism and its agents!
The problem worrying all in these days is the problem of security. Jewish workers ask: “How to protect our lives? Should we not support the ‘Haganah’? And the Arab workers and fellahin ask: “Ought we not to join the ‘Najada’, ‘Futuwa’ to defend ourselves against the Zionists’ attacks?
A distinction must be made between the practical and political sides of this question. We cannot thwart mobilizations and do not therefore tell workers to refuse to mobilize. But it is our duty to denounce the reactionary character of the chauvinist organizations, even in their own house. The only way to peace between the two peoples of this country is turning the guns against the instigators of murder in both camps.
Instead of the abstract “anti-imperialist” phrases of the social-patriots which cover up their servility to imperialism, we are showing a practical way to fight against the foreign oppressor: unmasking its local agents, undermining their influence; so that the Arab worker and fellah will understand that the military campaign against the Jews helps to bring about partition and helps only the feudalists and imperialists, while it is fought on his back and paid for with his blood; so that the Jewish worker recognizes at last the illusion of Zionism and understands that he will not be free and safe as long as he has not done away with national discrimination, isolationism and imperialist loyalty.
We have to keep up contact between the workers of both peoples at whatever place of work that this can still be done in order to prevent provactive acts and to safeguard the lives of the workers at work and on the roads. Let us forge revolutionary cadres. In this burning hell of chauvinism we have to hold up the banner of international brotherhood.
AGAINST THE STREAM!
World capitalism being on the downgrade tries to endure by inflating imaginary national conflicts, trampling down the masses and brutalizing them. In the long run that remedy will fail. The masses will have learned their lesson through suffering. They will get to know their enemy: monopolistic capitalism that is hiding behind its local ruling agency. With the class struggle getting more intensive all over the world and in particular in the Arab countries, the end of the fratricidal war in this country is bound to come.
The patriotic wave today sweeps everyone lacking the principles of international communism off his feet. Revolutionary activity at this juncture requires patience, persistence and far-sightedness. It is a way full of danger and difficulties. But it is the only way out of this patriotic mire. Well may we remember the words of Lenin which, spoken in a similar situation, apply also to ours:
“We are not charlatans … We must base ourselves on the consciousness of the masses. Even if it is necessary to remain in a minority, be it so. We must not be afraid to be in a minority. We will carry on the work of criticism in order to free the masses from deceit … Our line will prove right … All the oppressed will come to us. They have no other way out.”
The Faces of Economism
The Faces of Economism
[Reprinted from Spartacist #21, Fall 1972]
Revisionism is an attempt to attack the substance of Marxism-Leninism without openly coming into conflict with its great authority. Therefore revisionism often takes the form of maintaining lip-service to traditional Marxist terminology but re-defining (usually broadening) certain key concepts in order to smuggle in a different political line. For example the term “self-determination,” which for Lenin simply meant the ability of a nation to establish a separate state, has been transformed, most notably by the Socialist Workers Party, into the thoroughly utopian reformist concept of freedom from all oppression (class exploitation, national and racial oppression, sexual oppression, etc.) through separation or even “community control” within U.S. capitalism.
While the term “economism” has not undergone so grotesque a change, it also has been broadened well -beyond its Marxist meaning. For Lenin, the “economists” were a distinct tendency in the Russian socialist movement which held that socialists should concentrate on improving the conditions of working-class life and leave the fight against Czarist absolutism to the liberals. After One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, Lenin rarely used the term and referred to similar attitudes as reformism or narrow trade union consciousness. Nevertheless the term “economism,” which has become an important part of the contemporary radical vocabulary, need not be restricted to a purely historical category. However it is essential that it not be given a meaning fundamentally subversive to Leninism, i.e. that Lenin’s authority not be put behind ideas alien to Marxism.
Anti-“Economism” as Anti-Materialist Spiritualism
Attacks on “economism” are a frequent rallying cry of petty-bourgeois radicals whose response to labor reformism and working-class backwardness is to reject the working class as the driving force of the revolution. The current popularity of the term probably stems from its widespread use in the Chinese “Cultural Revolution,” where “economism” was identified with a desire for a higher standard of living. “Economist consciousness” was the sin of workers who resisted the “Cultural Revolution”—that is, who were unwilling to make the material sacrifices demanded of them by the Maoist faction. The political thrust of the “anti-economism” campaign was evident during the 1967 nationwide railway strike, when Red Guards demanded that railway workers accept a 12% pay cut and disregard standard safety regulations. This would have concentrated greater economic surplus in the hands of the Maoist bureaucracy, but would not have significantly benefited the Chinese masses.
It is precisely the anti-materialist spiritual aspects of Maoism—its rejection of the “consumer society” and Khrushchev’s “goulash communism”—that provides the link between the early New Left of Herbert Marcuse and the later popularity of Third World anarcho-Maoism. The likes of Robin Blackburn of the British New Left Review and Rudi Deutschke of the German SDS can be considered transitional figures.
Anarcho-Maoist attacks on working-class “economism” are similar to Victorian conservative attacks on “the intense selfishness of the lower classes” (the phrase is from Kipling, poet laureate of British imperialism). These attitudes are, generally voiced by genuine reactionaries. Marshal Petain blamed the fall of France on the “love of pleasure of the French common people.” As George Orwell once remarked, this statement is seen in its proper perspective if we compare the amount of pleasure in the life of the average French worker or peasant with Petain’s own!
The anti-Marxist perversion of the term “economism” by the Maoists and their New Left sycophants reflects fear of and contempt for the working masses on the part of petty-bourgeois strata. In the case of the Chinese bureaucracy, it is a real fear that the aspirations and organization of the Chinese working class threaten its privileged position. In the case of the Western radical intelligentsia, it is a belief that the social backwardness and cultural narrowness of the working masses threaten its life styles—both bourgeois and “liberated “—and values.
What Is Economism?
In the most general sense, economism is the failure of the working class to embrace its historic role, or in Marx’s,words, failure to realize that the proletariat cannot liberate itself without “destroying all the inhuman conditions of life in contemporary. society.” (The Holy Family) In other words, economism is the failure of the working class, in the absence of revolutionary leadership, to reject bourgeois ideology and place its revolutionary class interests above particular, sectional or apparent needs or desires. Concretely, economism manifests itself in competition between groups of workers undercutting or destroying the unity of the entire class, support by the labor movement for its national bourgeoisie, failure to fight racial and sexual oppression, indifference to democratic rights and civil liberties, and a lack of concern for the cultural heritage of mankind (bourgeois culture).
What economism is not is the workers’ strong desire for a higher standard of living. On the contrary, the basis of economism. is the material and cultural oppression of the working class. It is material deprivation, or the fear of it, which causes groups of workers to view their particular and immediate interests as more important than any other consideration. It is social and cultural oppression which causes workers to accept pernicious bourgeois ideologies like nationalism and religion. The struggle to raise the material and cultural level of the workers is essential to the real struggle against economism. The need for a revolutionary transitional program is precisely to ensure that these gains do not come at the expense of other sections of the oppressed but transcend the framework of competition for “a slice of the pie.” Preachments of moral uplift in the labor movement are not a serious fight against economism.
Social-Democratic Reformism and Trade Unionism
There is a strong tendency on the left to identify economism with simple trade unionism and thus to see any concern with the affairs of government as a step away from economism. The Workers League, American affiliate of Gerry Healy’s “International Committee,” presents any strike propaganda containing demands on the government, or raising the slogan of a labor party regardless of its program, as inherently anti-economist. Lenin is sufficiently explicit that economism does not mean merely lack of concern for “politics.” The economism/politics dichotomy demonstrates crude anti-Leninism. In What Is To Be Done? Lenin repeatedly insists:
“Lending ‘the economic struggle itself a political character’ means, therefore, striving to secure satisfaction of trade [union] demands, the improvement of working conditions in each separate trade … by legislative and administrative methods. This is precisely what a trade unions do and have always done …. the phrase ‘lending the economic struggle itself a political character’ means nothing more than the struggle for economic reforms.”
Trade unions are always and necessarily impeded by the bourgeois state. Even the most backward trade union bureaucrats are in favor of reducing legal restrictions on themselves and achieving through government reforms what cannot be attained over the bargaining table.
Social-democratic reformism and simple business unionism are two forms of economism that usually co-exist peacefully within the labor movement. And when reformism and business unionism do conflict, it is not always “politics” (reformism) that represents the higher form of class struggle. In the U.S. proto-social-democratic, “progressive” unionists (Sidney Hillman, Walter Reuther) have often been less militant in industrial conflicts than straight business unionists (John L. Lewis, Jimmy Hoffa). This is because the “politically concerned,” “progressive” union bureaucrats are closely associated with a wing of the Democratic Party, which they don’t want to embarrass by industrial disruption. The “anti-economism” of these politically sensitive union bureaucrats is a facade for sellouts and a cover for seeking bourgeois respectability.
Coalitionism
One of the few constant elements in the New Left radicalism of the past ten years has been the denial of the unique and leading role of the organized working class in the socialist revolution. Replacements have been sought in “the wretched of the earth,” the “Third World,” racial and ethnic minorities in countries like the U.S., then the lumpens, students and/or youth dropouts. Recently a spirit of ecumenism has made itself felt in radical circles and all oppressed social groups are expected to participate in the revolution on an equal footing.
The strategy is seen as building a coalition of various oppressed groups on a “program” achieved through the multi-lateral trading of demands. For example, if the women’s liberation movement supports the repeal of anti-strike legislation, the unions in turn are expected to support the repeal of anti-abortion laws. The two most developed advocates of coalitionism in the ostensibly Marxist U.S. left are the Socialist Workers Party and the Labor Committe. The SWP projects a coalition largely based on ethnic and sexual groups around a petty-bourgeois utopian program, while the Labor Committee presents a coalition of economically defined groups around a social-democratic program. Thus, the SWP foresees a black, Chicano, women’s, homosexuals’ and workers’ revolution, while the LC looks forward to a trade unionist, unemployed, welfare recipient, white-collar and student soviet.
Its advocates see coalitionism as a means of fighting economism. In actuality, coalitionism is simply another form of economism. It is based on the central theoretical premise of economism—that the working class cannot transcend (as distinct from disregard or deny) its immediate sectional interests and identify its interests with all the oppressed and with the future of humanity. Coalitionism does not seek to transform the consciousness of workers, but simply to gain their acquiescence for some “other” group’s “program” on the basis of necessarily unstable bargains. To the extent that they concern themselves with the labor movement at all, coalition advocates perpetuate the view that workers are selfish pigs whose political activities are correlated purely and simply to their paychecks.
Working-Class Conservatism and Petty-Bourgeois Utopianism
Revisionists and fakers feed upon the left’s general lack of familiarity with pre-Marxian socialism. Thus people are permitted to call themselves Marxists while putting forward the very ideas against which Marxism developed. A superficial view of Leninism is that it developed solely in opposition to reformism and simple trade unionist consciousness. But Bolshevism also developed in intense struggle against petty-bourgeois utopian radicalism, particularly in its anarchist variant. As Lenin noted in Left-Wing Communism:
“It is not yet sufficiently known abroad that Bolshevism grew, took shape and became steeled in long years of struggle against ‘petty-bourgeois revolutionariness,’ which smacks of or borrows something from anarchism, and which in all essentials falls short of the conditions and requirements for sustained proletarian class struggle.”
The hallmark of utopian socialism is the belief that socialist consciousness is based on a generalized moral sense, unrelated to existing social relations. Utopian socialism counterposes itself to Marxism by its denial that the organized working class, driven by material exploitation under capitalism, is uniquely the leading force in the socialist revolution. On one plane, utopian socialism is a reflection of the moral and intellectual snobbery of the petty bourgeoisie. Insofar as utopian socialism concerns itself with attempting a class analysis of the revolution, it usually locates the leading force in the educated middle class, particularly the intelligentsia, which is presumed to be genuinely concerned about ideas, unlike the working class which presumably will sell out socialist principles for a mess of porridge.
Working-Class Progressivism
Existing working-class social attitudes certainly fall far short of socialist consciousness. However, it is equally certain that of the major classes in society, the working class is everywhere the most socially progressive. It is the working-class parties, even despite their treacherous bourgeoisified reformist leaderships, that stand for more enlightened social policies. In Catholic Europe and in Islam, it is the working-class parties that carry the main burden of the struggle against religious obscurantism. The distinctly non-economist issue of divorce was an important factor in breaking the alliance between the Italian social democrats and the dominant bourgeois party, and has stood as a major obstacle to the projected bloc between the Italian CP and left Christian Democrats. In England the anti-capital-punishment forces were overwhelmingly concentrated in the Labour, not in the Conservative or Liberal Party.
It is true that the relatively progressive social policies of most workers’ parties do not accurately reflect the most backward elements in the class. (Aspiring. social democrats use this as a justification for accommodating to the labor bureaucracy, insisting that it is to the “left” of the “average” worker.) All this shows is that working-class organizations represent a higher form of political consciousness than workers taken as atomized individuals in the manner of public opinion polls. This is because the activists and organizers of workers’ organizations represent a certain selection, generally of the most conscious workers who have already broken from personal “economism’ ‘ and see themselves as representatives of broader class interests. Working-class organizations are shaped by the attitudes of what Lenin called “the advanced workers.” Ideologically conservative workers are almost always politically passive, forced by social pressure against being activists in the right-wing bourgeois parties.
Marxists have always’ been profoundly aware of and concerned with working-class conservatism. Genuine Marxism, in contrast to utopian moralism, locates and fights this conservatism in the actual living conditions of workers. As early as the Communist Manifesto, the demands for a shortened work week to give workers the leisure necessary for political and cultural activity, for the emancipation of women, and for free universal higher education, for example, have been an important aspect of revolutionary socialist policy. The utopian moralists have no program to counter working-class backwardness, simply emitting cries of horror coupled with occasional predictions that the working class will be the vanguard of fascism.
Trade Unions and Revolution
An important anarcho-Maoist myth is that trade unions are simply bargaining agents for particular groups of workers and are inherently apolitical. While this may have been true in the nineteenth century, when labor unions were weak, defensive organizations, it is certainly not true now. In all advanced capitalist countries, and particularly those which have mass social-democratic parties, trade unions exercise considerable influence in all aspects of political life. Even in the U.S. in the 1960’s—a period in which the unions were regarded as particularly passive and bread-and-butter oriented—the union bureaucracy was intimately involved in the major.social issues. Liberal union bureaucrats like Walter Reuther helped finance the Southern civil rights movement of the early 1960’s and played an important role in keeping it within the limits of bourgeois reformism. Millions of dollars in union dues are spent by union lobbyists seeking to pressure Washington politicians. The deeply conservative AFL-CIO central leadership under George Meany is one of the few significant social bases remaining for a “hawk” policy in Vietnam. The problem is not that the labor movement is apolitical, but that it is tied to bourgeois politics. The role of revolutionaries in the unions is not “to divert the economic struggle to a political struggle,” but to overthrow the conservative, reformist bureaucracy and pursue a revolutionary policy on both the industrial and the political level.
To assert that trade unions are inherently parochial and economist organizations is undialectical. All genuine class organizations (e.g. unions, parties, factory committees) reflect the class struggle. To say that unions as such (i.e., simply as bargaining agencies for particular groups of workers) cannot be revolutionary is a tautology. But unions can give birth to other forms of organization (e.g. parties, general strike committees, workers’ councils) and can themselves provide ‘the structure for a workers’ insurrection, ceasing then to function simply as “unions.” As Trotsky, who certainly knew something about the organization of revolutions, said: “in spite of the enormous advantages of soviets as organs of struggle for power, there may well be cases where the insurrection unfolds on the basis of other forms of organization (factory committees, trade unions, etc.).”
The radicalization of the masses must take place through struggle within the mass organizations of the class, regardless of form. It is not possible for revolutionary consciousness to develop among the mass of workers without lengthy and intense struggles and the intervention. of communists in such fundamental mass organizations as the unions. To term this perspective “economism,” as do the New Leftists, is to transform “Leninism” into a justification for petty-bourgeois utopian moralistic anti-Marxism.
Militant Longshoreman No. 1
Militant Longshoreman
No. 1 December 31, 1981
Re-Elect KEYLOR and GOW to Executive Board
This is the first issue of the MILITANT LONGSHOREMAN edited and published by Howard Keylor. For more than six years Keylor (along with Brother Stan Gow) published the LONGSHORE MILITANT. We presented a working class analysis of longshoremen’s place in the world and put forward a class struggle program for waterfront workers. The MILITANT LONGSHOREMAN endorses the re-election of Brother Gow to the Executive Board of Local 10 and supports the program outlined in the December 18 issue of the LONGSHOIRE MILITANT.
REAGAN’ S ANTI -SOVI ET WAR DRIVE
It’s becom comunplace for some brothers to argue that the union has no business discussing and taking positions or actions on El Salvador, South Africa, or Poland since the union is growing weaker and less effective in even defending our own jobs and working conditions. But it’s the same kind of union leadership which refuses to take on PMA that also refuses to take effective solidarity actions to defend workers in the U.S. and refuses to take positions that would point the way to defending the interests of workers internationally.
Reagan’s moves to strangle Nicaragua, support the junta.’s butchery of El Salvadorian workers and peasants, and blockade Cuba lead directly toward nuclear war with the Soviet Union. The vast U.S. arms build-up represents the goal of American capitalism to eliminate the U.S.S.R. as the main deterrant to U.S. imperialism’s drive to wipe out the gains of workers everywhere.
The unwillingness of the ILWU leadership to confront Reagan’s war drive was made clear at the April International Convention. Herman, McClain and conpany supported an “adequate” U.S. arm budget and refused to take sides in El Salvador. They uncritically endorsed the Polish “Solidarity” movement and took sides with Reagan against the U.S.S.R.. warning the Soviets not to interfere (even if capitalism was being restored?)
The editor submitted a minority report on Poland and argued for a “wait and see” attitude at that time. Keylor warned that the church-influenced, anti-Soviet, Polish nationalist leadership of Solidarity could mislead the Polish workers into laying the basis tor bringing back capitalism. Brother Keylor argued for a policy of support to those elements of Solidarity that were groping towards a working class political revolution against the governing bureaucracy, a revolution committed to socialist property forms, and appealing to Soviet workers toward the same goals.
The hour is getting very late to mobilize labor action to stop Reagan’s attacks on workers’ hard-won gains. Keylor alone among the delegates to the June Caucus voted against the Coast Committees resolution which effectively blocked our union fram taking the lead to organize work stoppages by maritime workers in order to block cuts in the Longshoremen, and Harbor workers Act. Only labor strike action can stop the cuts in Social Security and other social legislation and to stop the thinly veiled racist attacks on the gains of black people. Reagan’s wrecking of the air traffic controllers union is a clear warning that only massive acts of workers’ solidarity can prevent the destruction of the labor movement.
SOME PEOPLE NEVER LEARN
THE GIBSON CASE
It’s never been more urgent than now to keep the government and the capitalist courts out of our internal union affairs to prevent pro-employer judges from interfering in the hiring hall and registration system. The longshore division has been besieged with lawsuits attacking our contractual dispatch and registration systems, some of which the union has lost. In the Gibson case, which started 13 years ago, the Portland Clerks Local lost. Local 10’s pro-rated share of the cost, $ 30,000, has not been paid. If this policy of refusing to defend all longshore and clerk locals against lawsuits continues coastwise unity will be broken and every local, including our own, will be left to defend itself. This is the disastrous policy of most of the officers and Executive Board some of whom even openly support the bringing of lawsuits against locals and local officers.
Without a program of fighting the P.M.A. to maintain and expand waterfront jobs, which would allow the registration of women, blacks, and national minorities, we can expect even more Title 7 lawsuits including suits against Local 10.
DECLINE OF THE UNION
It’s always depressing to try to describe at each election time the state of the local and find that it’s gone down hill during the preceding year. Where are we now? Smaller, shorter and more infrequent membership meetings; fewer jobs, more longshoremen living on P.G.P.; P.M.A. chiseling on the contract, backed up by the arbitrary; unsafe working conditions, not enough manning; P.G.P. cut when men get fed up and take even individual job action; encroachment on our jurisdiction; and finally, men becoming desperate and going steady as S.E.O. skilled equipment operators.
Most dangerous and alarming of all is the fact that longshoremen are losing confidence in the ability of the union to defend their interests and same men are competing with each other for favors from P.M.A. representatives.
These conditions can be laid squarly at the door of a leadership which has accepted the 9.43 and S.E.O. system, refused to fight for manning and a shorter work shift, and has conformed to the policy of “no illegal work stoppages”, “work now and grieve later”, and “everything.is subject to arbitration”. The editor, Howard Keylor, submitted resolutions on all these issues to the April pre-contract Coast Caucus but got very little support from other Local 10 delegates.
Our local officers are reduced to complaining that Jerry Sutliff, area arbitrator, is “unfair” and holding up the vain hope, that if he shows himself to be very biased that he will be replaced. There’s only one answer: mobilize the membership to take on P.M.A. with job action to defend our conditions and to appeal to the coast locals for support.
THE S.E.O. MESS
THE CANCER GROWS BIGGER
The 1981 contract made the S.E.O. system even worse. The steady equipment operator system is further expanded and extended into the hall eating up more skilled jobs. Stevedoring companies can now order their “own” men from the S.E.O. Board and P.M.A. refuses to recognize a stop line on the S.E.O. Board; if one job goes outside the S.E.O. board all S.E.O. men qualified for that job flop and lose the guarantee.
All attempts to modify the S.E.O. system are simply doomed to failure. Brother Reg Theriault’s motion to stop S.E.O. men from driving tractors and other rolling stock against the ship was clearly in violation of the contract and would have led to.a major confrontation with P.M.A. Brothers Keylor and Gow voted against this motion at the Executive Board warning that this motion gives the illusion that it’s possible to modify the S.E.O. system without a fight. We put up a motion at that time to prepare the membership fora fight to finally end this cancer by calling all S.E.O. men back to the hall. No vote took place on our motion because Executive Board members promptly took a hike eliminating the quorum of 10 members.
FOR A CLASS-STRUGGLE LEADERSHIP
As only two people on the Executive Board Keylor and Gow can’t make any decisive difference in the course of the union. The most we can do is continue to expose what’s going on and to point the way out. Not until the union develops an alternative leadership committed to a class struggle program will we see a change in the downhill motion of the union. the following program includes those measures and principles which could show the way out of the dilemma in which we find ourselves.
A CLASS-STRUGGLE PROGRAM
1.DEFEND THE HIRING HALL – Call all SEO men back to the hall. Dispatch all skilled equipuent jobs from the hall.
2.DEFEND UNION CONDITIONS – Job action to protect union conditions and safety. No dependance on arbitrators.
3. DEFEND OUR JOBS – Build now toward a contract fight in 1984 for manning scales on all ship operations, 6 hours shift for 8 hours pay, one man – one job.
4. DEFEND OUR UNION – No “B” or “C” Registration lists. Keep the racist anti-labor government and courts out of our union. Support all ILWU locals defense against court suits and government “investigations”. No lawsuits against any union.
5. BUILD LABOR SOLIDARITY against government/employer strikebreaking. Honor all picket lines. Don’t handle struck or diverted cargo.
6.STOP NAZI/KLAN TERROR through union organized mass labor/black/ Latino defense action. No dependance on capitalist police or courts to smash fascism.
7. WORKING CLASS ACTION TO STOP REAGAN’S NAR DRIVE AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION – Oppose reactionary boycotts against Soviet cargo an shippment. Labor strikes against military blockades of Cuba or Nicaragua. Boycott all military cargo to Chile, South Africa, El Salvador.
8. INTERNATIONAL LABOR SOLIDARITY – Labor support to military victory for leftist insurgents in El Salvador. Oppose protectionist trade restrictions. International support to anti-capitalist workers struggles.
9. LABOR STRIKES TO SMASH REAGAN’s ANTI-LABOR/BLACK DRIVE – National maritime strikes to defend the Longshoremen and Harborworker’s Act.
10. BREAK FINALLY AND COMPLETLEY WITH STRIKE-BREAKING DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN PARTIES – Start now to build a workers.party based on the unions to fight for a workers government which will seize all major industry Without payment to the capitalists and establish a planned economy to end exploitation, racism, poverty, and war.
Letter to the OCRFI and the OCI
Letter to the OCRFI and the OCI
[First printed in Spartacist No. 22, Winter 1973-74. Copied from http://www.bolshevik.org/history/Other/Letter%20to%20OCRFI%20%20OCI.html ]
15 January 1973
Organizing Committee for the Reconstruction of the Fourth International; and Organisation Communiste Internationaliste
Dear Comrades,
At the Third National Conference of the Spartacist League/U.S. we held a major discussion on the Organizing Committee for the Reconstruction of the Fourth International (OCRFI), based on our translations from the October 1972 issue of La Correspondance Internationale containing the basic documents and discussion from your international conference of July 1972. We were also guided by the reports of our comrades Sharpe and Foster of their discussions last summer with comrade DeM. of the OCI.
We give serious attention to the OCRFI because we note that some of the steps that it has undertaken go in the direction of resolving the impasse which has existed between the SL/U.S. and the International Committee (IC) since November 1962, and the acute hostility between us after the April 1966 IC Conference in London. We are in agreement with the stated goal of the OCRFI to fight on the program of the Fourth International to reconstruct a democratic-centralist world party, and to pursue this aim at present through a regulated political discussion in an international discussion bulletin culminating in an international conference. We note that toward this end your July conference did indeed represent a break with the federated bloc practice of the former IC and was indeed marked by a real and vigorous discussion such as was absent from the Third Conference of the IC in London in 1966. Thus it appears to us that on the face of it the OCRFI does possess one of the essential qualities necessary for the struggle to verify the authentic Trotskyist program and to measure by that program the political practice, in its development, of national groups participating in the discussion. Therefore the SL/U.S. have come to the conclusion that it is part of our duty as internationalists to seek to participate in this discussion.
We note that we fully meet the formal requirement for admission to participation in your discussion process as stated in the resolution, “On the Tasks of the Reconstruction of the Fourth International,” i.e., we “state [our] will to fight on the program of the Fourth International to reconstruct the leading center, which [we] agree does not yet exist.” (see our 1963 resolution, “Toward Rebirth of the Fourth International,” and later documents). We are unable to request more than simple admission to the discussion, rather than admission to the Organizing Committee of the discussion, because of our programmatic differences, unclarities about or simple unfamiliarity with views held by members of the Organizing Committee. Since the Organizing Committee also intends to work toward the construction of national sections of the Fourth International, we can hardly participate in such activities given this programmatic ambiguity.
In our view, the preliminary purpose of a discussion such as that envisaged by the OCRFI must be to crystallize a series of decisive specific programmatic demands analogous to the concrete points defining revolutionary Marxist principle set forth by Trotsky in the 1929-33 period as the basis for rallying forces from the scattered and politically diverse milieu of oppositional communists.
Therefore we should like to list some of the issues which appear to us to pose differences or central ambiguities between our views and those expressed by the OCRFI or which have been advanced by the OCI. The importance that we attach to these points is that if unresolved they threaten the crystallization of a bona fide and disciplined Trotskyist world movement and center. Therefore from our present understanding these are topics which merit particular discussion.
(1) United Front: We differ with the conception of the “strategic united front” as practiced by the OCI and as set forth in “For the Reconstruction of the Fourth International” (especially Section IX, “Fight for Power, Class United Front, Revolutionary Parties”) in La Verité No. 545, October 1969 and in the general political resolution of the OCRFI. In terms of the OCI’s work in France, our position has been elaborated in Workers Vanguard No. 11, September 1972. We believe that we share with the first four Congresses of the Communist International the view that the united front is essentially a tactic used by revolutionists “to set the base against the top” under those exceptional conditions and decisive opportunities in which the course of proletarian political life has flowed outside its normal channels. Comrade Trotsky heavily elaborated on this conception over the German crisis of 1929-33 and also in his discussions with SWP leaders in 1940 regarding an approach by the SWP to the Communist Party U.S.A.
The united front is nothing more than a means, a tactic, by which the revolutionary party, i.e. its program and authority, can in times of crisis mobilize and then win over masses (at that time supporters of other parties) by means of concrete demands for common action made to the reformist organizations. Any other interpretation must base itself on a supposed latent revolutionary vanguard capacity within the reformist or Stalinist parties themselves–a central proposition of Pabloism.
The aim of the united front must be to embed the revolutionary program in the masses. In the same way, in the highest expression of the united front, the soviets, the condition for their conquest of power is the ascendancy of the revolutionary program. Any form of fetishism toward the mere form of united fronts or soviets (or for that matter toward trade unions or factory committees) means abdicating as revolutionists, because at bottom it is the dissolution of the vanguard party into the class through the substitution of such forms (and other politics!) for the role of the revolutionary party. This is not Leninism but at best a variant of Luxemburgism. One of Lenin’s greatest achievements in counterposing the revolutionary vanguard to the reformists was to transcend the Kautskyian conception of “the party of the whole class.” To place emphasis upon some mass form at the expense of the vanguard party would be to smuggle back in the Kautskyian conception.
When erstwhile revolutionary forces are qualitatively weak in comparison to mass reformist or Stalinist parties it is, in ordinary circumstances, equally illusory either to make direct “united front” appeals to the large formations or to advocate combinations among such large forces (when Trotsky called for the united front between the SPD and KPD he believed that the latter still had a revolutionary potential).
Certainly the tactics appropriate to a full-fledged revolutionary party cannot be mechanically assigned to a grouping qualitatively lacking the capacity to struggle to take the leadership of the class. However, the differences in functioning are in the opposite direction from those projected by the OCI. To the extent that the revolutionary tendency must function as a propaganda league, the more it must stress the presentation of its full program. As Trotsky noted, in the first instance Bolshevism is built upon granite foundations, and maneuvers can only be carried out in a principled fashion upon that foundation. The united front of the working class, of course, is the maneuver on the grand scale.
(2) Bolivian POR: We do not believe that the POR’s participation in the émigré Revolutionary Anti-Imperialist Front (FRA) fell from the skies. We agree with the OCI and the OCRFI resolution that the FRA–created following the coup of the rightist general Banzer, incorporating elements of the “national bourgeoisie” including General Torres–is a popular front and not the continuation of the Popular Assembly, which may have possessed the essential formal prerequisites to be a proletarian soviet pole in opposition to the earlier regime of the leftist general Torres. It appears to us that in the period of the Torres regime the best that can be said of the POR is that it subordinated the development of the vanguard party to that of the Popular Assembly, i.e. subordinated the revolutionary program to an ill-defined and vacillating collection of left nationalist and Stalinist political prejudices. Given the default of revolutionists, the Popular Assembly necessarily concretely possessed a core of Menshevist acquiescence to the “national bourgeoisie.” For further elaboration, see Workers Vanguard No. 3. In our estimation the POR’s earlier policy, which the OCRFI resolution emphatically supports, is an embodiment of the erroneous conception of’ a “strategic united front” and demonstrates the resulting subordination of the vanguard organization to the mass organization, in this case to the Popular Assembly.
Prolonged periods of repression there have severely limited our knowledge of or contact with the Bolivian POR, but it appears to us on the basis of available evidence that the organization has played a characteristically centrist role at least as far back as the revolutionary upheaval in 1952.
(3) Stalinism: We note that in the past the OCI has tended to equate the struggle against imperialism with the struggle against Stalinism, e.g. the slogans advanced at the 1971 Essen Conference. The general Political Resolution submitted by the OCI and adopted by the OCRFI takes this equation one step further when it denies the “double nature” of the Stalinist bureaucracy, writing of it simply as “the organism of the bourgeoisie within the working-class movement.” Perhaps the OCI has been led to this false formulation through a simplistic linear extension of the true and valuable insight that the class struggles of the workers cut across the “Iron Curtain.”
To us, and we believe to Trotsky, the Stalinist bureaucracy has a contradictory character. Thus in 1939 it conciliated Hitler and undermined the defense of the Soviet Union. But beginning in 1941 it fought (badly!) against the Hitlerite invasion. Thus our wartime policy was one of revolutionary defensism toward the Soviet Union, i.e., to fight against the imperialist invader and to overthrow the bureaucracy through political revolution, with by no means the least aim being to remove the terrible bureaucratic impediment in that fight. In the Indochinese war the role of the Hanoi bureaucracy, and our attitude toward it and the tasks of the Vietnamese proletariat, are essentially the same.
In the SWP’s 1953 factional struggle, the Cannon-Dobbs majority sought to defend itself against the Cochran-Clarke Pabloist minority by putting forth a position (similar to that of the OCRFI), that the Stalinist bureaucracy is “counter-revolutionary through and through and to the core.” Since this was a possibility truly applicable only to capitalist restorationist elements, in their most extreme form either fascist or CIA agents, the SWP majority was compelled to commit a host of political blunders in attempting to defend its formulation; and in fact this position, along with Cannon’s advocacy of federated internationalism, represented departures from Trotskyism which helped undermine the revolutionary fiber of the SWP.
Also in this connection we note the OCI’s analysis of Cuba In La Verité No. 557, July 1972. The OCI’s refusal to draw the conclusion from its analysis–which until that point parallels our own–that Cuba, qualitatively, is a deformed workers state indicates the potential departure from the Leninist theory of the state in favor of a linear, bourgeois conception as of a thermometer which simply and gradually passes from “bourgeois state” to “workers state” by small increments without a qualitative change. Such a methodology is a cornerstone of Pabloism. According to this conception, presumably the reverse process from “workers” to “bourgeois” state by small incremental shifts could be comparably possible. Trotsky correctly denounced this latter idea as “unwinding the film of reformism in reverse.” We note however that the OCI appears inconsistent on the characterization of the Cuban state; “The Tasks of Rebuilding the Fourth International” (in La Correspondance Internationale, June 1972, page 20) calls for the “unconditional defense of the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, of workers’ conquests in Eastern Europe, of the revolutionary war in Vietnam….”
(4) On the Youth: We note that the relation of the OCI to the Alliance des Jeunes pour le Socialisme is unprecedented in the history of Leninist practice and, in fact, represents a catering to petty-bourgeois dual vanguardist sentiment in the student milieu. We also oppose the subsidiary concept of a non-Trotskyist “Revolutionary Youth International” put forward at the Essen Conference in July 1971. The revolutionary youth movement must be programmatically subordinate and formally organizationally linked to the vanguard party, which encompasses the historic experience of the proletariat. Unless this is the case, student and youth militants can never transcend petty-bourgeois radicalism which at crucial times the proletarian vanguard will find counterposed to itself.
(5) Violence and the Class Line: We strongly oppose the OCI’s stated willingness to use the bourgeois state apparatus–the courts–to mediate disputes in the working-class movement. In addition, the SL/U.S. is unalterably opposed to the use of physical force to suppress the views of other working-class tendencies where that is the central issue, such as the OCI’s forcible prevention of the distribution of leaflets by the IKD at the July 1971 Essen Conference. We are not pacifists, and fully recognize the right of self-defense by ourselves or anyone else in the socialist and labor movements to protect meetings and demonstrations from physical assault and to protect individual militants from terroristic attack. Taken all together, our view flows from the proposition that the greatest free play of ideas within the workers movement strengthens the position of revolutionists and enhances the possibility for united class action. Conversely, it is the reformists and Stalinists–the labor lieutenants of capital–who most characteristically employ violence and victimization within the movement.
(6) International Committee: The OCRFI resolution, “On the Tasks of the Reconstruction of the Fourth International,” states that, starting in 1966, the SLL “started down the same path which the SWP had previously taken.” But further on, the resolution deplores the “explosion of the IC caused by the SLL,” on the grounds that this latest split “aggravates the dispersion” which began in 1952. We consider that organizational forms should correspond to political realities. We strongly opposed the break by the SLL (“IC”) with us in 1962 because of its apparently mainly organizational character. Only after the very sharp rupture at the 1966 London Conference, and especially in the several years following when the SLL piled up a series of major political differences with us, were we able to appreciate that the SLL’s desire in 1962 to make a rapprochement to the SWP then (to which we were willing to acquiesce but not agree with) was an expression of a fundamental political difference.
The SLL’s break with us in 1962 was, however, part of a real struggle within the American group. The 1971 SLL-OCI break seems to have been but a separation of bloc partners without visible repercussions within either group–hence without struggle however unclear.
At bottom, differing estimations of the split in the IC may reflect the linguistically slight but nonetheless real differences between the OCI’s “For the Reconstruction of the Fourth International” and the SL’s “For the Rebirth of the Fourth International.” Our slogan implies that a very fundamental process must be gone through; that it is not possible simply to fit together existing bits and pieces, perhaps with a little chipping here or there, in order to put the edifice together again.
Since the SL/U.S. has itself already had a ten-year history with the IC, we cannot simply approach the OCRFI discussions as if the previous experience between main elements in the OCRFI who had been part of the former IC and ourselves did not exist. Therefore we must review that past experience since it conditions our approach to the OCRFI.
Our views on the development of the IC since 1966 are set forth initially in Spartacist No. 6 (June-July 1966) on the London 1966 Conference and our expulsion; in the article on the Healy-Wohlforth current in Spartacist No. 17-18 (August-September 1970); in Spartacist No. 20 (April-May 1971) which is a summary of political and organizational developments since 1966; and in Workers Vanguard No. 3 (December 1971) on the SLL-OCI split. As you will note from these materials, from the time we first became aware of it at the London Conference, we protested the absence of democratic centralism in the IC.
We believe that one of the necessary tests of genuine revolutionists is the demonstrated capacity to even ruthlessly undertake self-criticism. The “International Committee” dominated by the SWP from 1954 to 1963 and by the SLL from 1963 to 1971 was always partly fictitious and partly a formalization of blocs of convenience by essentially national organizations. This demands explanation by those who would not simply repeat their previous experience. It is not enough to pass over the last eighteen years with the promise that from now on things will be done differently.
We were definitively expelled from the Healyite international conglomeration in 1966 at the very time the OCRFI pinpoints as the beginning of the SLL’s downhill slide. We believe there is a relationship. Evidently as part of the OCI’s attempt to remain in a common bloc with the SLL, and perhaps in part through ignorance of our real positions, the OCI has over the years projected upon the SL/U.S. a series of positions. Not only do we not hold, nor have we ever held, these views, but most of them are the exact opposite of our views. For example, the OCI asserted that we believe in the “family of Trotskyism” even though at the 1966 London Conference our delegation was struck by the aptness of an OCI speaker’s statement “there is no family of Trotskyism” and our speaker specifically quoted that observation approvingly, as was reported in Spartacist No. 6 and many times since. In the “Statement by the OCI” of 1967 on the IC, reference is repeatedly made to a “VO-Robertson bloc” and the general conclusion drawn that “the struggle against Robertson is fully identified with the struggle against Pabloism. His positions join those of the SWP and the United Secretariat where they are not those of Pablo.” The OCI in similar terms apologized to the SLL for the invitiation of an SL/U.S. observer to the Essen Conference.
The SL/U.S. was aware from 1962 on that the OCI tendency was not to be equated with the SLL, and after our expulsion from the London Conference we continued to note the difference (for example in Spartacist No. 17-18, in discussing Healy’s attempted rapprochement with the United Secretariat, we wrote of the Healy-Banda group “and their politically far superior but internationally quiescent French allies, the Lambert group.” We also knew through private sources that at least since 1967 the Wohlforth group internally had been conducting a vigorous campaign to discredit the OCI.
Our characterization of the OCI as politically superior to the SLL was based on a series of political positions which the OCI held in common with us in counterposition to the views of the SLL. Recent OCI polemics against the SLL (e.g. La Verité No. 556) note the OCI’s objection to several key SLL positions which we had also opposed: the SLL’s willful use of “dialectics” as a mystification to hide political questions; the SLL’s chronic tailending of Stalinism in Vietnam; the SLL’s enthusing over the Chinese “Red Guards”; the SLL’s notion of a classless “Arab Revolution”; the SLL’s unprincipled approach to the United Secretariat-SWP in 1970. We also considered of importance the OCI’s objection to the SLL position that Pabloist revisionism had not organizationally destroyed the Fourth International. The OCI’s position on this question appears to correspond to the view we have consistently held and upon which we spoke insistently at the 1966 London Conference.
Moreover, we have always taken a very serious attitude toward the OCI, not because of its numbers but because of its experienced senior cadres and its continuity in the world movement. We have centered in this letter on the presumed differences between us and the OCI, but the strengths of the OCI have reflected themselves as well, in specific political positions, some of which we have learned from, such as the OCI’s insistence on the basic class unity across the whole of Europe, the “Iron Curtain” notwithstanding. Other positions as noted above we have developed in an independent but parallel fashion. Above all, we respect the OCI for its adamant attempt to give life to its internationalism.
That is why we patiently waited when no other option was open to us vis-à-vis the OCI, and when we had the opportunity we have persistently sought discussion. It was especially with the OCI in mind that in the concluding portion of our final statement upon being expelled from the London Conference in 1966 we stated, “If the comrades go ahead to exclude us from this conference, we ask only what we have asked before–study our documents, including our present draft on U.S. work before you now, and our work over the next months and years. We will do the same, and a unification of the proper Trotskyist forces will be achieved, despite this tragic setback.”
Recently, in the document “The Tasks of Rebuilding the Fourth International” (which the introduction to the English edition states is “central to [the] international discussion”), the OCI characterized the SL from the 1966 Conference as “centrist” or “centrist-sectarian.” Thus, rather than following our documents and our ongoing work as we asked in 1966, the OCI has simply continued to echo the SLL’s avalanche of falsehood aimed at our political obliteration. In the light of the above points, this would seem an appropriate time for the OCI and with it the OCRFI to undertake a thorough examination of the SL’s politics.
We do not expect, and would have no confidence in, a simple reversal of appraisal of the SL/U.S. by the OCI. Estimations of the SL/U.S. by the groups comprising the OCRFI should be guided by two considerations. One is the questions of general political and programmatic character such as we have gone into above. We naturally believe that we are correct about these; but because our views have taken shape within the American Trotskyist framework (and during a period of enforced national isolation) we must allow that they may be partial, and in ways which we cannot presently know. As the main Political Report to our recent National Conference stated: “The SL/U.S. urgently requires disciplined subordination to an international leadership not subject to the deforming pressures of our particular national situation.” (see Workers Vanguard No. 15, January 1973) It was in this spirit that we published our article “Genesis of Pabloism” (Spartacist No. 21, Fall 1972) which contained substantially the sum total of our present understanding of Pabloism.
The other question, subordinate but within the framework of essential programmatic agreement very important and perhaps contributory to that programmatic agreement is the question of comrades internationally understanding the concrete reality of the socialist movement in the U.S. in the context of the evolved American labor movement and the specific configuration of class relations in this country. There is a striking lack of correspondence between the existing divisions within the ostensibly Marxist movements in Europe and America so that any effort to superimpose groups in Europe on “similar” groups in the U.S. is inappropriate. The six-months’ stay by Comrade Sharpe in France was extremely helpful in bringing this point home to us. It would be extremely clarifying for example if a representative of the OCI could come to this country for an extended stay to examine, for example, not only the SL/U.S. in its concrete work, but also currents such as the “Vanguard Newsletter” of Turner-Fender, which has stood apparently closest formally to the OCI; the International Socialists, who mainly look to Lutte Ouvrière as their closest friends in France, but who contain sympathizers of the OCI among them; and the other tendencies within the American radical movement. Moreover, the trade unions as they have evolved here should be examined in the union offices and on picket lines. More broadly, characteristic college campuses and the reality of the National Student Association should be investigated.
We take our commitment as internationalists seriously as a condition for our very survival as Marxian revolutionists, and by this we mean neither diplomatic non-aggression pacts with groups in other countries nor the Healyite fashion of exporting subservient mini-SLLs. As one of the results of what is for us precipitous growth domestically, we are acquiring the resources–human and material–to undertake for the first time on a sustained basis our international obligations.
It is in the context of our need for a disciplined International and our firm commitment to fight to bring about the programmatic agreement which forms the only basis for such an International, that we wish to participate in the discussion opened by the OCRFI.
We are enclosing copies of all our documents referred to in this letter. Should we be accepted into the discussion organized by the OCRFI, in order to familiarize comrades internationally with our views, we would like to submit three documents initially to the discussion: (1) this letter, (2) our delegation’s remarks to the 1966 London Conference, (3) our Statement of Principles
Fraternally,
Political Bureau Spartacist League/U.S.
cc. Spartacist League/Australia-New Zealand
On Clara Fraser
On Clara Fraser
[Tthe following statement by Samuel Trachtenberg was distributed at the Freedom Socialist Party’s memorial meeting for Clara Fraser (3/12/23/-2/24/98). The meeting took place in New York on April 19, 1998]
To the Comrades of the Freedom Socialist Party,
On behalf of the International Bolshevik Tendency I would like to take this opportunity to express our condolences to you on the death of the longtime leader of your organization, Clara Fraser. While her political trajectory since the 1960’s has been in a radically different direction than our own, we honor her memory as a cadre of the revolutionary Socialist Workers Party of the 1940’s and 50’s. In particular, we recall her role as a key leader of its Kirk-Kaye tendency, which during the 1950’s put forward the revolutionary integrationist position on the fight for black liberation. This contribution, authored by Dick Fraser, Clara’s partner at the time, was a critically important programmatic contribution to American Trotskyism and it is one that we uphold to this day.
We also recall Clara Fraser’s role as one of the SWP cadres who courageously defended the Revolutionary Tendency (a Trotskyist tendency in the then degenerating SWP) against the moves by the Dobbs regime to purge them on bogus charges of “disloyalty.” The RT, whose political tradition we of the IBT seek to uphold today, gave rise to the Spartacist League, which, like the FSP, was founded in 1966. For a brief period the two groups had fraternal relations and both sent representatives to each other’s founding conferences. At the FSP’s launch the Spartacist delegation observed that. the two groups had close agreement on the questions of black liberation and opposition to imperialist war, but noted that the FSP’s failure to call for political revolution in Mao’s China indicated an important area of difference.
As the years passed the divergences between our two traditions have tended to grow. This has not prevented our organizations from collaborating on matters of mutual interest. In particular we appreciated how the FSP, under Clara Fraser’s leadership, was willing to defend us against the slanders of the degenerate Spartacist League of the 1980s. We were pleased to solidarize with your party’s successful defense efforts in the Freeway Hall court case, which scored a key victory for the civil rights of all leftist organisations.
Over the years Clara Fraser saw many of her contemporaries drop out of politics due to demoralisation, but she remained active right up to the end. We honor her memory and her fighting spirit.