BEA to RR (1 August 2019)
Issue
Today, imperialism, culminating in the U.S., has extremely tensed the globe since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, invading Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and Yemen, and provoking Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. Imperialism is mobilizing all its apparatus and propaganda machines to demonize its enemies and praise the war of aggression. Thus, they were able to mislead their own working class and turn the self-proclaimed “Marxist” into their heralds by intimidating them before the pressures of war. In this regard, RR comrades’ position on Libya and Syria, supporting the victory of Libya and Syria, must be an important contribution to the global socialist movement.
As you comrades know, we have separated from the IBT, which used to take a treacherous neutral position on imperialism and colonial affairs. Their theoretical basis derived from the neutral line of the Spartacus League on the 1979 Iran Revolution. We define it as an unscientific line deviated from Leninist tradition. RR comrades, on the other hand, express support for the 1979 SL line on Iran.
The common ground between RR and Bol-EA
But you comrades have a similar position with us in tactics in Egypt, Turkey, Libya, Brazil and Syria, which have been the big issues between IBT and us. And the conclusion reached by comrades through similar examples and quote of Trotsky is very scientific and completely consistent with our position. This is a very important point to let us know that our discussion is hopeful.
“For us, such a cases are analogous to the bloc with Kerensky against Kornilov, siding with China against the Japanese in the 1930s and 1940s, and siding with the Spanish republic against Gen. Franco‘s upheaval. one “classic” case often forgotten is the possibility of siding with German Bonapartist government of Papen/Schleicher against a fascist coup in the 1930s.”―RR, 12 June
“For Marxists, “militarily supporting one side against the other” takes the concrete meaning of defending the organization of an independent proletarian action, that is, with its own revolutionary perspective.”―Ibid
What’s different?
But comrades are showing flaws in analyzing the nature of the conflict that has taken place in these countries.
“The question at hand is about the correct relation between revolutionary strategy, which is based on Permanent Revolution, and revolutionary tactics, especially when it comes to taking a military side in inter-bourgeois conflicts such as coups d’état, imperialist interventions and civil wars.” ―Ibid
Who are the subjects of the conflict here? Are they the bourgeois of imperialist motherland and colonies? Or colonial bourgeois sects? Comrades say it is the latter in the next sentence.
“The political events discussed in the case of the coup d’état in Egypt and Turkey, or the civil war and later imperialist invasion in Libya and Syria can all be traced out to the fact that a faction of the bourgeoisie was attempting to remove another from power to better repress and exploit the proletariat or an oppressed nation. In these situations, Marxists have a duty to oppose defeat those attacks because their victory would mean the establishment of harsher conditions for the working class to fight for its revolution.”―Ibid
We do not agree to describe this conflict simply as a bourgeois internal struggle. In particular, all four countries are colonies. The political upheaval of these countries can be seen at some point (for example, from Libya until March 2011), on the surface, only through a struggle between the bourgeois sects. But the imperialism behind it is a much more decisive factor. Today, it has been revealed that the wars in Libya and Syria were long-term invasions of imperialism. Also, it is now clear who is responsible for the coup in the two countries, given Egypt, which has become more reactionary in the Arab world as an active tool of U.S. imperialism since the coup, and Turkey, which is in serious conflict with the U.S. after the failure of coup.
In fact, it was Riley’s analysis that the events in these countries were bourgeois internal struggle. Riley’s “Middle East Chaos” points out that Syrian “civil war” is actually a U.S.-led imperialist invasion, as shown in the table of contents such as “Syrian Jihad: CIA as Quartermaster,” “Imperialists Engineer ‘Salafist Principality’” and “Imperialists Propose Partitioning Syria.”
But at the end, it concludes that the event taking place in Syria is a “civil war,” or bourgeois internal struggle, and draws the political conclusion that we take neither side.
“In Syria’s civil war, revolutionaries do not support either the brutal Baathist dictatorship or its reactionary Islamist opponents.” ―Middle East Chaos
“The international workers’ movement has no interest in the victory of either Syria’s Baathist dictatorship or their reactionary Islamist opponents” ―Ibid
Riley certainly analyzed the Syrian situation scientifically in this article. However, he betrays the scientific analysis that imperialism is the cause of conflict, and brings to the wrong conclusion that we should be neutral because it is a bourgeois internal struggle.
On the other hand, RR comrades have different attitude. Comrades have come to the political conclusion that if the interests of the working class are at stake, we should not be neutral and fight with a sect of bourgeoisie against the other sect. This is the right conclusion to be faithful to the cause of the working class. But correct political conclusion should be based on scientific cause analysis.
The case of Iran
RR comrades criticize us on the question of revolutionary tactics in 1979 Iran:
“We do not think it was possible to give such movement an abstract “military support” in general or defend their rise to power. Neither do we call the Islamists ascension a partial victory” ―RR, 12 June
Furthermore, comrades criticize us by quoting Workers Vanguard 223 and 225 published on Jan. 19 and Feb. 16 that military support for Khomeini is to help him rise. And later, citing conflicts between women, ethnic minority groups and Khomeinites which were sharpened after March 1979, comrades say, ‘We should not give military support’ to the latter.
On the other hand, however, the comrades also expressed the view that if anti-shah camp, including Khomeinites, engaged with shah and imperialism we would fight on the side of former (Military support).
“For instance, if the Shah tried to “solve” their existence through bloody military repression, we would see it necessary to call for their defense, or if the imperialists had invaded the country to maintain a regime which favored them, we would also defend a practical bloc with the Khomeinites to throw them out.” ―RR, 12 June
The reason why the positions are so inconsistent is that you have mixed up anti-shah struggle, began in January 1978 and ended in February 1979, with incidents that took place after the struggle. Therefore, we would like to summarize the events in Iran in a brief chronology from January 1978 to March 1979 so that there would be no mutual misunderstanding before refuting the main arguments.
The timeline of Iranian revolution and Workers Vanguard
| Iranian revolution | Workers Vanguard |
| 1978 January 7 – Police launch a bloody crackdown on seminary students protesting shah’s propaganda slander on Khomeini. | |
| late January to early August – Protests protesting regime’s violent crackdowns take place over several months and gradually subside. | April 7, 1978 No. 200 |
| August 19 – A big fire break out at the Rex theater in Abandan, 422 people fell a victim, SAVAK is suspected of being behind. Popular animosity towards SAVAK widely spreads. | |
| September 4 – Troops fire at sit-ins in Jaleh square in Tehran, killing 64 people. (Black Friday) “Down with the shah” slogan becomes the main demand of struggle | September 8, 1978 No. 214 |
| September 9 – Teheran oil workers go on strike in protest of the Black Friday incident, A wave of strikes spread to the other sectors | September 22, 1978 No. 215 |
| September to December – A nationwide general strike and demonstration involving millions of people takes place. | |
| 1979 January 4 – Shah appoints Bakhtiar as prime minister | |
| January 4 to 15 – Widespread general strike and protest calling for the overthrow of shah and Bakhtiar takes place. | |
| January 16 – Shah flees the country | |
| January 17 to 31 –Continuing mass protest and general strike calling for the overthrow of Baktiar. Khomeinites and liberals initiate negotiations, regarding the transition of power, with the military under control of general Robert Huyser | January 19, 1979 No. 223 |
| February 1 – Return of Khomeini | February 2, 1979 No. 224 |
| February 9 to 10 – A revolt supporting struggle breaks out at Tehran’s Doshan Tappeh Air Base, left-wing guerrillas join rebels to repel regular forces, rebels capture barracks, police stations, prisons and broadcasting stations. | |
| February 11 – Military surrenders, victory of anti-shah struggle | February 16, 1979 No. 225 |
| March 18 – Khomeinites assault on a rally advocating the rights of women | March 2, 1979 No. 226 |
| March 18 to 21 – Provisional government and Khomeinites launch military campaign against autonomy seeking Kurds | April 13, 1979 No. 229 |
The meaning of military support
In addition, we will make clear what ‘military support’ is. That’s because comrades describe our military support as something “abstract.”
“We do not it was possible to give such movement an abstract “military support” in general or defend their rise to power.”
“But we would not give Khomeini an abstract ‘military support’”
Military support is not “abstract.” It is a very “concrete” tactic adopted in “concrete” situations. For example, who will comrades fight against on whose side “temporarily” when Rousseff and the rightists fight? Of course, both sides are enemies of the working class, and it would be perfectly good if we could overthrow both of them at the same time. But what will you do when you can’t? Didn’t the comrades take the line of striking the rightists and defending Rousseff “temporary”? Trotsky gives an excellent analogy to this problem.
“When one of my enemies sets before me small daily portions of poison and the second, on the other hand, is about to shoot straight at me, then I will first knock the revolver out of the hand of my second enemy, for this gives me an opportunity to get rid of my first enemy.” – For a Workers’ United Front Against Fascism, December 1931
Military support in 1979 Iran
Let me now reveal our opinions one by one on the arguments of RR comrades. First of all, comrades criticize us as follows, quoting Workers Vanguard No. 223 (19 January 1997):
“To “militarily” support the Islamists ascension to power (Instead of entering practical blocs with them on specific occasions or contexts) amounts to political support.”
On January 19, 1979, when this article published, there were fierce protests and general strikes in the streets and factories of Iran to overthrow the shah’s prime minister Bakhtiar. Three days ago, Shah fled, but the military loyal to him survived under the control of Robert Huyser, who was sent by the US government. Coincidentally, in 1953, Shah fled overseas after the failure of the first coup, but returned immediately thanks to the success of second coup directed by CIA. Although the situation was a bit different in 1979, due to this similarity, No. 223 treated the military coup as a serious threat.
The backbone of the Iranian colonial regime was not shah but the U.S.-led military. So, at the moment when the No. 223 was published, the military had not yet been overthrown. Therefore, the struggle to overthrow the shah regime at this point was not over yet.
Iran’s working class played a major role in the struggle through a general strike, but failed to dispel the illusion of Khomeini due to the absence of the revolutionary vanguard party and the line of people’s front raised by self-proclaimed Marxist organizations, Tudeh party and Fedayeen. The working class has yet to be politically and organizationally prepared to wipe out the military and bourgeois opposition represented by Khomeini at the same time. Therefore, we had to fight ‘temporarily’ with the former against the latter in a battle between the opposition, including Khomeinites, liberals and leftist guerrillas, and the military at the time of the No. 223.
Workers’ vanguard 223 went further to warn that Khomeini and the military could establish Islamist military dictatorship like the Zia regime in Pakistan. But the class instinct of the working people in the streets regarded the military as an enemy. Revenge on SAVAK, introduced in No. 223, and widespread support for the military revolt that took place a month later prove this. Thus, negotiations between the Khomeinites and the military did not dismiss the struggle against the military, only giving the revolutionary vanguard a chance to expose their essence in front of the working people.
So, what had to be done to deal with Khomeinites? We would never have been silenced for anti-shah struggle like Tudeh party, Fedayeen and Mujahedeen. Instead, we would have criticized the negotiations with the military and raised “the overthrow of the military and the execution of the firing officers.” And we would have helped the working class to defend their political and organizational independence against the Khomeinites trying to stop the general strike for negotiations. Finally, we would have criticized the Khomeinites’ mentions advocating the oppression on women and persecution on heterodox Bahais and warned the working class of their reactionary nature.
Such a policy would have promoted political armament of the working class and the oppressed people who will fight against Khomeinites in near future, while overthrowing the military, the worst enemy of Iranian working class.
Straw man fallacy
Next, comrades argue on the basis of Workers Vanguard 225.
“To support the ascent of Khomeini to power would have been a strategical, political form of support which would only sown illusions and false expectations in the results of the Islamists’ rise to power.”
This sentence of comrades is the creation of a strawman. We have never insisted on “helping or supporting” Khomeini’s ascension to power. We have consistently been wary of “infusing illusions and false expectations on the Islamists’ rise to power.” Lenin’s April thesis in this regard is a key example of our tactics.
I want you to point out which part did we insist on “helping or supporting” Khomeini’s grip on power, or the part that could be interpreted as such.
Flaw of Workers Vanguard
The situation analysis of No. 225 has serious flaws. First, the title begins with a huge headline “Mullahs win” at the front, and claims in the section cited by comrades that:
“This is not a victory of working masses. Today, Iran belongs to middle-class Islamic reaction in a bloody alliance with a section of the same officer corps……But his victory, assured by the capitulation of elements of the higher levels of the military.”
Workers Vanguard 225 describes the situation in Iran as if an alliance between Khomeini and the military had been forged, like the Zia regime of Pakistan exemplified in No. 223. But what about reality?
On Feb. 9, seven days before the No. 225 came out, a revolt erupted at an air base in Tehran supporting the struggle. Rebel forces defeated the regular army with military support from leftist guerrillas and enthusiastic support from the citizens of Tehran. The victorious rebels and left-wing guerrillas armed the Teheran people with seized weapons and captured barracks, police stations, prisons and radio stations. The regular army collapsed without a hitch because it had already been weakened by demoralization and agitation of soldiers.
Khomeinites and liberals were forced to stop negotiations with the military and support the revolt because of the unexpected revolutionary awakening of the working people. The embattled military gave up resistance and surrendered on Feb. 11. This ended the anti-shah struggle with the collapse of the colonial feudal dynasty-military dictatorship.
Khomeini established a provisional government under the premiership of liberal Bazargan to prevent the complete collapse of regular forces and state apparatus. But the provisional government was so weak that it had to share its power with local committees (Komitehs) which were guided by various clergymen, workers’ strike committees-factory committees (Showra), and autonomous bodies of national minorities. In addition, Komiteh’s Revolutionary Guard, Khomeini’s militia Hezbollah, leftist guerrillas such as Fedayeen and Mujahedeen, and militias of national minorities all remained armed after the victory.
After the collapse of the shah regime, Iran’s state apparatus was in a highly unstable situation, unable to monopolize armed force. In addition, the U.S. imperialism, which had supported Iran’s capitalist system by force over the past decades, now lost its influence as Iran’s military has been neutralized. Iran’s capitalism faced a serious crisis after the anti-shah struggle, considering the point that private property without the protection of state power is meaningless.
The victory of the anti-shah struggle on February 11, 1979 was a victory for the Khomeinites. But at the same time, it was also a victory for the left-wing guerrillas and the working people, who went beyond Khomeini’s control and toppled the military directly. As a result, the apparatus has been greatly weakened, creating a dynamic of forces in favor of the working class for some time. But from then until 1983, the left-wing and labor camps failed to defend and expand the achievements of victory. As a result, Khomeini, the savior of Iran’s capitalist system, won the final victory.
But because of this the victory of anti-shah struggle should not be equated with the Khomeinite Islamists’ grip of power. Responsibility should be given to those who rejected the socialist revolution after the anti-shah struggle and really helped the Khomeinites’ rise to power.
The true line of Workers Vanguard
Next, comrades say that then-Workers Vanguard’s line was not “Down with the shah, Down with the mullahs” but “Down with the shah, No support to the mullahs” express in No. 225. And the slogan of No. 225 illustrates the line of SL well.
If SL’s line was the latter, it is perfectly in line with our position. But the central position of Worker Vanguard in 1978-79 was “Down with the shah, Down with the mullahs.” The reason we criticize Workers Vanguard is that SL has almost consistently raised this slogan to Iran and the world’s working class as a guideline for the struggle.
However, SL didn’t call for “Down with the shah, Down with the mullahs” from the beginning. The line of SL expressed in the Worker Vanguard 200 on April 7, 1978, in the early days of the anti-shah struggle, were as follows.
“Down with the Shah! Smash SAVAK!”
“For full trade-union rights! For full legal equality for women!”
“For the right of self-determination for national minorities!”
“For constituent assembly based on universal suffrage!”
“For workers and peasants government!”
These demands have combined very well the strategies and tactics to advance into the socialist revolution, responding appropriately to the development of the anti-shah struggle. This line lasted until September 8, Workers Vanguard 214.
However, on September 22, 1978, Worker Vanguard 215 posted a “Down with the shah Down with the mullahs” in a banner headline. From that time on, SL adopted this slogan as a new line and consistently pushed it until No. 224, issued on February 2, 1979.
Decision of International Executive Committee, February 10, 1979
But the slogan was not found in No. 225. Of course, the same slogan could not have been raised because the shah regime was overthrown at this time, but there was no indication of “Down with the mullahs.” But the slogan “Down with the mullahs” was raised again in the next issue. Why did this strange thing happen?
On Feb. 10, 1979, SL’s German branch adopted “Down with the shah No support to the mullahs” as a revision, criticizing the slogan, “Down with the shah, Down with the mullahs.” And it was unanimously approved by the International Executive Committee, which was attended by representatives from French and British branches. Proposals of the amendment explained the reasons why this slogan should be amended:
“There is a weakness to the slogan in that it expresses a historical perspective but lacks a tactical element; also, at the time that the slogan was first promulgated the shah was still in power and the slogan implied an equivalency between the shah and the mullahs. In the hands of revolutionary Marxists the slogan was used to express the correct program; in other hands it could be used to mask a sectarian program.”
And they proposed to adopt the slogan, “Down with the shah, No support to the mullahs!” Perhaps this is why the slogan of “Down with mullahs” has disappeared at the No. 225, published on February 16th. This “Down with the shah Down with the mullahs” was an ‘ultra-leftist’ and “sectarian (Feb. 10, 1979)” slogan which was controversial within SL.
Of course, revolutionary organizations can also make mistakes. The important thing is to correct it as soon as possible.
Back to the sectarian slogan
So, has SL succeeded in correcting its errors? No. In No. 226, published after the correction of No. 225, SL says:
“their position was spelled out in a banner headline in the American SWP’s Militant (23 February): “VICTORY IN IRAN.” A victory for whom? Not for the guerillas, not for the Kurds, not for the oil strikers or the women who will now be pressured or ordered to put back on the chador… Meanwhile, Khomeini and his mullahs-the real victors-are preparing to strike down the “satanic” left “traitors”!”
If the victory of the Anti-Shah struggle was a victory only for Khomeini and his followers, not for the working class and the oppressed people, why on earth had SL adopted the slogan “Down with the shah, No support to the mullahs”? Eventually, SL returned to “Down with the shah, Down with the mullahs.”
Furthermore, “Iran and the Left”, printed on Worker Vanguard 229 (April 13, 1997), reaffirmed that the slogan “Down with the shah, Down with the mullahs” was correct.
“Workers Power argues that participation in the Khomeinite demonstrations amounted to “a de facto anti-imperialist military united front” (ibid.). But these demonstrations were not civil war, in which victory for shah’s army would mean obliteration of the popular forces, and thus a policy of revolutionary defensism on the side of the mullah-led forces would necessarily be posed. The demonstrations were essentially a pressure tactic for the Islamization of the existing state apparatus. The Khomeini leadership was clearly looking forward a coup against the shah by a Persian equivalent of Pakistan’s “soldier of Islam” General Zia. The demonstrations for an Islamic Republic were just that.”
In other words, the demonstrations that took place in 1978-79 were not “civil war” but merely “pressure tactics” of Khomeinites, so there was no need to defend them. I wonder if they could say so to the people who were shot to death by troops on the streets of Tehran during 1978~1979.
As such, SL did not correct its line and returned to the “Down with the shah, Down with the mullahs” line with enormous cynicism.
Now, are these inconsistences of SL normal to the comrades’ eyes?
What position should have been raised?
Comrades point out the Khomeinites’ suppressions on women and minorities, calling on us to answer the following question.
“From a tactical standpoint, it is necessary to delimitate when and where we could have sided with Khomeini and Islamists.”
It’s a very good point. We will therefore clearly state when, where and how we should have sided with Khomeinites: “From the beginning of the revolution on January 7, 1978, until the collapse of the military on February 11, 1979, we struggle with Khomeinites to overthrow the regime. At the same time, we unconditionally protect the political and organizational independence and warn the working class of the reactionary nature of the Khomeinites. After the victory of Anti-Shah struggle, we struggle to build the workers’ power. In this process, we fight uncompromisingly against the Khomeinites’ assaults on working class, women, and ethnic minorities. But when the military stages a coup or imperialist invasion takes place, we fight temporarily with the Khomeinites.”
I think this has been enough to answer the question. Furthermore, I think it can be the answer to the question of bourgeois democracy. Because the reason why the Khomeinites were hostile to bourgeois democracy was not just because “The core Islamists were always openly in favor of a theocratic regime(RR).” Aside from their “subjective preference,” Khomeinites had to repress democratic rights like fascists because of the “objective conditions”, the fact that the Iranian capitalism was in danger after the Anti-Shah struggle. Therefore, we should have fought intransigently to defend the bourgeois democratic rights against the Khomeinites. Only through this path we could have defended the present dynamics of class and proceeded to socialist revolution.
Khomeini, Shah and the US imperialism
Finally, you comrades remind the United States of choosing the former while weighing Shah and Khomeini, and raise two reasons for that.
“(1) they preferred him to Khomeini and (2) they had nothing to lose by doing so”
We agree with RR comrades that Khomeini was never a true “anti-imperialist” champion and was ready to join hands with the United States. And later history proved it. But the reasons suggested by comrades are too simple and inconsistent with facts.
First, why did the US imperialism prefer Shah? In the aspect of class, there was no difference between the two. However, Shah unconditionally served to defend American interests, and Khomeini was based on a popular movement that violates the US interests apart from his subjective intentions. This difference was a serious issue to imperial financial capital. Because in short-term, oil rights, loans, arms contracts and joint ventures were at stake, moreover there was a possibility of national-liberation movements and communist revolutions spreading all across the region like Afghanistan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia etc.
Second, did they really have nothing to lose? By contrast, the US could have lost everything at the time and actually lost a lot. At the time, the Iranian communist revolution was a real threat to US. As a result, as the Islamic republic survived, US had partly lost what they could have lost all due to the communization. But the very fact that they lost something significant is undeniable. For example, they have lost oil rights and are constantly provoking Iran to reclaim them.
The 1979 Anti-Shah struggle, the so-called Iranian revolution, broke down the colonial regime. The people of Iran achieved the fruits of regaining its oil rights, which had been in the hands of Britain and US since 19th century, and driving the US forces out of Iranian territory. But the Iranian working class did not end the Iranian capitalist class, which hated them more than imperialists. As a result, a Turban wearing Bonaparte, called Khomeini, crushed the working class vanguard on the backs of the petty-bourgeoisie and the backward parts of working-class. As a result, the rights of the working class, women, and ethnic minorities have greatly degenerated, and a privileged group with turban appeared. At the same time, some of the excess profits that the imperialists used to pump up from Iranian oil wells were used to raise the average life expectancy and eradicate illiteracy after the revolution. This is why imperialists today abhor the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Permanent Revolution vs Stageism: 1917 Russia and 1979 Iran
Our position on Iran has been fully explained. What remains is whether the February Revolution or the 1979 Revolution can be called a “partial victory.”
The revolution clearly goes through a series of stages. These steps conform to the political consciousness, the degree of readiness and class dynamics of the masses, not arbitrary regulations. These steps are by no means just skippable. The masses can only leap to the next stage in a contradiction of each stage in where victory and setback intersect.
The February Revolution was also a stage where victory and frustration were combined. The revolution won the victory of neutralizing the Czar-Bourgeois state and building the Soviet. Thanks to this, workers, farmers and national minorities were free to organize, instigate, arm themselves and occupy land and factories.
At the same time, the February Revolution experienced a setback in which the Compromisers handed power to the bourgeoisie. The settlement of urgent issues such as the eight-hour labor system, land, peace and national self-determination has been postponed indefinitely and royalists, Black-Hundreds and officers have begun to run wild under the condolence of the Compromisers. Thus, the February revolution was both a victory and a setback for the Russian working class. Lenin and Trotsky’s Bolshevik Party could see through this contradiction and intervene in time to leap the February revolution into the October revolution.
The same was true of the Iranian revolution. The revolution won the victory of overthrowing the imperialist puppet regime and regaining oil rights. At the same time, the Iranian working class and the oppressed people had the opportunity to organize, instigate and arm themselves freely after 26 years since 1953.
But state power was passed on to Khomeinites and the Liberal Bourgeoisie, and an attack to restore capitalism ‘order’ began. The refusal of the nationalization of the means of production of the Shah and the large capitalists, the fascist violence of the Khomeini followers, the imposition of feudal lifestyle on women, and the bloodshed suppression of the ethnic minority came immediately after the revolution. This was a frustration of the Iranian revolution. Unfortunately, Iran did not have a Bolshevik party in 1979, so the contradiction of the revolution did not develop into a socialist path and eventually degenerated to the Islamic republic.
Finally, comrades hold the distinction between the February Revolution and the Iranian Revolution on the grounds that Khomeini was much more reactionary than Kerensky. But as we have seen, both Kerensky and Khomeini appeared at similar stages of revolution and mobilized all the reactionary means to stop the socialist revolution. Kerensky, however, had fewer means because of the correct guidance of the Bolshevik party. And decisively Kerensky was unable to show more of his reactionary nature because he was overthrown.
* * *
It is a pleasure for comrades to point out the reactionary nature of the Logan and Riley groups and to pursue a truly scientific path. But at the root of the groups’ claims is the line of SL, represented by “Down with the shah Down with the mullahs”, which February 10 1979 International Executive Committee points out to be “Sectarian.” This line was behind the neutral line in various imperialist-colonial conflicts, including Brazil.
We fully endorse the International Executive Committee’s resolution on February 10, 1979. Almost every sentence and logic in the resolution was our argument in the IBT internal debate. If so, then there is no contradiction between us in this matter.
The vanguard of working class should never be inconsistent in the analysis and the line. It is because the destiny of hundreds of millions of working classes is on our way. In 1978-79, SL analyzed the situation in a non-scientific way and stuck to the ultra-left-wing line with internal zigzags. As can be seen in the history of the revolution, this inconsistency grows more and more errors over time.
1 Aug 2019
Bolshevik EA